EXECUTIVE PROMOTION POLICY AT A TIME OF HIGH RETIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01114R000300080018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For aplease 2001/08/09 : CIA-RDP89-01114F*00300080018-7
Executive Promotion Policy at a Time
of High Retirements
We are in the second year of abnormally high executive attrition, with
losses exceeding 20 percent a year. We face a third such year, unless the
pace of inflation abates significantly. Such losses understandably raise
questions of the adequacy of the feeder group and of the desirable promotion
rates.
From what information we have, this is a government-wide problem. We
find that the rest of government faces high executive attrition rates, is con-
cerned about executive development, and is concerned about the effects of pay
lids and pay compression on motivation for executives to serve and to stay on
the job. For the Agency, with its large number of executives eligible for
earlier retirement than the rest of the Federal Service, the incentive problem
is significant.
We have prepared several charts for comparison. Figure 1 shows that the
average age of Agency executives is comparable with the rest of government,
51 years as compared to 52 years for the entire Federal service. The Agency
has a significantly lower portion of executives aged 60 and above and a larger
portion in the 50-54 bracket.
The Agency's feeder group of GS-15s is younger, 48 compared with 52, but
the reason lies in an age distribution where fewer than 20 percent are above
age 55 in contrast to the nearly 40 percent for the entire Federal service.
The Agency has about 50 percent of its feeder group in the prime ages of 45
to 54. (Figure 2).
The comparison is favorable in terms of total length of Federal service.
The Agency's executives actually have longer Federal service, 26 years cora-
pared to 23. The Agency's feeder group has directly comparable Federal service,
about 22 years. (Figure 3).
The average time-in-grade of the Agency's GS-15 feeder group is 51 months,
longer than for any other grade. As Figure 4 shows, there is quite a variance
among the Directorates, with NFAC and DDSU showing the longest times-in-grade.
This is a function of slower promotion rates attributable to a smaller portion
of employees eligible for the Agency's retirement system, with its advantages
for earlier retirement.
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OPPPM has attempted a number of approaches to answer the question,
"What is the desirable set of promotion rates for supergrades under present
circumstances?" We have suggested that the significant focus is on the
appropriate rate of draw from the feeder group. For most Directorates
and components of the Agency, this draw does not exceed 10 percent of the
GS-15s. Rates of 10 percent or lower permit adequate replenishment and
seasoning of the feeder group. The basic control is that of enforcing
the standards for promotion to supergrade equivalent.
Because the currently possible promotion rates are abnormally high,
management has been interested in testing the impact of alternative pro-
motion rates. We have tested some alternative sets of rates on the
assumption that we will continue to have high supergrade losses through
FY 1981, then drop back to a more normal outflow during FY 1982 and the
next year. On this assumption, high promotion rates could not be maintained
past FY 1981. On the other hand, rates geared to normal supergrade attrition
would hold the supergrades significantly below ceiling at the end of FY 1981
and would not allow for making this up during subsequent years. It would
incur high risk of a loss of supergrade ceiling by OMB action.
Consideration of these alternatives led to another. In this, the
high maximum number of promotions possible in FY 1980 is averaged with
the number of promotions associated with normal attrition. The resultant
promotion level produces some shortfall in the number of supergrades below
ceiling at the end of FY 1980, but permits the shortfall to be made up
during subsequent years of lower attrition.
Table 1 displays the proposed promotion levels in comparison with
25X1A FY 1979 and with the maximum level possible for FY 1980. Table 2 displays
the results of computer simulations using the promotion levels proposed in
Table 1 and incor oratin the assumations of hi h attrition continuing
There are two desirable consequences of using the proposed level of
25X1A
promotions. It is possible to maintain relatively steady levels of pro-
motion through FY 1983, by which time the attrition cycle may again be
swing. It is also possible to schedule a more orderly process
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AGE
EXECUTIVES - GS 16-18
FEDERAL AGENCY
1977 12/79
FREQUENCY (%)
AVERAGE AGE:
FEDERAL 52.1 YEARS
AGENCY 51.09 YEARS