ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE AND ADJACENT AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM 1967-1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500220048-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: May 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Road Construction in the Laotian Panhandle
and Adjacent Areas of South Vietnam 1967-1968
Secret
ER IM 68-46
May 1968
copy N2 62
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
decIouifcalion
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Road Construction in the Laotian Panhandle
and Adjacent Areas of South Vietnam
1967-68
Summary
The North Vietnamese are engaged in an intensive
program to construct new supply routes, with limited
all-weather capability, into South Vietnam from
Laotian trunk routes to support military operations
(see the map, Figure 1). Work started on a number
of new roads during the last quarter of 1967, prior
to the Tet offensive, and is still in progress. All
of these new roads branch off a north-south trunk
route in the Laotian Panhandle and run directly
across the border toward important US - South Viet-
namese military installations in South Vietnrm.
The newly completed routes provide the Communists
with an increased capability to introduce troops,
heavy weapons, and sizable amounts of materials by
truck into four widely separated areas in the
northern part of South Vietnam.
North Vietnamese strategy provides for connecting
their road network in North Vietnam and Laos with
the existing road system in South Vietnam. To
achieve this goal, the North Vietnamese have simul-
taneously built or upgraded five new crossings of
the South Vietnamese border (a total of 215 miles
of road" during the past six months. Two of the
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Director's Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs and the Office of
Current Intelligence.
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new roads parallel Route 9 in Laos and lead toward
the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Further south, a road in
Laos has been connected with a road in the A Shau
Valley in South Vietnam leading to Hue. The North
Vietnamese have joined a fourth road with an
important north-south route in South Vietnam.
From the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese have also
extended a new road to the vicinity of the major US
base at Dak To. New feeder roads branch off this
route and lead southeast toward the provincial capi-
tals of Kontum and Pleiku.
The new and expanded roadnet is an attempt to
establish a more reliable year-round logistics
system. All the new roads crossing into South Viet-
nam, except the two roads paralleling Route 9 in
Laos, are limited all-weather; all connect with
logistical base areas along the main trunk route.
Sections of the main north-south route in Laos, and
especially the segment north of Chavane, at times
become impassable during the rainy season, but the
enemy may be able to maintain most of this primary
logistical route for a longer period this year than
in previous ones. In addition, a new road which
appears to have limited all--weather capability is
under construction from North Vietnam around the
western end of the DMZ.
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Road Construction 1967-8 Dry Season
Kho
Sanh
e -
/ Saravano
THAILAND
Lip
I3
CAMBODIA
j stung Tr nq!
VIETNAM
Oak Pek
Ploiku
Kontum
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,Chavune
Shau r~
~~?r, Da Nang i\ _
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Past Trends in Road Construction
1. The timing of new road construction in the
Laos Panhandle follows a classic pattern based on
weather. In the dry season, villagers are impressed
into service to improve or repair existing roads and
to construct new ones. During these periods, new
truck parks, fords, and logistical facilities are
built. As the road system deteriorates during the
rainy season, the enemy abandons new construction
and concentrates on maintenance of the primary road-
net. The following table illustrates the relation-
ship between the weather seasons and the construction
effort in the Laos Panhandle.
New Road Construction in the Laos Panhandle
and Adjacent Areas of South Vietnam
1964 - April 1968
Total Additions Additions Per Month
Weather Period (Miles) (Miles)
Prior to January 1965 Negl. Negl.
1965 dry season (February-March) 60 30
1965 wet season (April-August) 25 5
1965-66 dry season 415
(September 1965 - March 1966)
1966 wet season 30
(April-October)
1966-67 dry season 50
(November 1966 - March 1967)
1967 wet season Negl. Negl.
(April-September)
1967-68 dry season 246
(October 1967 - April 1968)
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Road Construction Prior to 1967
2. Prior to 1967 the North Vietnamese concen-
trated their efforts in the Laos Panhandle on building
a logistics system which paralleled the South Vietnam-
ese border. In early 1965, Communist forces began to
expand their logistics system so that by March 1966
it extended from Route 15 at Mu Gia Pass to the tri-
border area. This strategic supply system is based
on a north-south parallel trunk route (92/96) that
has been improved each year during the Laotian
dry season, although it is not yet an all-weather
route. This infiltration corridor, the so-called
"Ho Chi Minh Trail," is also served by North Viet-
nam Route 137 southwest of Dong Hoi, an alternate
route to the Mu Gia Pass built in 1965-66.
Road Construction During the 1967-68 Dry Season
3. Since October 1967 the Communists have opened
five new motorable roads from Laos into South Vietnam.
Before being improved, these routes had been used for
the past three years as porter trails and limited
personnel infiltration routes. In addition to these
gateways, which are discussed below, the Communists
have under construction a major new road from the
Dong Hoi area in North Vietnam which will pass around
the western end of the DMZ. This well-built road,
being pushed through some of the most difficult
terrain in North Vietnam, could provide the North
Vietnamese with another limited all-weather route
to the road complex serving the area west of Khe
Sanh. Some 16 miles of the road were built
an impressive achievement
considering the mountainous terrain. The rapid pro-
gress and pattern of constru,-:tion indicates that the
North Vietnamese are using mechanized construction
equipment and trucks (see the photograph, Figure 2).
Access to Khe Sanh
4. During the recent dry season, ending in
March, the North Vietnamese built two new roads
parallel to Route 9 west of the Khe Sanh Combat Base
to support their forces around that Marine strong-
point. The first road, north of Route 9, is an
extension of Route 92 and crosses the South Vietnamese
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Figu.ti.e 2. Road C1;tden Cait~s.t~ute.t-i.oit F,'tom the Do)[.Cl Ho.i. Anea
Towand the Wes.tenrt End o6 .the DAfZ 25X1
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border northeast of Ban Houei Sane, a former Royal
Laotian base on Route 9. By late March, this road
terminated 9 miles northwest of Khe Sanh.
5. Another road was completed at about the same
time from Route 92 across the South Vietnamese border.
it now terminates about 8 miles southwest of Khe
Sanh.
see the pnotograpn, Figure 3).
The roads paralleling Route 9 traverse fairly dense
jungle and are improved earth surfaces with a limited
amount of corduroying. Route 9 will probably remain
passable during the 1968 rainy season because of
continual improvements since 1965; the parallel
dirt roads have already begun to deteriorate.
F.igune 3. UnLmpnoved Road South o4 Rowe 91
Amph.Lb.iouz tank-6 ,invo.2ved in attacking Lang p
entered the riven at .th.L point.
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Route 922 and the A Shau Valley
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7. The North Vietnamese first began to extend
Route 922 toward the A Shau Valley from its terminus
near the South Vietnamese border in December 1966.
Up to that time the route ;-ad seen little use since
the capture of the A Shau Special Forces Camp in
mid-March 1966. By late April 1967, Route 922 had
been constructed across the border and connected
with the existing South Vietnamese national Route
548 at A Luoi, the northernmost airfield in the
A Shau Valley. This connection, 56 miles long,
gave the North Vietnamese the use of a motorable
road from Laos through the entire valley. Early
this year, the Communists reopened and upgraded
all of Route 922 and added more facilities to the
already extensive logistics complexes along the
road.
8. the North Vietnamese began
to construct a new road toward Hue from a point on
Route 548 just north of the town of Ta Bat, the
location of the central airfield in the A Shau
Valley (see the photograph, Figure 4). This new
road, which parallels part of a previously existing
road (Route 547) leading from the valley, has been
extended from Route 548 at Ta Bat to join Route 547
at a point north of Ta Luong, 22 miles southwest of
Hue. From that point towards Hue, Route 547 is only
an upgraded trail for some 8 miles. The remaining
section is reportedly in fair condition; however,
it is controlled part of the time by allied forces.
9. At Ta Luong, the newly constructed road
fords the Song Bo, a sizable stream which flows in
a northerly direction perpendicular to the road.
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F,i,gtuce 4. Road Lead.i.i a Sad
ToW ULd UUue
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This stream could be used to move supplies to staging
and storage areas northwest of Hue. 1 :1 25X1
tracked armored vehicle, tentatively identified as a
PT-76 amphibious tank, was reported in an enemy base
area 12 miles north of Ta Luong.
10. In the A Shau Valley, the North Vietnamese
have built bunkers, antiaircraft sites, and truck
parks, the largest of which is just northeast of
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Ta Bat near the junction of Route 548 and the nrur
11. The Communists
have continued Route
548 through the valley
into a salient of Laos
southeast of A Shau.
Between 28 March and
9 April the enemy built
18 miles of road through
der.se jungle and difficult
mountainous terrain east-
southeast in the general
direction of South Viet-
namese Route 14. The
last reported terminus
of the road was in South
Vietnam, some 10 miles
northwest of an enemy-
controlled town on Route
14 west of Da Nang (see
the photograph, Figure 5)
Figure 5. Route 548 Extended
F}tom the A S(lau V