STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: December 9, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Th\EFIF ?ccrc:
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
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DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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Docombor 9 1975
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SOV+rT UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE
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C0N1IfN7'S
buc:amber 9, 1975
Urezhnov's Speach in Warsaw. . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Arbatov on US-Soviet folati,ons . . . . . . . . . . 3
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Yugou 1aVia-USSf: Official Talks . . . . . . . . . 6
Bulgaria Protests Yugoslav Allegations
on ttacadonian Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Romania and the Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ttungary: Conversation with Kadar. . . . . . . . . 12
Czochonlovakia: Shades of 14
Cadrati Abroad Central
Committee Post Filled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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Brezhnev's speech at thn Polish party congress
Van shout: can nubsly.nnce, but., an in his wo 1t in racent
months, boarish on the state of relations with the
Went. An wan appropriate to the occasion,, Iirezhnev
spent over half of hit; 30 minutes talking about the
steps taken toward closer economic and p,1litical in-
tegration between Poland and the UBStt, i nd more gen-
orally, the beneficence of the socialist, community.
In his encomium, tJrexhnev referred to the norms of
"socialist internationalism"--words tho16,. in Yugoslavia
and itomania translate as Soviet hegemoiii.sm--but he
quickly followed with a sentence portai.ning to the
indcpondence and sovereignty of the st-iton that make
up the socialist community.
CSCE wan clearly on his mind, perhaps bacauso
Warsaw offered an appropriate venue for repeating a
few "truths" about the Helsinki agreements. His de-
mand that no one aspect of the agreement be ompha-
sized over another and his criticism of the West, for
its fa:.lure to propagate the text sufficiently have
on said before; no, too, has his reference to
"ideological penetration" by the Wr,;,,t.
Brezhnev made explicit reference to the follow-
up CSCE session in Belgrade in 19?' and spoke favor-
ably of the possibility of organs Ong European con-
gresses on such problems as the e: ,/ironment and
energy over the next two years. ';hie clearly was
meant an a trial balloon, and more will probably
be heard from Moscow.
Srozhnev's speech, as is often the case, is
as interesting for what he chose not to say as for
what he said. There was no rejoinder, implicit
or explicit, to criticism in the US regarding So-
viet activities in Angola. Ile made no mention of
December 9, 1975
Breyhnav' n ,_Speech in Warsaw
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the socialist duty to support "liberation movomentn,"
nor did he refer to the immutable continuation of
ideological struggle.
Urethnev repeated the familiar formulation on
the need to move ahead with detente despite the ef-
forts of Western critics. tie did not, however, nay
anything explicitly about relations with the Us or
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Arbatov on
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Soviut Relations
Geergy Arbatov, Morcow'e moat prominent academic
authority on the UG, last week offered Ambassador
Stoenaal his latest views oti bilateral. relations. lie
predicted that Soviet detente pole;iy would be reaf-
firmed at the party congioun next February, but said
that criticisms were being heard !n the USSR and that
there have been "discuesionn" about detente within
the Soviet leadership.
Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, implied
that tloncow was closely following the increased crit-
icism of detente in the US, especially an that issue
showed signs of becoming a center of debate in the U5
election campaigner. Other Soviet commentators are
also speaking more frequently of the effect of the
presidential campaign on US policy, particularly
policy toward the USSR.
Arbatov acknowledged that there is uncertainty
about who would be the leaders in both the US and
the USSR a year from now. Ile was careful to pr i.nt
out, however, that Urezhnev was in "good shape" and
would definitely be arouund for a while yet. lie ad-
vised that both sides ought to strive for as much
bilateral pro, ress an possible under the prevent
leaderships, succession uncertainties notwithstanding.
He ning,.ea out SALT as one "central" issue on
which he thought both nidea could and should show
flexibility "before it in too late." He reemad
pleased about reports that Secretary Kissinger might
noon return to Moscow in an effort to break the
stalemate.
Responding to a comment about Soviet involvement
in Angola, Arbatov observed blandly that difforoncen
between Moscow and Washington would inevitably arise,
but argued that these problems should not prevent
progress in other areas.
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Arbatov's views, frequently and freely conveyed
to Americans, arc often plainly self-'sorving, intended
by warning or cajolery to influence US perceptions in
ways favorable to Soviet policy. Ilea apparently on-
joys Orazhnav'n confidence as a substantive axpurt,
howavor, and is evidently attuned to the mood in Mos-
cow. on occasion, at in his rocant articla in In-
vgatia against Western critics of Soviet behavior, he
seams to nerve au a quasi-official conduit for points
his patrons want made to the US.
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Yu lavia-U551 : Official Talks
The Yugoslav ministers of foreign affairs and
of foreign trade are in Moscow to sign a long-range
economic agreement and to make a first-hand assess-
ment of pre-Congress politica in the Soviet capital.
The conclusion of a five year trade agreement
for 1976-80 will probably be the public highlight
of the visit.
on the political side, Foreign Minister Minic's
talks--possibly the final ones at this level before
the CPSU congress moats in February--promise to be
less rewarding. Belgrade clearly is not satisfied
with recent Soviet denials of involvement with
Cominformist subversives. The two countries are
also deadlocked over conflicting goals in the long-
postponed mcuving of European Communist parties.
Belgrade and Moscow both support the MPLA in
Angola, but their stands on the last Sinai accords
are in conflict and.could cause trouble. Similarly,
Minic could face Soviet displeasure over the Yugo-
slav premier's precedent-setting visit to China
this fall.
Yugoslav media are playing several tunes on
the Minic visit. For the benefit of the West, the
press is insisting that relations with the Soviets
are more or less normal--and thus not susceptible
to third party manipulation. A commentary broad-
cast to Moscow last week, however, reasserted Bel-
grado's nonaligned principles, including its con-
tinuing struggle against "hegemony" by either bloc.
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BU1-__9a Protests Yu onlav Allegations
on Mac on an 3:unue
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Sofia has reportedly made a formal protest to
Belgrade about Xugoulav propaganda claims that Bul-
garia has used terrorism to suppress its Macedonians.
Despite the pro test, Yugoslav media are again stop-
ping up the pace of anti-Bulgarian commentary.
According to press reports, the Yugoslav ambas-
sador in Sofia was summoned to the Foreign Ministry
last month to receive the protest. The Bulgarians
reportedly decried allegations that Sofia had ar-
rested numerous Macedonians and had deported them
to camps in the north
Neither side has publicly re erre to o protest.
The Yugoslav media have nevertheless continued
to repeat and even embellish these same allegations
in the wake of the Bulg. rian census last week. The
latest commentary flatly states there was no cate-
gory for Macedonians, and notes the survey only
served Sofia's political purposes by proclaiming
that Macedonians are ethnic Bulgarians.
The latest developments in the long-standing
dispute shatter the climate of uneasy calm that
lasted barely two weeks after Bulgarian Foreign
Minister Mladomov visited Belgrade last month.
Mladenov and his Yugoslav counterpart, Milos Minic,
25X1 reportedly discussed the issue of Belgrade's in-
flammatory polemics, but were unable to agr on
muzzling Belgrade's outspoken nationalists.
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Jtom ni fi and the Ara.bn
Romania's pursuit of a balanced policy in the
Middle taut--maintaining relations with both Thraol
and the principal Arab antagonists--continuer to
cause problems between Bucharest and some of the
more militant Arab Staten. The US embassy in Romania
has provided a wrap-up of the current difficulties
Bucharest faces.
The Arabs are annoyed with the large volume of
business the Romanian national airline (TAROtt) does
with Israel. Romania's repeated refusal to answer
Arab queries about its air service to Tel Aviv or
about how many dews it is allowing to emigrate ap-
parontly led to the current Arab boycott of TAROM.
More recently, Romania was absent when the Utt voted
on the yeti-'Zionism resolution, and Libya reacted by
refusing landing rights to a TAROrl plane. An Egyp-
tian official in Bucharest labeled this action par-
ticularly "dirty" because Tripoli had "bullied" Ro-
mania into setting up the air route in the First
place. The tgyptian did suggest, however, that if
Romania made some concession, such as discontinuing
TAROM's passenger pooling arrangement with El Al,
the situation mig..t improve.
Romania's relations with Israel have blocked
Bucharest's attempts to improve relations with Kuwait
and the Persian Gulf states. Earlier, Kuwait had
floated a signed prospectus for a $100-million loan
to Romania on condition that the Kuwaiti parliament
ratify the Romanian-Kuwait trade protocol. Ceausescu
was apparently anxious for the loan to go through in
ordce to demonstrate that he is getting something in
return for recent Romanian aid credits and the dis-
play by Bucharest of some sympathy for the Arab cause.
Failure of the trade protocol to pass the Kuwaiti par-
liament not only killed the loan, but also caused
Ceausescu to scrub his late November visit to Kuwait.
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Uucharest has also had its problems wit-.h Algiers,
which has been unsympathetic to Romanian attempts to
gain observer status in the nonaligned movement. Dep-
uty Prime Minister Oancea's visit to Algiers from Ho-
vombor 26 to 20 was, in part, designed to gain Alge-
rian support for Bucharest's overtures for admission
to the nonaligned summit ir. Colombo next sun fler.
beputy foreign Minister Paconte reportedly will
not off soon on a tour of several Arab countries in
search of "oil and money." Pacoste's itinerary has
not been announced, but the cancellation of Ceau-
soscu'e Kuwait trip probably means Pacoste will have
little chance of gaining either oil or money from
those Middle Cant states in the best position to meet
Romanian needs.
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1i itlgar 1. co"Vergation with
ttuntjarian party leader Hadar told / hassador
Hciuliffe last Week that Hudapest is prepared tO
fulfill the "freer hover eht" provisions of the ttel-
ginki accord and that it hopes to etpan>l trade with
the Wi.
t4adar characteristi+ ally tted?Jed his str.teb;ent
on t uropean security. After sot`te jeneral observa-
tiohs on the utility of ittereased travel in correct=
inch iillusions, he condluded that icpleMentatiOn of
the "freer t?avvefent" provisions has an "inevitabi l-
ity" about it. He said this alas so despite the at
that "gone" still entertain Many reservations about
t3ashet Three and that the Corrnunist countries may
not hove as quickly and orthrightl~ as others
Micht wish.
Hadar's Statements on increased trade With the
U Was Mote than the usual call for r~,ir,t=fa*aare _
nation status. Apparently to dispel ally 14astern
notion that ttuntJary's economic pro'bler..s would cause
it to reduce econoiic ties with the west, gadar
said that ttuntlary needs aegess to western technol-
oqy, taarkets, and raw Materials. He added that al=
t.houcgh CtR? 7 inte(jration is 1,--port-ant for resource=
poor ttunrjary, -1e disagrees with "theoreticians"
who arque for tore ecot onic inte tration solely for
h ise dig .rtes
int.e~rrit>ivft-s -
-M-others who arjsue that tiunjary should shift note
co.- erce to trade with other t.orhunist countries.
Hadar, the consurate politician, could have
been tailorin his words for weatorn ears, calculat=
ink that hints of tiunrtarian dissent could field im-
port- nt political and econonic benefits. On the
other hand, sore of his private words are in line
With his public adMission last June that tt?utz taxi
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e0nduots one third of its trade With tile tlestt "Of
ne+ essit ," not-, ehoiee. this c 'tents also Jibe Witil
reeettt ttunEatian iorei=ln trade PrOjeetions, which
gh0W that ttunjarian trade With tile West duritij the
noxt five years is extfeoted to increase at a faster
rate than total trap.
In a logo=keyed tAannet, i