A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 1, 1975
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved Foelease 2005/01/10: CIA-
Cb Yh'"1~Q4^
A New International Order?
Robert W. Tucker
I T Is A MATTER of general agreement that
traditional patterns of inequality in
international society arc widely challenged today.
Differences may and do persist over the lengths
to which this challenge can be expected to go in
the years ahead and the consequences it will
have if permitted to run its logical course. These
differences do not affect the view that for the
present, at any rate, we are in a period when
inequalities once accepted as Part OT the natural
order of_things.are_ho_loiiger sso accepteda-Nor- do
they affect the judgment that many of the in-
equalities endemic to international society in the
past are no longer sustainable.
The contemporary challenge to inequality has
been almost as sudden as it has been pervasive.
It is of course the case that we may find har-
bingers of the opposition to inequality we experi-
ence today not only in the interwar period but
in the years preceding World War 1. The egali-
tarianism of nation-states that is a commonplace
today was not unknown at the turn of the cen-
ury. Nor was the logic of this new egalitarianism
obscured to its adherents. The 20th-century equa-
tion of the nation and the state not only invested
the state with a legitimacy it has not previously
possessed; that equation also gave to the claim
of state equality an appeal and force it had never
before enjoyed. For the equality of nation-states
evoked, if nothing else, a far more persuasive
analogy with the ideal of individual equality than
had the analogy earlier drawn between states and
men. The ideal of the nation carried with it a
quality of ''naturalness,'' hence a quality of indi-
viduality, that could be attributed only with con-
siderable difficulty to the state alone. Once the
implications of this ideal were accepted, it fol-
lowed that nation-states need be no more identical
than men to claim that they had an equal value
by virtue of their individuality. And as in the
ROBERT \V. TUCKER, professor of international relations at
Johns Hopkins, here continues the analysis inaugurated in
his much-discussed article in last month's COMMENTARY,
"Oil: The Issue of American Intervention." Professor
Tucker's books include A New Isola lionisrn: Threat or
Promise? and The Radical Left and American Foreign
Policy.
case of individuals, so in the case of nations, it
ryas, arf;,ued._.41],;ii cquali_ty was violated when indi-
viduality was suppressed, tlt-r=ough deiual of politi-
cal independence, or when it was robbed of self-
i=espect by_the disabilities-political, legal, and
econonuc-which effective?}y depiive -a co77ective
froth fill participation in nternational-society.-
`liut if the new eglitu=tiiriism of nations was
eventually to serve both as a prime factor in the
creation of new states and as it powerful rallying
cry for the removal of inequalities held to deprive
peoples of self-respect, these were consequences
that largely materialized only in the years follow-
ing World War 11. They are indeed the conse-
quences that form part of the basis for the present
challenge to inequality. Prior to World War I1,
however, they appeared as little more than the
first winds that herald the possibility of a coming
storm. Oil balance, the interwar period conformed
to traditional patterns of inequality. Although
the legitimacy of the more extreme manifesta-
tions of self-help-above all, armed force-was no
longer accepted with the equanimity character-
istic of ail earlier era, the historic functions of
military power remained largely unchanged. The
current view taken of the "disntility'' of military
power was clearly not the view takers in the inter-
war period.
Nor was it only with respect to the use made
and expected of military power that the world of
the 1930's was still very much a traditional world.
It is instructive to remind ourselves that demands
for equality in the interwar years were, in the
main, the demands of states now, as indeed then,
comprising the powerful and wealthy of interna-
tional society. What was then popularly termed
thesu'uggle between-TH-6 '?raves"" and the " have-
nots was in -reality a strn glc among, he haves.
In this respect as well, the interwar period clearly
followed it traditional pattern. A majority of the
have-nots of today had yet to achieve indepen-
dence. With rare exception, they were not in a
position to press for equalities that, for better or
worse, are achievable only through the institution
of the state. Of the have-nots of today that did
enjoy independence then, the claims to equality,
when heard at all by the haves, seem quite mod-
est. by comparison with the claims of the develop
ing states today. What is increasingly taken as a
commonplace today, that the division between
the rich
ger to pt
the mus
11crst,asic
teas the
group. -1
rich nati
mum sill
tcrtained
precept
lives.
It is n
a new et
of the
establish[
one may
ciple of I
the hom;
ground.
Iarations
than lire.
period.
Similar
govern if
preted as
inequalit
Internati,
Bank) ch.
as well a,
of the p;1
arated III
pants). 11
Charter I
spite the
nations I
"the sovc
the ['mitm
for the
final des[,
intportartt
almost ut
Securitc
-in pro
security.
The cl
powers at
%o enrol r
interests 4
%ign of of
tint[ that
of interes
Writ pm '-
sl,hcres 01
City of in
order was
tare the
regarded
Was little
Given the
cil, the c.
balance-of
charter is
38
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 A NEW INTFRNATIONAL ORDER?/39
Approved For lease 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B0098S 00200120006-2_ -
the rich and the poor nations poses a grave dan-
ger to peace and stability, was then no more than
the musing of a few seers. The contemporary
persuasion that this division is morally repugnant
was the possession of perhaps an even more select
group. The conviction that justice requires the
rich nations to help all peoples obtain a "mini-
-num subsistence" could scarcely be seriously en-
tertained by nations that had yet to recognize the
precept of minimum subsistence in their domestic
lives.
It is no more plausible to find the promise of
a new egalitarianism in the wartime declarations
of the United Nations or in the institutions
established to order the postwar world. Certainly,
one may find repeated reaffirmation of the prin-
ciple of the "sovereign equality" of all states. But
the homage paid to this principle broke no new
ground. What is significant in the wartime dec-
larations is the extent to which they reflect, rather
than break from, the experience of the interwar
period.
Similarly, the structure of the institutions to
govern the postwar world can scarcely be inter-
preted as a departure from traditional patterns of
inequality. The Bretton Woods institutions (the
International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank) closely reflect, in their voting arrangements
as well as in other ways, the economic inequality
of the participant states (an inequality that sep-
arated the United States from all other partici-
pants). In the structure of the United Nations
Charter the reality of inequality is no less, de-
spite the affirmation of the "equal rights . . . of
nations large and small," the pledge to respect
"the sovereign equality of all the members of
the United Nations," and the voting provisions
for the General Assembly. In the charter's orig-
inal design of order the feature of fundamental
importance is the practically exclusive power and
almost unlimited discretion conferred upon the
Security Council-that is, upon the great powers
-in providing for international peace and
security.
The charter afforded no assurance that the
powers accorded the Security Council would be
so employed as to give equal protection to all
interests of all member states. The charter's de-
sign of order was made dependent on the condi-
tion that the great powers retain a basic identity
of interests (a design which in itself clearly did
not preclude acknowledgment of great-power
spheres of influence). So long as this basic iden-
tity of interests was maintained, if the price of
order was deemed by the great powers to necessi-
tate the sacrifice of what otherwise would be
regarded as the legitimate interests of states, there
was little in the charter to prevent this sacrifice.
Given the role and powers of the Security Coun-
cil, the chief difference between the traditional
balance-of-power system and the system of the
charter is that the latter sought to make explicit
and to legitimize what the former left rather
obscure and never quite dared to legitimize.
11
I F WE are to find in the United Nations
the principal institutional expression
today of the demand for greater equality, we must
do so in terms of what the organization has become
and not in terms of what it was initially intended
to be. The change from an instrument of the great
powers to a forum for the new states to press their
claims begins in the. 1950's and coincides with
events that suddenly gave the weak of the world
iinexpected significance. In part, this significance
may be traced simply to the impact of the rapid
decolonization that marked the years from the
late 1910's through the early 1960's and to the
very novelty of an international system that had
achieved universality. Even in the absence of the
cold war, this sudden appearance of a large num-
ber of new states would have aroused exagger-
ated expectations of their effect on world poli-
tics and, particularly, great-power relations. In
part, however, what gave special significance to
the emergence of these states was a bipolar power
structure and a concomitant hemegonial conflict
that soon became coextensive with wliat was for
the first time a universal international system.
The pervasiveness of the cold war was matched
by its intensity. A characteristic feature of the
conflict was the tendency to snake almost any
discrete issue into a symbol of the whole and to
relate almost any conflict of interest to the under-
lying and ultimate conflict of interest.
In these circumstances, the states of the Third
World took on an importance for the superpowers
they would not otherwise have enjoyed. Although
almost any feasible shift in the political alle-
giance of Third World states could not have
decisively altered the respective power positions
of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was
nonetheless assumed that the global balance of
power might well depend upon the ultimate dis-
position of the underdeveloped nations. In fact,
once the cold war moved from Europe to Asia
and to the Third World 'generally, conventional
balance-of-power calculations became ' increas-
ingly irrelevant to the major protagonists. What
moved the Latter was not so much a fear for
their conventional security interests-though this
fear was never absent-as a fear that they might
become irrelevant to the majority of humanity -
comprising the Third World. It was this prospect
of a diminishing influence that led to the vision
(or nightmare), which persisted for more than
a decade, of an America beleaguered in a hostile
world that had chosen the example of Communism.
Although the cold war gave many of the states
of the Third World a salience and leverage they
would never otherwise have enjoyed, it also lim-
ited considerably their independence and freedom
Approved For Release' 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 40/CUAtNMENTARY FEBRUARY 1975
Approved Foriylease 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985,'00200120006-2
of action. Conversely, while the decline in-inten- Nixon foreign policy, did so more out of hope that -
sity of the cold war after the rnid
1960'
i
-
s
ncreased the developed and capitalist states might be in-
the level of independence of these states, it did doted to acknowledge a responsibility to improve
so largely because the great cold-war protagonists the lot of the developing nations than out of con-
attached a decreasing significance to an interest viction that the latter might somehow compel the
they had earlier deemed crucial. In part, they did former to do so. No doubt, this view was an
so simply for the reason that in the wake of the exa
d r
er
gg
e
e
a.. -, , n."u uic uangers tnat crisis cessive preoccupation in the 1960's with the
h w
illuminated th
d
,
ey
a
partially and almost im-
perceptibly turned away from a view of their
rivalry which previously had given it an almost
completely hegemonic cast. In part, perhaps, they
did so out of a sense of fatigue as well as out of.a
growing realization that the contest could not
have a decisive outcome, particularly in the area
that the cold war had increasingly centered on.
The struggle over the status of the Third World
had been primarily a struggle for political alle-
giance and influence, not territorial control or
conquest. But the reliability of political allegiance
and influence in the absence of more traditional
means of control was increasingly placed in ques-
tion. Thus what had once appeared as a vital
and manageable stake in the cold war took on an
elusive and questionable character.
It is not without irony that the decrease in the
significance to the two great powers of the Third
World states coincided with the rise in the de-
mands of the latter fair a greater measure of
equality. Although by the middle to late 1960's
the restraints imposed upon the states of the
Third World by the cold war had clearly begun
to recede, the burdens an increased measure of
independence imposed upon political leaders of
these states had just- as clearly not receded. How-
ever persistent many Third World governments
had been in their criticism of the cold war, the
attention they had received as a result of that
conflict had assuaged deep anxieties over their
very viability as states. If the cold war restricted
their freedom of action, it also gave them a much
needed sense of importance and worth. This lat-
ter sense was probably of greater moment to gov-
erning elites than fears-real or simply professed
-that the cold war threatened their indepen-
dence, for despite the restraints it imposed, the
cold war provided a psychic confirmation of
independence.
Third World, a preoccupation that was held
largely responsible for the disastrous intervention
in Vietnam. We had -failed to see that the world
-developed and underdeveloped alike-had be
come pluralistic. Although a pluralistic world
might be far more complicated than the world .
of the classic cold war, it was nevertheless held
to be a much safer world. Interpreted in essence T
as the triumph of nationalism, pluralism in the
prevailing view meant that Communist expan-
sion no longer carried the threat to America
it once carried. Pluralism also meant that the
prospect of Communist expansion had dramat-
ically declined. With that decline, the importance
of the Third World declined as well. Contrary to
the radical explanation that we were in Vietnam
because the greater stake in the conflict was ac-
cess to indispensable raw materials on Western
terms, the prevailing view was that we were in
Vietnam because we had misunderstood the
changes that had taken place in the world. In-
deed, the argument went, we had never really
understood the Third World at all. John Kenneth
Galbraith summarized the new understanding of
Third World-states in these terms:
They are poor and rural.... For the apprecia-
ble future they will so remain. Even by the crud-
est power calculus, military or economic, such
nations have no vital relation to the economic
or strategic position of the developed countries.
They do supply raw materials. But even here
the typical observation concerns not their power _
as sources of such supply, but rather their weak-
ness as competitive hewers of wood in the mar-
kets of the industrially advanced countries.*
With the advantage of hindsight, we can see
what Galbraith passed over, that the supply of raw
materials might not always be in excess of de-
mand, that at least some of the "hewers of wood"
might choose to combine rather than to compete,
and-above all-that the heretofore weak might
achieve a "vital relation" to the strong should
N RETROSPECT, then, the cold war may
I be seen as having afforded not only
the occasion for an otherwise unexpectedly rapid
decolonization but as having provided a marked.
stimulus to demands for greater equality on the
part of the new and developing states. Neverthe-
less, the common view at the close of the 1960's
was that the Third World formed, for the most
part, an area of marginal significance in world
politics. Even those who objected to this view,
and to what they saw as its manifestations in the
the latter, for whatever reasons, prove unable or '
disinclined to make use of their strength. More.
over, this estimate of the relations between the
developed and underdeveloped states not only
underestimated the progress in development that
marked the efforts of a number of Third World
states; more importantly, it neglected the rising
demands throughout the underdeveloped world
for a greater measure of equality. During the",-
* John Kenneth Galbraith, "Plain Lessons of a Bad Dec- . -
ade," Foreign Policy (Winter 1970-71), p. 37.
traun
perh.:
thane
gathe
had
incre;
rule
had
domi.
reflec
of Sig
merit,
by vi
legiti:
sent c
states
attenc
prole,
derde
histor
trea t cars i
West(
if not
as an
equal
self-in
deuce
.
pecte(
syStell
anicm
equal
old o
mitlut
that
habits
equali
lion
held t
deuce
minis]
new
con tl
indep
forms
erupt).
is the
fence
based
accon
deter.
and s
rent
resole
words
laratir
tional
 A NEW J"TERNATIONAL ORDER?/41
Approved FoIQelease 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00984P000200120006-2 _
traiuna of VIetlam these demands had been,
perhaps understandably, overlooked. In fact, the
challenge to inequality had slowly but steadily
gathered momentum throughout the 1960's. It
had clone so in international forums where the
increasing acceptance of the "one state, one vote"
rule gave the small and weak an influence they
had never possessed in the traditional system
dominated as it was by customary practices that
reflected a consensus of the strong. On a number
of significant issues requiring international agree-
ment, novel constraints were thereby introduced
by virtue of the need of the powerful to obtain
legitimation of their interests through the con-
sent of majorities often made up of Third World
states. An emergent political equality has been
attended by the demand for a greater measure of
protection for the economic interests of the un-
derdeveloped states and by the insistence that the
historically disadvantaged be given preferential
treatment. Nor have these claims fallen on (leaf
cars in the developed and capitalist states. Among
Western elites, at any rate, many are responding,
if not over-responding, to what they suddenly see
as an urgent need to reduce international in-
equality, if for no other reason than that of vital
self-interest rooted in an ever-growing interdepen-
dence. V
W ~[ T tiAT are the characteristics of the
V new egalitarianism that are ex-
pected to determine the future international
system? In part, it is clear that the new egalitari-
anism resembles nothing so much as the old
equality. If international society is on the thresh-
old of a new era, it is not apparent in the com-
mitment of the new states to an interdependence
that precludes a freedom of action states have
habitually claimed in the name of their sovereign
equality. Westerners increasingly find a contradic-
tion between the new egalitarianism, which is
held to result largely from a growing interdepen-
dence, and the state's insistence upon its undi-
nminished freedom of action, but the elites of the
new states do not share this outlook. On the
contrary, for the latter it is precisely the complete
independence and sovereignty of the state that
forms the most important-certainly the most
emphasized-part of the new egalitarianism. It
tence have reiterated that the international order,
based on the sovereign equality of states, must
accord to every state the unrestricted right to
determine its own course of political, economic,
and social development. Thus the "full perma-
nent sovereignty of every state over its natural
resources and all economic activities," to use the
words of the UN General Assembly's 1974 Dec-
laration on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, is an "inalienable right,"
the exercise of which is not to be subject to any
external "economic, political, or other types of
coercion." More generally, the principle of sov-
ereign equality is interpreted to give every state
the right to define its legitimate interests and,
subject to limitations which remain uncertain, to
take such measures as may be necessary for their
defense. Save perhaps for the self-consciousness
with which these claims to equality are made by
the new states, there is little that is novel about
them.
Nor is there any novelty in the insistent claim
that the subjects of the new egalitarianism are
states and states alone. There is no warrant for
seeing in the new egalitarianism the precursor
of a growing equality within states. The growth
of equality among states may prove quite com-
patible with a continuing, even a deepening,
inequality among individuals within states. What-
ever the meaning we may give to the equality of
states, the assumption that the consequences of
state equality need not be clearly distinguished
from their consequences for individual equality
can only lead to confusion and worse. The almost
wholly abortive attempts since World War II to
secure the effective internationalization of basic
human rights afford a clear illustration of the
point at issue. To the extent that the human-
rights movement has made any progress-and
such progress has been minuscule-it is not unfair
to say that it has been made despite the insistent
assertion by states of their rights-among which
the right of equality has been paramount. The
central thrust of the claim to equality in inter-
national politics and law not only remains a claim
to the equality of states, it is a claim that serves
today-as in the past-to reaffirm the view of the
state as the exclusive guardian of the interests of,
and sole dispenser of justice to, the human beings
who comprise it. This claim shows few signs of
receding today. Certainly, the new egalitarianism
in no way challenges it. If anything, the new
egalitarianism has given this claim renewed
strength.
In some respects, therefore, the new egalitarian-
ism is little more than a refurbished version of
the old equality which was quite compatible with
almost any and all forms of inequality. In other
respects, though, the new egalitarianism is in-
deed new. The powerful are not to employ their
power, certainly not their military power, against
the weak on behalf of interests whose defense
would have evoked the threat or use of force
only a short time ago. Intended primarily to deny
the legitimacy of armed intervention in response
to action a government may take within its terri-
torial jurisdiction, the prohibition has also been
extended to cover so-called issues of "global man-
agement" (e.g., conflicting claims over the use
and exploitation of the oceans and space). At the
same time, the developed states are to acknowl-
edge a duty to assist the underdeveloped states in
Approved For Release'2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 42/COMMENTARY FEPRUAP" 1975
Approved For,elease 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B0098i000200120006-2..
the great task of reducing the material disparities
among them. The prevention of nuclear war
apart, this task forms the most important pur-
pose of the new international order. Here again,
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order may be cited as
representative -of the new egalitarianism. The
principal purpose of the new order, the Declara-
tion reads, is to alter a system wherein the devel-
oping countries "which constitute 70 per cent of
the world population, account for only 30 per
cent of the world's income." A substantial reduc-
tion of inequality in the global distribution of
income forms the collective responsibility of the
developed states. The framework within which
this duty is to be implemented, however, must be
one designed by the "whole international com-
munity," the collective decisions of the commu-
nity reflecting the principle of political equality.
The logic of the new egalitarianism therefore
requires discrimination on behalf of the mate-
rially disadvantaged. This logic has been given
expression in the preferential standard by which
the developing countries, through the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), have sought to replace the most-
favored-nation standard. There is no question that
the UNCTAD scheme is discriminatory. In place
of equality of treatment between the rich and
poor, UNCTAD substitutes a standard of equity.
Its well-known rationale is that among developed
nations equality of treatment (in the form of
the most-favored-nation principle) is equitable,
whereas among developed and underdeveloped
nations equality of treatment is inequitable and,
along with other consequences, promotes further
inequalities of wealth. Among unequals, the un-
developed nations have argued, equality of treat-
stronger. Hence the conclusion that the discrim-
of the preferential standard, is equitable because
it serves to reduce inequality.
RE the claims of the new egalitarian-
1 ism, as articulated by Third World
spokesmen, to be taken seriously? I see no reason
why they should not. It is easy to show that they
often combine two different standards: one for
the developed states of the North, another for a
largely undifferentiated South (comprising the
very poor states, the emerging class, and the
nouveaux riches). Thus the insistence that every
cannot logically lie t-econciled with the insistence
that some states have a duty to share their re-
sources with others. Whereas the former claim
risks nullifying the basis for an "international
welfare order," the latter claim attempts to save
such basis by proclaiming it the special duty of
the favored few. It is for this reason that a de-
tached, though not unsympathetic, Western ob-
server of the new states' position can voice con.
tern over the possibility that these states have
"constructed needless barriers to some of their
central needs for the future-namely the accep.
tance by more affluent states of some level of duty
to transfer resources to other states to meet the
direst material needs of great sections of man-
kind."* But logical consistency here could be
maintained, and supposedly "needless barriers"
removed, only by the concession in principle of
a claim that responds to anxieties which are the
result of a long history of domination and formal
inequality. Rather than make such a concession,
the new states find little difficulty in advancing-
logically inconsistent positions, or, more to the -
point, in insisting upon a double standard of con-,
duct. Besides, this double standard can always be
justified by invoking a past in which material
disparities presumably arose because of what is
seen as a double standard imposed on developing
peoples.
If the claims of the new egalitarianism are not
to be dismissed because they proclaim a double
standard, they are also not to be dismissed because
they gloss over divisions separating the countries
of the South. The juxtaposition of Southern rhet-
oric with Southern realities has been undertaken
many times. But what does the exercise prove
apart from what we already know: that there are
many conflicts of interest among the countries
of the South and that, given normal expectations-
of state behavior, a number of these conflicts will
persist and even deepen if for no other reason
than as a result of markedly different rates of
development? We did not need the oil crisis to
demonstrate this, though it clearly has provided a
very vivid demonstration. The devastating ef-
fects of current oil prices on many developing
countries have been met with relative indiffer-
ence by the major OPEC countries, thereby put-
ting to rest the romantic notion that the new
states would lead the way to humanity's moral
regeneration; The most telling comment on this
notion has come from a Senegalese official who is
reported as having said about the world's re-
sponse to the West African drought that while the
United States "gives enough to allow itself an
easy couscience," the infinitesimal assistance given
by rich fellow Muslims in the Arab countries
indicates the latter "have not reached the state
of conscience."t
Ilic oil crisis allords apparent vindication of
the view that "the South" does not exist in the
sense that it was widely seen to exist only a dec-
ade ago. At the same time, if the major OPEC
countries have not set the kind of example that
many vainly expected of them, the all-important
point remains that to (late thay have set an exam-
pie that others will attempt to emulate, even
* Julius Stone, Of Law and Nations, p. 361.
-1 New York Times, November 10, 1974, p. 34.
Approved For Release'2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 A NEW INTERN J,,46,vNA 1. ORDER?/43
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2- -
though on a considerably more modest scale. Corn- ttoversy over what constitutes minimum subsis-
munal solidarity is not a prerequisite to common tense continues to evoke widespread and deep
grievances that- express themselves in claims to disagreement. That what has been accepted as a
grcarer equality. Nor, for that matter, is the precept of justice only so recently within historic
presence of conflicting interests it bar to the pug- national societies may-indeed, must-also be re-
suit of interests that are still perceived as shared garded today as a precept of justice in interna-
by most governments of the South. The rather tional society deserves, one would think, to be
disconcerting, truth is that the reactions of South- treated with some skepticism.
ern victims of present oil prices have been almost The point remains that this response is increas-
as astonishing in their way as the reactions of ingly taken for granted by Western elites. It is
Northern victims. A large literature on what apparent in the view that finds a "logical incon-
sociologists term "relative deprivation" would sistency" in the disparity of effort made to allevi-
have led us to expect the Southern countries to ate poverty at home and abroad. It is equally
show intense resentment toward the sudden riches apparent in the persuasion that not only the same
and new status of the major OPEC states, and moral case may be made for the redistribution of
particularly in view of the lack of concern the wealth among states as for such redistribution
latter have shown over the effects their actions within states, but substantially the same peace-
have had on the world's poor. It may be a mixture keeping case as well. The appeal of and need for
of fear and hope that prevents this resentment greater global equality, it is held, must grow with
from becoming manifest. Then again, however, the growing awareness of the vast gulf between
it may be the persistence of grievances and inter- conditions of domestic life (in developed soci-
ests that are still held in common despite feelings eties) and those of international life. Thus the
of resentment. To the extent that it is the per- growth of equality within the state forms the
sistence of commonly held grievances and inter- precursor of the movement toward the growth of
ests, the response of the developed states to OPEC equality among states. In this view, the dynamic
actions has clearly not served to discourage the of equality cannot and will not be contained at
claims of the new egalitarianism. If anything, this the boundaries of the state. Reflecting the devel-
response has given such claims new impetus. oprnent of the more influential domestic societies,
W HAT is extraordinary about the con-
temporary challenge to interna-
tional inequality is not so much the challenge
itself, however, as the response it has elicited and
the expectations it has generated among liberal
elites in the developed and capitalist states. It is
quite true that in theory at least liberalism has
always been far more egalitarian than is com-
monly recognized, and that this egalitarianism
did not stop at the boundaries of the state. Nor
did liberalism rest with the promise of legal and
political equality for those peoples that met the
standards of civilization and, accordingly, were
deemed capable of directing their own destiny.
The liberal credo not only held out the promise
of legal and political equality but the further
promise that free trade, besides being propor-
tionately beneficial to all, would promote a, grad-
ual equalization in international income distribu-
tion.
Even so, until very recently it would have
seemed incongruous to hear from liberal lips that
material inequality in international no less than
in domestic life must be justified and that, at the
least, such justification must fail if it does not en-
compass the provision of a. minimum level of
subsistence to all peoples. That a just society
must insure a minimum subsistence for all is a
principle accepted within most Western societies
only in this century, and within the United States
the world community will become a welfare com-
munity in roughly the manner that Western
states have become welfare states.
Still, the question persists: what will induce the
powerful in international society to yield what
has only so recently and often so reluctantly been
yielded in domestic society? Clearly, if the in-
equalities that have traditionally marked state
relations are to decline, the institution that has
afforded the primary means for maintaining in-
equality must also decline. The effective chal-
lenge to inequality requires, at the outset, that
the more extreme forms of self-help-especially
military force-no longer perform their time-
honored functions. Provided that physical coer-
cion of the weak by the strong has largely lost
its former utility, as many now believe, nothing
would appear to be of comparable moment in
altering the hierarchical structure of interna-
tional society. It is in the assumption that the
rising material and moral costs of employing force
now effectively inhibit-or very nearly so-the
strong from resorting to force against the weak
that we must find one of the root sources; if not
the root source, of the challenge to inequality.
Nor is it reasonable to expect that a growing
disutility of military power will have no effect on
the economic power wielded by the strong. Al-
though disparities in economic power remain in
a world where military power is presumed to be
increasingly at a discount, the effects of these
disparities must surely be altered as well and in
the same direction. Power may not be indivisible,
only in the. past d trR01L s '2G05101/$9r@ 6Jlat-Fk0P$]6B 9"RQ0920t&JLQ0Ytt4r the
 4a/co,It l`aly ~ b lea` 2005/01/10: CIA-RDP86B0098fi1, 000200120006-2
utility of military power has markedly declined,
there need be no devaluation in the efficacy of
economic power. Recent experience has shown
that even against a very small state, and one with
a vulnerable economy, the effectiveness of eco-
nomic coercion alone may prove surprisingly lim-
ited. In part, this is so for the evident reason that
economic coercion permits the weak alternatives
that physical coercion does not. Then, too, the
limited effectiveness of economic coercion may
in sonic measure be attributed to the same
sources that limit the effectiveness of physical co-
ercion. While the legitimacy of the former has
not been subject to the same standards as has the
latter, economic coercion has been called increas-
ingly into question even when employed by the
wealthy country to protect interests that are the
result of undertakings the weaker (underdevel-
oped) state consented to.* This argument draws
added force one it is recognized that economic
coercion can only have its full effects to the ex-
tent it leaves open the option of physical coer-
cion. In this respect, it is quite understandable
that many who reject serious economic confron-
tation in the oil crisis do so in part on the ground
that this may lead eventually to military confron-
tation. Finally, as in the case of physical coercion,
so in the case of economic coercion, the same
argument will be, and has been, employed: the
costs may well outweigh the gains, whether eco-
norllic or political, in a world where the poor
and weak have displayed increasing sensitivity to
any form of coercion.
The erosion of military and, in some measure
at least, economic power as instruments of the
strong must clearly have, if continued, a pro-
found impact on the hierarchical nature of inter-
national society. Even so, this erosion cannot of
itself confer the kind of leverage needed to ef-
fect a significant redistribution of the world's
wealth. The reduction of material disparities
among states is affected by the new constraints
on force largely to the extent that these con-
straints permit the weak to take measures within
their territories that in all earlier (lay would
have invited armed intervention. In this sense,
it restricted scope afforded to forcible measures
of self-lielp may diminish, and for one select
group of countries spectacularly so, disparities in
wealth. Yet it is only in this sense that the new
constraints may do so. In con3cquence, their ef-
fects-again, the case of oil apart-would appear
to be rather peripheral in reducing material
dispari ties.
In a broader perspective, however, the leverage
Third World states are expected to enjoy by vir-
tue of their possession of natural resources indis-
pensable to the .industrialized states is only one
feature of a more general vision in which the
vulnerabilities of the strong will become increas-
ingly apparent. The dependence of the rich on
the raw materials held by the poor is only the
most recent and dranr,uic -uanifestatiml of this
vision. The vision would persist it) the absence
of concern over continued supply of raw mate-
rials at less than exorbitant prices. It is to be found
in the repeated admonition that we cannot begin
to solve the many environmental problems we
face without the cooperation of the 'T'hird World
states. It is also to be found in a host of economic
issues other than natural resources--investments,
markets, monetary reform, trade liberalization.-
-ill which the Third World is considered to have
the power to "hold us up.'"--
a't-.t., it is not these and related issues
S that form the crux of the conviction
that the present inequalities of nations-above
all, material inequalities--mnust somehow be re-
duced. Instead; the essence of the._c-liallenge to
iile~trality_is_tl~e~presumcd danger that these in-
ca ualities- hold out to %nternatioti ifi_aticiii-~V- peace and
SG thilit.y. The power of rice weals that is it ast`to
be feared, on this view, is the power to transmit
misery, -i.n__th~koiai~9f_-cli-tos Ltnd.W"ai?. Wlrhethel?
this transmission takes an active or a-pmssive form
is held to be less important than the vulnerability
of the rich to whatever form it takes. We have
become familiar with the metaphors that are in-
tended to convey this sense of the vulnerability
of the world's favored peoples to cmticl'itions that
may one day prompt the less fortte.nate and their
governments to desperate behavior. The United
States, Samuel Huntington writes, "is it tenant
occupying the largest, most elegant, most: luxuri-
ously furnished penthouse suite in, it global
apartment house." As such we have "a clear
interest in insuring that the structure as a whole
is sound and that minimum conditions for decent
human existence prevail in the building"** Rob-
ert L. Heilbroner puts the matter more generally,
as well as more ominously, in these terms: "Even
the most corrupt governments of the trnderclevel-
oped world are aware of the ghastly resemblance
of the world's pi'eseiit economic conditions to an
immense train, in which a few passengers,
mainly in the advanced capitalist world, ride in
first-class coaches, in conditions of comfort un-
imaginable to the enormously greater Numbers
crammed into the cattle cars that make up the
? It serves ico useful purpose here to enter into extended
discussion of what constitutes "consent" as between parties
l really unequal in power. If the fact of inequality tier se is
validity. Al apparently more plausible attack, on the validity
of agreements entered into between the rich and. the poor
almost as many ditlicultics as the test it replaces.
For Whom," Foreign Policy (Spring 1271), pp. 130.31.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 Approved For lease 2005/01/10: CIA-RDP86B01D985Rba!>J M2 #O6aDEx?/a5
of power-at least among the developed and cap-
italist states-may no longer be the principal cre-
ators and guarantors of order.' And since nature
abhors a vacuum, the new equality is also likely
to lead to an international systemm iii which the
relative power position of the Soviet Union will
*Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human
Prospect, p. 39.
be considerably enhanced, for the Russians are
neither depen`deilt in any significant way on the
new states nor disposed to view their claims in
the manner of \1Tcstcrn elites. The disjunction
between power and order will accordingly be
largely one-sided in its effects. Whether this pro-
spective outcome is to be welcomed or decried is
not at issue here. What is at issue is the problems
it must raise to the degree it is realized.
There are many who will take exception even
to this manner of formulating the consequences
of the movement toward greater equality in in-
ternational society, let alone to what they sense
to be the implications of the formulation. Why
speak of a growing disjunction between order and
.power, it will be asked, rather than of a changing
power? Moreover, why speak of the principal
possessors of power that are no longer the prim
cipal creators and guarantors of order, if it is
admitted that order implies power? True, con-
vention sanctions the loose usage whereby one
speaks of power that is no longer usable or effec-
tive. This manner of speaking is misleading, how-
ever, since power that. is no longer usable or
effective is no longer power in any meaningful
sense.
Thus, it is argued, no useful purpose is
served by pointing to the markedly declining util-
ity of traditional forms of power as creating a
separation between power and. order. What is
happening instead is. that a new and more egali-
tarian order is emerging, in part because a form
of power that was once decisive and pervasive
is no longer so, or, at any rate, no longer nearly
so decisive and pervasive. On this view, then, to
point to a growing disjunction between power
and order betrays a retrogressive outlook and a
yearning to return to the traditionally hierarchi-
cal system ordered primarily on the basis of rela-
tive military capability.
There is some merit to these considerations, if
for no other reason than what may appear as
order to one observer may yet appear as disorder
to another. So it has, always been, and we have no
persuasive reason for believing contemporary
judgments are somehow free of this perennial
bias. Unless the concept of order is reduced to
the mere effectiveness with which power-what-
ever its ingredients and application-secures such
behavior as its holders ordain, there is an unavoid-
able element of preference implicit in all judg-
ntents on what constitutes order. If this is true
with respect to civil society, it is for obvious rea-
sons all the more true with respect to interna-
tional society.
It is not these qualifications, however, that
form the principal objection to the position which
holds that there is a growing disjunction between
power and order in state relations. Instead, objec-
tion centers on the alleged failure to recognize
what Pierre Renolivin has terlnecl the "underly-
ing forces" at work in contemporary world poli-
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
bulk of the train's carriages." Eventually, in
the absence of a greater equality, the world's
apartment house or train will be subject to dan-
cgers that may threaten all of the inhabitants or
passcngers. But it is the rich among them who
are presumably the more vulnerable, if only for
the reason that they-have a great (teal to lose.
"Tuts in what almost appears as a reversal of
the "natural" order of things, it is the weak of
the world who are considered to hold out grave
peril to the strong. Moral obligation apart, it is
the world's interdependence--indeed, its indivisi-
bility-that compels its out of self-interest to re-
duce present material disparities between the
world's rich and poor. The appeal to self-interest
resulting from an inescapable interdependence
need not and should not be understood only in
the narrow sense of avoiding material injury.
Even if the poor could be safely left to their
suffering, the prospect of living in a prosperous
enclave that is surrounded by a despairing world
would prove unwelcome. More than that, it is
argued, this prospect must eventually prove
morally debilitating, especially given our aware-
ness today of conditions from which it was once
possible and rather easy to divert our attention.
It is in this manner that a view initially based
upon calculations of self-interest moves almost
imperceptibly to one based. upon moral obliga-
tion. The sentiment of sympathy or pity may not
appear in unalloyed form, but it is clearly there
even though combined with anxiety over the ac-
tions to which the poor may finally be driven in
the attempt to alter their condition. Since the
same combination is a commonplace in arguments
for greater equality today within Western soci-
eties, there is no cause for surprise that it should
form the basis for appeals to reduce inequalities
in international society. What is surprising is the
rather casual manner with which a collective
moral responsibility that encompasses humanity
is increasingly viewed almost as self-evident.
T liE Oil crisis enables its to see with a
clarity we could not have before some
of the consequences of the new egalitarianism.
One consequence is that if permitted to run its
logical course tl, . e new egalitarianism will lead,-
.
as it is leading today -to f~n6wisjunction
between power and order, that is, to an inter-
national society in which the principal holders
 46/COMMENTARY FEBRUARY 1975
Approved Fo lease 2005/01/10
hies. For it is these forces which are presumably
constantly eroding the old order and the forms
of power that maintained it. There is neither
space nor need here to review once again what
by now a large, and still burgeoning, literature
has elaborated. Suffice it to say that an increas-
ingly interdependent world is found to result from
weapons that can no longer protect, let alone
aggrandize, the state; from a technology that no
longer permits the "separate" state; from trans-
national economic and social actors that have
come to function largely independently of the
state; and from a process of industrial growth
which creates problems that cannot be resolved
in isolation by the state. In almost all its varia-
tions, then, the theme of interdependence points
to the state's growing loss of autonomy.
But what is of relevance in this context is not
so much the state's loss of autonomy as the egali-
tarian implications this loss conveys. Marked
inequality-certainly radical inequality-is seen to
threaten an interdependent society for the reason
that interdependence is considered but a synonym
for vulnerability. A society made up of increas-
ingly interdependent units is a society made up of
increasingly vulnerable units. If the great moral
imperative of the age is equality, as we are con-
stantly told, an interdependent world that does not
respond to this imperative is evidently a world
with a very bleak future.
Interestingly, however, the by now pervasive
theme of interdependence is only seldom applied
to the Soviet Union (or, for that matter, China),
and with good reason. By this very omission we
may conclude that interdependence is largely
irrelevant to the state that will assuredly'continue
to play a major, and increasing, role in world
politics. For the purpose of conventional politi-
cal analysis, this qualification alone `may well be
regarded as critical. Still, one need not press this
point. The qualifications to interdependence are
considerable even when kept to the rather ab-
stract level its advocates appear to prefer. If in
one sense modern weapons make all states vul-
nerable as never before, in another sense these
weapons confer a security on their possessors that
states seldom enjoyed in the past. If in one
sense technology-particularly communications--
no longer permits the "separate state," in an-
other sense technology gives the state making full
rise of it powers it previously rarely possessed.
Moreover, the same technology that confers these
powers also makes possible--at any rate, for the
favored few-a policy akin to autarchy. It is of
course the case that whether states pursue a pol-
icy of independence or interdependence, they
Hurst eventually face the problems attendant
upon growth. But there is no compelling reason
for believing these problems can only be resolved
through the methods of interdependence and, in-
deed, there are a number of reasons for believing
quite the contrary.
CIA-RDP86B0098O00200120006-2
VEN if one accepts time view of an
~-+ ever-rising interdependence occurring
at the expense of the state, the prospect of a grow-
ing disjunction between power and order is not
thereby excluded. It is excluded only if one as-
sumes that interdependence itself is largely consti-
tutive of order and that this order is. self-main-
taining, at least in the sense that its maintenance
sloes not depend upon the threat or use of physical
coercion. In fact, however, such interdependence
its we have in international society today, while
creating the need for it greater measure of order,
provides no assurance this need will be net,
whether by a supposedly declining state or by
some alternative institution (s). Indeed, if the state
is being slowly but surely drained of its autonomy,
as the believers in interdependence would have it,
then in the absence of effective alternative political
institutions, what order international society has
heretofore enjoyed must be jeopardized. Surely
the order of the past generation must be jeopar-
dized, since the state that has presided over it is
presumably no longer capable of doing so.
11 the interdependence advocates do not see
matters in this light, it is because they do assume
that interdependence itself is largely Constitutive
of order, that an interdependent world must
establish its own set of rules and constraints, and
that this order does not include force, the ultima
ratio that characterized and defined the traditional
system. Obviously, the new system will still be one
largely dominated by self-help. What else could it
be in the absence of supranational institutions?
But the self-help of interdependence will show a
far more benign face than the self-help of the
traditional system, and it will do so because the
threat or use of force is destructive of interde-
pendence. Is this apparent circularity of the argu-
ment a fundamental flaw? No, provided a suffi-
ciently high value is attached by all participants
to those consequences held to follow from inter-
dependence.
To be sure, the more cautious prophets of the
new order of interdependence' readily concede
that the emergence of this order is bout compli-
cated and threatened by the persistence of "obso-
lete" forms of power (and, of course, by the
persistence of equally obsolete attitudes that have
yet to adjust to the requirements of an interde-
pendent world). But this admitted tension be-
tween the old and the new is seen as unavoidable
in it period of transition. It can, and in all likeli-
hood will, be overcome as the forces of interde-
peridencC continue to Crode the already weakened
position of the state.
What is the basis for believing that this tension
between the old and the new will be resolved in
favor of the new? It will not do to respond by
pointing once again to "underlying forces" the
significance of which are, as noted, quite ambigu-
ous. At best, these forces leave one on uncertain
grounds and, if anything, suggest that the ten-
 lion, rather ~,~pprpcved F e~eas 995// IOCO
new, may only become more pronounced. If this
is so, it serves to strengthen the view of a grow-
ing disjunction between power and order with all
that this disjunction must portend. Even in the
*new order of interdependence, it seems only Yea
sonable to assume that conflicts of interest will
arise and that, as the oil crisis has demonstrated,
a growing interdependence will itself be produc-
tive of many very serious conflicts of interest.
How will such conflicts be resolved if the tradi-
tional means for resolving them are to be neither
employed nor meaningfully threatened? To re-
spond that the means of conflict resolution will
increasingly approximate the means of resolving
conflicts within the state assumes a degree of
consensus international society has not known in
the past and clearly does not know at present.
But this in turn assumes a formative agent of
consensus-and, indeed, of conscience-that here-
tofore at least has invariably been the state (arid
not, as a still regnant liberal outlook insists, an
elusive "society").
v we are plainly not already in a con-
sensual world, is there plausible rea-
son to believe that we are moving toward one?
Interdependence cannot of itself provide such
reason, since it is as much a source of conflict as
of consensus, if not more. Can development pro-
vide what interdependence cannot provide? Many
apparently think so and find in the very univer-
sality of commitment to the cause of development
the consensus that may serve as the foundation of
a new order. But the issues that interdependence
raises are also in large measure the issues develop-
ment must raise, however widespread the ap-
proval development elicits in principle. This is
so if only for the reason that. the commitment to
development, if taken at all seriously, is evidently
a commitment to a greater measure of equality.
Although development may and does mean many
things, one thing it surely means to its legions of
supporters is it world in which material disparities
will be less marked than they are at present. No
doubt, those who go so far as to equate develop-
ment with equality exaggerate. The exaggera-
tion is a pardonable one, however, in view of the
importance equality occupies in the development
imperative.
Unless we assume that the greater measure of
global equality expected to attend development
will result from the indigenous efforts of the de-
veloping countries themselves, the development
of the latter evidently entails a steady and very
substantial transfer of wealth from the rich to the
poor countries. Is it reasonable to expect such
transfer to occur voluntarily as a consequence of
qa; P$10 o009 4~ X41 ~4-g6~~-- point of
reference the only experience we have. Within
major Western democratic states, the efforts that
have been made to achieve it greater measure of
socioeconomic equality have met with consid-
crable resistance, and this despite their relative
modesty in both intention and result. Yet these
efforts have been undertaken within nation-states
that have a long history and enjoy some measure
of cohesiveness and solidarity.
The paradox, and the difficulty, attending all
movements toward achieving greater equality are
that in large measure they must presuppose the
very conditions they seek to achieve. The great
end ultimately sought through equality is frater-
nity, in Tawney's expression, the society of fellow-
ship. Yet the achievement of this end remains
unattainable without that preexistent measure of
cohesiveness and solidarity which safeguards
against the conflicts that demands for greater
equality raise, conflicts that may well prove de-
structive of fellowship. No major Western state
has yet managed to resolve this paradox satisfac-
torily, and for the reason that none has enjoyed
the moral resources, the degree of consensus and
sympathy, requisite for its resolution. Instead, the
quest for equality has been met by the promise
of equal opportunity, by the expectation that ev-
eryone's material condition may be constantly im-
proved through growth, and by the recognition
that everyone must at least be insured a minimal
level of subsistence. Whether one regards this rec-
ord as coinntenclable or deplorable, a substantial
realization of equality or a betrayal of it,- is not
at issue here. Of relevance is the point that this,
in rough approximation, is the historic response
Western democratic states have made to demands
for greater equality. In part, this response-the
provision of a minimal standard of subsistence
--was made only after a relatively high level of
development had been achieved. Even so, its rec-
ognition has come slowly and, -to many, quite
inadequately.
.If this experience has any relevance for the
problem of global inequality, we can only expect
that the development imperative, whatever the
degree of consensus it elicits in principle, will in
reality provide an acute and continuing source of
conflict. Given the notorious lack of cohesive-
ness and solidarity of international society, the de-
anand to reduce present disparities of income and
wealth would prove productive of conflict even
in quite favorable circumstances. For even in quite
favorable circumstances, international economic
relationships would still be relationships of equity
with their clearly redistributive overtones. More-
over, the prime movers in the demand for equal-
ity will be states. Is there reason to expect that
the claims of underdeveloped states to greater
equality will be moderated with a steady improve-
ment in their standards of living? Here again, if
some transcendent consensus on the desirability
of development? It would not seem so. Certainly,
the experience of domestic society is at all rel-
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 48/CON MENTARY FEiBItUARY [(175
Approved F elease 2005/01/10: CIA-RDP86B009WR000200120006-2
evant, the answer cannot prove comforting in its
implications for international conflict.
It is a well-known theme of conservatives that
the issue of equality grows more acrimonious and
demands for greater equality more insistent as the
poor begin to improve their living standards and
to see the possibilities heretofore hidden from
them. But the theme also happens to be borne
out by experience, and candid egalitarians have
always acknowledged, while defending, the growth
of resentment against inequality that attends the
growth of equality. It is one of the great egali-
tarians of the century who wrote that the deter-
mination to end disabilities deemed needless and
advantages deemed preferential "has its source,
not in material misery, but in sentiments which
the conquest of the grosser forms of poverty has
given room to grow." Recently, a champion of
greater global equality has warned in unequivocal
terms against the belief that a modest rise in living
standards among the underdeveloped nations will
moderate their claims and thereby promote a
world with less conflict. t Nor is the reason for
the sharpened intolerance of inequality that at-
tends the growth of equality to be found simply in
the sentiments that rising expectations bring,
sentiments which readily make remaining in-
equalities appear intolerable. In part, this rising
determination to end inequality is to be explained
by the conviction that the position of the priv-
ileged is no longer secure once concessions have
been wrested from them by whatever means. The
significance of this conviction will of course vary
according to circumstances. In international so-
ciety it is bound to prove quite significant, given
the circumstances normally marking the conces-
sion of interests by states--let alone the concession
of vital interests. It was entirely to be expected
that the major OPEC states should view the man-
ner in which concessions were wrung from the
developed and capitalist states as indicative of a
power position no longer secure. And it is to be
expected that if the latter states continue to be-
have as they have behaved to (late, the former,
acting on this view, will press for a still greater
measure of "equality."
These considerations suggest that the develop-
ment process-as interdependence-holds out the
promise. of far more conflict than consensus, and
this even accepting the assumption of relatively
open-ended growth. It is this assumption that pro-
vided the foundation for Western-inspired post-
war development programs, just as it is this as-
suinption that accounted for the optimism placed
in these programs. Given a moderate amount of
competence and will on the part of governments
of developing countries, a convergence of per-
R. It. Tawney, Equality, p. 225. of course, what consti-
tutes "needless (lisabilitics" and "preferential advantages"
varies with the growth of equality itself.
f Gunnar Myrdal, "The World Poverty Problem," Britan-
nica Book of the Year 1972, p. 34.
capita growth rates was expected to result in the
not-too-distant future from modest aid infusions
and technology transfers. Convergent per-capita
growth rates, in turn, would eventually lead. to
per-capita income levels that, if not equalized glo-
bally, would still exceed. the levels of income pre-
vailing at the time in the developed states.
This view persists in sonic quarters evert today,
but it is clearly a rapidly declining faith. Popula-
tion growth alone has dealt it it very severe blow.
The goal of converging per-capita growth rates
has been moved from the not-too-distant to the
indefinite future and levels of per-capita income
once entertained have simply been abandoned.
In the meantime, disillusionment within West-
ern countries over the results of development ef-
forts in many Southern states has been met by
rising resentment of the poor over what is seen
as a commitment by the rich that is at once no
more than of token significance and yet increas-
ingly unbearable for the interventionist pressures
it is often felt to bring.
In retrospect, it is apparent that the favored
solution for international inequality was it varia-
tion of the favored solution for domestic inequal-
ity. Even if the rather elusive, though ubiquitous,
"gap" was not substantially closed, it would not
matter terribly, it was believed, if the standard of
living of all rose dramatically. This proposition is
fir from self-evident, again as domestic experi-
ence has shown. What Charles Frankel has ob-
served in the domestic context ("a man does not
have to be poor to be disadvantaged; he merely
needs to be poorer than somebody else") may
prove no less relevant in the international context..
At any rate, the favored solution of an open-
ended growth process has been called into. ques-
tion and, in consequence, the faith that found in
development the promise of a new order has been
shaken. For the appearance of constraints on
growth changes the entire setting in which devel-
opment and the reduction of global inequalities
were to have taken place. What once appeared
as not only a plausible but a painless goal no
longer does so. Nor is it enough to respond that
present constraints on growth will not prove to
be lasting, that what we are confronted with is a
short-to-medium term problem likely to be re-
solved, depending upon the particular constraint,
over the next ten to thirty years. The long term
may produce catastrophe. On the other hand, the
long term may find solutions to problems that
appear next to insoluble today. We cannot know.
But it is not the long term that concerns us. It
is the near term, for that is the only term state-
craft responds to, if indeed it responds to that,
G IVEN the circumstances likely to pre-
vail in the near term, the need for
order will not prove less. but greater than in the
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
p:t
do
ris
eit
tra
it
to
it
th
Wi
th,
ca
fat
m'
b)
ti(
p(
Wi
ai
to
Sit
N
CC
U
S(
w
tc
es
tl
ri
 Approved F lelease 2005/01/10
past. It Will Drove greater because interdcpen-
dencc creates relationships and development gives
rise to claims which, if not somehow resolved, may
easily lead to chaos. The oil crisis strikingly illus-
trates this need without affording any assurance
It will be met. If anything, the course of the crisis
to (late indicates that it may well not be met. If
it is not, the reason will be that the strong among
the developed and capitalist states are no longer
willing to enforce the order of the past, while
the weak who have challenged this order are in-
capable of creating a new order. Even so, the
failure to enforce the order of the past will still
mean, on balance, the relinquishment of interest
by the strong.
Is it plausible to expect this anomalous situa-
tion to persist? If not quite plausible, it is still
possible, if only for the reason that this situation
will remain critically dependent upon political
and moral perceptions which may yet transform
today's possibility into tomorrow's reality. To be
sure, these perceptions are not of equal moment.
Nor are they directly relevant to each and every
conflict of interest between the developed and
capitalist states of the North and the states of the
South. Moreover, they are ' identified much more
with elite groups in the North than with the
publics at large. Still, their general significance
today for the response the new egalitarianism has
evoked cannot be in serious doubt. Implicit
throughout the preceding discussion, they are: a
rising disinclination to use or to threaten force,
whether from the belief that force is no longer
expedient or from the conviction that force is no
longer a legitimate instrument or, more likely,
from a combination of the two; an exaggerated
view of the sources of strength of the Third World
which is, in large measure, a function of the view
that the developed states are in many respects
highly vulnerable; a persuasion that growing in-
terdependence is threatened by inequalities which,
if allowed to persist, will result in generalized
chaos or war; a commitment generally to reduc-
ing international inequalities, though without a
clear idea of-or, for that matter, interest in-the
effects a redistribution of wealth would have on
the redistribution of world power; and, finally, a
sense of guilt over a past for which we are now
thought to be paying the inevitable price.
It is against this outlook that the response to
OPEC actions may largely be understood. This
response could scarcely condemn the ends pre-
sumably sought by the oil-producing states, for
these are the very ends (interdependence, equality,
development) to which Western liberals have long
been committed. It may of course be argued that
however unexceptionable the professed ends
sought by OPEC states, the means employed to
these ends are to be condemned. But such condem-
nation is less than persuasive if it is made simply
on the ground that the present oil price is in ad-
ministered price of a cartel. Quite apart from the
lAc1RDPB6Bt00 9.0(200120006-2 were also
the administered prices of a cartel, the prices of a
number of industrial goods developing states must
import are, in effect, administered prices. If the
OPEC oil price today were one-third its actual
price, it is doubtful that much weight would be
given to the fact that the price is administered by
an oil-producer cartel. It is very late in the day
for 11'estern liberals to object to price-fixing sim-
ply because it is undertaken by states. Equally, it
is very late to object to international transfers of
wealth which result from state action when the
need for a positive role for the state in the form
of aid-giving has long been taken for granted,
It is another matter to condemn the means to
otherwise laudable-or, at the very least, unob-
jectionable-ends because of the effects these
means have on others. Although OPEC actions
affect both the rich and the poor, it remains the
case that the effects are very different. The rich,
if they are lucky, may only be made marginally
poorer. The outlook for the poor is of a different
order. Suppose, however, that the major OPEC
states were to show an unexpected degree of wis-
doin and self-restraint and to offer the poor states
a concessional price for oil. Suppose, further, that
the Arab oil producers decided to share a very
substantial portion of their huge revenues. with
their Arab brothers and to grant large loans on
soft terms to predominantly Muslim countries. In
these circumstances, what petrodollars might re-
main for recycling in the `'Pest would be modest
and of" manageable proportion. Indeed, the price
might be markedly raised. What would the ob-
jection be, then, to the actions of the oil export-
simply to the Slicer magnitude of the transfer of
case for Western liberals to make. Though per-
haps still objecting to the means, their objection
would seem almost trivial when set alongside the
approved ends.
INCL these circumstances do not. obtain,
S those committed to the new egal-
itarianism are saved from having to face the con-
sequences of their cornunitment. The point remains
that the oil crisis is the clearest indication we
have to (late of the way the new egalitarianism
may be expected to work it given tree rein. It is
not easy, holvever, to see it being given free rein
in the future. A political-moral outlook that once
proved not only relatively costless but congenial
is apparent that if acted 11po11 the result will mean
a world over which we will have decreasing con-
trol at increasing cost. For if a large portion of
Western liberal elites finds no more difficulty in
distinguishing between the United States and
Bangladesh than it does between California and
Mississippi, it is sale to say that the general public
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 50/COMMENTARY FEBRUARY 'tI75
? Approved FcJelease 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86BO09QAR000200120006-2
continues to find a great deal of difficulty and
that democratic governments will continue to
prove responsive to the distinction the public
draws between its collective welfare and the we]-
tare of those outside the state.
'['here are even reasons for believing that this
distinction may be drawn more sharply in the
future than n the recent past. One reason, par-
adoxically enough, is the growing demand for
greater equality within many of the developed
states. That in America this demand may be ex-
pected to mount in intensity is forecast alike by
champions and critics of equality.* Yet a more
egalitarian America need not mean a greater will.
ingness to reduce global inequalities of wealth,
and this all the more so to the extent that egal-
itarianisni takes place within the cultural and
value setting of "traditional" America.t In these
circumstances, a case may be made for an Amer-
ica that shows no more, and perhaps even less,
disposition than today to concern itself with pov-
erty abroad. We may expect that those experienc-
ing improved material well-being will, despite
their improvement, insist upon defining "needs"
in terms of "wants." This being so, the demands
for further material improvement are, if anything,
likely to increase. These considerations, moreover,
are only underlined by the prospect that indus-
trial growth within the developed countries may
decline in the years ahead, however modestly. For
even a modest slowdown in industrial growth
will intensify the problem of equality for domestic
societies whose social stability is so centrally de-
pendent upon economic expansion.
In retrospect, the present concern over reducing
disparities of wealth among the developed and
underdeveloped nations may yet appear not as
the beginning of a new era but as a brief inter-
lude that is followed by a restoration of attitudes
not essentially dissimilar from those which pre-
ceded it. This is not to say that traditional pat-
terns of inequality will be or should be restored.
It is to say that the claims of the new egalitarian-
ism will either be moderated or we will have a
period which by comparison will, make the post-
war period seem almost benign.
* For the fortner, see Herbert J. (.ans, More Equality. For
the latter, Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post?Indttstrial
Society. Gans writes (p. xis) that "more equality must come
because Americans favor it and because America cannot
function in the long run without more equality." Bell finds
(p. 425) the redefinition of equality-from equality of op-
portunity to equality of result-"the central value problem
of post-industrial society."
f As Herbert J. Cans is so persuaded. He writes that egali-
tarianism in the future America "will not be based on
altruism," that "it will be individualistic," and that "it
does not presuppose that people are ready to stop com-
peting for material or nonmaterial gain." More Equality,
pp. xvi, 25.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 Appre4eb
All That.
Glitters Is
No t Guilt
THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS. By Robert
W. Tucker. Basic Books. 214 pp. $10.95
WEN THE IDEA of the "haves" and the "have-nots"
first was clearly stated in the 1930s, the "haves"
were the United States, France, and Britain, and the
"have-nots" limited to Germany, Japan, and Italy. It was a
decidedly European-centered view, but, at the time, the
political world was centered in Europe. Then came World
War Il and then decolonization.
By now, the .'have-nots" of the 1930s have joined the
"haves" of the 1970s, and the real split today is usually de-
scribed in geographic terms, between the North and the
South, that is, between the developed and the developing
nations-while the Soviet bloc rather stands aside.
According to what by now has become the conventional
wisdom in both North and South, this split requires the
construction of a new international order, one in which'
the new nations of the South will have much greater say.
In the industrial democracies of the North, the dominant
voice has become that of the "accommodationists," who
clearly make such a case. Indeed, so strong has this wis-
dom become that some spokesmen for the Carter Admin-
istration will say that the "global issues" have become
even more important than our relations with the Soviet
Union.
Less articulate, for the most part, have been the "rejec-
tionists," those who see no particular reason for the new
order, and even less reason why we should rush to cooper-
ate in constructing it.
Now there is a most effective rebuttal to the accommo-
dationists, in the form of this slim volume by Robert W.
Tucker, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins who has
proved a skilled lacerater of conventional wisdom. Sev-
eral years ago, he wrote an equally short book criticizing
the Vietnam War on the very reasonable grounds that a
much too expansive doctrine of national security was at
the basis of the American involvement.
His new book, though dense and austere and uncompro-
mising both in style and point of view, is one of the most
DANIEL YERGIN, the author of Shattered Peace: the
Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State,,
is on the faculty of Harvard University.
UNCERTAIN GREATNESS: Henry Kissinger
and American Foreign Policy. By Roger Mor-
ris. Harper & Row. 312 pp. $10.95
By DON OBERDORFER
I T WAS BOUND to happen.. One of Henry Kissinger's
former aides has marshalled his ammunition, taken
aim and opened fire. The erstwhile wizard of diplomacy
is vulnerable to those behind the curtain who saw the
methods of his mastery and knew of his abundant secret
DON OBERDORFER is a reporter for the national staff
of The Washington Post.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :ICIA-RDP86B00985R000200120606-2
dealings,
Morris'
ger with
force of
great m.
Kissinger
der. In a
shots f in
A fore
Johnson
tamed t:;
three Ki:
staff sho
It was a
ously, it
who saik
Morris t
himself i
 some special moral superiority. The -- - =am ~~ ? V mole
(Continued from page F1)----- sensibility is based, he writes,, "upon a
mistaken-at the very least, undemon- AND
L
important and penetrating contribu- . strated-view of what self-interest re-
tions to the discussion about what quires in today's world. It does not re- AMS KIM PM
should U.S. policy be toward the Third quire that the rich must make conees-
A World. Indeed, it will do much to crys- sions to the poor because in a con-
tallize the issues in the debate. frontation with the poor the rich are,.
Tucker's starting point is the charac by virtue of their riches; vulnerable in
ALL DESTSEI LEP.S ARE 201% OFF
ter of international politics-that by ;o a way the poor are not. The power of
O
nature, the international community is the poor that has been made so much' ' off
an anarchic world, in which the ine- of in recent years is either largely a 101111 quality and hierarchy of states is in- piece of romantic nonsense or-more N
evitable. States are not people living likely-a reflection of an underlying,
under a constitution that grants them if largely unexpressed, conviction that o;'FICE Dupont Circle White Chevy Chose
equal rights. Rather, they are inher- the patrimony of the developed and Open 10-9 Mon-Sot/12.9. Sun ? Visa /MosterChorge/CentrolChorge .
ently different. Some have longer capitalist states is, after all, hardly S,..
coastlines than others, some more oil, worth defending-either because it
some more power. was largely achieved through the ex-
The current international order, shaped and maintained to a considera? the ploitation of
affluepce thaothers t at has ... been or created because
the is
ble degree by the United States, is now itself a form of corruption." 1
under sustained attack. Further, he suggests, this sensibility Give more than one million people
But one of Tucker's most central is based upon a second delusion, a mis- a chant' to lain- Whal you're selling.
points is that while the calls for a new taken belief that the state's power is Wig Iva Pour ctauuilied ad. Al
I4
rder may be similar, the impulses in being eroded. Rather the new egalita- Call 22:W200.
the First World and the Third World rians emphasize the key role of the
are very different. state. .
The Third World countries are not But these two points of view have
arguing that the nation is not the basis converged to make heavy demands ALiNS TA
R
of international politics. Indeed, they upon the Western world, and the ina-
are emphasizing the role of, the state. bilit.y or reluctance of the West to re- gm. sky
,h Their aim is to. shift, power to them-, sist them leaves Tucker most gloomy. blows the energy crisis selves. This impulse Tucker labels the He foresees a new international order
new egalitarianism." There is nothing not more stable or just or humane, but
surprising in the fact that the Third even more unstable and dangerous, be- x x
World countries should seek greater '$
cause there will be such a soar die- ~ t , u t F t ` "
power, f r that is what natinns usually junction between power and force ~->~ '~ .;t
seek. This "rejectionist" case, so effec
More startling is the second category tively expressed here, can obviously be ?5~ fx
-what he calls a "new political. sensi- criticized in turn. Perhaps Tucker has )ol
bility" among liberal elites in the West. overstated the challenge. Maybe the
u ~Ny y
This sensibility--and the very word talk of a new world order" is only a
suggests an element of romanticism- game; what is really involved is not
`c motivated lie argues, b a sense of
Y much more than a tinkering with tar m~ # r >
Awl
gi,ilt, an unhappiness with their own iffs and a stabilizing of export prices
societies, and by a sense of shared hu ~. 4
Perhaps.
inanity no less expansive than the once At a deeper level, a critic could say unchallenged doctrine of national se- that Tucker is really rejecting the curity. LEN,
force of industrialization as it spreads
Tucker is ,not arguing that "shared around the world. After all, once upon n f
humanity should be denied. "What is a time, Britain was the world's only in-
novel," he says, ".is the insistence that dustrial power. The difficulties en-
men now act upon this assumption in a countered in trying to accommodate
manner they have not acted in the other emerging industrial powers,
past, that they draw positive duties of most clearly Germany, helped precipi- '
distributive justice 'from it that they tate the two world wars. That analogy
had not heretofore drawn and that MON&
r might suggest an accommodationist
they give a scope to those duties they course
have never before been willing to give. But Tucker's basic question cannot
The simple, though decisive, claim of be evaded. Why? Why give away so
the new political sensibility is that we readily the power? Will we be better
'?o longer differentiate, for osrtain off, or will the anarchic international
purposes, between fellow citizens and world become even more unpleasantly
mankind." anarchic? This deeply pessimistic book
This sensibility is Tucker's real tar- is asking those in the West to avoid the
get, lie finds little real basis For the easy course of slogans and vast, vague As n The Guns of Navarone, MacLean trots o,,.
Westerners' sense of guilt toward tht appeals, and rather to think clearly ware for an engineering adventure-spectacular,
Third World, or for the assumption about what we would do and for what Reviews. $7.35 at all booksellers.
that Third World nations can claim purpose.i
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 \ CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 ~heApff I ' se rb059i710 4CI RD~& 0ki5ROOD26~SfQ
ILL INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY become increasingly
egalitarian? Are we only at the beginning of a movement toward
greater equality that will eventually carry us to the international wel-
fare society many now envisage? Or are there rather sharp limits to
the equality we can project, even.in principle, without assuming a
qualitative transformation of the international system?
These questions cannot be usefully addressed without reminding
ourselves of the sources of inequality in international society. The in-
equality of states stems in the first instance from their varying natural
endowments. In a reversal of Rousseau's claim respecting individ-
uals, we may say that political collectives are born unequal and that
in consequence of their different natural endowments they are des-
tined to remain unequal. These "natural" inequalities, it is true,
have not given rise to uniform consequences; they have not deter-
mined in unvarying manner the character of the international hierar-
chy. The degree to which physical extent, geographic position, natu-
ral resources, and population determine collective inequalities of
power and status has varied considerably. This is so because the sig-
nificance of these characteristics depends upon the techniques avail-
able in a given period for exploiting them and, of course, upon a col-
lective's capacity and will for doing so. Still, there are limits beyond
which natural inequalities cannot be compensated for by states that
share the same civilization and a roughly comparable level of devel-
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R00020012000
 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
INEQUALITY OF NATIONS The Future of Inequality
opment. This has been particularly true of states that have shared in-
dustrial civilization.
By far the most striking inequalities that have marked the interna-
tional system have been those resulting from unevenness of socio-
economic development. It was this unevenness of development that
by the late nineteenth century gave rise to disparities of power that
had never before been reached yet once reached were to prove short-
lived. There are no persuasive reasons for believing that in time
inequalities resulting from unevenness of development cannot be
narrowed sufficiently to dispel the special sense-and all too often
the reality-of vulnerability stemming from the juxtaposition of de-
veloped and undeveloped. If an inability to participate in industrial
civilization is presently seen by the elites of most of the new states as
the critical manifestation of inequality, it is one that will eventually
be altered. The attitudes, motivations, and institutions that are so im-
portant in determining material progress cannot be acquired over-
night. But they can be acquired by elites intent upon achieving a ma-
terial progress that will insure their recognition as equal participants
in industrial civilization.
To what extent are inequalities consequent upon unevenness of de-
velopment imposed by the international system? And what is the
character of these external constraints? These questions have long
been a source of controversy. Today, they appear to elicit more con-
troversy than ever. Nor is this surprising,. given the failure of reality
to conform to the optimistic 'projections of rapid growth in the Third
World that were commonplace until the middle 1960s. Disappoint-
ment over the outcome of these earlier projections gave unexpected
popularity and considerable persuasiveness to radical analyses of the
causes of underdevelopment that stressed the external constraints on
development imposed by a capitalist world economy. At the same
time, disappointment over the failure of earlier growth projections
prompted many Western observers to shift the emphasis they had
once placed on the internal impediments to development. Although
the record of the developing countries was by no means uniformly
poor, it could easily and most reasonably be read to mean that inter-
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
nal obstacles to development-not least of all, those rooted in cul-
tural patterns-would prove much more resistant than had been sup-
posed. But this conclusion was, for a variety of reasons, quite
unpalatable. Unwilling to accept the view that the principal con-
straints on development were still to be found within the backward
countries themselves, rather than in the relationships between the lat-
ter and the developed states, Western liberals-when not emphasiz-
ing population growth-came increasingly to focus their criticism on
an international economic system held to exacerbate the plight of the
underdeveloped. To these critics, the system could nevertheless be
corrected by rather. modest reforms that would remove the principal
external constraints on development. To the radical critic, the con-
straints a capitalist world economy places on the developing coun-
tries could be removed only with the virtual disappearance of this
economy.
There is no need here to review the radical critique. What is neces-
sary to emphasize in the present context is simply the insistence of
this critique that a global capitalist economy must be held primarily
responsible for the inequalities resulting from unevenness of devel
opment. Are these inequalities distinctive to capitalism, however, or
would most of them form a part of any international system other
than one in which the component units were autarchic (and, accord-
ingly, formed no system at all in the strict sense)? The corollary of
the radical thesis that an international capitalist system inevitably
produces and sustains the inequalities we find in the present system is
that an international economy dominated by socialist states would be
free of these inequalities.
. The basis for this position is familiar ground. It is contended that
the characteristics distinguishing a global capitalist economy would
not characterize an international economy dominated by socialist
states. Thus the inequalities consequent upon foreign investment
would be absent from the latter system. So, too, the inequalities at-
tending trade relations between developed and developing econo-
mies would disappear. More generally, and by definition, the needs
presumably inherent in and distinctive to capitalist economies-for
.163
 o > cu
w o
O m D n
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
.~. n a 5. N n. ?c., O 'C7
U w G vC a) Q iV b) uu c7 C U C
44 a~ d v a
C~I c w Or- c'j
?(U " Q (U n i U c-0
(U ca >
"S ~' v ro b o ?- o a
a) C C U U O
o v u 3 .c b u ?'
C N U ~. (U bA U cd u U
a3 u a.)
.n N C ~ ~ G .C .O O Z Q. bb ~I c3 b)
p O E?k b4 p? (U cOC "O ""G 'C3
, CL, -
u 0
C's
NYU
o
cU aq o o ai 0
~+ t
O U ..-. ^?" O tSi N ?C U
a" U J
3 a) b
rn n
C
O
3
v ?J
c ?(U
bf)
C'j
t, > n
4-. u
U
Y U
w O
0
bq
ro
C
o u
GA
Gf) C
a) 7r s O a a
d U c3 " O0 3 ti ci
o a) ., o
bl)
(U C GA o 0 "C O U
o O} ~' a 3 6_v
'.3 'n ?O y cA L O
O
U c3 > b) U u
~ .,a C 4] ~ O u v H
(U C a) 0 ( b) X ,r C)
4)
:Cr C o r a .~ o 4) ?
y u .~
O [ C cUn r- 4 u
U U fir. a) C C a w ?n
c7 a Q a) C > ?C9
cC cV c v
UCO" c3 by C C
'C7 C T3 C T ~; N > ^
O a) o sT m y O C
O = ni C fti >
yCy ? Cy C n+ .G C O ~''
o a) .r O Y a) o i> a
O.. V C
) Q '3 J J tG O 4= y O C}?
3 u 4. v a a E-~ S CC
a u to
O? Cf~
O C ~
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
H V
O O
 ILI
?C u C ,. F C
4 7 ^N?,
U > X22., y.., U
~e ~? 3 0 a ba
N .'T r N ,p~ ba
4 N
bf) O :n ..? .cam: A O
a C N 2 O
C N D U ba N
O Ca ,C
a. C o 0
p ate) p 0) O 2 U
o .Y b?a 2 tea.) '3
K O O r
a " >> !/ -0
Ci c.. N 4) u G O
N > x -a ?
o c o U-
N ' :T ? N 'U
1. - t
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
G
O C)
c 0
O C?
U U .C V
O C)
z
U-i w
. C UU ~
a .c
9 ?o. 9 C)
C b -d O
O C U C
to
73
N 0
c > w a C)
C U O cC
ii
q : C) _ cA
?. O ..C c; O
_ _ ?rf O n!
ai 9
P ON
a
-0 -C)
CLI V..
N ~U
o
- ro
Cu
_a c c~ p' cu
U Q, U O
ci "'C U .C) ,Ct3
J U .C CJ
T U CO N
&-I
C1- a ca O Q
c v
l r V ,Y
C > "S cr a; c
i ~" O E-' ~
Q 4- U cci
rU
CA
C) N :ty O' T G ,,?, C
C) 'C) O C') .0 G
.9 to z 9 9 G Cn C)
4-1
C C C ,7?~ vl a -0
U
0 to
a 'VI 4
w
O
C)
0.
7 O
.o >_C ro 9 a
U
Yy U
GU
U a
C
71
0 -o
C
n M Si IS `-0
ni 6 ict O J . C ,M
a ) ?0. t, O u ...
i?~ G h 0 i o f
4 O w N ? .HOC . G
2 z'~
0 y n' Q3 v u r
~- ~' A (y O L L? j
- o Ct 4i .oc v C u
0 (4 C,
to 0"
V .0, U c'J CC vi 7 R
y CL^ ?~ u .c, u v
v. v ; :? a s u 3 v
V O, c u .n 0 0- e
N ~ri ~~ C,,, C C ?D
T) RS O 3
N O C r~w~ y w
O O 4 ?~ P, u
N A C N ?p y 15 .C
U9 }. O O y W L.
a. y F L '~ c a
u c 3 ti ~'' 'tl ~" v
N ,u O !., ~N o a
.C .C O. Lam. C w C to
a .E 3 u ro 2 0
G r! E
!' O w .O U C rs
y 7 I N
~ ~~ .tl O .G N N 4~ C
" Y U m =
a ?tzi_. a o o
'n n ci cr ?- o o
U
C,
o O
G
c
O CC-)
9 C
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
rr+
 ?c ?[ 3 3 N 3 ?~
0
- a 0
w cn G ..~ O >, ..~ G
'% i^.. 4) U F-~ CC N C)
0 ro
n .3
CC
: O U U
c~ N N N
7 N ~ aU~ Acs
W G N C
h ?'a o
c3 N d
'C3 bq
C U G
f, u C) O
C CL >
O O s o
H
A .C
ro
a
> U
O
N N
C U
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
0 n 5 .r, 'd CJ 0 cn C v~
0 ?
0) N c3 G 9 C
m o a " o ., c
w "G G~ 0~ E a a
~~ V7
'" bfi O N c~,a
C .~,~ C C3"
'~ O 'b k N ~ :7 ?~'
"?~ c f N O.
o O -n O 5 F" 0
G 2 "' C U :7 O ?
o 0 o. .~ Q'~ ? O - v7 4:
u ate) $ aan cra
?v O?' v a 0??40
N O G 2 2 G 2 G u
O bA '- to, V .L .C c C N N 0 ' 7 3 ?- C U
'~ a .d N U? +1.?- `?~' Y Y G .. CJ G
0 N V7 I ?C O
0
N' U O cd d~ G .O c-S N Cj C v, w
? 3 o
C'J
N Q. bD N '=+ > c3 O ( cn ,Cy >
cu >
U ~: A 0 N ;.. .0 G w u O
O on C c'V - p O G- O
U 0 0
7
0
0 r
N C
CG C"
bf) bju
C G N
0 ro
ry
0 E CN
. 0
s h U
N C) T
v
C
0
.)
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
NOW, SWOO
 0
v
G)
3 ? i
x 3 . H .o'
C) 4) ? _
E
Gfj
CIJ
cC .'+ O
.C /.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
> 72
C
3 aui ? T oup ? B
ro ro U .C ~%' p G) N
ro ~ U W ~ .-' ..C L~.
U C d U
_ Q) G Cl .0
L) a) f
^' U Zn
(0 N
u Cl
n E ro
v n 0. G)
t3 f)" a, v~'i ,Cl
w O O 'C1
. W .0 E
uD
ro
U in C) .L. >e U ='
cC a)
o )- ? H w
t O Y a) Y
Z]. Cl > C C ro
ro A U ro .~'
ro
E Ej
A
n
C
ro
o
CO)
G y
3 0 o
o U ro u
0 E .
}y L. ro
Gq w taa
N P aF
a) u o c
ro . A
Cl 4) :n .O
~ C ~! T) ~ 'y N G C G y C G S 7~ ~ .~
ctl 7 9 ."~-'. v u O 9 'O .tl
U b ~ O M n .?-~ G .C R ftt ctt .~.. V .. ~
d 4- r. rs 4, F C .9 v ?...- -u u O N M ? .7 ~' 4
11, P
cA .f_+,' v cy bD w C :) .C .C ca
a b
w E G 0 w .]! ..TJ P E h '% a h h .Tw C)) N. ?': SC..
v u G u o4) ro u a c G
cs c
ro u y o s^ o c a
S a m? c P F a 3 3' u 3 cr G u eui
? c y z Rs K ',' G c v: C -? m
u
p G [ 7
~" I ' _ aroi L' v -:2 4. 11' G ?.c~ c-emu.",
O "~ .a"..-. ?b .C O Ys a 4 .Y G T N G CC G O C) C
GL 3 LA G N? 0.l y. C a ..O
a C G n N 0. G
'O y , ro Ci C1 v p ..a.1 4 G flR C D 3 y.
?c v v a, s Q. = cG H G y a ro
3 su ?c ? Q rn ci ? u? v o v G cx
v w y u .c w" ~ v ?d g ~ < ~ ''~ ~ ~ ro oU c.. u Y y
0 w? u ?5 eui : j c uc v c ro o` E o s n
E- 7S
) N 9 O C ..O ?~ Oji G :d .~ C' 4 U G t" w w
ay
' O E C G G "'~ CT C a-~ N .O 3 LL YO ? O
? _? 3 o a u u a
3 3 b o o v `p
0 c c?- ai ? a 9C C)
v ro a' c . c
a o 3- .? o a o T'x (1 ;..-C s a E
G
c A U a E V o r .3 v a o .~ 0
`0 3 ~ O c A .? cU J ro ~a~ 3 "3 m
3 e 'y O0 ? v u a, o, E E -'
O, O~'V CU.~ O ?O ?U ~, > y n. 2j vL' cJ .~ ?w
N E
R . G ti a '~ ' U O G co H ca. 0 .- O-C
c c . ?0 _ c c o o a L
E? o c a ?~ V. G u ~s c- x c E
e cn
~.Ev cu?.~' 0. .. 3 cc b c._
8 E.
cs uc
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 4-
o
V
CIJ U
C
O cCi,
CC? . O
T .~ V
V,
K
0 N
?~ L
U C
? O
s.. U)
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
C O
O ~O
U N
4L.,
U U
O
C 2 I)
cis
b bi L V
U
C= t- ctl v 3
U c U 'U .C
Ci
't7
r2
U
b
o.c E
C1. U v,
v N O
U r aU N
fn "~ > o
C.) O U a.?
U
aCq
..O
E
o `~ U ~ ~ .a r 3 v ~ 'G
L v^ .O .... C) L L .D . ti
LO O NL T -C7 . C 0 U a t2 V
n U care t C6 m
3 _n ate) ~^ U ?; a C C
q U b 'fl a . . U p 0 C
cF~ O ? Y 7 .0 v 'C ..C w [ O
C) CIS C) v c -, - cri c cy c~
Q) cam, c3 # c-, P ti "
V U
U a s n n d
"Ci
C) U fn r C
-cy
it . U N
~T.
C3 h e yvc .> ti a v
40 0
C) U O 'Y T CC) c,.. - ..C? T A
~, cs o o c
C ,. C) ~. cn 'U
p a o ~' v c` w o?
a) 3 v ? c C1 a ? ob
0 C o c; 0 L
a _ c
L T U CI,
C O
'- C C~ 9 L
cY O C C) o
3 .n
o c 3 Cr N ?G
N fl~i tiA . ~ G ~ m z'
U V1 .rU CC lu
a o > * W
N O b U di a
N C1. 5 ~. 05.. a
CO O .,^t'., U O N~
y 7a O
U U U wU
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
.. u r
.O Fa,.,i 'y C O
3' c
a O O V G
a. I 3 ...
i; n V Ca G 09 u C w~.^ u y, G cc*
G 3 i u u a p a_
C> ~n cn G ?~ G G O O
.n ci u ^ ~'' c^ 3 v,. u
C 7 0 L C a ?~ G
j
W V s o[~ v ?`. C
a G OA."' G N ~ C ty. 'U '3 G .~... c-OS
cop n y o s .
C k7 U Cq N C U :: C T. 4..
"i s C CL Y, C .C r. y b U C in O
L o o )) E ... ? c .. o' v
O hl v C- 0 0 G K C .. ~' G? U
G ..v. -. a v
M rn o P 0 u c y a K q .c ~s a .r_
J y C R .
c ~ cov ._. E r.oc E .~.
 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
cu
C =
_
a o
a~ a o N ,~~,
~?~>
c
I
x?
a)
c n?
o 3
i
e n
c
s
C'J 8
-cz
? ant" .~ E .o b')
v, o w
.
.
d :.~ N O q G 's ? .~".? n.. vi ? N U ca
c3 > as a) ti `~
CL 0 O xn u [S" [ .n, ~ n 5 Lam.. "~ n Q a./ _ al a nazi .C., 4i'; C
U " .O bQ -0 ap"i ? . C "?'~ N ro E C? t>
Ca "U w ou U U o O p ?
f
"d o to
4) C), co o as o U e)
a, a` a as U A ;; '' r- , Ob o c "a a'
Er CZ cn
o n, i t a v? a. n as CIS ro On
o O +~ C j w 0 ?at c vv d o ?
-
- w o z w q o 3 .. 6 b d i v a a, Q) o : .-
4Q V ' ? O Q LS ? " O ? O Jti
a ,fl G ~, a~ ro by
r 4.
Zi Pi
aS W O 0 7;
[
[ O
?O C bq c~ ~' n ti. U
U O' O c- U .b U U ..s...
C'3 ci O as 4 O v v d v r4 'c r
? c o? U u u u ? u o f
a
aU.? .^~,.. bf, ro `n f"' a) G a) a) cci c3 a? ro U ^?
ctl
aJ ci of :~ ~ by 2 ..4 O n. O O q 'UU C r4 ej
cn .fl , >
O A
o ro
~0 2 ED O O
ai v > s~
72
A Q)
4.
o ?
 C
EM
C C C
3 cal u
o
DQ N
0. o., >
a) b a)
ai a
a 3 a
a) aa) O
T C
C N u
O t~ [ D
n .o a)
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
b O
:> E
.C .G C C F P G cl
C C "' w a) - rn y' C C:. ~~>'y 0 5 Y U ' m
jm~ - 6 -o o - u n a - Cl >, Q
O d N u H w O J d w ~` C
? ~, N a.) U O C Ci O I 4; 0 a O
c .Y vu 2 ') On C O v ~- cQ .u
'-' w. a . a) 0. c a v '" ?C a) a)
'm 0
a) o .c > ?. c v ?o a)
4A 6 0 C?" 0. ~ U U Q) o Cam. ?; rn C?~ O
:.d G ?a Y o > -j r rCC u u O S
C ?.., .}' ^ _ y o 4A' `Ct yet
In > ?O .1~ Ci > 4) C 0 4-. fn vi O,
0
w a _ -2w - a)w c aa) o
4A .C y: b y 'cCJ rn Cn 'n O U Y u
y.' o c
n N Cl) n Cl y. C w `, a) 0 0 0 42 a)
4 N t) a) Y .U ccf + aj O .2 ^ n, n U
E
:ar >;
u a) C C a~ Y '~
C ~ O
C Y ... ^b LUb
O G a)
C i~ ni U a N C
0
C n
N O C p cC
x H oq ~ a) 3
a) C). a; CC Ca
- o - ob o
6 F g
O C O
a) CC
ai
cn C4
N Ob
Ou a) a)
C O C]b
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 <
..Cw.
w .d v
E c .c
w
Y
42
3 ~ o
`l
^ I- w
w
to ~ w
-cs -~
CyJ C 4-. Q
C Q
bA d1 O Y p
w
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
'S 2 .5
w w w C w
.a o o o 0 w
C's
0 V. W ? 0 r-
O
~~. . o a ..
g w -0
E
w
ca
0
O ?L-
w
O ?~
c w
O f3. cam-! ~ ~ .N
to ti
Y as bi)
lam. a '3 O
cad, a 7 ~V?' O
a) U ~ c3 n a)
a
a.
O
N
a)
b
.o
? .L1 O " .C
a a a) a Y
?V 3 bA oT?i bA N 3 O
cn o V " a) C; ro
11;4 0
'a Cj
C13 0 m.
O a) O vOi cei L!
p O a O Cl
tlo
a? w Cs a ?
C) cq d) -0
6000
'0' >N 42
a) ~~ U Q U t CC7 C C s
W axi O ,O O '^) v p 00 o A te, 'y
a) '.1 m a) _ O t3 a)
- E.y .9 C) G +'C. C ni "G1 N .., O ? n "C cC?3 9
a) O C b4 O 3^ `~ yak -C: O n a
bA
O ?C C O V 0 cOi O
OV 0 0 Y R by ai aGi v' ? on ?"? d
,0 vi ua > as O O
c a) w > ' a^ ?a
v, nn Al
`v 7 >
C N
00.0 O0 C,3
o '"
> a a~
r`On ~ ?C c~
b w
o
C a .U ?~ .0 C
Ij 6-
O ~ a, F w U Y~
O
O ?
6 2-4 2 Y G O
C
c>3 :n
n o n n n F
7 n I C#)i O .'t..~. bq - C] N
CLY k ti O .~ b0 'C T
N b 0 y 0 0 O,. O
N a) w
fl 4; O .. ...,
?) a) C 0 ,O . w
w E cd
IU 'In
w o Q E o o w ti a~ a~i
bp O
-E -gi
b o a , a >
>
> 5 ap E o .~ 4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
?C bn
CT
>
d F,
C L
Cn O
.
C
C N
.C
r
L4
O O
o c 03
03
?o N
^y j )
u u
0
cn
C
bf) 0 C
C a:
C
I
U C) C
o C)
bn
S 0
bn G
r y
.. 0 -'
7Ei N' .'4
U 0 2 O v_ O ~j . ca .' N
e^ 0 O a C
ca.
Q u 72 -S:
c"Net c C n U) ,., ,.. rn C1. .
CQ 4. O '~ N C n O. O T7 C
O r 4
Can N 'n Z N ,~
.C C C rn '0 C ems.
p r n, N ... O T 'C3
N '.. O O :n N ~ a) N O
"-, r C) w Y v o-
O." -0 O L. ~, O C o- p
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
x Co
T .~- rn ..O O N N w > at
as C C 7 0 C) G bq cC
N a
a) 40-
ci d M aui i
r C cr r _ v
`n a 2 ate.. C o
C) > p `C 6) C v C 'b C
c's
v- ?0.C w E o~ c o a
.C e,. or
O w~y ~G p rp a
rti C). n .p 0.(.1
C. 'C C 0.. D 0.-?
O y 'G s. A A
m 0 O s ' s y c 5 G
C. u
y 'U 'C p 4 h a - O
a 0 c a w c N c
C O in .Na. 9 nnA (,~ =d .. O U~ 0,0
J O o G u0.~i u 0Oo y a A
0- -0
ro a a ,C U u G 'v
V. p o a
?
O m a C U C) s w U ;~ d' cn ? N
00
th r: F ? CZ, ? U 0.0 U C). a 4 V~
?G bn ?.. .C U
C b0 C, E. Ppp C. C v G
O M h _: N w Q,. O O T) U
p'a a
c 4 a ro v ' v w u g
O 0-ro cCn au u ?~
g c v v a c a v'
aai -O y c c ?`"
b`n a y cu aai ~ ~ ~ a~i ~ b
]C.. Y w C C O y i
of ~~ C 0 U O 9d . p C
. m v (4) yb
W E T p a 4 a bQ W
[T.
a ^ s P.
m a E a ~~ ri 0
03 d) EL 0 u
T .C O O 4. .? C 0. E C
- nE >b a.c v- noo
.0 u O?O P 0 O V
~.0 a > w 0.U
o ~.?w yic > a 0.
a K . o o u E .,,0
U, d c p
-Q O T ti .2 H A~
.p u L ?~ a w
E ,w a...:U b9.p a V 5 O
?; A. v a 0) ... o U eb ..5. W
U a a y e CON bG 0)
C G OO C .~i, 3 :~ R C
a C. O a c .., C N
p L.O .y 5 Ca a
p ~F"?> Ev C
N u
a.o
u ac o p a"') Y cs n.
c . pp
CIJ
H a> 7" ti o u G4 $
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985ROO0200120006-2
 O r- 4: .6 K
.a O O .. C) C
Z U r
r) C) O cJ b U
O
O i 0 .0
w C) E U c
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
r 4 . C) C ti
.-T.. t_3. C Nom'. Q y 0 GQ
v G
O' a.0 0 C 5 C. O
O C)) u a> 01 C 0 a) i
Cd u
.O =
H O dQ
? 3 2
0
U O C)
u w'
o CI
W a) a U . . U
O O
czs m o .Y
a) to T n
o. G C) GA a)
0. w - 5
O U W Z
G a~ C
^ T C/) Vl b
.C ' ~" in Gb) V N
r-
C Ui > 0 O
C) 'in G ?d C) 01.
O
0 V
N
O
. 0 a a)i CCC
Cf = V .C
c, v> C) J u o a o ~? o0 0
Y - Oa -C CC y ?OO C 'CO.. C{. [' 70 C
O -b ... ^n O N ?G U
.., G o
~ >. ~ ~ ? u o O y s,
~? ? c S av {~ CAo
O O C O )? v 7 R'4 u u
a ^p E= c 'v '~ a Q1
au=? ,
? N w
E
0 n C ? C iC
a 4. s .C p? u ti~...~.C U O
C O Q 'F) w >
C ;n O? > = O 72 C5~ - O . N
y O.~ C4 Cn O~bgro "'.' `~ E
'Z o
a a >O
O O ?' H C
C/J ^C
xc0 yu
o
cn
C C ' O
G C x Ea o)o
? N
p U G
3 c e' a c ro 5 ?'3 ci
a E' v a.v
0 IN 08
> U
E._p u v
cl r-
B, Q- c~ > p g v a a> > c O Co p
v:.} F u u 'L Cn > v, .:n v I y Q W? .C
c u 3 P. r U ou v I o Z N
" a 5 0ro caw 0 3t 0 c 0
0.1 a c,a?j`Z.`ao a~.E0`2 4) NW on>+(u E
>
y o n c w o ?? o ra c ro aC y w CIO LTJ M; t;
aU U
O w O O= b0 v N iE O w a' O 4W, y
a
00 > u ? s.-'.Ew.C {n o E S ~ E 0 a.
WO Cc~ b ~ > ICI ~
3 d o
N y Y p
C
o E a o
C O ti w ca
ro a
u O CL
y O
c 'a0, ro? a a v
N ? C
`~.c aav c'7. S
o F~ r > >
O vb o' er
Er,
Op c ov g
E
O 0 O
OM C g c
O
w a ?' ? U as
0
E 0.
U O
20
W N ? N
cn ~ O as 2 V
C ' 7
a
G v
0
o ~ ~ ~ O O
3 a y. a
u u a ?
ow ~'n 3
CrO oy
.Y H .. ? . C
3 .0 04
Ou ~40 0.D ro
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
,WWI _wm~
 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
0-
?"~~' 'Cl ?~?'
t:
>
w
wo
0 'C T pq ta)
a N cG
O a) U v
N
T 0 C,3
0 O
N N 'd a)
u p -o W
o
cV ~
a
ro Y
0
N
C C?Ti
N o
d a.
N o
> ?c:
v, N
a Q
a 0
c
r- M
u a)
O N
O
C
a " c:)
O 0 U 0
O 0. Q
E Q U
y~N
a U T 'Q
C C
0
o .~ 0
0 42
- u c c C
9 . a.
N 0 y N
3
G U) vl U O O
O ?; N N >
C'J
C ~.a) C)
N a) 3 a a
0
g a
o _ u ou f) 4,
N N un
ci S N b
a) 0 N T a. N N
o a) a) 1 a O[ T
P- :3
bq b O = ..-. r O
q U '_4 .6 y :b
?G a J C _>> U TJ
0 o N
0 u
4-
O c Y
P
4J P
03
5 q" U _C L a) - 0p..
O N G n
S
a
N
bi) a d. a
q O U >
y s. F-. 0
?at N O N .14 N O Qa,. ;
te ICA
N U U T >ti
N .U. N
bN 0 , O
ccl
U 0
? aj 3 p o 0
0 9 0 0 a
Q O T cC .a .0
ctl A < a ro 3
17, W= to)) o aGi
ti ~A O > w
U U 'Vi 'iq N UJ 0
-d b? 2 o a. - 0)
~ 0 O ~
bq ~? 0
9 of ni
o N ~C u
n .A O O U
O 9 Q.
cq CL.
= .C - O ti U y
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
 nj
Q- 0.01 E'"' c 'C3 c3
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
C c3 b a)
a p ~p O
C
a
^ cn
a) ^. V~ .C U cd
? tL a Q) L
COO O B G c3
9 w O a ?0 w
to > p
> a) cV ~ OU > O w
0 to
n .o o O
Q
a,
.a -a c _U
?~ ? O Q)
a) 9 O a ai a) a> O
C W O -U O O 0 w a)
'O N 'b cci N 4. U5 0.) .~
n)
O
a)
U ;. w
c ?' d :y O
CCI O cct 42 ' 9
CIS
a) a~) `" w 4" O
0 d Ua) ~~ 0
c -c c W
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R~0~00200120006-2
v
cU
4~
O O
4
O
^
4
C
y
a
) ~,
O
0.)
J
C
U
N
QU.
'C
n
? p O o
 > >
Cam., V
'U" c._? 3
0 M
a)
V y C
u b
? O V
M Q+
C C
t2.. a)
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2
a
O
V
C, '0
O i"
O O }' =
^' o ai E Y u
q) is 0 } bq C Q s-.
- " u C.axCE
~a ti
? 'c~ ca
>' b ai 0 ca
ca u A
O ?i b a) ~L C,
C C
04 0
c .~ O cC _ a? C c .. G b>
~' ?~ a cn o- o
ss, v a? = G
tom.., ca ~.` b .C y v, ~' O O
t: 0 a). y . G ~ >
V Z u b C C) V .; V aGi
VO Y a) Y p U ro 0 ? ~^ L) C
-2 ZO M. 0
C U Oq bq M u ate.. O 'O cU.. U s`n? U
N is v~ ?C N '~ fl)
a
C
r
a)
C V
n
a.) u
C U 0 C
3 a
C
a)
14
w Q
-C CL
N
y 4C O
U
U
T
L
>) .,U, U C3
C3
o
0 ~