FAS NEWSLETTER ARTICLE, 'INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?'

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• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2005
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I Thc. nuellig,nce community, rind its budget, pose many :;.,1 (,, . These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence , ......
collection but they are also used: to jultify clandesiir.e po-
1 problems of traditional concern to the Federation of Amer- n I ...-
lineal operations. However, overthrowing governments, ?
I ican Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper '..'
secret wars, assassination, .and fixing elections are cer-
use of high technology, mid defense expenditures. In the '..:
' i last quarter century, intelligence agencies have prolifer- '. '.7),'.',!.? tainly not done ''for the benefit of the, existing inteliigcnce .
I
ated. The United States has established an agency which ? :....-1,?:?.,;!. agencies" nor are they dues."related to intelligence." , I t
goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, inter-?,.t.e,-;..i.,? ; Sorned a
,ay a court may rule l
i
"..'-; ,:'? authorized.. tat political act.ivities arc not
cues in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology
1 . suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy .".S..,!.'..-.?1::' In any case, at the urging of Alien Dulles, the National ?
;las been developed apace. And the $4 to $6 billion ht:Ira.g.??'!",..r,i1,:.!,' ? Security Council issocrl a secret.trective (NSC 10/2) in
spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest - '':`.,.,7',1948, authorizing such specia.1 operations of :dl kind
unreviewed" part of the defense budget.
' ,???:'?'.4'.'....;-'?:', provided they were secret and small enough to be pausibly ?
" -. ..
.??,-; .. .
Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Sc-' ' . ?dernable by the Government, 17...: . 1
_'e s .,,
corny Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the ...:'....,.. Even this authority has been exceeded sine everal im-
,
possible-to-deny operation's have been undertaken; the ? ..
problems posed by these developments. .
U-2 fliFht, the /31y of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the ? :
Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding ?? ii.?",'' Laotian War, and so on. , ? .? .
sie,nificance in its international political impact, is the Di- .,,.....:?:,..
rectorate of P The National Security Act, gave the CIA no "policelans of CIA, within which clandestine politi- ? ?.',.;,:'..'-????,
subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security
cal operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in 'ti.0
functions ..." But another secret Executive Branch (loco-
this newsletter, More and more, informed observers rives- .
e.. ,
tion whether. clandestine political operations ought to be ... ment evidently did give the CIA authority to eitqiee in
continued on a "business as usual basis In the absence ::. ' domestic operations, related to its job, It was under this
. ".. .:!!,
authority that such organizations as fonndations, educa-
of an investigation, a 'secret bureaucracy--which started ,ii?.:,
?, - s
in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war nnd 1.-,..';:?;',..
tional organizations and private voluntary group were
,
?. .., ' C
which grew in the CIA during a cold war?may simply :.......1- involved with the IA at the time of the National Student;..- Association revelations (1966).? '
:1 continue to practice a questionable trade. - l'??'''.;;;,:?-?? ? -,'"? ???? The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for
Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs' not only;';','.1.' "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably em-
abroad but at home, where they arc encouraged only too ' '.',!---,:????:. phasize the intelligence, rather than the manioulation
easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other .? t,. function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrase's, that
nations wrong? . - ? - j-.:r'::?'?,. gloss over it quietly, The public can easily it trie tie-
. .
Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, ..:???? ... .? ? sittibility of knowing as much as?possible. But. its ipStinets .
? ..t.iess'...?.
oppose doing abroad what it would riot tolerate riii,:lionie.
one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D..??.1.:?,r;:..:..s'
,?,..1.,,,,;!....? And it rightly fears that injustices coinmitted abroad may
I.asswell . wrote a comprehensive; and prophetic boo l.... i
,a,a,,,,`-;?...... begin to he tolerated at home: how many elect.'Ons can
"-',Iational Security and Individual Freedom." He warned
of the "insidious ,menace" that, a contintring'crisis might tf,et.,:.....'?:_.7?.)e. fixed abroad before it. he,gin to try it here? l'he:;:last .'
"undermine and eventually destroy free institutions," We .....N:r,,., cleclion showed such a degeneration of traditionio Ameri..
Would see, he predicted; 'pressure for defense expendi-'-;?:.0,...,S,San standards. ,
...' . s, ,'- ..
tures, expansion and centralization. of Government. with-.!,il''i...;;?!.' I he preent Director of Central intelfigence RiChard'
Helms, is working hard mid effectively at pres'enting an
holding of informition, g,eneral?suspicion, an undermining -,??;i'':',....,'),
of press and public opinion, a weakening, of politicalso.v0.3...ier Image of OA that will not offend. In a tea it speech,. he?
panics, a decline of the Congress, and' of the' courts. ? . ':.' 4;.,..?. 'aid: . .
: Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to,i,:i!'il'.-1.--).:??..-:':',.
"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our ? ?
government and our country leaves 6 uncomfortably ?.
?.
r reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. :wilicli.:?.;f:'.:.-,
aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . ., We propose tc ??
:.,., responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justIfy_a, i4,,;.. ?
adapt intelligence to American society, not vice ve.rsa,"
. : I loday? Li ...:;. ? .. ?
? ??? ,,,
Even construed narrowly,?this is no easy job, and adapt. ,,?
- - The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central ..?
.: hag clandestine political operations to American ideal's, ma:, ?
..? I.ntellieence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for .::.;
.
r:oordm well be quite impossible
ating the intelligence activities of the several rele-?'.:,!!/.....1...-
?ii:-".- At the time of the Day of Pigs, President Xemiedv- -..:o..c
vant government departments and agencies interested in .'? 1.:?',47..
i?'..'....scrious consideration to breaking CIA into two pc''?:
such matters, Today, a quarter century later, CIA is re-.',:?''''t???...
one piece would. conduct operations and the other .... ... ,
pocted to have it Inidut of -about $700-million to SI- "i'.:''!',.ro '
just critic:et intelligence. The dangers were only too evelen,
iiiWi,:i. and . a staff of lierliap 18,000 people, or aboid ;'-';''..'''': :
8,000 mow than the Devarttnen(. of Statel-TITi-s11(1-1 :''/.1....!,:??? II) Kcni"Y of l?ettinr? (4'.'ratinui' ibacti:-):1-`.'?/1\t'i(11!`.:1(101:tv
vnta iii
,....i.,.'!.., who \VCR.. accumulating lite inforn
aee in si-ie &es CIA an edge in interdepartmental :
,.,..,...V,... sisted on a united operation, arguing that separation wouldmec:rings for which for example others rn_.2y-ITT: too rushed ... ,
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App d For Release 2005105/26% CIA-RDP75B00380R000p0M0004J
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0 NEWSLETTER
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SPECAAL 1t11.1-'1)i"r
SECS( F.,T IN'i ELLIGENCE:
?
FED FR ATi ON OF AMERICAN SCIIAUTISTS ?
THE INTELLIGENCE CMWUNIT.Y: TIME FOR REVIEW?
:i.i,Vi..-....'..;.. ba inefficient and disruptive. Pon there are many areo?
.)
to fully prepare or riot be able to assign a suitable person
. ,..iiiii?it:,.,.. melds on both sides and the ? issue deserves continuiii-
e.
The National 'Security Act authorized CIA to . ....or ,??,...--;.: consideration: . ,. .
..... ffn particular, there i5 something to be ?said for dcddir,.
'perform for the benefit , of theexiving intelligence 11',:.:ii..-!::,.....now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by another De,-
aryncies such additional services of common concern t15,..i.::.,.,:::':,: tity Director for .Plans (i.e. clandestine opaernions), Tte.,
the Natimuil Security Council determines can be. tnorc..,i0:. would otherwist, tend to institution:1114C Cile notion thet
effectively accomplished centrally;
, , ,,..' l',`-::. ?.;...1 CIA-ItSCIf is run by the, organizers of clandestioe ;lens...tics
"perform such other functions and duties reintdr4 iu,:-..::,
., "il:.s.rather than by those who do technical Mtellieence. Indee6,
intelligrnce affecting the national ccurity as thc Na-',.;,. i,,. ;,-,?;:,i
Ion of bt-41,7,inc, in out-
tional Si:eurity ColApiirkbroodipot likeregt61200810#/Q,.: -CIA7111(61:NiEladiiA86C1,i61)601604-6/i 1
(italics added) .. '? '. . .: ..,..
? ?, (COU'IY.A.a1:::1) 2;11.:i'l.-1 ..,.',\C:-.;
. ? .. ,...
? ?
41
tleIpoRlIfFY715 0380R000300020004-7
, ? -:
snk. is : .- c. (IA. , ??
e,?tecederittal sccrecy concerning CIA's Inutgct ? -.'? SPII1IT 01--:.0:7;3 LIVEZ-? '.")ivi
,,I.?-?,-, .,.:,t.:1 ;c:. o.?.-c:carnin:illon. It is beim; argued. in a citi-, ''J lie. wrife.s ()SS veteran Franei.. f`,Ii:ter, "I,1-
::. n Nuit., ? ra't It i:: unconstitutional to., hi.de the appropri3, . hetit('d front 1)onovan Ith: lotr,hled iind mkehiovom
.., of OA in thc intdg.,,Is of other depArtments hccatr.e ?? , tn-eoetnpation nit!' :teruni awl the
Con.--.;:dotio,t ri-ovides,. in At tide ,I,. !...;!c.ti1,,,9, Ctatr.c. ; ? - tuie td Ow rv:dittl of that lei;ary." CIA incti, 1;:e
,?:' ()
.i: siti, SS prillecessors, have li:cen lin:TM:ilk e, free-oh,.. I.
. . . .
. ?,1,. ; Illr, III:1;re!6Ive, nod 011(11 1111)11.. poliina-,i', imowle:Iv--
. ....? ..
-,:
' No ioo.icy shall Oe drawn from the 'Ire:kitty huh in -..1.0 ...libie than their State Departnwitt eoth you.s. Ant%
co.d!.,equence of approptiations made by law; nit(A.no?;: like the them of I) 0 ii 0 v II II ' fi melioration, CiA
r,- .?:oti Stotortertt and' Account of the- 1?eceipts. aorlr.:.. "r.irooloi" abroad still resist headipiarters "interier-
Thores? of an public Ivfooey sltall ha published! ' cane in thtli- activities. ..?
Ji filliT 1.0 dote. (italics added). . . ?
. ---- I?. fiords SwIth,.OSS 7:he ..S'ecret Iii.. tory of Amer.
Ica 's First Central iirteitii,;cttcr Agency, Uoiversitr of
Not ol.iy t'in.: CIA expenditures but the distorted budger?
? "1r. - Caltiortila l'ress, 19/2, pi:. 302.
ici)m-It. oi. Othor agencies would seem to violate this pro- NI
s.:.ion. 'Tile petitioners call for A functional .brenkdoWn11,,.. . . p
-, - hopeful summi
h t conference 'in 1900 ano thus perpetusted ..
s'io,,eing i,,..eneral categories of uses of CIA funds mid rt ::.
ss dangerous tensions. Yet Ihis?was CIA's greatest claridestint:
bre.I'sdowit by nation shoWing ? Where funds have been :s.'
? ,-.1.? success! ? .
..... ? . . . , ,i :.
cit 1 n ly, them k tittle justificzition for hiding the totiii??c:,... In the case of the Thy of Pigs opertoion the djsastcr wa, ? .
...-\,,..!.t'. complete. CIA supporters of the plan became its advocate:
figure of CIA expenditures from the public and the Con
_:\
This itmrc reveals less to any potential enemy than 'I'l?'': and pressed it upon President Kennedy. According is?
'? the. sis'e of the IX:ferise Department budget?which Wu'.' sonic sonic reports, they even led Iiim to believe that the Fs1seti? '.
freely reveal. Releasing at least this overall figure .would ."::-:',1.. bower Administration had g,iveit the plan a go-ahead from .' .
makc unnecessary the hiding or (lie CIA ',wig' in: Uther.',.:-1,.'. which disengagement svould be embarrassing. Once the
ni:,cilcy budgets. This would stoi) an authorization rind;.;',.; Invasion started, they pressed for more American involvc. s
oppi-opriation procedure :which systematically and peren.s.'s?,': mcnt. The plan itself .was;' in retrospect; ludicrously ill. -
nially misleads Congress and the public, . ? ? ...:. i ,...;? S.?;1`.;.:, conceived. Despite the proximity of (:iiha. inteliieence-?
, ... ? ? ? ?
? '? : ? % .- ' . about the likelihood of tluiticcessary uprising was far too ?
'. Ploblems Posed by Clandestine' e ..-: ssee,
?...,...'. - optimistic. .
Political Operations Abroad
This failure had repercussions as well. It let the Presi- ?? '
CIA's four divisions concern themselves with SuPport.;i.?...,,:?dent feeling Insecure arid afraid that the Soviets thoueht :?-
12_ .?siqTechnology; Iritcili_gence, and Plans. Pres 5-.1'..-s him weak for not following through. It left the Soviets '?? ? ??
.,
s re:ports suggest that the _personnel -In . thcse dIvis164':?'?')';-fearing an invasion of Cuba in doe eoutse. -rhe stage was ? .....:
6-.66677-7:::i.. 'G ei for the missile crisis. Some belics.Ve that U.S. involve- ?
. numberespecTIT/-61-Y,-6,00-0,-4,000, 2,000 and
The Intelligence Division examines open and secret data';:,....isr ,rnent in Vietnam was also encouraged by Kennedy's fear ?.:
Mill prepares economic, social, and political reports ois ...._.; ?
? a . .?????:.J of being seen as too weak.?
situations, .. ? ?
. .. , , -?-?..s.se. Clandestine political operations obviou'sly have far- ?"
It is in the Plans Division that clandestine operations are
? i ,
? \
?
-andertaken. Former Deputy Directors for rlans have??'..,'...-reaching political consequences no one can predict. .! ? ?
I
been: Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, Richard' Bissel and.,..se-:-: ' Is the Burden of Secrecytoo tr;real??
,11 i
after 1962, Riciord'Helms?now thesDirector.of the Cik?-.?:2-` s The CIA recently brought ne.ainst Victor _Niarshetii, ..
,,...? s ,
itself. . ? ???' ? a former employee, for not submitting to them for .clear-
. .s ....
Does IlieCIA Pressure Presidents? . - . ance a work of fiction about spying operations. It iSl evi7
sl The most dramatic elandc'stine operations' obviodsly...1..:..)......dent. that the?CIA feared disclosure s about clandestine -op-
? -, ? crations or methods. The result was a "prior restraint" '?
I
ii have die approval of thc President But .as any bureaucrat ?::,1'. ?? d
. or cr without precedent in which fvfarshetti is prechided knows, it can be hard for the President to say "no"' to ..e.!. ,
,. from publishing anything, about CTA, fiction or not, with- ?
:?,i
employees witliartiatie-Ideas ii4-117are deeply. felt, :, (???
- I . ?,....,...out letting CIA clear it. 'rims a dangerous precedent ... ? ??
i _The U-2 and Bay of Igs operations?both tinder the .fs,....
ap,ainst the traditional freedom of . American press anti '.1.' ?
I . guicranee 6r ilicTi-;-irciliTs61?revca-tiris phenomenon.. In s:i..
; publishing is now in the courts fas a direct result of Gov- 's. ? .%
I both cases, the President (first Visenhower, then Kennedy) .,"...,,,, ?.?
.1 went siong-,-,Vitlithe plan reluctantly. In bud, eases, the ...,:.', discussed at home. This is a clear example of 1110 slate.
_ I operation c?ventually embarrassed them greatly. . - .1.1'.ment written by James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
. In the ease of the 11.2, President F.isenhower recalledee. (May 13, 1798), "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the '' ? ?
.. . 1,in''.: If one of these planes is shot down, this thing is ..'',Ioss of liberty at home is to be charred to proyisionsi..., ..
going to be, on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world' .?"ti against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."
. .? ?
be In a mess." Ile often asked the CIA; NVIiat liappens..4,;sy ?
?I if you're caught? They Would say It hasn't happened yet?;.'',...;: Must We Manipulate the Underdeveloped ll'oritl?,
I ?:,I For the clandestine (Plans) side of CIA. a large insti..- hut it was obvious that it would happen eventually. In --,"):.1: . ? , budget
. tultonalizeu now sees little future in the develosied ????
deed, two years after the 1960 crash, it was an agreed milLy' sl ? ,..i,
: ' I world. ?In the develOped free world, the stability of :Gov...,'. ;'.? tary estimate' dolt Russian rockets could hl at 63, 000e iis?
. ? ernments now tmikes political operations urinecessarVS'..1.11.-.1., ?
feet. Arid it was known. that these U-2s could flare out...e..? the
. ? ??-'.. t_ ,0111911mist developed world. these politic:II operations ' ......
t wieit polio v,,ould CIA itself have had th L
e self-controi ? i? . .
to stop the flights?
..... are largely impossible. Indeed, even intelligence collection ' ? ? ?
.
? ? ???1,.`? .hy traditional .techniques seems to have been relatisisly ????
..., ?
l?ss
Are the.RepercussionS Worth It? , unsuccessful. . ? ' ' . ?
,....;,.:
Wo lc articd a ere;it deal from' the U-2 flights. though ..',,,.. The. penetNition or OA by the Soviet spy, Philby, is ?
?,:' said to have left CIA with a total net negative balance of .
it s?ias of much less direct signiticanee to our security rind
t,soiciiiility than is commonly believed. The last U-2 kiwi ,',,,- effectiveness for, the years up to 1951..It comploielv do. '
siill had not found any Soviet .missiles other than test ye: ??? ?? str?Yed the Cll.\ ?.:7"1-st "nay of PIP?s'i---ti'll etTort to over-' ?
secret to he used C en
:. throw the Albanian Government in 19,1's which cost the
ii CL s. Bu t tl , c information was tOci V .. .
missile .. , lives of 300 Men, . ?:
ti,ough it was known to the Russians. At home,
p. Via% , still a popular fear based, on Pencil and paper.::: ' The only really .Important clandestine Soviet soui.,:e of ,
c.lteutiltions of "capi-thilities" Jather.-lhati? "intentions ?ot ,. -.Information .known publicly was Pankee'sk'hepohlis._
di sect , knowledge,"? AP, cool Foro jeftteachwotiao :- ciAL,FPFlq93P7q9. 0Q300988,994:7--,-,---
. _ ? . ,.. ...,-, . , , . ..)?,.;.'.... ? + ..1 , .i? ', : '?4 ? ki./IC "NEXT 1"/",..C;;....)
. ./
,
eminent efforts to act abroad in ways which cannot he
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. ' Tiill ItMitiT.,IGF.i'iCE COMIMITY: TIM FOR BEVIE1/ ? COF.TINURD .
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literature rnally?shows only one other.trinmph in penetrat-
i
rg Soviet secrecy with spieS: tTIZT)btaining of a copy of the '??? AGENTS LIKE FTIEEDON1 Oi'-' ACTiON ___..2... _ ,
secret speech by Kh rushchev denouncing .Stalin. ,But this ? Writing after the Ivor of his negotiations for the .sur
, speech was being widely. circulated to cadre aflit! Eastern .', render of the German forces in North lolly, Diii1e3
?? Euro-lean sources. Allen Dulles. on television,AR,Red-this . cautiously suggested:' "A n intelligence officer hi the
IN...) "one of the main?coups .of the time I was fat CIA]." .... ??,-.!.: field is supposed to keep his home office informed
'. 'Compared to the Soviet Union, the underdevelop0 'of what he is doing. Ill'Ii is Ci"i1C Inive bill 1)?'" Sonic
world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The GOC...:1 reser-1,11110mi i's he may overdo it. If, for example,
t
he tells too much or asks too often for instructions. ., ernments are relatively unstable and the 'societies pro-, I
be is likely to get some he doesn't relish, flint what is -
',, vide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the 1,.
xvorse, he may well find headquarters hying to lake
",? underdeveloped world lends itself better to clandestine . ?
. r of the operation. Only m
operations, these onerations are much harder to justify.
ove the is conduct cm the !Tot can real n anly plis,s judgment oil the detail-,
We are not at war?usually, not even at cold war-- ns co?ntrnsted with the policy deeisimi5. which. of
With the countries in the underdeveloped world. And they course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Dulles
rarely if ever pose a direct threat to us. whether or not added, "it Imi at ways amazed Inc how desk per.onnel
they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today. ?.' thousands of miles away seem to acipiii e wisdom and
? fewer and fewer Americans see ? the entire world as a ,? weird knowledge about local field conditions which
struggle between the forces of dark and light-----a struggle:, ... they assume goes deeper than that nvailahle to the
in which we must influence every corner of the globe.. .?. man on the spot." Almost without exception. Dulles
In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director H and other OSS otlerators feared the burden of n high-
cently said: ? .
Helms re- ...
levet decision that might cramp their freedom iof
. ? ? .. ..
._....
f ' ?I? . action. "
?1 ?? ?i; ?
"America's intelligence assets (sic), however, do not : . ? I?. Harris Smith. OSS The Secret flistory of Amer-
, exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat; .!'.,? irer's FirTt Central lnterrigence- Agency, University of
or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The'?' California Press, 1972, pg. 9. ?
.., ? United States, as a world power, either; is involved ..? .
, or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide tecting America's reputation--and that of is citizens thiing ''?,..- .:
range and variety of problems which require a broad, ,.? business there?from the constant miasma of sospiCion
and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy : , . . ,
: of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other court- .? ? '
' makers." .? - '5I, ?
. . . ? .. ? ? ' tries. Open sources would continue to supply the U.S. with ?. , ?
Thus, where the Office of Strategic ,Services (OSS) of , ? 80% of its intelligence, Furthe??inielligerce in the under-
World War II was justified by a hot ivar, and the CIA by ... developed world could bc collected by State, Department ??? ? , '
a_cold war, the present justification for intelligence activi- ? ? officials through embassies. This policy would enforce the? ,.,...
tics in the. underdeveloped world springs (wer .morc only - now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in ? i?',.!
from America's role as a "great power." ..: dealing with the Nations involved. ?-?: , 1?''.
. Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant. If lu- ????.-- Arguments against this policy include tl_ieset the area
,
. formation were all that were at issue, a strong ease could .;_?; is too important to U.S. interests to permit such Willi- ? - , ...
. ; be made for getting needed information when you need it, ?? ' drawal and the credibility of: the withdrawal would :''Irn ? ..
. throuah open sources, embassies and reconnaissance, But .ck hard to establish, at least in the short run.
.- .,
i?r?f clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then onc 7 . 2. Permit covert activities in the underdeveloped world ??; -
? ? 'requires long-standing penctratiorl of institutions of all ? only for information, not manipulation: This policy would- '...
. kinds and a great deal of otherwise unimportant infor- , -prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislatos's."%.
' mation necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers. I .., private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would .?
Political Control of Agent in the Vidal.. go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation f;p4r
s
.... non-interference in the affairs- of oilier countries. One
Ike:wise political operations are. so sensitive and, po-' ._ ?
;
might' for example, adopt the. rule sug,;csted by. I Iiirry ?
tentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be
mid
Howe Ransom that secret political opei-ations could'tesoicl control. But is this really 'Possible.? To each
. used only as an alternative to overt military action in -4-1 i
foreign movement of one kind or another--no matter how ; . .
? ' situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. seetrrity. -. :- ?
distasteful?CIA will assign various operatives, if only ?to' ??? , -1.
Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for: ! ?
get information. In the process, these operatives must':
espionage would leave the U:S. with a capability rot': .?
ingratiate themselves with the ruovenlent. And since they espionage would
the same agents that are secretly providint .,
arc operating in a context in which' subtle signals are the .1 .
information could secretly try to influence events. Hut [het , -? ?
r91c, it is inevitable that they Will often. signal the moVc- ?.? .% ..
-, ' ! is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose :..., Tient that the United States likes it, or might support it. -.
' ?
?:.,;Incleed, the agents themselves may think they are cor-. ? and for the other.
!. ,
, i, ?,' ..
reedy interpreting U.S. policy?or what they think it Also large scale operations would not be conducl?1??
' '-'
under this rule. According to some reports, the CoMmittk, .. ?
should bc?in delicate maneuvers which they control..
hat
for example, did it inean.When CIA agents told i... chuairc.Ly General Maxwell Taylor, that reviewed the 1
...---
Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possi- . P.- ' 1333' of Pigs episode,
, recommended to President Kennelly.: ?
ld
e" toTherp if 'a coup were mounted. (See Philadelphia (who apparently agreed) that the CIA be limited to opera-.. .?.. . , ..
,
. equipment no larger or more
.,. tions requiring military equipm ?
Inquirer, April 6, 1972 'VIA Role Dared in Sihano0 ,
.. compfex than stile arms?weapons wfiraieould be carried '
ouster."). ,--,----
- , b . .
No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy . y individuals. .
?3. Require that relevant reoresentotives of Courres ?
lions give rise. These problems would be dramaticallY v be
will . be insensitive to the problems to which these sines- ?.! .
..,.-, consulted before any clandestine operatious, beyond those '.
, -',.- .required for hitt:We:owe collection, ore .tvuiertokeu: it is ? :
diminished, however, if CIA were restricted to information
an unresolved dispute, between the Excentive and LeF.is-,
gathering and were known to be. The movements would -;. .
; ...! when the lixecutive . Branch ..
then cease to look to CIA for policy signals. - ?? lative Branches, whether and
. ...., may undertake operations affecting U.S.. foreign policy
Alternative Controls on CIA .1.-.- without consulting,- Congress. If a clanCstine. political
What alternative positions might be considered toward :.. operation Is important- enough to take tar. always high ,
CIA involvement abroad? There arc these olternative pos. ..,,. risks of exposure, it should be important enough to consult
wpilities: . : J ,
, - ; ,. Congress. These consultations can produce a new. per--
i. Prohibit CM fiiierotions I . crAcrkoprop5togalkiRoogsb4620004,47111 ill) po r(anz. The ',..
rievelopert world: ThJ, : ? . ,
1,;r!'", ? ' - '.':..-T.:.'..'.: : i ;.'.j.;.-.','..:A.:,: ( coimiaizti .1r..-i. il:-.G2.,)
s"
el
I.
:
???
i . ' ? 7
s?
? t. I, . 'rt l? .
........._ _
;(1.; 7CF,Tiff.t.I.Th';lial C',0?IMQ1:1:`Irk: TI311:: Foil nr.vinttrz " . ,
! ,
1 .? .
.
( :10 in 0 a II 0 f OM Nl. IMPW. kfi 11 fkittAgikgAMIN24 71-daRBP75B043380ReaM002006*-7--+- . .. .
cIlle. of t k who
he w predicted auctu::.?tely tilt political con
r
--'?,,. ciA hlECOiVIING'A 1lliliTtiv.,7 r
':j?
. .
5Cquc?ce3 of the Day of Pigs operation..
While the Institutional forme of politienl control ,.?..
ii('
. 4. Require that the ombasstplor be advi. it) of covert :,.: nppenr effective find suflicient, it is rreilly the will of
?pore-1110ns in the nation to Which lie. IS accredited, ttfouitor.0 .-.,.
' tile 110110C111 officials who must exert control that is
compliance with Congressional oversida: ,Undcr the l,71,1- 1 111;1)0011ot and that hns most .often been liteldn,,,,. ?:?;',',-. ...
ncdy Administration, after the Bay of Pirrnetter wrnt1;.-.. Even Ivlien the control le tight rind effective, :., more
to all eni-bassics ithirming the authority 01 rhiTAmbassat',0cI? important question may concern the cmcilt Co v,flicit
over the -representatives OVC.T.A:Tilit tfil, authority is l'. ?; CIA infornintion and policy judgments affect political . . ? ? '..
VAliously interpreted tin-Crir-rightile periodically thrilled ?? decisions in fore;gri :inks, .. ? ; .
told strengthened. One method of policing the order would i :, Whether or not political control is being exercised,
involve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional ' the more serious question is 1)hether die very exist-
staff who would quiz the Ambassndor to be. sure that he '. enee of no efficient CIA. cruises the U.S. Government ?
to rely too much on el rind estioe and illicit nc tiviti es,
knew at least' as much as did they about local covert .
3
activiti back-rilley tactics. subversion nod what i known in
es. Another control would require that Assistant ,
Secretaries of State knew about d olTicial jargon as "dirty trielts.'.'ie covert activities in their ??
region. In all thesO cases, political oversight and political Finally regardless of the facts, the CIA's reputation
iri (lie world is so horrendons mid its role in events
perspectiv.c would be injected into operations that would, 8
so exaggerated that it is becoming ri borden on Amer-
otherwise, be largely controlled ,by an intelligence point of e. .icOn foreign policy rather than- the secret .weapon it
view. '
.was intended to be. 4 - .
, Improper Ike of Force ... . , . .0.- The New York?Times, April 25,
. .. . __I ?
One morally and politically important imperative seems .,
, clear: ArIopt mu! announce a firm rule ogninst murder or :,; ? fotuldations"7. (Saturday Evening. Post 5 / 20?/ 1967
..i torture. there are repeated and persistent reports that this , p Speaking OW, nage 2) ' . -
rule. does not exist. There was the murder by a Erecn beret, ... President Johnson appointed a:panel headed by then. ,?:! :
.. . ?
?
..There k the Phoenix program involving widesnrcad assas. .
Undersecretary of State Nicholas dell. Katzenbach to'? ? ',-.
,sination Of "Vietcong agents "---many; of which, it. is re- .??.,
review this aspect of CIA operations, The 'other panel ??? '
? ported, were simply the victims of internal. Vietnamese .?
members Were IWAV SCCretAri John Gardner (a former. ? ,
rivalries. Some years ago, the New York limes qnoted One e
OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was
of the best informed men in Wnshington ni having asserted ,
, , to study the re! ti 1 ; 1
a..misnip netween CIA and those "eduen- '
? ? that. "when we Cate!' one of them fan enemy new], 't ::.1 tional and private voluntary organizations" which operate
?:? becomes necessary to get everything out of them and we...I. abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such
do it with no holds barred,"' .
- .., organizations could ''play thei'r proper and vital role,"
? There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor
-- ;`' The Panel recommendations wcre as follows:
3\.farchetti, formerly eicctitive: assistaRt to the?geputy,:..i.,c: ? ' ' .. . .,
- '
Dire tor of CIA:
? ..t ' -e,......,?, , :,? I. It should be the policy of the States Govern- :- ? ::..,
mcnt that no Federal agency shall provide any covert , ? ,
"The director would conic. back from the White noose .!?.:... financial assistance or support, - direct or indirect, to
and sliike his head and say 'The President is very, very,...,.. any of the nation's educational, or private voluntary
- ' - ....,...?
upset about We agreed that the only solution , ?,..ore,anizations.
...
was _______.? But of course that's impossible, we can't :. . 2. The Government should promptly develop and estab.7 ?
be responsible for a thing like that.' .. 11tha public-private mechankin to provide public fonds
'The second man would say the same thing to the third
,.... ? openly for overseas activities Or organizations which ate
man, and on' down throukh the station chief in sonic
. adjudged' deserving, in' theN national interest, of public
country until somehodyi.tslent ;out and ? "Id support. ?? t!' '
nobody was responsible.". (Parade Magazine, "Quitting
the CIA," by Henry Allen'.) .. I ... .....----dy: On March 29, 1967, President'lohnson said he ae-
.....cepted point I and directed all Government agencies to
Problems of Clandestine Domestic Operations
1
?
Implement it fully. Ile said he would give "scrims con-
After the 1966 revelations' that the Central Imellig,ence ''' .., ,
? . ' smeranon" to point 2 but tipparendy never implemented it,
Agency had been financing time National Sttuknt Assceia-*
When these operations were firsteproposed by Braden,
. tion, a variety of front organizations land conduits were :.
Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting:
unravelled which totaled about 250. The. CIA gave its .1
Thero is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold
'
? money directly to foundations which, in (urn, passed the ' ,., ?
. . war." Twenty years later, though We -are no longer in any
secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups. organ- 'm
risk of the cold .war," some would like to continue
izations and study projects. These, in turn. often.sopported , "losing -- i ?
despite the regulations'
individuals.)'-fhe organizations Included National Utica- , ?
At l
tion Association, Afriean-AMedean Institute, American , east?one influential forMer CIA official's thirilting -....
Newspaper Guild, International DeVelopment Foundation, :-' was simply tto move to deeper cover. And sympah(or
r ...', .
thi.s approach probably goes very deeply into the so-call'N
end many others. ?
"Establishment." For example, when the National Student ???'...,
The way in which these organizatIOns were controlted ..
. Association scandal broke, those who ran the liberal, now
was subtle and sophisticated in p fashion .apparently ?
char-defunct, Look Ma
nc.terisfic of many clandestinq CIA operations., Thus, yMagazine, were so incensed at general ex-
while distinguished participants, in the Congress.. for Cul-thirty years (I) defending the studerit7,. In such an atmos-
tura' Vreedom and editors of its magazine. Eitcountervi- ; ,
/mere one must expect liberal' (much less conservative) ..:
(Indy believed that the orgarlizaelon5 were i-1-61ig' onlY . inunciatinac and bankr, to cooperate whole-heartedly wiih .. .
what came naturally, the CIA ollicial who set the entire ?, -ie
tt CIA whatever the cover. '.? 4
covert program in motion, Thorna3 NV.. :ill-Aden. saw it this; .,.
In tiny case, what could sti.elt deeper cover be? in the
Way: '
., . . ? ? . first place, commercial establishincot. or profit-makine . 7'
"WC had placed one agc.rit in ft Eli rope b a s t cl organiza-'? oroni.tations ore exempt from the ban lience, with o; ? ',.
(ion of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural without: the acquiescence of the ofilciais of the enittp4n7...
Freedom. Another Agent became an . editor . of .1.--n1,-,,..!CIA agents might be placed in strategic positions. ? It n ? ??
counter. The aryls could not only propose ruttoConi,,,1 possible also that organizations, whicli seemed to
monist programs to the ofticialleaclers of the organiza-
tions but they could t?Ary were actually ineorporate.ri in such a way .14:;6 '0(
also "C'gc't vglY5. nrul inentl t? ' n'irotit-rnaldiw, Mee possibilities include enrielL110 indi?
solve the inevitable budgetary prohlents, Why not sec .? . ? .,..! .i. -1 . ; ,...,?,:
it die needed money cOuld bq obtained From "Ameritan . ' ? -.;'''...:?,'.'., ?? ' ; 4'. (610,ai.71510 .1',7,>,cri a;)
.. - ?
. i
l
.13
!city, InTErAPPAXIct;FigICEttieittseri2i9.01A42Q141fikiN7RDP.75B003,80R000300020004-7
..... _
vidnak by throwing, business their way rind having them"
CIA CHANCING. P Eit:;ONALI-CY
imlividuals support suitable philanthropje enterprises. ?
net.
here are still SINISNIVC, progressive men the CIA,
To die extent that these arrang,enternsamiFh voltintar)
y
orgaidiations, they pose the sante proldems which.createc
Imithe Agency' nre s carebecoming scarcer by no, moment. Theer trainees no. longer conic from the Phi
dic distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved Presi? Beta ranks of Harvard.. Vale, or Berheley, The
_
dent Johnson was.seitsihrehen it pro : ,Agency is widely r.egarded on colleg'e campuses as
Indirect" sit port Moreover, in the coming gcneration:itsvc the principal symbol of an that is wrong %%id. our
. can expect is coMinuation of the existing trend toward nation. "For the world is N sn IMIC," In role A mold
whistie-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to Toyolice recently., "the CIA lois uon- become the
bogey that C0111 1111111k11.1 11:15 been for A Iticrica. 11.ber-
keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the most
ever there is trouble, violence, suffering. tragedy. the
"indirect" support may eventually become known. ?
rest of us are mot. quick !?uspcel the ci A h.is
All of these deep cover arrangements are made 'midi
baud in it." Millions of college students and soling
easier by (Inc intelligence community's so-Called "alumni professionals, the fotore Vplorer rine" of ilie'Oriited
association." These 'arc persons who are known to. States, would accept that judgment.
community through past service and who .arc willing
R Harris Smith, 055 The Secret 1/i.story of Amer- -?
turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sornctiines....,.. 'Co First Central inselligence Agency, Um'rersify .of
"'eh more is involved. Examples from the Pa:a include California Pros, /972, pg. 382. -
thcsc. A high official of CIA's predecessor?the Office ?.
In any case, us the distaste for CIA g?ows, CIA has p
of Strategic Services (OSS)?becomcs head of the CIA-
financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another moral obligation to stay out of the lives of those who do
becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends . not wish Co be tarnished by association with it. In one ?
of the Middle East. A Deputy Director of State Depart- country, it is reported; CIA put funds into the bank tic-
merit. Intelligence becomes President of Operations and posits of a political party without its knowledge. hut whar....?
Policy Research, Inc., a CIA conduit which financed ? if this were discovered! Obviously, CIA could lightly risk ?
"studies" of Latin American electoral processes. (This::: - the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate.: ...
official is simultaneously well placed to 'arrange stnclics;..H by trying to help them secretly. ?
of elections as the Director of the American Political TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE
SLiencc Association!). . ;.; Defense Intelli.!,,ence Agency (1314):
Thus, a large nod growing domestic network of persons The Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence acencics
provided such parochkti nod' biased inte lligence estimates ,7
trained in dissembling, distortioni-nod 1111111:M
.lion, may be growitig in our country. And the use of these in the late fifties that they were removed in 1 961 from the ??1
kinds of skills may also be growing, more acceptable..... Uitcd States Intelligence Board ( US111) and replaced by
Dinning the Republican campaign for President, n memo- . a new supervisory organization: thc Defense Intelligence .?
random went out ton-CpuTdican coll-CF,C organizers w/OcIt- Agency (DIA). DIA's job Was to .coordinate all of the.
urged them to arrange a ni-6-ek election and gave _what ? Defense Department's intelligence resour:es- and analyses.
.sccmcd to be pointed hints about how to manipulate. the Allen Dulles had feared that CIA and DIA Might become
erection. rivals and coMpetitorsi apparently, this has become the ? .
?
This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia ?
that divides Americans from one another. It makes them
-ask questions about tW-r?,,associates,7751licagues.
secre-
tarics and acqmaintances?questicms that are destructive'
'of the casn'M and trusting at traditional in Amer-
' ica, (Already., unbelievable numbers of persons cern to
assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.)
As tire public sense of cold war dissipates: the American
distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow.
' The occasional disclosiire of. any "dirty trick" or political
..manipulation spoosoro.'d:by CIA will certainly deepen (114
' sense of unease, lit the Old, as now, nOny of the best am.
most syhisticated college graduates will not beiTiTn
to work for the CIA, And mLfessional consultants Viill
discouraged .as well, The rilli7717-717.77.7-77Taractei
of the Agency in suell'a way as to further threaten Ameri?
can values,
, One method. in the American tradition, for keeping CIA
honest would Inc a puhlic-ititercst organization of alumni
or the intelligence community (and those who are. serviced
?by hnelligence in the G(nvernment). This public interest
' group would, as do so tormY others, offer its testi."'" to'l
Congress on ?matters of interes.t to it?in this case, hitch ..?
The estimony might be givcn in public or in exec- ;
otive session, as appropriate; And Constructive suggestions
and criticisms could be made. ?
Such an organiiation would have us credibility and ati-;.!
dimity that no other group Can. have and a general knowl-
? edge of the relevant intelligence problems facing the natioul:.
mid public, It goes without saying that no one in tIns
organization, or communicating with it, would?violate
laws, or oaths, associated with classified mr(Wmation_. The
Federation of Ainerieon Scientists' strategic weapons coin...,
mince is an example of the feasibility .and
by which a group of persons,. well grounded in stra-
tegic arms problems' can, Without vihlating'aily rides on
er policyr .?
mi ne such information, tit:aka -informed antfuseitil
. In 7
July, 190,7theTitiel Chairman of the lilno RirlbOq
pronouncements. Man ersons constilted,tn Lte, ;
0511 ,
or this ocw'sredai. ndorcd-1113 StIgeSS,1011.
" ? ? ??
:I, ?
By 1964. DIA had: merged the intellirence publica- .
tions of the armed services into publications of its own:
?
launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the .
"Central Intelligence Bulletin:" supplanted J-2. (Inc in,-
telligence staff of the Joint Chiefs; replaced the servicc:.
in providing "order of battle", information and had bas,
ically reduced the services to,.ilte. role of collecting rim
intellig,ence. ?
A number of informed observers have neverthelew
suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and .that in
functions could well be taken over 'by CIA. Others. will ?
Pentagon experience, have noted That there is ho way in
prevent the military services' from having intelligencr'?'
branches and--that being lite 'case?DIA is necessary
sit on them and coordinate their conclusions: In rim; case.
in contrast to CIA's reputation for competent normally'
disinterested analysis,. DIA and the. intelligence service
i_-
pose real questions of thlundrincy, Waste, service ?
and inefficiency: ?
: Both of the Appropriations CommitteeS of Congreo
-arc convinced that .1.1tic is such ,Waste in Defense
Dc-
partnnient Intelligence. 'In 1971, the House Committer '
reported:
The committee feels that the intelligence operation of
Y. the Department of Defense has grown beyond the actual
? needs of the Dcpartincnt and is now receiving tin in-
or( mate share of the,liseal resources of the Department. ,
Redundancy is the watchword in many intelligence
nip-
erinticnnc The Milne inforunicutioin is ounihit and obtained
by various means and by virions ory.anitakons, co-
.: ordination is less effective than it should be, Far more
matetial is collected ?than is essential. material is col- ?
lected which cannot be o:altiated in a reasonab'e lengd;
,.. of time and is therefore Wasted. New intelliwneo me4.0A.
; have beeoroe available. and have been incorpor4ed
into the 'migrant Avithoul offsetting reductions inIiI
? oroccclores; ' ?
, ?
.?
? 41;iprOlie,CI'POr,R0446;i4:50/06/20 OS4,000'768 '030R0b030002q004.7
. . ,
? iVere. SVI\ NtiTt)N. Ap".150WaticciFIV?4 mm a%V 0 /1.3./ 0
o ? ah-iiiiii7iidilithiFibiiiiitobih&CC.41i7
coiii,,;Ifvo n Fool-Igo I e n ions, its on in me e.
Ler Of thepp mitte
Aropliations Come mid Ore rank. I'Vc "rc flointl to have to lake n harder look ..iI Intel-
ligeliee rt:quirements, Ilecantie they drive thl i ;IcIli-
inr, i?ember ut Atined Services, I respectfully plead " genee process. In so dolor, they Create de mand!. far
mit)) Inv CI knot's to iitlioy isie to receive in executive lc,
remnircc.s. '1Vre is a. kurlencv for requirements-- .
session eiiimeti intelligence information to in bun wire stairtl?to admire immortality.
form on intellieent joilionent on titatterglitViich so One requirements question we will risk mirs.:Ives is
yitaily piled our security; nod so 1 chin void lo corn.
5%hether we 51im1t1 maintain ii world-o lite daia base,'
inittee mid on tlie floor of the Senate on the 1ui5is ?f cnItected in advance. as insurance ogainst the con-
the Nets. There have been scvcrn1 eases INherel.r liur,enLy that we may heed some of this data in ii pare
have tint been able 10 do that in ilie past. In niy;
ticolar situation. Much of this 101Ormalion can be
oplolori, 0115 lack of disseminated Informiolon hns o acquired on veil. short notice' by reeronnis?.:ince
a
cost the country n veal tlerd.of treasure niul 0 limn- ? means. As for the rciiininder, we arc ening to have to
her of Auto-iron lives. accept the risk of not hal
from Congressional Ilecord-Settate ,..-, int! complete informatioo
on some pails of the woild? 1Ve haven't enough re- '
? ?.? ' November 23, 1971,S.19.52c t?inire?:s to cover everything. arid the hiett Oriotily .. ,
? Report on ? Odense Department problems Gilbert Fitz.- .. missions have first call on Iihat lye do have.
' ' Iniele told a press totiferente'. "I believe that Old Pcittacorie:''). --- lion. Robert F. Frorlitke, Socciat A ssivata to .the ,
L',"-'-'?
, sutlers froin toi) much intelligence. Thee can't use what ?????,:il. Srcretarv of7579-inntellegenee, .Tune 9, 1971
betoreitefrnse,Appropriations Subcommliter,71otiv(
t Cv....y rct because. there is' so touch collected. It would ? ?,!';?
,. of ftepre.centatives, ?
I.. tilmost be better that they didn't have it becrttate jeA ?t:-? A ? :?
diniCtill to rind Out what's important." Ile went on to 'I';' rarbeommittee on Intelligence Operations. - ? r .?
?
? suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much tictail.w ,Ork. ?-*; The subcommitee of Armed Services on Cl,' Ii is not. '? 7 ':
aild (00 hi tie looking ahead in the five-to-fifteen year.,;'-' ; met for at least two years?although SCrIZIlor symintIon,, '-. --
Y % ? ? .? I i
,calips. ... .. . ? a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure
Norio/rut Security Agency (V?ref.): .. .. . .. ? a Incetinr,. In .1971, Senator StenniS and Sv?nator Elk:a- ?
? ., ..,. - , .
In 1952. a Presidential diretive.-ser tip the National . ? der?then the Chairmen of oic ra A rrned-7ineirees and ? .:
Security Af'..cricy as a separate 'ail.vicy: inside the Defense ..,'...;.: Appropriations Committees (as well i1fi of their f..'1A 611b? ? . ti
?,.. a.
. Dep;%rtment. NSA's ;basic Chlticl are to break codes of'''..:1?? (ommittees) Said they knew nothing_ about the CIA. .-e.? ?
? . other.Nasrions, to 'maintain the security or U.S. codes. and '/..,1'. financed war in Laos?surely CIA's bierest operation:
".'
to perform intelligence functions with regard to electronic ?-? (.2ongressional HcconCiqovernbcr 2, 1971, pg. Si 9523
and radar emissions, etc. In 1956, it had 9,000 employees.' 519530.)
Today, it is thought to have 1.5,000 and a.budget well over,
..??????-? The Congressmen ;are u?derstandably reluctant even
?
abillion.
. . -.. . . !'".' .o know about intelligence operation. Without publicity,
In August 1972, an apparently well-informed former it.', ? Ind public support, there is a limit to their influence over
employee of NSA wrote a' long memoir for Ramparts ' ??? 'he events about which they hear. And if they cannot
Magazine. The article summarized the author's .elaime ,.?/: appeal to their constituency, the;knowlcdge of secrets only
by saying: . . ? . . .1.te makes them wines-able to the Smear that they leaked a
., t
"... NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet airplane i :.:. sccrct or mishandled their respOnsibilities. . ..........e.
the numbers on the side of each plane, the name of the LY3 Approximately 150 resolutions ba\tc been acted ini'''...
? pilot in command;' the precise longitude arid. latitude of 7e'i.! the Congress to control the CIA and/or other intelligence ..,...'
every nuclear submarine; the Avhereabouts of nearly, .,.? functions. The most common resolution has called for a ..- - .'? e ' '
?every Soviet VIP; the location' of every Soviet missile. ?Joint Committee on Intelligence, and-: there is much to Ile
base; every army division, battalion and company?its
i
w commandere
? eaponry, and deployment. Routin said fort. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to
ely the ?'-:* review such matters might strengthen Congressional .
NSA monitors all Soviet in diplomatic and '.:et) eight.
over-
mcreial radio traffic, including .Soviet Air Defense. Tay- -1-wo more recent OTort$, both sponsored by Sen. ator ,
tical Air, and Kcill forces. (It was the NSA that ?(ottnk.1 ? ?
?
Swart Symington, have tried different tacks. One rcsolu- i
'Cite Guevara in Bolivia through radio coMmunications
? tion called for a Seleet.Committee on the Coordination of '
intercept and analysis.) NSA eryptologic experts seek ?
to break every Soviet code and do so with remarkable ? U,S. Government activities abroad:. such a committee ; ?
success. Soviet scrambler and computer-gencrated'sig- ?'!, would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities ? 1??-,; ?.
? nals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary voice and In particular. Another approach called for limiting the
manual morn(' radio transmissions. Interception of., ???:,... U.S, intelligence expenditures of all kinds to 54
Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to guatte quite pre- . Senator Clifford Case (Rep., N.J. has sought Co control ??'
?.
ciselv (he effectiveness of Sm.iet Air Defense units i ili-r;Vii\--by offering recolutiotisal simply ninth; o"any '??;:.: .?
Methods have been devised to "fingerprint" evcrv aeency of the U.S. Government." These re soluti? m- ?
?ef t
human?voice used in radio transmissions and distinguish
them from the voice of every other operator. The
' Accucy's Electronic intellie.eriee Teams (ELINTI .are
enelable of intercepting any electronic signal transmitted
anywhere its OW world and.'from on maly5is of ihe.
? intercepted sienal, identify the transmitter and nhvs-'
ic.div. reconstruct it. Finally'. after having shown The
cile and sensitivity of the Aeencv's big cars', it isatmost
sunerfluous Its twin( out that NSA monitors and records ,
men' trails-/S Oct:11100e call." ?
A July 16,? New York Times' 'report noted that "c:t-.
tensive independent checking in Washington with sources,
;Intl out or Government who .were familiar with int?
tellieence matters has resulted' in the corroboration of
mans' of (the article's.; revelations," Expertai had denied.
however. the plausibility of the assertion that the ;.ormiell..
reeed code:: of the Soviet Union had been broken,
body existing restraints on DOD which, (JA was ?mem.
venting: e.g.,. he sought to prevent expenditure of funds?' ?
? "Tor training Cambodian military.forces. In short, Senator
%:?CaSe is entrdlOSIZinr, the (act thaft CIA is a statutori
signed agency, which Ccmgreq? empowered, and which ?
;..???,? Congress can tontrol. I
?I Congress has not only Oven the 'Executive branch W.:. ?
blank check to do intelligence but it has not even ;nsisted
.1,e on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 19.17 ' ?;*?:' . .? ? ,
??????,, requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intellie,ene,7 ;??,?!
? ?
to the national security and prov:itie for thr applopriate.
dissemination of s iie It intelligence within Me invent- ?
'"ent ? . ." (italics added)eAs far as the legislative branch
? 'of "government" is concerned, ;his tins not been 00,Q,
On July 17, 1972, the Foreign 'Relations Committee re-.
: ported out an amendment' (S. 2224). to the National
:tinily Act explicitly requiring the CIA to "inform fully
and currently, by means of reeular and special reports"
CC/(`iGilESSIONAL. ovrinsiGH-r OF II-117:
INITi:l..LIGI-3NCE COMMUNITY'
.the C'ornmittees on Foreign Relations and Armed S.7rvices
1 nu eadi lions,: of congress, the Armed Services and .1" both liouscs and to make special reports in re.ponse
Appropriations Committees have a subcommittee that is;
to weir requests. The .Committee? proposal. sponseued by -
..typo.;ei.1, in principle; to oversee ,,CIA. In the louse of e!. Senntor?John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasi. upon
P?errcc(-sntalivcs. even One ilarlIn of the?-APi`c?c'Pri'tk'15 .. ? ,the.,existing precedent whereby .the Joint Atomic l'Alcoi:y
subzur.iniittee menthers.arc secret, Iii ,the.Senate,?the .116..e-eetcorninittee gets. specie] ? reports (corn, k-)0.0 .on iteenie
tenior ilierilherli of the Aporopritillon Committee Silent .0
Mora" Intellieenec ?
' ..1 : ?
Aj3f)reNitd.FOr. Release -.26.05/65)20. 75600380R0 Ci300020004-7
. .
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, .
, , ? `? - ?
?
SCIENCE,4P139PY901Fq19RP,Ie2V40121:105/05/20 : CIA-RDP75130038011000300020004-7
FAS: Reviving Lobby .0 ICs
ABM, Scientists' 1,1):114
After 20 years of limited activity, a
once-outspoken scieneelobby group, the
Federation of American Scientists, is
111111ille an effort to live up to its own
slogan as he voice of science on Capi-
tol I till."
In 1945, within months of ,Ffiro-
shima and Nagasaki, 3000 scientists
acro ,s the country, who were connected
with building thesmtomie bomb, band-
ed together to prevent the military from
gaining, exclusive control of atomic en-.
ergy. '1 he issue at the FAS today is?
in two words--arms control, with em-
phasis chiefly on the Antiballistic Mis-
sile System (ABM) and on the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Vi-
enna, which reopened this month.
The men who founded both FAS
arid, its parent organization, the Federa-
tion of Atomic Scientists, in 1945, 'were
mostly physical scientists. Among the
principals were Leo Szilard, Lyle Borst,
Ifarold C. Urey, and William lligin-
botham. Many original members still
sit on the FAS Board of Sponsors or on
the governing group, the l'AS National
Council, Those original members still
dominate FAS membership today. But.
it is now a quarter of a century later;
that' base-line 3000, which joined in
1945, has dwindled to approximately
one-half, Iffid FAS is seeking new imd
younger members among biologists,
-
chemists, social scientists, and engi-
neers.
The latest Chapter in FAS history is
it revival attempt, which began in 1968
and now, in terms of active organizing
and lobbying, is almost 1 year old. Dur-
ing meetings in 19611 and 1969, the
Council decided to expand itself, the is-
sues it studied, and the FAS overall
membership. Most important was the
decision to hire a .full-time lobbyist-
director.
share ol the cmoit tor tone (let eat ol the
Mayslohnson Bill, which would have
left the door open to military control
of the. atom, and for the creation of
the Atomic Energy Commission
( A EC )
. 1 The style of science lobbying was
much the same then as now. The pyra-
- midal structure of the science profes-
sion enables a few, well-known scien-
tists to speak pubticly with a weight
disproportionate to their number. Thus,
the postwar FAS lohbies consisted
mainly of private meetings between
congressmen and the most prestigious
scientists who could he drawn to Wash-
ington to talk on a given question.
These years also saw the develop-
ment, with FAS assistance, of one of
These decisions were part of a spirit
of activism felt by many scientists over
the then-hot issues of Vietnam, mili-
tary funding of research, and the ABM,
Eliot the social responsibility bonfires
of 1968 have become somewhat damp-
ened mid smoky in the comparatively
uneventful months of 1971. Thus, al-
though FAS's lobbyist-director, Jeremy
J. Stone, enters his second round of
congressional lobbying this month on
ABM and SALT with a warm wel-
come from his fellow opponents of
ABM in Congress, FAS's drive to gain
on active rank-and-file membership
'is meeting a somewhat cooler response.
The Scientists in 1945
From 1945 to 1947, the Federation
of Atomic Scientists and its successor,
the FAS, conducted a bustling lobby
supported by 11 enthusiastic site groups
at atomic laboratories and universities,
These two groups arc given a solid
the most. enduring science-government
institutions, the seminar breakfast,
where one or two scientists?whenever
possible, well-known ones?explain the
technical intricacies and policy impli-
cations of an issue to a privately con-
vened group Of congressmen.*
hut after that early activist period?
in which FAS members even consulted
with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer on a movie
about the bomb titled "The Beginning
or the End"?FAS became what its
older members variously describe now
mrs "a sleeping giant," "geared only for
crisis action," or "virtually nonexist-
ent,"
But although FAS's profile appeared
to have sunk so low that, to some peo-
ple, it was barely visible, FAS did a
number of things between the late
19-10's and 1968: It backed the crea-
tion of the National Science Founda-
tion: it reported on chemical and Ili?,
logical warfare before they became a
public issue: it helped obtain more free-
dom for foreign scientists' entry into
the United States and for U.S. scien-
Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020004-7
I ii,?1 aln oad. And dm Mg I ic
!'cAj5'6rdvedr.)...iPPereae
ailed sLi(1111.SIS 11110 11011tidellikk
lin\c h)y.111V was tinder fire,
Two important campaigns in matters
.t1omic during this so-called "dormant"'
wow a stIc-6-1Nskti camPatgu 10
11,1\-?,. the unitod Nations appoint an in-
i,,?rnational committee to study the ef-
fects of radioactive fallout in 1955,
and a breakfast seminar program in
1061 civil defense,
1:,N5 also tried to protect the inter-
] e:Is of its constituency, the scientists.
1 When Allen \L. Astir), director of the
;"?:ational Bureau of Standards, was
tIi reatened wit Ii the loss of his job as a
ii-sult of the NI1S stand on battery ad-
ditivcs, FAS took part in his defense.
When Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of
the AFC, was nominated to be Secre-
tary of Cimmieree jn 1958, FAS joined
the opposition to the nomination.
A full-time office in Washington was
maintainecl for most of the. 1950's,
v.hich put out the FAS Newsletter, a
1.-,ti,in publication to Science and Pub-
11.,. .-11fdrs: Rullctin of the Atomic Set-
c,tti,fv, also born during the postwar
1 , ak wile scientists' movement. During the
1u,,o's attorney Daniel Singer, general
' counsel to the FAS, served as a part-
limo Wdshington coordinator.
1 he scientists who formed FAS in
were primarily physical scientists
? cAlco Icimt,:111 Soillh, A Peril and a Hare!
71, Alovemeni I,, Amrrlea 1945-47.
(I ol 4%1 f!,) Presn, ChIcor,o, 1065) (Library
or cotylo, Cainlorolo N. (i5-17300).
whose galvanizing issue was the bomb;
by 1963, the most active members on
the Cotineil were not these but a young-
er group whose held of interest was .
strategic weapons and the arrnsl race.
According to Leonard Rodberg, in
967 and 1968, when scientists in Sc-
attic and Chicago revived local FAS
Hi.ipters to fight proposed local Anm
imlallaiions, the Council began to think
of the whole FAS as a potential vehicle
for a national campaign on arms race
issues,
? FAS in Transition
But such a drive needed a full-time
lobhyist in Washington, and, as an or-
ganization historically composed of and
11111 by scientists, the rather improbable
hybrid of a scientist-lobbyist seemed
best. In the fall of 1969, the Council
decided to find a director and double
'AS's yearly dues of $7,50 to pay him.
1 collard RodlnAibplilisqdti Fli9rtAgyetr
it' of Mat viand and now at the !mak
I "I' I :dud" Voir, Junr oi the ne,,ve!,t
2005/05/2a :!! UN-RCMP 75 Be 038 MOO 030 OM 0 04n7
II. p:ner;11 book on the
ornc; race, Bare. 1,, Oblivion, 5 nod is
now Chancellor or dm university of
California at La Jolla.
Topether ;.;ton,?, ;;s indefatigable leg
Mall for the or:raniz.ation, and York,
as the impcceakhy, ercdentiallcd expert
at the lop of I Iii 1ca(i1inic heap, have
made a foriniclalle tcron- -and the key
to the rise of LAS's 'profile on Capitol
Stone give:-; Yolk much of the credit
for 1hj. York's 1)01) credentials and
imposing appearance, he says, make
him the ideal expert congressional Wit-
ness. Ile says, "Ii 1 shake my head and
say 'It'll cost billion,' people just
look at each ?OKI- and say 'Who's this
guy?' But if Iterb York shakes his head
and says, 'It'll cost $3 billion,' every-
body just nods and says, 'Oh really?
That much?' "
11111 ihi? onh? pre-
waled by the llodherg Rump were
young activi:.t graduate strident!: or
ro:ent. l'h.D.'s, These 'apparently..
conned convinced that the
FA'; as a !!rottp should not take a New
"FAS was :it a ero.,;sroads," Itodberg
rec.-Ans. if to revive, and how In
re-
vise. It was decided to follow the model
of catty days and do the kind of elitist
lobbying it bad done before."
After talks between John 0. Rasmus-
son, then chairman of FAS and pro-
lessor of chemistry at Yale, Leo Sar-
tori, associate professor of physics -at
and Jeremy J. Stone, then at
the Council on Foreign Relations in
Washington and author of two books
on the arms race, Stone was chosen
mis FAS's full-time director.
:tacitly Stone, 35, is a mathematician
lorned arms specialist who is known
for his nimble-tongued debating ability ?
on strategic weapons questions. His
carc.7r as a mathematician began wills
a Ph.D. in 1960 front Stanford, fol-
lowed by 2 years at the Stanford Re-
Instittne and 2 years at the then-
nipicont Iftulmin lmlittne. Developing
an interest in strategic policy, Slone
taught both arms control studies and
math for 2 years at Pomona College,
Teat 2 year; at the Harvard Center for
International Affairs, and care academic
s'car' at the Council on Foreign Relit-
lions, lie has written two books?Con.,
lowing the Arms Race, in 1967, and
Strategic Persuasion, in 1969. t Now,
as director of FAS he puts out the FAS.
Newsletter. 4: Ile is the son of I. F.
? Stone, publisher of I. F. Stone's
Weekly. While on his grant at the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, he became in-
terested, he says, in lobbying. He had
been oetive in FAS in the late '60's
along wills Rodhcre, and was chair-
man of the nominating committee to
bolster. the Council. Thus, Stone
emerged as 60111C011C known to the
? Council, .who also knew the FAS and
who, moreover, could fill the double
bill of scientist-lobbyist.
Ho took office on 1 July 1970, just
as Rasmussen stepped aside as chair-
man 110(1 Herbert F. York became the
new chairman. York was formerly : di-
rector of the Advanced Research Pro).
ccts Agency (ARPA) and Director of ?
e )2068$03/24w614-RDP7E13,00e8Ctiff0
muter Presidents Fisenlmwer and Ken-
Voices on Capitol Dill
The largest lobby on Capitol Hill
concerned with ,A13M is the Pentagon
itself, which can use its prestige, re,-
sources, and vast national organization
to persuade Congress that the ABM
should go ahead. The White House al-
so spends considerable political capital
in Congress in the emirs? of ABM
lobbying.
In addition, there are promilitary
groups such 05 the American Security
the Arm, llorc P/C55, Com-
brislgo, 54 lSc., 1967); Mraicgir Persuasion (Co-
lombia 1.101v. l'reqq, New York, 1969).
Obtnioed nt I:Olen-Minn of Amerlcon Scien(11ifs,
2.03 C St., N1'? 1110160gton, D.C. 20002,
? Rare to Oblivion (Simon and Schualor, Now
York, 1970).
Council, which raised, for example,
$200,000 in a single preelection Mail-
ing last fall. The strategy used was to
send out 2 million pieces of mail offer-
ing a "national security index," which
rated all congressmen on their voting
records on security issues and which
showed that about a dozen men up for
re-election had "a national security rat-
ing of zero."
Until FAS opened its one-room, one-
secretary office near the Capitol last
July, there was a. single major anti-
ABM lobby, the Council for a Livable
World (CLW), founded in 1962 by the
late physicist Leo S4ilard. CLW is
sometimes credited with having "made"
ABM an issue by undertaking the cnor-
moos :task of educating congressmen
iild ins and outs of strategic policy
.--ririttittIcnts which to the layman usu-
00900a0Q04-Ang of a very complex
Poker game in all the tongues or mini.
Al.so m the hcld against ABM were When the FAS National Co111161 tic- logical wallow is also somewhat active.
?
\ NI l'11"*13(kbliigyePdtiOte4goolioe01011'1-InA iDiklyck?"tYkailQw""
013130R0FidJotidkoldOht"' 1);"
cL mel ,1 ceislation, and I le Jutted undetslood re 1 IT ---- nonphesicis s rolmeil and coni-
NVoi Id redci oreaniiaoon would he I"1. 16" 111'111" noe'I.self-desei died
umher late onlo thiN wisne di.Slone has la-carolled the Ilavor of as "a national olg;mi-ation of rialto-al
ill .101y,, FAN rained publicity rally lohby, not he has yet 10
and both for the novelty woi k the second mil Ade of Ii eadiing
of the scientists' lobby and 'because of lite into the near-defunct national or-
Stone's peisonal keowledge of strateeic eani;ation.
weapons data nod his ability to ad- Stone firs1 aimed to double member--
just arguments to the level of practi- ship -then at 150M?within a year.
cality required by both specchwriters fluil hcfore he was hired, the dues had
and politicians themselves. Slone :ilso keen donbled yearly, and re-
made Pick:Mos use of his coneression- newals wele dtoPPOle? 1Thr"
al and academic contacts to help well- chased his of scientists have 110114:41 it
known scientists such as York, George respectable return 01. 1 percent; they
It. Kishakowsky, science adviser to ' have twilight Slone 800 new nienthers
President Eisenhower, George Itath- ',Ill date. lie now predicts that at the
jell';, visiting professor of political sci- end of his first year on 1 July 1971,
crier,. at MIT., 1.1erbert Scoville, Jr., ;ho will have brought something above
formerly assistant director of the dis- increase of 50 petcent,
armament agency, and Marvin ()old- persuatline scientists to pay 3;15
larger, professor of physics at Prince- ',In lei:Live A newsletter is one thing; per-
ton, to testify. Most such witnesses ,'suailing them to li,enerate local action
represent only themselves when they 1; is another. 11101101 membership is
testify; or kw, however, Stone him- swelling on paper, FAS local chapters
self has testified on behalf of the?FAS. arc limp. Even the Seattle and Chicago
Thelma, ihisted, Stone's coon-1?,troops who fentglo the ABM locally in
terpart at CI,W, says that last slimmer, 111-",11 are thoteTht to he ?less active now.
at the time Stone first appeared on the; A volunteer who aided Slone last
till, the C:I.NV was mainly concerned '):aneeler :?clting up a second FAS na-
with influencing the fall elections and tiHnal nelicolk; Technical Advisory
bad loss lime and resources to devote ',-,corninittees To Infinence C0111',ITSS
141 1110 AIIM fight, Moreover, he says,l(FA(1.1.1('). No far, B. Michael Casper,
'the 1urn1hc was less concerned about associate professor of Ph5'Nies as Carle-
AIM then than (hiring previous lights. at College, has enlisted 500 scientists
Nonetheless, SMne's tiny operation!: in :1.25 coneressional distriete?or about
helped coordinate what opposition,e'l ball in the nation --to form local TAC-
then' WAS And kept the issue alive and,', it. groleK to talk to their representa-
kicking on the llouse rind Senate doors. lives mid senators ;Mont science-related
Thus, FAS joined the club of anti- i ..o.y; when they revisit their borne dis-
A13?t congressional stoners, politicians. triels. Tho aim is to e:scrt precisely the
outside experts, and lobbyists?a clique 'same kind of local pressures that were
described by one reporter as 41an1tiltual. so .effective in the postwar years of'
, admiration and reinforcing society" FAS. But so far, the grcmps have been
. which tries to head off the viecissitudes inactive. Moreover, one Council mem-
of polities and keep. everybody going her who talked with Science at some
atom*, the same track, length about FAS failed ho mention
that he had heel) invited lo their in
Money 111141 Moilliel'14 10e111 TACTIC 1;1'4)1111. Casper himself
liii FAS's rejuvenation could ha says limit the whole project, launched
'111,11.lived if Iwo asPeels of the Orgafd- on n budget of $1000, iS t.00 embry-
....nwit Ltd to revive: money and mem- onie for evaluation,11
whcn it collies to Two other pieces of the, national VAS
mu.. lc, the most powerful influences Include the Comicil itself, which Jnd-
It hrlr gfotips which can berg SAYS 1MS heroine less nctive'sinee
itch \II coin P?1i1111 funds or votes for appointing Stone. Another is the so-
catillid.iles. This Is one reason for called Issue committee, set no by Stone
socces,,; its 12,000 active spon- to research nod publish on FAS issues.. country Is in a crisis situation of surfs-
mils raised over $300,000 for mull- On paper, VAS has SCVC11 ISS11C cons- dent magnitude so that people will. do
dates in last fall's campaign. But FAS mittees?but most of them have only the kinds of things FAS would do."
can deliver neither mone,y nor votes, one member, a chairman, only the Mtn.,
.4--DE11011A11 Si IArLISY
ll'InIlY ha% fAltil5r81/41tipPiRglaSdkliA?fOrtil 1114
: #37N0081*000300020004-7
montlscrdlin, let a ono tO r, VO ttWaY 'Neov C 1114 cousisten y wor n
to candidates. ABM; nnother one on chemical nod bin-
, ,
7111(1 ;,06.-11 .1:1c1111...1(; ;.t1(1 enincrlr,."
Ilirl hi .;lone and the Council agrce, 111;it
EAS should not he a oor-issue organi-
zation, and, by broadening its member-
ship and participation, Stone hopes to
broaden also the ranee of issues it will
deal with in C.ongress. lints, it can
become the "voice of science on Capi-
tol
VAS and M''...`,PA
But one group it is ord likely to add
is the radical younger scientists NVIRY,C
principal organ is Scientists and Engi--.
ricers for Social A11(1 Political Action
(SESPA), Michael 11, Goldhaber, assist-
' ant professor of physics at the Univcr-
, sit}, of Arizona, a SI Si1A founder and
member of 1:AS's National Council,
says that, al one time, there was it
chance SESPA would "fold up and
join" FAS, But both miner, are glad
nothing happened. be says. "There is
room for both SESPA and a FAS."
Ile says that inary young scientists
see the FAS Conn& ''hip, fat part-
ners of the Peelaeon," who believe too
much in "the WaShiegion approach" to
problem solving, Tic argues,' for exam-
ple, that ABM opponents first claimed
that Alt Ni wouldn't Work--a techno-
cratic argument, his said, which only
bad the effect of the Pentagon's pro:
pmal of an ABM which Would work.
"An ABM which works is even worse."
irrAcTir., it M. r, 1Scilnr1mc411,.
C4)11,:1'v, No41111,1(1, Minn, $5057.
Goldhaber says tilat there are many
. radicals in science who "don't speak
the language of FAS." "Even to talk
about continuing to build wc,,potii at;
r this point is an insane way of speak-
ing." And these people are, rightfully,
part of S1',,SI'A, says,
Um jos( as there has been a lull
among activities on the SI SPA wing or
:.science this year, there has been apathy
? among the more "established" scientists
as svell. As Ilernarit Feld, professor of
H physics at president of the
' 'Council for n Wodd, and VAS
Council member summarized: "The real
question Is whether people feel the
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