STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
5)IV 10P Hav, M
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
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Top Secret
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November 20, 1975
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN WROPIE
C0NTIsNTS
November 20, 1975
Possible Soviet Objecti?res in Angola . . . . . . 1
Communist Parties Remain at Impasse. . . . . . . 7
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Speculation
on I-iusak's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Yugoslavia: Vojvodina Party
Leader in Trouble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Shape of Rumors and Speculation
About Soviet Leadership Changes. . . . . . . . 13
Sakharov's Prize: The Dissidents' View.
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Possible Soviet Objectives in Angola
More than ju-t Soviet interest in Angola was in-
volved when Moscow moved quickly last v,- ,:-.k to recog-
nize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
as the sole legitimate governing authority in the
former Portuguese territory and to establish diplomatic
relations with it.
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Recognition also got the Soviets
are pressing hard, particularly in Africa, to persuade
other states to establish relations.
The high visibility of the Soviet role is a break
with the past; only three years ago Moscow seemed to
be losing interest in the Popular Movement. Divided
by factional strife within i'_s own organization and
unable to speak as the unchallenged leader of the
14heration struggle, the Popular Movement did not ap-
pear to have any immediate prospects for overthrowing
Portuguese rule. But all that changed with the fall
of the Caetano regime, and the Soviets suddeniy found
themselves with an opportunity to exploit a relation-
ship ;,fith the Popular Movement that stretched back to
the mid-1950s.
Military Aid
When independence for Angola became a certainty,
Moscow's first order of business was to strengthen
the military capabilities of the Popular Movement.
Military shipments to the movement began to increase
sharply in late 1974, and have accelerated ever since.
In addition to training MPLA troops, the Soviets have
provided it with an impressive array of military hard-
ware. The movement's arsenal is well stocked with a
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the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.
Given the substantial amount of fairly sophisticated
weaponry that Moscow i_; now providing thi Popular Move-
ment, it would not be surprising to see Soviet military
advisers and technicians turn up in Luanda. Mosro, ' a,
however, would almost certainly prefer to avoid--or
at least limit--the involvement of its own military
personnel in Angola by relying on Cubans to support
the Popular Movement in the field.
Reaction to Sov ie t Involvement
For their assistance to the Popular Movement,
the Soviets have hFd to pay the price of at ?.^ast a
temporary setback to their relations with other
African states.
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Not surprisingly, the strongest negative reaction
to Moscow's heavy-handed involvement in Angola has
come from sub-Saharan Africa. A number of these states
were particularly upset over the Kremlin's decision
to get out in front of the Organization of African
Unity on the Angolan recognition issue.
--Soviet pressure an Uganda to recognize
the Popular Movement ba y ruffled OAU
chairman Idi Amin's feathers and was one
reason for last week's "temporary" rupture
in relations between Moscow and Kampala.
--Nigeria has publicly criticized the
Kre mlian's "flagrant interference" in
the affairs of Angola and, privately,
its blatant disregard of OAU efforts to
effect a reconcil.l.ation between the ter-
ritory's warring liberation groups
--The already tenuous relations between
the USSR and Zaire, which supports
ono of the Popular Movement's rivals
in Angola, have become even more seri-
ously strained, and President Mobutu
appears to be considering breaking or
at least suspending diplomatic ties
with Moscow. Kinshasa sees the sub-
stantial Soviet military buildup in
Angola and in neighboring Congo as a
direct menace to Zairian security and
is actively seeking to have this threat
brought to the attention of the UN Se-
curity Council.
--Tanzania's President Nyerere, who has
been a staunch supporter of the Popular
Movement, is said to be re-evaluating
his position as a result of the large-
scale Soviet involvement in Angola,
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which he has publicly deplored.
--Kenya's President Kenyatta,
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Angola and its recc':rnition of the Popular
Movement as "gross interference" in
African affairs and a direct affront to
Nairobi, which had been working hard to
cement relations among the rival Angolan
factions.
Thus far, the reaction outside of sub-Saharan
Africa has been more muted. The Soviets clearly will
be discomfited if the issue is brought before the UN,
and may have some concern that their action in Angola
will be cited as behavior not in accord with Moscow's
professed commitment to relaxation of tensions. But
much, if not all, of this negative reaction was pre-
dictable, and it seems likely that when Moscow made
a decision to pull out the stops for the Popular Move-
ment, it was based on the calculation that prospective
Soviet gains were worth the price.
Soviet Interests and Objectives
A conventional, one might even say old-fashioned,
explanation can be made for the Soviets' desire for
a favorably disposed, perhaps even client, regime in
Luanda. Economically, Angola is a potentially rich
prize compared with the other former Portuguese
African territories; it has such resources as oil,
coffee, and mineral wealth. The Soviets have no com-
pelling need for these resources, but they might want,
for example, to use Cabindan oil to supply Lome of
their East European clients. They may also want to
hinder Western access to minerals in the area.
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Strategically, Angola could be of some signifi-
cance to the Soviets if they are contemplating ex-
pansion of their naval activities in the South
Atlantic.
Politically, an Angola that was working in con-
cert with the Soviet Union could be a platform from
which the Soviets might hope to expand their influ-
ence into adjacent areas, particularly southern Africa
and, perhaps eventually, Zaire.
None of these interests will be served overnight,
nor does Moscow necessarily expect a quick return on
the investment it has made in the Popular Movement.
Insofar as Moscow is motivated by these interests in
Africa, it is in the longer term.
But there has always been a exogenous factor in
Moscow's policy with respect to Angola and the other
former Portuguese territories. The specter of China
has loomed large in Soviet thinking, and Moscow
clearly wants to put the lie to Peking's assertions
that it, rather than the Soviet imperialists, acts
in concert with the interests and the aspirations of
third world. The Soviets are also sending a message
to would-be revolutionaries that association with
Moscow pays off, and that the Soviet Union does not
stint in supporting its friends.
A related message may be intended for the US--
that the USSR has the will, and the capability, to
compete with the US for influence in peripheral areas
of the globe.
The heavy domestic coverage the Soviet press has
given Angola also raises the possibility that there
are internal political reasons for Moscow's in-
creasing support of the Popular Movement.
It may be that Angola provides an opportunity
for the Kremlin leaders to demonstrate adherence to
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and support for revolutionary movements, detente not-
withstanding. More important-., if things go reasonably
well, Angola can be cited as tangible evidence that
the correlation of forces in the world arena, despite
some setbacks, is moving in ways favorable to the
Soviet Union.
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Communist Parties Remain at Impasse
The European Communist parties have postponed
until January setting a date for the already much-
delayed European Communist party conference.
The senior delegates, who met again in East
Berlin this week, had been expected to complete work
on the controversial document to be issued at the
conclusion of the conference. Continuing differ-
ences between Moscow and the independent-minded
Yugoslav, Italian, Romanian, and Spanish parties
apparently prevented this and led, in turn, to the
failure to set a date.
In the wake of the postponement, conference
preparations in East Berlin will revert to lower-
level editorial efforts to harmonize the various
parties' positions.
Yesterday's postponement virtually excludes the
possibility of holding a European Communist party
conference before the Soviet party congress in
February. The Soviets had made a number of conces-
sions in an apparent effort to hold the conference
before their congress.
The setback will be even more embarrassing to
Moscow because the Soviets also failed at the last
minute to have a CEMA summit meeting held this week.
The two events are not directly related, but the
consecutive postponements convey an impression of
disarray in the Communist camp,
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USSR-Czechoslovakia: Speculation on Husak's Visit
No reason has been given for the visit to Mos-
cow by Czechoslovak President and party chief Husak
later this month, but the signing in October of a
new East German - Soviet Friendship Treaty during
party leader IIonecker's visit has led to speculation
that Husak might sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet
treaty.
Unlike the case of East Germany, where the
previous friendship treaty had clearly become out-
dated, there appears to be no compelling reason for
a revision of the 1970 treaty between Prague and
Moscow, The latest East German document incorpo-
rates the "Brezhnev Doctrine," expands the provision
of mutual assistance beyond Europe, and abandons
support for the reunification of Germany. The
Czechoslovak treaty already contains the first two
elements and the last does not apply.
Indeed, the two documents are very similar;
the Czechoslovak treaty may even have been used
as a model for the East German - Soviet accord.
New elements in the East German treaty include
specific references to closer cooperation and co-
ordination in the political, military, economic,
and ideological fields, but these themes, already
familiar in the speeches of Czechoslovak leaders
are not sufficient in themselves to warrant re-
writing the 1970 treaty to include them.
Statements on further cooperation and pledges
to defend detente and the results of the CSCE
could easily be contained in a joint protocol,
should Brezhnev feel the need for an easy foreign
policy success before the coming Soviet party
congress. This would accomplish Moscow's aim
without the embarrassment to Husak that a revision
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of the friendship tread would entail. The Czecho-
slovak leader would probably not want to focus
attention on the 1970 document, which is the first
embodiment of the Brezhnev doctrine in international
law.
On the surface, there are no pressing bilateral
problems that require resolution at the summit, but
Husak may seek to work out unresolved details of
trade arrangements between the two countries before
their respective five year plans are announced at
the end of the year. He may also report on the
status of his party as preparations begin for its
April party congress and try to get a reading from
Brezhnev on how things stand in the Soviet party.
Whatever the agenda, there is no doubt that
the Husak visit will provide an occasion to celebrate
the unity and cohesion of the socialist. carp,
quality much in need of advertising in the wake of
the abrupt postponements and delays in moving to-
ward a CEMA summit and convening the European Commu-
nist conference. The example so ostertatiously
set by the East Germans and Czechoslovaks may also
be used by Moscow to persuade others in the camp
to fall into line.
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Yugoslavia: Vojvodina Party
Leader Trouble
Dusan Alimpic, party boss of the Serbian prov-
ince of Vojvodina, is evidently in hot water, and
the first personnel shake-up for the Tito regime in
years could result.
Alimpic, a former secret police official and
a hard-line orthodox Communist, came to power during
a purge of liberals in December 1972. Ile now ap-
pears to be in trouble for the very traits that
first brought him to party prominence. Alimpic's
reputation as a dogmatic disciplinarian and his
record of suppressive tactics strongly suggest that
he sympathizes with the "firm hand" program advocated
by the Yugoslav neo-Stalinists. There are, in fact,
rumors that he is a Cominformist.
Although the rumors are probably unfounded,
Alimpic's stewardship in Vojvodina is definitely
being criticized. For at least the past year, Stane
Dolanc--Tito's number two in the party--has made
an unusual number of visits to the outlying towns
of the province in an apparent effort to survey
the people's mood. Tito himself grilled provincial
:Leaders--minus Alimpic--on the local state of af-
fairs in early November. Ile was clearly not
satisfied.
For the past six weeks Alimpic has been out
of the limelight, and it is his subordinates who
have been making the mandatory noises against Com-
informis ts. During a brief Tito visit to Vojvodina
last week, Alimpic's name was prominently absent
from the list of local officials who welcomed him.
On Tuesday, one of Alimpic's subordinates--the
chief of the Novi Sad party organization--made the
November 20, 1975
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public announcement that nine Cominformists are under
arrest. The nine, who allegedly were inspired and
encouraged from abroad," could, when tried, provide
an opportunity for Alimpic's political enemies to
criticize him openly for his laxity in checking
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The Shape of Rumors and S eculation
About Soviet Leadership Changer
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Reports and rumors of future changes in the
Kremlin affecting leaders other than General Secre-
tary Brezhnev have been received sporadically over
the past year. They can be expected to increase in
frequency if not in accuracy as the CPSU Congress
scheduled for next February draws closer.
for the next generation to move up has generated
speculation among both Soviet and foreign observers.
To a very large extent these reports appear to
spring from recognition that a generational change-
over is impending in the Politburo. The general
secretary and his deputy are 69, the premier is 71,
the president and the minister of defense are 72,
and the ideological "high priest" is 73. Only Premier
Kosygin has a clear "heir"--First Deputy Premier
razurov--in place. The lack of visible preparations
Most of these reports contain no suggestion
of a coup and are cast in terms of "plans" to deal
with the contingencies of failing health and
advancing age. The scenarios are extremely
fragmentary, as if the speakers lacked a complete
list of Kremlin VIPs and had forgotten or never
heard of the less visible but still key leaders
and portfolios. Those variously rumored to be on
the way out have been the most visible seniors--
Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, Suslov and--since he
gave the October Revolution address this fall--Pelshe.
Polyansky, although by nc means a senior, has also
been rumored on his way out, obviously because of
the bad harvest this year.
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There has been no speculation concerning
Grochko despite his age. EquW,ly curious is the
tendency to separate Kirilonko (69) from his age
group of "outgoing" seniors and to view him as a
member of the rcplacemont generation. Presumably
this is because there is a lack of confidence on
the part of the speculators in trying to single out
a successor to Brezhnev who is really from the next
generation.
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The cast of players from the take-over genera-
tion in the circulating scenarios is limited essen-
tially to those leaders whose duties keep them in the
public eye in Moscow. A very mixed bag of Kirilenko,
Mazurov, Gromyko, Romanov, Ponomarev and Demichev
are posited individually, never as a group, as the
"next" generation. We have received no speculation
thus far concerning KGB Chairman Andropov, Moscow
party boss Grishin, party secretary for agriculture
Kulakov, or RSFSR Premier Solomentsev. Less sur-
prisingly, regional leaders such as Kunayev of
Kazakhstan and Rashidov of Uzbekistan have also been
ignored as have party secretaries Ustinov (defense
industry), Kapitonov (cadres), Dolgikh (heavy in-
dustry) and Katushev (relations with ruling CPs).
With the exception of the obvious promotions
of deputies--Kirilenko to replace Brezhnev and
Mazurov to replace Kosygin--there is little con-
sistency in the pattern of the reports.. In
contrast to last year when his removal was frequently
rumored, Gromyko this year is as a stayer,
ne will be
part
o a "troika" to succeed Brezhnev.
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Kosygin's departure is predicted fairly often,
although one report has him moving to the less
onerous slot now occupied by Podgorny. Suclov's
ago is implicitly recognized with his "understudies"
--Ponomarov and Doiuichcv--variously suggested to suc-
coed him. El_,her one is logical if one looks at the
two portfolios he carries--international communism
and Soviet intellectuals--but Ponomarov who will be
71 in January is scarcely representative of the next
generation, and Demichev has been clinging by his
fingernaLls to his candidate Politburo membership
since he lost his secretary slot last fall.
in sum, this crop of rumors and reports
--appears to spring primarily from wide-
spread recognition of the visible gen-
eration gap in the Kremlin;
--is too inconsistent to represent a con-
certed effort to push a given Soviet
line;
--ignores several key figures and in many
cases shows a distorted understanding
of power positions in the Kremlin;
--represents an interesting but not un-
expected political phenomenon in the
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Players
Mazurov to succeed
Kosygin (logical)
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Gromyko to be in
"troika" to succeed
Brezhnev
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"dark horse" Shelepin
might succeed Brezhnev
in a stalemate (far
out)
Brezhnev, Kosygin,
"et al" out. Kirilenko
"quite old" but to
succeed Brezhnev.
(visible generation
gap)
Brezhnev to remain,
Kosygin, Pelshe,
Polyansky to go.
(Kosygin is 71, Pelshe
is 76. This has been
a bad year for agri-
culture.)
Brezhnev dying, Ki:,--i-
lenko or Mazurov to
succee
would prefer "someone
like Gromyko"
Suslov contending
against Brezhnev,
might achieve an
upset
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Podgorny to leave,
:(osygin to succeed
him, Drezhnev and
Mazurov will be
"replaced", military
to come into leader-
ship. (Elaborate
but not particularly
credible.)
Ponomarev vice Brezhnev
(out of left field)
Kirilenko vice Brezhnev
Kosygin to resign,
Mazurov to replace.
Podgorny to resign,
Shcherbitsky might
replace.
Suslov vice Brezhnev
(his worst fears
expressed)
Romanov (of Leningrad)
vice Brezhnev. (A
man
______Iwho is clearly
a comer, but that's
too big a jump.)
Demichev vice Suslov
(logical if faint
hope)
Mazurov "excellent
chance" vice Brezhnev
"when the time comes."
(He is Kirill's son.)
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Sakharov's Prize: The Dissidents' View*
The award of a Nobel Peace Prize to Andrey Sak-
harov appears to be generating a degree of cohesive
activism among members of the Soviet dissident commu-
nity that may give the regime pause, at least over
the short term. In the longer term, however, the
dissidents' prospects remain grim.
Support for Sakharov among the dissidents gained
momentum with the release to the Western press on
November 19 of a statement reportedly signed by 77
Jewish activists praising Sakharov's contribution to
peace. The document is the third public declaration
of support for Sakharov and his principles that has
appeared in as many weeks. The first, signed only
by a handful of the most prominent names, was made
public on October 30, evidently in response to the
publication by Izvestia of a statement by 72 members
of the Academy of Sciences condemning Sakharov and
the Nobel Committee.
Last week, 37 dissidents of differing philo-
sophical stripes joined in issuing a statement con-
demning the regime's refusal to permit Sakharov to
travel to Oslo next month for the award ceremony. The
dissidents pledged support for Sakharov and charged
that the regime's action is proof of its "fear in the
face of the unwavering movement of civil thought and
morality" in the USSR.
The first two declarations, both of which may
have been drafted and organized by writer Andrey
Amalrik, brought together such figures as reformist,
Marxist historian Roy Medvedev, sculptor Ernst
Neizvestny, former general Petr Grigorenko, poet
Aleksandr Ginzburg, members of the official writers
union Vladimir Kornilov and Osip Cherny, and Larisa
Bogoraz, wife of writer Anatoly Marchenko. Also among
the signatories were Jewish activist Vitaly Rubin and
mathematician Vladimir Albrecht. The latter is the
secretary of the Moscow branch of the London-based
Some copies of the Staff Notes of November 19 did
not contain pane 2 of this article. It is therefore
reprinted in full today.
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human rights organization Amnesty International--a
post formerly hold by Sakharov's associate Andrey
Tverdokhlebov, who was arrested in April and re-
portedly is scheduled to face trial soon.
Although the dissidents' claim to a cohesive
"movement" is an overstatement, Sakharov's award has
become a focal point for some persons in and out of
the establishment who until now have not been pre-
pared to play an active role in the human rights
field. For both the big names and the lesser lights,
the regime's handling of the dilemma presented by
Sakharov is less important than the fact of the No-
bel award itself. They see in the prize proof that
Sakharov's efforts, and by extension those of the
dissident community as a whole, have been recognized
by the West in the most dramatic way possible. They
clearly hope by their actions to sustain and broaden
the West's attention to their cause.
The dissidents' actions are a product of Sak-
harov's confrontation with the regime over basic
principles--freedom of thought and movement--which
all can support. Their new-found courage and seem-
ing unity, however, do not stem from a common assess-
ment of the situation and are, therefore, probably
fragile and temporary.
Some of the dissidents hope that a united front
on the issue of Sakharov will increase official con-
cern over the Soviet image abroad, especially now in
the post-Helsinki and pre-CPSU congress period, and
result in an improved domestic climate. Others, more
numerous, believe their long-term prospects and those
for democratic change in the USSR are so dismal that
nothing will be lost by grasping the opportunity pro-
vided by Sakharov's prize to rake the regime over
the coals. Jewish activists--while pleased with Sak-
harov's award and willing to stand up for him--appear
convinced that neither support nor lack of it for
Sakharov's cause will have any measurable effect on
their specific interests, mainly eased emigration.
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The more pessimistic majority see the Kremlin
as willing to use Sakharov's case to make even clearer
than before that the CSCE agreements cannot be cited
by the West to press for change in Soviet domestic
policy. They also point to the Soviet leadership's
recent retrenchment on doctrinal issues as an indi-
cation not only of pre-congress closing of ranks,
but also a reaction to perceived exploitation of hu-
man rights by some in the West i;o sabotage detente.
In this atmosphere, the dissidents see their future
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