PROPOSED TOPICS FOR UNCLASSIFIED HISTORIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76B00734R000100070010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 12, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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DD/MES 73-3642
12 SEP 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CIA Management
Committee
SUBJECT
Proposed Topics for Unclassified
Histories
staffs.
1. The Chief, CIA Historical Staff has proposed
that unclassified histories be written on the topics
described in the attachment.
2. I suggest we discuss the proposal at a
Management Committee meeting after members have had an
opportunity to review and discuss the topics with their
25X1
HAROLD L. BROWNMAN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
NGA Review Completed.
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D?R?A?F?T
PROPOSED TOPICS FOR UNCLASSIFIED HISTORIES
General Title for Series:
The Central Intelligence Agency: An Arm of
National Security Policy
1) The Battle for Iran
In the immediate post World War II era, the USSR attempted
to secure a dominant role in Iran, rich in oil reserves. The US
government decided to help Iran resist the Communist takeover
Work Plan:
This history would require the services of a full-time writer,
with some research assistance, and would require an estimated six
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2) A Communist Beach-head in Latin America
The first attempt to establish a Communist government in
the Western Hemisphere occurred in 195+ in Guatemala. The US govern-
ment decided that the Arbenz regime,which had material support from
the Soviet Bloc, was unacceptable from a standpoint of national
security.
there is evidently no compilation which could
serve as the base of a completed history, classified or unclassified.
Project files are available; the key officers, active and retired, are
scattered.
This history would require the services of a full-time writer,
with some research assistance, and would require an estimated nine
months to complete.
3) The Communist Bid in Africa
Beginning in 1960 with the emergence of many newly-independent
nations, the Communist Bloc made a strong effort to capture the
allegiance of the new nations or to deny their adherence to the Free
World cause. A major skirmish in this conflict took place in the
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Congo, and their influence was weakened throughout the Continent.
Work plan:
Files and key officers are available.
An unclassified history would require a full-time writer with
some research assistance, and would require an estimated four months`
work.
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4
This is a major undertaking which would require at least two
full-time writers, a small research staff, and could take up to three
years to complete.
5) The US Involvement in Vietnam
CIA was involved in wide-ranging activities in Vietnam and
Indochina and will provably continue to be for the foreseeable future.
An accurate account of CIA's role is essential to a fair history of
this US national security activity.
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r '0
25X1
25X1 the Communist use of Laos in the war in Vietnam.
Work Plan:
A full-time writer is researching and writing. It will take
him at least two years. He will probably need some research assistance
to handle the analytical side of the question.
6) The War in Laos
CIA hascarried a major burden in the US government's efforts
to establish and maintain a neutral, independent Laos and to control
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25X1
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This project would require the services of one fell-tune writer
with research assistance and would take an estimated one year.
(Note: CIA was.one of the first to recognize the Indo-China
situation as an integrated problem.
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The Agency's perception deserves special treatment.)
7) The U-2
The development and use of this collection device by CIA
is a classic example of:
(1) CIA's response to priority national security
requirements
(2) CIA's ability to procure, deploy, and operate
in secrecy
(3) CIA's ability to coordinate the needs of the intelli-
gence community and to balance requirements against
the collection capability
(4) CIA's ability to establish a national facility to make
efficient use of the product.
The U-2 program led directly to follow-on efforts, especially
the reconnaissance satellites.
This project covers a remarkable response by the Agency with
full cooperation from private industry and governmental agencies to
an urgent need for information on Soviet military programs.
Work Plan:
The major task will be to conduct ca_re_ully-structured inter-
views with leading personalities, such as Dick Bissell,
Art Lundahl, Jim Cunningham, and others. This should give this history
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the human drama it requires.
25X1
25X1 Althouc->T-1
the basic research has been completed, it is estimated that a full-
time writer would be required for at least six months.
8) Analysis of Communist Intentions and Capabilities
The end result of the Agency's activities is to present the
President and his principal advisers with the best possible estimate
of foreign reactions to US interests and courses of action. As leader
of the intelligence community and on its own, CIA analysts are responsible
for seeing that all data and judgments are weighed.
On several major issues (the Soviet capability for long-range
attack, Communist efforts to subvert Latin America, Communist intentions
in Southeast Asia), the collection and evaluation efforts have been
dovetailed to support US security objectives.
A history of analysis is vital to a balanced presentation of
CIA's primary mission. It has been a major theme in official state-
ments, public and private, by the Directors of Central Intelligence.
Work Plan:
but
There are fragmentary _ra~ ^?re ceg in various ' histories,
?
they are just that. After the key issues have been identified, a
full-time researcher would spend an estimated one year collating
his material and another nine months writing. This project calls
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for an author with considerable substantive depth.
9) The Communist Role in Cuba
The total Agency involvement
encompasses the US effort to help the Cubans overthrow the Co=,-mist
regime, the Soviet effort to establish a missile base, and Cuban
efforts to export their revolution.
A balanced presentation would treat the Agency's failures
and successes with candor. This history would serve to illustrate the
changing conditions under which the US Government conducted its
foreign policy and these changes as reflected in the Agency's responsi-
bilities and activities.
Work Plan: The present plan is that the current work on the Bay of Pigs
will lead the writer to broaden his vision.
There are vast quantities of both raw research material and
finished studies or1 various aspects of the Cuban story.
An estimated nine months of research would be followed by
one year's writing.
10) Supporting the Cold War
In every Agency covert activity, there is a saga
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aggression
Work Plan:
Once the issue is chosen, a full-time writer would require
some six months to research and another six months for writing.
(Note: This ain't no soft soap for the DD/', 5. I have
received, on behalf of various DCI's, as much support as anyone in
the Agency, and have long admired the accomplishments, including
support's enormous ability to hide its light under a bushel.)
11) The Covert Cold War in Europe
When the Communists clanged down the iron Curtain, they
also began to try to gain control of Western Europe through subversion.
The Agency was assigned a key role in blunting this new kind of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
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Work Plan:
Remarkably little work has been done, except for the
post-Katzenbach post-mortem. The files are available, but the
officers are scattered, especially with the dissolution of CA
Staff.
It would take a substantively-qualified researcher one
year to round up the material, and another year to write a balanced
evaluation.
12) Technical Intelligence
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This is an area which Mr. Dulles described as taking all
the fun out of intelligence. It has also taken a huge bite out
of the taxpayers' pocket, and has crept into a major role in
our collection and analysis.
13) Before CIA
At some point, there has to be an authoritative account of
how US intelligence grew from bits and pieces into the DCI-CIA-
community. complex. Actually,
of 0TP, has been writing for
some time on OSS; his terms of reference could be expanded.
Work Plan:
This need not be a priority task, nor a major chore. It is
worth noting that several people have tackled the OSS story and
failed for reasons that are obscure.
14+) The intelligence Community
What it is, how it got that way, and how it works.
Using the completed histories of Smith, Dulles, and McCone,
an account of the community from the viewpoint of important national
security issues would be most useful in illustrating the connections
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between policy and intelligence.
Work Plan:
It ought not take a distinguished intellectual who can write
more than one year to produce this piece.
15) The Reconnaissance Satellite
The development of this collection tool is, like the U-2, a
remarkable saga of ingenuity, imagination, and security.
Work Plan:
has proposed that the retiring project manager of
submit a summary outline of the project.
'EGA'
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0 SE? 19.7 +
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Executive Secretary
FROM : Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT : Management Committee Item - Definition of
Vital Records
1. Action Requested: A restatement or reaffirmation of the
present Agency policy toward Vital Records is required.
2. Background: This Agency operates a Vital Records program
as required by Executive Order 10346. This Executive Order was
issued in April 1952 during the apprehensive days of the cold war
25X1 when the possibility of nuclear confrontation was considered omni-
present. The Executive Order contemplated a Vital Records program
25X1
25X1
I With the passage of
time and the change in the relations between the United States and
the U.S.S.R., the perceived need for such a relocation site has dim-
inished. At the same time, the Vital Records program carried out by
the various components of this Agency has eroded. The components see
little reason for expending the effort and manpower necessary to main-
tain a current Vital Records program in anticipation of a nuclear
holocaust which may never occur. This unconscious decision may well
be valid, but it does leave the Agency in an indeterminate position
relative to a Vital Records program.
There is a requirement for Vital Records for reasons other than
nuclear war. The Headquarters Building may be destroyed by fire;
conceivably, we might even have an earthquake that could demolish us.
Without elaborating on all disasters that could befall us, it would
seem wise to redefine a Vital Records program and re-establish it as
a dynamic concern in order to permit the Agency to carry on its func-
tions in the event that such a disaster should occur.
CONFIDENTIAL 25X1
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3. Action Recommended: The publication of a Headquarters
Notice (attached), followed by a rewrite of the Headquarters Regu-
lation redefining the Vital Records program as one which is necessary
to enable the Agency to continue to execute its mission and functions
in the event of inability to use the Headquarters records for any
reason.
/s/ Harold L. Brownman
HAROLD L. BROWNMAN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
Attachment: a/s
Distribution:
Orig. - Ret. to C/ISAS
11 - CIA MC
2 - DD/M&S
1 - DDCI
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 Ar.1INIS'IRATIVE - INI-EMAL USE ONLY
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RECORDS AND WRRESPONDF GE
VITAL RECORDS PROGRAM
1. In October 1969 President Nixon issued Executive Order 11490
which revoked Executive order 10346 and reaffirmed the Federal Govern-
ment's position which requires that each Federal agency must be able
to perform its essential functions during any emergency. Whereas the
earlier order addressed itself to civil defense emergency plans, its
successor is more comprehensive and includes emergencies arising not
only from warfare but fire, theft, sabotage, flood, or any other disaster.
2. Executive Order 11490 specifically requires that each agency
establish a program for the safekeeping of essential records. Since
STAT this program is administered on a decentralized basis
STAN
STATI
3. To ensure that the Agency will be able to operate during and
after an emergency, it is essential that each operating component
identify those records that are essential to it on a continuing basis
and which, if destroyed, would constitute an irreplaceable loss.
Once identified, copies of these vital records should be scheduled
for transfer to the Agency repository for safekeeping and routinely
replaced when updated versions are issued.
4. The DaNM~S/ISAS/Records Administration Branch is available
to advise offices on all matters pertaining to vital records.
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE :
HAROLD L. BTUMI AAN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
DISTRIBUTION: AB
AU4INISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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COO;.i DEN !AL ~. . ?~G,
2 4 AUG 1973
SUBJECT Bigot Lists
1. Action Required: This memorandum responds to
your request for a paper-to be discussed with the Manage-
ment Committee for implementing a community-wide Bigot-
List System.
2. Basic Considerations: The following basic
considerations were set forth on 15 August 1973 in a
"Task" paper to the Office of Security from.Mr. Ben C.
Evans, Jr., Executive Secretary.
(a) Components of the Agency and
intelligence community would identify
particularly sensitive projects or
activities.
(b) Bigot Lists would be prepared
by name and organizational identification
of individuals privy to the project or
activity.
(c) The Director of Security as
Chairman pf the USIB Security Committee
would implement the Bigot List System but
will first prepare a basic paper on the
dimensions of the work and of the problems
involved in implementing the above. The
paper is to be discussed at a Management
Committee meeting.
CON DF NT F) IA .
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MCA-.S
MEMORANDUM FOR:. Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for Management
and Services
Acting Deputy to the Director of Central
Intelligence for the Intelligence Community
25X
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3. Staff Position:
(a) The Office of Security believes
the concept of a Bigot List System is feasible
and that with the proper guidance the system
can be implemented.
(b) The Office of Security is of the
opinion that the Office of Security rather
than the USIB Security Committee is better
experienced in this area and should be tasked
with maintaining the Bigot Lists.
(c) The Office of Security has prepared
and attaches the desired report on dimensions
of the work and problems in implementation of
this concept.
(d) While in the long run the computer
may provide the most economical and efficient
means, we are of the opinion that the effort
should be initiated on a manual basis. If the
lists grow too numerous or too lenghty then a
simple computer program can be explored. If at
a later date a more complex and complete "on-
line" update and retrieval computer system is
indicated then we could move into a system
similar to the current Special Clearance
(SPECLE) System maintained by the Office of
Security.
(e) This position has been discussed
with the Intelligence Community Staff and they
agree with this approach.
4. Recommendation: It is recommended that this memo-
randum with its attachment be referred to the Management.
Committee as a basis for discussion of a community-wide
Bigot List concept.
25X1
Acting Director of Security
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24 AUG 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Report on Dimensions of Work and
Problems Involved in Implementing
A Bigot List Procedure
1. This paper reports on the dimensions of the
work and problems involved in implementing a community-
wide Bigot List System.
2. Assessing the feasibility of a community-wide
Bigot. List System, and the work load which such would
entail, requires definition of the scope of the program
and the intended allocation of responsibilities for its
operation. The following are presented as the basis on
which the Office of Security approached the problem.
(a) Basis for Inclusion.
Definition of a "particularly sensitive
project or activity." is subject to interpreta-
tion. The originator of the project or official
responsible for its security should be permitted
to use his judgment and nominate them to the DCI.
The DCI, however, should make the final selection.
Pending a test run, there is little basis on
which to estimate how many projects or activities
might be selected for inclusion. For computation
purposes we assumed that there might be twelve
agencies or special program offices each of
which might submit 25 Bigot Lists with as many
as 100 names on each list.
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(b) Completeness.
It is assumed that the DCI intends that
the set of lists include all projects or
activities which the responsible officials
consider are particularly sensitive. In CIA,
for instance, this would include the DDO as well
as the other Directorates. In Defense it would
include the military services as well as the
DIA, NSA and special program offices.
(d) Size of Individual Lists.
It is assumed that "particularly sensitive"
matters are those to which access is limited to
a small number of persons, not exceeding 100
individuals although it is realized that some
activities could require that more people be
given access.
(e) Update.
The duration of need for the list as well
as the frequency of updating it are factors
which bear on the problem of maintenance. It
is assumed that the need for each list would be
renewed on an intermittent basis. There may be
need to add names to the list but we see no need
to delete identities since this would defeat the
purpose of knowing who had access. Update
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(addition of names) would be performed every
month by the originating office and the re-
validation of the continuing need to have the
project on a Bigot List should be done by them
every four months.
(f) Responsibility for Maintenance of
the List.
Four possibilities were examined:
(1) Sponsoring agencies could main-
tain the lists of their own sensitive
projects.- This concept negates the goal
of a centralized location where all such
material would be rapidly available.
(2) CIA could maintain a master list.
of only titles of the Bigot Lists, not
identities. Responsible officers in each
agency would maintain their own Bigot Lists
of individuals with access. Again this
fails to satisfy the objective for a
central location for all identities
approved for access to each list.
(3) The USIB Security Committee can
maintain the lists. It is noted that the
USIB Security Committee has no staff
capability to discharge this responsibility
and has had no experience in such activity.
(4) The Office of Security, CIA can
maintain the lists. The Office of Security
has had experience in maintaining lists of
formal compartmented clearances and currently
handles for CIA and the community over 45
compartmented projects or Bigot Lists with
25X1 individuals listed
on them.
(g)' Content of Each List.
The amount of information maintained in
each list will have a major impact on the
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administrative cost of its maintenance. It
is assumed that each Bigot List will include
the name and office or organizational
identification of each person on the list.
Addition of social security number. and the
title of each person is feasible but would
add considerably to the cost of establishing
and maintaining each list if done by computer.
There would be minimum costs if this information
were included on a manual system.
(h) . Costs.
Costs for four alternative means of
controlling the Bigot List System were pro-
jected. All costs were predicated on the
assumption that there might be as many as
12 agencies which would submit lists. Each
agency might-submit as many as 25 lists.
Each list might contain as many as 100 names.
Costs are expressed in "ball park" figures
since we could not address the unknown figures
of frequency of reporting, number of copies of
reports. and duration of maintenance of the lists.
(1) A completely manual system
was considered. This system would
require departments. and agencies to
submit approved lists to the Office
of Security, CIA. Updating and re-
validation would be left to the
originator on a schedule to be
determined by the originator. The
Office of Security would retain these
lists and thus be in a position to
provide the Director with a facility
for a central location of all lists
and all names approved for access as
reported by the originator. While
this procedure might be handled by
the Office of Security, some experience
will have to be acquired to assess the
dimensions of the effort. It might
require a .modest increase in personnel
or assets.
n (S~- ~ 1} r- n, e 3}
Ui'141 IUs..1'H A _r
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(2) A total Bigot List System
controlled by CIA using IBM cards in
a "batch mode" computer process was
considered. This would require each
originating department and agency to
submit to CIA its list of individuals
on pre-punched IBM cards. CIA would
in turn provide weekly or monthly
printouts. Such a system would involve
a one-time developmental
25X1 and an annual production
It is estimated that two addition-al
system operators would be required.
(3) The possibility of adding to
the Office of Security's current
SPECLE program was considered. We
were informed that SPECLE could accom-
modate only eight additional Bigot Lists
without a significant redesign cost.
Adding eight Bigot Lists to the SPECLE
25X1 System would not involve any developmental
cost but would cost for
maintenance and reports. No additional
personnel would be necessary.
(4) A total system similar to
SPECLE but dedicated to maintaining
Bigot Lists for the community was con-
sidered. Such a system would permit
"on-line" update and retrieval. It
would involve a one-time.development
25X1
roduction
and an annual
p
This system would re-
quire in addition two key punch operators
and two system operators.
3. Recommendations: The following recommendations
are offered by the Of ice of Security in implementing a
community-wide Bigot List System.
(a) The originator of the project
or official responsible for the security
should nominate to the DCI sensitive projects
or operations for Bigot List protection. The
DCI should make final approval of these lists.
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(c) The Office of Security, CIA should
be tasked for initially maintaining the Bigot-
List System on a manual basis until the scope
of the effort has been identified in a trial
run. The Office of Security is. then to make
further recommendations as to how maintenance
can most effectively and efficiently be
accomplished.
(d) This report .be provided to. the CIA
Management Committee as a basis for discussion
of the DCI's Bigot List proposal.
25X1
Acting Director o Security
Distribution:
Orig -
Return to OS
1 -
ER
1 -
AD/DCI/IC Staff
2 -
DD/MES
11
ES for MC
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19 SEP 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Executive Secretary. CIA Management
Committee
Deputy Director for Management
and Services
SUBJECT t Proposal for Declassification and
Release of Selected Agency Publications
and Histories
1. Action Requested: It is requested that you approve a
plan to increase the amount of information made available to
the public. The plan outlined below represents an effort to
meet two objectives which, on the surface, may appear to be
mutually contradictory--i. e. , to be more forthcoming in releas-
ing information and, at the same time, to protect intelligence
sources and methods. Inasmuch as the plan constitutes an
initial attempt to formulate a program along these lines, it
should be regarded as tentative in nature and subject to modifi-
cation as experience is gained.
2. Background: You have advised the Congress of your
intent that the Agency be responsive to the public' s right to be
informed, while, at the same time, vigilant in the protection of
intelligence sources and methods. The clear requirement to
protect sources and methods severely limits Agency options in
releasing information and dictates a conservative approach;
information once released cannot be recalled, and it is imperative
that nothing be done to cause sources to lose confidence in the
Agency's discretion. For this reason. operational traffic, other
G?
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correspondence, plans, raw information reports. and documents
incorporating data from sensitive collection systems have been
eliminated from consideration. Further, it is not proposed to
include estimative intelligence products in this program. The
Agency' s finished intelligence publications remain, and it is
these which would probably hold the most interest for the general
public. In addition to the various series of Agency publications,
Agency histories, particularly those which chronicle the Agency' s
role in connection with specific events, would also be of interest
and value to the American public. The proposal, therefore, calls
for the establishment of a program for the release to the public in
unclassified form of selected Agency finished intelligence publica-
tions and episodic histories. Separate plans are advanced for the
two types of documents.
The plan for releasing finished intelligence publications calls
for each production office to conduct a systematic review of its
products in order to identify publications appropriate for release.
The prime criterion for release would be the impact of such an
action upon national security. If it is determined that this test is
met, other criteria would come into play: potential public interest;
timeliness of the information; quality of the product; whether
clearances from other agencies would be required; etc. It can be
assumed that the number chosen for release will be very limited.
It is proposed that each production component review at the end
of each calendar year all publications which it produced over the
preceding five-year period. To the extent that the producing
office can at the time of publication fix a definite date or event
for the declassification of the report, the review task will be
simplified. Those publications which in the judgment of the
originating office can be declassified and are otherwise suitable
for public release shall be forwarded to the Chief of the Informs- .
tion Systems Analysis Staff by 31 January of each year, and he
shall be responsible for arranging for their review by the CIA
Information Review Committee. For those publications in which
the Committee 'concurs in their release, the documents shall be
reprinted with a new cover, all classification markings and
coordination statements having been deleted. If the author is
overt and he so desires, he shall be identified and, if appropriate,
a few of his scholarly credentials noted. Subject to the approval
of his office, the originating component shall also be cited. The
version thus sanitized shall be released through the Document
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T7 MI~i-
 ~~ J 1
iGfv..i: ~a~ u L w .
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Expediting (DOCEX) Project of the Library of Congress, a channel
which the Agency now utilizes for the release and distribution of
selected unclassified reference aids.
The plan for the preparation and release of unclassified episodic
histories is patterned after a technique successfully employed by
the Historical Office of the Atomic Energy Commission. As applied
to the Agency, it would entail having an Agency historian collect
all pertinent documents and write an all-source history. The
history would be coordinated like all other Agency histories. On
the basis of this all-source history, the same Agency historian,
upon the recommendation of the Chief of the Historical Staff and
subject to the concurrence of the CIA Information Review Committee,
would then prepare an unclassified version, with all pertinent
documents. The two versions with their documentation would then
be submitted to a panel of historical consultants composed of five
to seven professional historians of "recognized competence" who
had been fully cleared for Agency employment. This panel would
render an opinion on the value and accuracy of the unclassified
version. Consideration would be given for the inclusion of
minority dissents or caveats in the unclassified version, provided,
of course, that such measures did not disclose sources or methods
appearing in the classified version. If the panel so recommended.
the history would then be reproduced in the requisite number of
copies and distributed through the facilities of DOCEX. No histories
currently available should be considered. for declassification and
release at this time. The preparation of unclassified versions,
however, should be considered for histories now in the process of
compilation or programmed for future production.
Obviously, both the unclassified histories and the declassified
finished intelligence products could be made available to Congressional
watchdog committees and/or deposited in the National Archives simul-
taneously with their release through DOCEX.
3. Staff Position:
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4. Recommendation: That approval be given to a plan
calling for the systematic review, effective January 1974, of
intelligence publications for the purpose of possible declassifi-
cation and release through DOCEX, such plan to be incorporated
into Agency regulations; and that approval also be given to a plan
for the preparation of unclassified Agency histories and their
publication and release through DOCEX, subject to the recom-
mendation of a panel of historical consultants and approval by the
CIA Information Review Committee, such plan also to be incorporated
into Agency regulations. _
HAROLD L. BROWNMAN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
Distribution:
Orig Ret to ISAS
i - DDCI
I C/Historical Staff
I - Assistant to the Director
2 DD/M&S
11 MC
A pprpa d o - a1paig.?005I a-C,I~A- 6 ffrROO0100070010-3
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 4 . DI%~`:'.:&s / ]" .` .lam
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20SEP1973
MEMMORAND UM FOR: CIA Management Committee
FROM Deputy Director for Management
and Services
SUBJECT Timing of Honor and Merit Awards
/''Z C:/A - G/
1. Action Requested: That the Management Committee
review the matter of the timing of honor and merit award
recommendations and awards to be given to retirees.
2. Basic Data or Background: The large number of
honor and me awards su -;fmi.t teu for employees who retired
by 30 June 3.973 brought a special problem into clearer
focus. 11ihat was experienced were many cases of employees
whose meaningful, productive, and often outstanding'long-
term Agency careers had never before been formally recog-
nized. Only a she last ;foment, occasioned by retirement,
were these employees finally considered for some type of
award.
3. Staff Position: it appears to me that a delay
in awards exats tine purpose for which t1fl.e Agency's awards
program exists and, to a degree, establishes an. attitude
that signals awards are associated with retirement and are
not a means of giving timely recognition to outstanding
accomplishments or performance.
I suggest that the Management Committee review
this matter. As a contribution toward discussion, I have
set forth below some ideas which could bring the awards
program closer to its intended purpose.
a. We should encourage, by Agency notice, all
supervisors to submit award recommendations in a time
frame current with the achievement or performance for
which recognition should be granted.
'o. We should stop the practice of awarding the
Intelligence Medal of :,Merit or the Distinguished In-
telli ge'nce Metal to retirees, except in unusual situa-
tions. Such cases after being reviewed by the Honor
and Merit Awards Board could be submitted to the
Management Committee to decide whether an exception
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SUBJECT: Timing of Honor and :Merit Awards
to the general policy should be made. Recognizing
the need for some transition time and also to avoid
injustices to employees now close to retirement, I
propose an effective date of 1 April-'974 to insti-
tute this new policy.
c. The Career Intelligence Medal,, the Certifi-
cate of Distinction, and the Certificate of Merit
should be the only awards normally approved for re-
tirees.
I believe that these changes will make our awards
program a more meaningful one since they are aimed first at
giving deserving employees awards on a timely basis, and
secondly to establish the Career Intelligence Medal and the
Certificates as a retirement norm.
4. Recommendation: That the Management Committee re-
view the matter o _ imng of Tern limendations for honor and
merit awards, as described above, and the type of awards to
be granted to retiring employees.
.HAROLD L. BROW AN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
Distribution:
Orig.- Adse
1 - ER
2 - DD/ i;,S
2 - D/Pers
I - DD/Pens/S?
Ir - C/BSD
- Management Committee Members
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DD/MFS 73-3758
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CIA Management Committee
FROM : Deputy. Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT : Incentive Awards for Employees Earning Bachelor and
Advanced Degrees
1. Action Requested: Approve the awarding of a Quality Step Increase
(QSI) to an employee earning a bachelor or advanced degree, principally on
the employee's own time.
2. Background: The superior overall intellectual quality of Agency
employees together i,tith the value to the intelligence profession of ex-
.pertise gained from formal education suggests that incentive awards would
encourage further academic achievements by Agency personnel. Use of a QSI
for such a purpose would be a tangible and continuing form of recognition
to an employee with the initiative to improve his or her professional
qualifications. Although the Agency does sponsor some employees for full-
time academic training, paying all costs including salaries, it is neither
practical nor economically feasible to do this on other than a very selec-
tive basis. Consequently, a supplementary program supported by the incen-
tive of a QSI should challenge some employees who otherwise would not
improve their academic standing.
3. 'Staff Position: The anticipated minute increase in average grade
resulting from this proposed program would be a simple and inexpensive way
to benefit both the Agency and the employee. Specific guidelines as to
eligibility of employees and other governing criteria are now being studied;
however, no unusual obstacles are evident that would delay early imple-
mentation of the program.
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4. Recommendation: Approve in principle the concept of awarding
Quality Step Increases to employees earning bachelor or advanced degrees,
principally on their own time.
HAROLD L. BROWNM.AN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
APPROVED :. . ................
Distribution:
Drib - Adse (for return to DD/MEjS)
11-ES
2 - DD/MUS
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DD/IES 73-3730
2 0 SEP 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Annual Homecoming
Bill:
I have discussed your suggestion for an annual homecoming
or "old-timer" day with the Directors of Personnel and Security. We believe
the event could be successfully and securely staged, although there are some
important factors to consider and resolve before making a final decision.
25X1
25X1 The number of retirees attending a single event should not
exceed capacity of the auditorium. I suggest that we can logically
25X1 have t has number by inviting former employees who retired during FY' 70, FY'71
and FY'72 and still reside in the Washington area. Approximately one-half of
I Iretirees during these three fiscal years still have mailing addresses
in is vicinity. Therefore, I believe we could acceptances out.. of
25X1 invitations. I would not include PYIY3 retirees until next
year.
If the trial run of the homecoming achieves the desired
results, then consideration can be given to having additional sessions and
inviting retirees living outside the area.
We should require an acceptance to an invitation in suffi-
cient time to do a current name check and to insure proper identification of
the retiree when he arrives. I should think that two to three weeks lead
time would be adequate to handle the security and all other arrangements.
This would mean that invitations should be mailed four to five weeks before
the homecoming is scheduled.
Having said the above and being prepared to implement it,
I must question the advisability of expending personnel resources and money
on preparations for an "old-timer" day. Although the event would undoubtedly
be appreciated by the retirees, I have difficulty rationalizing any gains for
the Agency and the taxpayer, particularly in this period of restricted budgets
and personnel reductions. Therefore, I suggest that the proposal merits
further discussion before you make a final decision.
25X1
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Execu:i -e Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for Management and
Services
FROM Director of Personnel
SUBJECT Unit.Citation
1. Action Requested: That .you approve the concept
of a unit citation.
2 .. Bas i'c Data or. Background : The Agency's awards
program does not now include an Agency-level mechanism for
recognizing bodies or groups of employees whose collective
performance or. contribution is of special significance.
The matter of a unit citation was discussed some years ago
but was not approved because of divided views among the
Deputies. It is believed that the time has come to re-
consider the question.
3. Staff Position: In the Office of Personnel we
have alrea y initiate individual recognition in the form
of Quality Step Increases for those employees who worked
so diligently and well on the flood of retirements which
occurred prior to 30 June. In my judgment, something more
is needed to mark the work of the units involved. Obviously,
a unit citation would be a perfect solution for this specific
situation and others like it elsewhere in the Agency.
You will recall that during your meeting with
the members 'of the Honor and Merit _Ai~,ards Board I sought
informally your views on the matter of a unit citation.
At.that time you indicated you were in favor of such an
award to recognize the contributions of a group of employees,
an entire component of a station or base, etc., but added
that those employees'who had made a particularly important
contribution to an effort meriting a unit citation should,
in addition, be recommended for a specific award.
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I am in no way suggesting that the unit citation
be used in lieu of individual awards or other forms of
recognition. As in my own instances, individuals should
be recognized when such recognition has been earned and
is due. What theunit citation does, however, is to allow
a supervisor to. go that one step beyond and also commend
the collective performance of a .group of employees when
appropriate.
If the concept of a unit citation is approved,
we would suggest using the same procedures in effect for
the processing of existing awards. We will, of course,
develop appropriate regulatory changes for review.
4.' Recommendation: That you approve the addition
of a unit.citation to the Agency's awards program.
25X1
John F. Blake
? Director of Personnel
APPROVED:
Date .
DISAPPROVED:
Distribution:
0 - Return to D/Pers
1 - Director
1 - Deputy Director
1 - ER
2 - DD/MES
1 - D/Pers
1 - DD/Pers/SP
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
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25X1
Series B, Copy
1 October 1973
FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA M:Ta nagement Committee
?rE~,(ORANDU'l
THRU: Deputy Director for Management and Sarvices
SUBJECT: NPIC Procurement of UNIVAC 1110 Multiprocessor
System
REFERENCE: Memo to DCI thru ES/MC and DDS&T fr D/NPIC,
dtd 1 Aug 73, subj: Request for Approval of
NPIC Plan for Computer Support for 1975-1950
1. The Chief of my Information Processing Staff has done some
5-1/2 pages of pros, cons and considerations which boil down to the
fact that the UNIVAC 1110 can do the required job, but so could the
IBM 158. The main question he poses is: how important is
compatibilit with Headquarters IBM systems (and, by extension,
the future Not insignificant in top
management deliberation of the attached is its increased price tag of
about)
2, . AD/OJCS concludes (Tab A) that the NPIC plan is technically
sound. He notes that compatibility is a management issue and that
acquisition of a UNIVAC 1110 would further isolate NPIC from the rest
of the computing "community" in CIA. He concludes that the N--?IC
request should be approved, but that NPIC should re-study their
z-
for C~. 1UaI processors terminals, the. former ` niE
=i'2
1riCr .. 1 latter posing "monumental' to Zstics and .~ CC
~.-ln~ costs and t:l'~ o -?
wo:'' load prohh ms .
On b l