STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: June 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
Secret
Midde East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
25X1
No. 0689/75
June 10, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/1SEQR 86T00608R000400030046-6
25X1
Angola: Nationalist Groups May Be Edging
Toward Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ivory Coast: Hcuphouet-Boigny Provides
for a Constitutional Successor.. . . .
25X1
June 10, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/19:CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
Angola
NationaZiot G'roupo May Be
Edging Toward "'ivi1 War
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola and the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola, the principal nationalist groups in the
transitional government, may be edging Angola
toward civil war.
The two groups have clashed repeatedly during
the past two months in northern Angola, as well as
in Luanda and Cabinda. The Popular Movement appears
determined to estavlish military superiority over
its long-standing rival.
Last week, the Popular :?Sovement also attacked
units in Luanda of the srndller National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola. The National
Union, which has tried to remain aloof, fought back.
None of the th,:ee has the supplies or the
mibility to wage a sustained military campaign, but
the two larger groups appea.i. to be preparing for
that eventuality.
Bitter Rivals
The rivalry between the Popular Movement and
they National Front dates back to the late i960c:
the early years of Angolan nationalism. Throughout
the insurgency against Portugal, which began in
1961, the two groups fought each other almost as
much as they did the Portuguese.
In the early years, the National Front was
dominant and was favored by the Organization of
African Unity. By the late 1960s, however, it was
overshadowed by the Popular, Movement, which was able
to swing most African states behind its cause. It
also received a steady stream of military supplies
from the USSR.
The transitional government installed last
January has encouraged more competition than coopera-
tion. It was constructed on a system of checks and
(Continued)
June 10, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/T9 :qa-WP86T00608R000400030046-6
balances in which members of one liberation group
find themselves working, as government officials,
with subordinates from the other groups.
The integrated political, military, and police
organizations of the transitional government have
failed to maintain order because of the conflicting
interests of the three participating groups.
Portuguese officials are not very effective
because they are caught in the middle. Portugal
still has about 24,000 troops in the territory, but
most of them are stationed in and around Luanda.
All of them are anxious to go home and would probably
be unwilling to get involved. in prolonged fighting.
Separate Armies
A major problem is that the independence agree-
ment allows each of the three co maintain a separate
army. Each group is required to contribute to an
integrated national army, but all havc shirked this
commitment, steadily building up their own military
forces, particularly in the northern half of the
territory and in and around Luanda,
The National Front and the Popular. Movement
draw the bulk of their tribal support irom northern
Angola and maintain their heaviest concentrations
of troops there.
The two largest groups have established important.
bases in northern Angola and dominate major supply
routes to Luanda. The National Front has gained
control of the port of Ambrizete, in northwestern
Angola, partially relieving it of its depencence on
Zaire.
Fighting in northern Angola on May 28 was started
by a Popular Movement drive to disrupt the Front's
supply routes and to force the National Front out of
areas where the Movement's tribal supporters pre-
dominate. The Movement apparently suspected that a
similar operation was launched by the National Front.
('Continued)
June 10, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/1 951& J 6T00608R000400030046-6
Reliable figures on the troop strengths of the
respective groups are difficult to obtain. The
gZou;,)s inflate or deflate their own figures according
to political. necessity.
It would appear, however, that each of the two
major groups has about 8,000 to 10,000 troops in
Angola, the bulk of which are in northern Angola.
The third nationalist group, the National Union,
has about 3,000 troops.
The Popular Movement apparently has several
thousand troops in Cabinda, where it has long been
active. The other two groups have much smaller forces
there.
The National Front may have an additional 10,000
troops in Zaire being trained by Chinese and Zairian
instructors. It is also recruiting former Portuguese
army officers who have been purged by the military
government in Lisbon as "politically unreliable."
Advantage in Luanc3,a
The Popular Movement has demonstrated that it
can quickly mobilize large groups of well-armed
irregulars in Luanda that give it a distinct advantage
in the capital city.
In recent months, the Popular Movement has been
receiving more military supplies from the Soviets.
These supplies are sent to Congo--long an important
base f or- the Popular Movement--and are forwarded to
25X1 Angola
(Continued)
June 10, 1975
SECRET'
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : IQBF T00608R000400030046-6
The National Front is actively--some reports
suggest desperately--seeking additional weapons and
money abroad, particularly from West European and
Persian Gulf countries. The fragmentary information
available suggests the effort has not been very
successful.
Zairian President Mobutu, whose own country
suffered years of civil war, is particularly sensi-
tive to the prospect of similar turmoil in Angola.
Both Zaire and Zambia, moreover, rely heavily on
rail and port facilities in Angola to ship their
copper.
Mobutu remains adamantly opposed to the Soviet-
backed Popular Movement gaining control. of Angola,
but he does not seem able to provide the Front with
what it needs to attain military superiority.
The Cabinda Problem
The three Angolan groups and the Portuguese
regard Cabinda, long administered as a district of
Angola, as an integral part of the territory. The
OAU supports this position.
Mobutu, however, would like to see Cabinda
detached from Angola, and is pushing the view that
the Cabindans should be allowed to decide their oFr:
political status. He has allowed a small Cabindan
separatist group to establish a headquarters in
Kinshasa and has given it modest financial and
technical support.
A rival faction of the Cabindan separatist group
is based in Brazzaville. Both factions have repre-
sentatives in Cabinda, where each has a public follow-
ing. Neither faction is able to challenge the three
larger groups for control of Cabinda.
None of the three larger groups has enough
popular support in Angola to win a majority in a
constituent assembly election that is supposed to
be held before the end of October. The assembly is
to select a head of government to assume office upon
independence.
(Continued)
June 10, 1975 4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : 494WT00608R000400030046-6
The three groups could agree to postpone the
national election, thus reducing the immediacy of the
competition between the Movement and the Front. Only
the Movement, however, now seems to favor a postpone-
ment.
25X1
All three, along with the Portuguese, stand firm
on November 11 as the date for independence. Unless
the three can compromise on a head of government,
Angola will become independent without a strong central
leader.
25X1
Agreement to Meet
The leaders of the three groups have agreed to
meet in Kenya beginning next Sunday, according to an
announcement made late yesterday by the Kenyan foreign
minister. The purposes of this, meeting are to attempt
to stop the fighting in Angola and to discuss the
shape of a post-independence government.
Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union,
which has remained out of most of the fighting, could
emerge as a compromise choice as head of state. Holden
Roberto and Agostinho Neto will have to subordinate
their rivalry for the sake of Pngolan unity; if they 25X1
do not, any compromise arranged at a summit will only
postpone an ail-out c3nflic t between the two
antagonists.
June 10, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
SECRET
Ivory Coast
Houphouet-ISoigny Provided for
a Constitutional Successor
The Ivorian constitution is being amended
at President Houphouet-Boigny's direction to
designate, for the first time, a specific
successor to the president.
The constitutional amendment provides
that, upon the president's death or total disability,
the president of the national assembly shall assume
the presidency and serve out the president's re-
maining term of office.
The mantle of succession clearly has been
placed on Philippe Yace, the government's number
two man. Yace has served for 15 years as presi-
dent of the national assembly and secretary general
of the country's sole political party. The 55-year-
old Yace, who suffers from. periodic bouts of ill-
health, had generally been considered fIouphouet-
Bcoigny's unofficial heir-apparent. lie probably is
better known to most Ivorians than any of Houphouet-
Boigny's other close associates who have been waiting
in the wings for the president's nod. Yace has been
seen at the Presidents side on all important public
occasions and during the latter's recent extensive tours
of the interior.
If Yace succeeds to the presidency, he ^ould
nevertheless face some problems in gaining full
acceptance. So far, he has been given little chance
by Houphouet-Boigny to develop a significant base of
support outside the ranks of the party stalwarts. One
of his drawbacks stems from the fact that he comes
from a small coastal tribe with little political clout.
Yace also has acquired enemies as the-President's
(Continued)
June 10, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
SECRET
hatchet-man and he is not well liked by many
students and young educated government and party
workers.
25X1
The President himself appears to be in
generally good health as he approaches his 70th
birthday. He is now winding up his third 5-year
term since Ivory roast became independent in 1960
and is certain to stand for reelection this November.
As long as Houphouet-Boigny remains in power Ivory
coast may be expected to continue as-one of black
Africa's notable success stories where an impressive
degree of political stability and economic progregg
has been achieved.
June 10, 1975
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6
Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6