LEHMEN'S DRAFT DCI STATEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130058-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: October 8, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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Ci 7 S ? J~c3
8 October 1975
STATINTL
Mr. Cary
Mr. Thuermer
SUBJECT . Lehman's Draft DCI Statement
1. The IC Staff, like other components, is impressed by
this draft and we are hopeful that the message can be imparted,
if not before the HSC, then before some other public bodies.
2. In, ~.r effort: to be:~helpful,. I asked a?few.rnembexs of the .'
IC Staff to research Chairman Pike's modus operandi during the
Pueblo hearings and in the HSC to date and try to come up with
questions that he (or other critics) might raise in challenge to
some of the points in the draft,
..3. Attached for' what they are worth are the"questionns.
In virtually all cases, we have not tried to come up with the answer.
We hope this will ;permit some tightening of the draft where it might
be appropriate, and we hope too that these questions may serve to
forewarn of some of the challenges that lie ahead.
MEMORANDUM FOR: :Mr. Lehman
AU:ac1iment
Knoche
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
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STATINTL
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Sample of Kinds of Questions Which
Might be Asked by Mr. Pike After Reading
Mr. Colby's Prepared Statement to the HSC
Mr. Pike: Mr. Colby, on page 1 of your prepared statement
you. say that this Committee is "using the wrong
measure for intelligence effectiveness."
What is the right measure?
Answer: ?
Mr. Pike: 'Again on page 1 and on page 2 you state that the
primary ..-function, is not.' simply to predict -events
but t.o..pr.ovide the po'li.cymaker.:w.ith.the de.epest,
possible understanding of the foreign environment..
Then you. follow.. that with. "one irnportan.t..aspec.t pf
this task is to prevent
the policymaker from being
taken by surprise by an event." But then you say
that "this is quite different from the prediction
of the event." How is it different? Isn't this
what warning.is all about? What is your definition
of warning?
Answer: ?
Mr. Pike: On page 2 you go on to say that "The traditional--.
or pre-1939--view of intelligence was one of the
spy seeking out of the enemy's war plans.. .This
concept. is totally out of date.!. ,Per.haps . that
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is why we failed at Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Perhaps that accounts for the fact, according
to your October war postmortem, that you didn't
make use of the reports on the Arab war plans.
Do you have any comment?
Answer: ?
Mr. Pike:. On page 3 you say: "The task for intelligence
is to analyze and integrate this material into.
assessments and judgments relevant to our
nation's concerns abroad." Where is all this
material- integr.ated,? In the CIA? `What about-.*
material from NSA?and DIA and State INR--who
in the intelligence community brings it all
together?
Answer: ?
Mr. Pike: On pages 5 and 6 you mention the necessity of
"clandestine collection or espionage" that is
"focused largely on the major closed societies
that?.could threaten our 'security, that-..-do not.
have a free press" and so on. Does Chile now
have.a free press?
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Mr. Pike: On page 7 you say that intelligence. "must be
independent of partisan preference or loyalty
to preconceived judgments." How do. you manage
the inevitable dissents which must arise if
Watch C nmm; t tF+a?
many written dissenting views came'out of the
this principle is really operating? For example,
did everyone in the Watch Committee agree with
their report of 6 October that there would be
no hostilities- even though'-the- war. had:.-already:
started? .Over the years of. its. existance, how.
Mr. Pike: On page 14 you discuss the Soviet grain problem.
Did you warn of the Great Grain Robbery? Is
this type of intelligence problem domestic or
foreign?
Answer: ?
Mr. Pike: You point out on page 17 how well you did in
predicting the types of Soviet missile systems
How well did you do on the numbers of weapons?
Answer: ?
Mr: Pike;.. On the. next page ..you :say "The .$oviets can .and. do acquire from a subscription to Aviation Week
information which may take us several years and
'many millions to 'obtain." W}i?y don" i you take.::.:
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out a subscription?.
Answer : [Forced laughter]
Mr. Pike: On page 25 you indicate that your aerial
photography proved that. we did not bomb the-
dikes in.North Vietnam. Were these pictures
made public? Did the North Vietnamese ever
put their antiaircraft artillery on dikes,
and, if so, did we bomb them?
Answer: ?
her. Pike-:' Also ori?'page 25''you say At lea*stone'.-foreign
leader y no particular-friend of ? ,the US", is
alive today because the CIA warned him of-a'
.plot against his'., life!.'., .Who was. this? Who.. :'
were the plotters? What happened to them?
Answers: ?
Mr. Pike: On page 27 you.discuss the Indo-Pak war. Were
you informed by the policy makers ahead of
time of the decision to move part of the US
7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean? Were you
asked to assess possible Indian (or other)
reactions?
Mr.. Pike:
.. vasion ? was on 22 August: -'Are you -sure?- -
On page 30 you say the date of 'the Czech in-
Answer: No, Mr. Chairman, it was the 20th.
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Mr. Pike: On this matter of coups.on page 31, you say
"But [US intelligence] can only rarely
predict with confidence precisely who will
act, how and when." I assume you are not
including those coups which the CIA themselves,
instigated. By the way, how well did we pre-
dict the coup-in Chile?
Answer: ?
Mr. Pike: On page 35 you discuss the case of Mr. Adams.
He gave figures in hig testimony; you did'nof?.
You. say "But nevertheless lie. ''had succeeded
in forcing the figure up." May we ask, from
?what..figure.t.o.what figure?
Answer.: ?
Mr. Pike: Did the discussion of the issue reach the
highest policy levels? Did they know of the
disagreement?
Mr. Pike: On the same issue, you say the figure was
reached by "compromise." Is this usual in
assessing estimates, by a process of negotiation?
Answer: "!
Mr. Pike: Again, on page 36, you say the "CIA was able
i-n subse'quent. estimat:es..to raise. the figures
further." From what to what?
Answer: ?
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Mr. Pike: In your discussion of the October War you
discuss the action-reaction cycle where each
side mobilizes and go on to say "It is in this
context that:. our analysts interpreted the
events of October 5 and 6. They were concerned
that war was breaking out by inadvertence."
.This seems at odds with your post-mortem which
implies that the Israelis failed to go on alert.
or mobilize until tbe.last minute thus. giving
the Arabs an invitation to attack. Any comment?
Answer: ?
Also who in the intelligence community was con-
cernbd about'an attack? Your post-mortem indicates
that almost everyone thoughtwar would not break
out. Any comment?
Answer: ?
Mr. Pike: You also refer on page 38 to "plans and more
Mr. Pike:
plans" generated by the Arabs. Did any single
person analyze all the successive Arab plans?
Did they recognize that the plans called for
a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack?
On the next page you refer to ,a' report, which
you say turned out to be correct, but that you
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"could find no corroborative evidence." how
did this report fit with the plans mentioned
earlier?
Answer: ?
Mr.-Pike: I have heard that the J-3 in the'Joint Staff
went on a mini-alert about the 30th of.
September based on the report and one of the
plans mentioned earlier. Did you know of
the J-3's action at the. time?
Mr.
Pike: How good are your communications with .the J-3.?
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