THE MANPOWER SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500220004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Manpower Situation in North Vietnam
Secret
Copy No. 5 0
ER IM 68-4
January 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP i
iXCLUO[O -NOM AUTOMATIC
OO . AUI l ANA
'LA a AI-iCAT1ON
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
5 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Manpower Situation in North Vietnam
Summary
A fresh appraisal of the manpower situation
in North Vietnam leads to the general conclusion
that reserves are adequate to meet current
demands and that Hanoi could support a military
mobilization effort higher than present levels.
During the past three years the North Viet-
namese population has been subjected to heavy
manpower demands to build up and maintain military
forces and to implement countermeasures against
the bombing of North Vietnam. These drains
admittedly have been sufficient to bring about
some tightening of overall manpower availabilities.
Local stringencies are reflected in occasional
reports from some regions on the drafting of youths
as young as 14. An analysis of all available
evidence indicates, however, that these reports are
discussing atypical situations and are often con-
tradictory. In the more generalized case the
Hanoi regime has acknowledged manpower problems
and responded by an increasing use of women in
the labor force. However, Hanoi's manpower
reports continue to describe conditions and
problems that were also characteristic of the
North Vietnamese labor force before the war-
induced manpower requirements were felt.
A comparison of the manpower situation in
both North and South Vietnam is revealing.
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. it
was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the'Special Assistant for Viet-
namese Affairs.
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These countries present nearly parallel cases.
South Vietnam, however, effectively controls
a much smaller population -- 11 million to ?
12 million --? than North Vietnam, whose population
exceeds 18 million. Yet South Vietnam has been
able to maintain a full-tame military force
nearly 1.5 times the size that North Vietnam main-
tains. The disruption of agricultural produc-
tion and distribution in South Vietnam is largely
due to the huge refugee problem ,and the interdiction
of normal transport routes, both reflecting VC/NVA
action rather than the call-up of military manpower
by Saigon. If North Vietnam were to call into full-time
military service the same share of its population as
has South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese full-time
military force would be more than double its present
size.
Despite the possibility of significant errors
in the estimates of manpower resources, North
Vietnam's situation does not appear critical.
The agricultural labor force of 7 million by itself
is such a large component of the total labor force
and is so under-utilized that large numbers of
workers could be drained off without significant
decreases in production. In addition, other sectors
of the economy are believed to contain: additional
slack which could be used to meet mobilization
demands.
An examination of the manpower situation in
World War II Germany also reinforces the judgment
that North Vietnam has adequate manpower reserves.
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Introduction
1. North Vietnam is a predominantly agricul-
tural country with more than 70 percent of the
labor force engaged in farming and related
activities. As in virtually all underdeveloped
countries, this labor force is grossly under-
utilized in peacetime. Most of the population
has always subsisted on a very low standard of
living, calculated to be less than $100 per
capita in terms of total output of goods and
services. The population has been inured to
hardship, having undergone famine and war over
long periods in the life of most adults liv4.r3
today. The country is ruled by a doctrinaire
Communist elite, with a revolutionary tradition
and a familiarity with suffering. Manpower is
relatively mobile, both geographically and with
respect to work tasks, since the great bulk of
labor is essentially an unskilled force.
2. North Vietnam may now be experiencing
some difficulties in filling all its requirements
for manpower from the prime age groups. For
coastal and antiaircraft defense as well as its
home reserves, North Vietnam may have to make
increased use of o1'er men and the less physically
fit. However, the weight of the evidence does not
support a presumption of a numerical manpower
shortage. Although the air war ties up large
numbers of North Vietnamese in bomb damage repair
activities, most of this labor force is so engaged
only part time. There are ample reservoirs of
labor in agriculture, services, and handicraft
industries to supply this low-skill labor force
with only a negligible effect on the output of
the economy as a whole.
Demographic Data
3. Estimates of the current population of
North Vietnam range from 17 million to 20 million.
A population of 17 million has been cited in some
North Vietnamese statements, and a current
population of 20 million can be derived from
official North Vietnamese estimates of the annual
growth rate of the population applied to 1960
North Vietnamese census data. In a country as
undeveloped as North Vietnam, an accurate enumera-
tion of the total population is impossible even
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for a highly centralized re ime , 25X1
or ie nam s population at the
ginning of 1968 was about 18.7 million.
Of these, approximately 2.8 million are males
between the ages of 17 and 35, more than half of
whom are believed to be physically fit for military
service. During 1968, an estimated 200,000 males
will reach the age of 17, the minimum for drafting
into the militia, and slightly less than 200,000
will reach the military service age of 18. Of
the latter, approximately 120,000 men p lQbably woll1r]
be h sically fit for military service. 25X1
estimates are developed through t e use
of Western demographic techniques and historic
demographic data on North Vietnam and provide the
data used in this memorandum, although they are not
assumed to be without error.
Labor Force
4. In the 15 to 64 age group, there is a
potential working force of 10.4 million, of whom
about 4.9 million are male. Excluding the
military forces and students, the work force
totals about 9.8 million, of whom about 55 percent
are female. The following tabulation shows an
estimate of the labor force according to major
sectors of employment as of 1 January 1968:
Sector of Employment
Thousand Persons
Agriculture
7,000
Services
800
Industry (including
handicrafts)
800
Transport and communi-
cations
400
Trade
Construction
Other
Total
9,800
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The estimates of the labor force, by occupation,
are based on statements by North Vietnamese
officials. Although the number of workers in
each of the above categories may be subject to a
substantial margin of error, the large number
in agriculture and the handicraft industries has
been reported with some consistency. Similarly,
there is little doubt of the continued employment
of a relatively large labor force in the services
sector of the economy. These three sectors, in
which individual productivity is low, provide a
reservoir of manpower that can be tapped with
little adverse effect on the total domestic
production.
5. Before the bombing began in 1965 the North
Vietnamese labor force was largely unskilled,
underemployed, and, at least in agriculture,
seasonally unemployed. Agriculture employed 70
percent of the civilian labor force and was
particularly labor-intensive. Through natural
increase, more than 120,000 males and almost the
same number of females are added to the agricul-
tural labor force each year. By keeping the
agricultural labor force steady at about 7
million since the beginning of 1965, the regime
apparently has freed a total of more than 700,000
potential agricultural workers for non-agricultural
activities. Henceforth by simply drawing on the
natural increase of men in the agricultural labor
force and permitting the natural increase of women
to replace an equal number of men, the regime
would be able to obtain a large additional number
of males for military or war-related tasks. In
addition, the present size of the agricultural
labor force could be reduced substantially without
producing a proportionate decline in agricultural
output because of the low marginal productivity
of each farmer. For many years the regime has
had a goal of reducing the number of farm workers
per hectare from the present level of three workers
per hectare to only one person per hectare.
6. It is possible over the longer term for
North Vietnam to compensate for a considerable
reduction in agricultural labor by the increased
use of agricultural machinery and materials. The
amount of fertilizer and equipment used per hectare
is well below that of Western countries. The
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increased use of equipment, such as tractors,
truc,;s, irrigation pumps, and harvesting machinery,
would undoubtedly decrease the labor requirement
per unit of rice produced. So far, however, we
have seen no great emphasis by the regime on the
importation of such labor-saving machinery.
Alternatively, shortfalls in food production could
be made up by imports from the USSR and China.
Such imports ara now taking place.
7. Handicraft industries account for about
one-third of the total oLitput of North Vietnamese
industry and employ about 600,000 workers. This
work force distributed throughout the populated
areas of the country has been and continues to be
a source of manpower that can be diverted with
only slight adverse effects on the economy.
8. In addition to the manpower reservoir in
agriculture and handicrafts, there are various
smaller pools of manpower in other occupations
from which men could. be drawn. We have, however,
little evidence of diversion of manpower from
these sectors. There are estimated to be
approximately 120,000 males in trades outside of
the state sector, about 180,000 in consumer
services and about 40,000 males in teaching.
Therefore, about 340,000 stales of working age and
demonstrably capable of some economic activity are
available for military-related work. In addition,
at least 40,000 male students above the age of
15 are studying in North Vietnam and about 5,000
are studying abroad. These have not been included
in the labor force. The number of students is
growing, especially those studying abroad.
Excessive diversions from these groups for war-
supporting tasks would undoubtedly result in a
decline in living standards and, in the case
of students, would be counter-productive in the
long run, but might be considered justifiable
under the circumstances.
9. The bombing of North Vietnam's industrial
facilities has freed a small number of factory
workers for other activities. Industr.es that have
been paralyzed by direct bomb damage and/or outage
of electric power were primarily modern facilities
using complex machinery and modern production
techniques yielding higher labor productivity.
It is Astimated that by mid-1967 about 30,000
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workers had been put out of work by the damage
to modern, industry. Although the workers freed
represent only about 4 percent of the industrial
labor force, they have a higher degree of technical
competence, skills, and industrial discipline than
the average member of the labor force. They
undoubtedly play a significant role in the main-
tenance of production by dispersed industries, in
the repair of damaged facilities, and as cadre
for supervising general bomb damage repair work.
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War-Induced Manpower Requirements
11. Major war-induced manpower requirements
in North Vietnam are twofold: (a) those to
support the buildup of Communist military forces
and to replace combat losses in North and South
Vietnam; and (b) those required to repair the
damage from airstrikes against North Vietnam.
12. North Vietnam's armed forces were built
up rapidly from about 230,000 in February 1965
to the present force level of 480,000, or to
about 3 percent of the population. This buildup
has required the mobilization of less than 20
percent of North Vietnam's draft-age m.n, and
Hanoi has not found it necessary to alter the
current military service ages of 18 to 35. The
rate cf increase during 1967 was well below that
of the two previous years. The military buildup
alone has required about 120,000 persons annually
during 1965 and 1966. During 1966, estimated North
Vietnamese combat and infiltration losses ranged
from 35,000 to 45,000 men, and during 1967 these
losses were much higher. The manpower requirements
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have been met for the most part by the drafting of
almost all the 120,000 physically fit males
estimated to reach the draft age each year. The
regime has also had to mobilize some reservists.
During 1967, there has been no evidence of
changes in North Vietnai's mobilization program.
Unless North Vietnam sees a need for maintaining
a much larger military force in the North in 1968,
the number of physically fit males reaching the
draft age should meet or exceed the number required
for military service in South Vietnam at present
loss levels.
13. The principal diversions of civilian
manpower have been those required to repair and
build lines of communication, to disperse
industry, and to man the transport system.
The services of 475,000 to 600,000, or about 3
percent of the population, have been required to
offset the effects of airstrikes on North Vietnam.
Of the total in war-related activities, less than
200,000 are occupied full time. The part-time
civilian force is used primarily as conditions
warrant. At any one time, more than one-half of
the part-time workers may be engaged in the repair
of lines of communication and about one-third in
civil defense. In substantial portions of the
country, weather conditions prevent air attacks
for several days at a time. During respites from
bombing, the part-time force is more actively
engaged in repairing bridges, filling in craters,
and stockpiling materials. For example, an
article published in Hanoi in September 1967
discussed the mass use of nearly 300,000 people
in the area south of Vinh for several days and
nights on two separate occasions for completing
road repair and road construction tasks. It is
probable that the concerted activity described in
this article was undertaken to capitalize on the
absence of air attack during the 1967 Tet or
previous bombing pauses.
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15. The discrepancy in the minimum conscrip-
tion age might be explained by the fact that
youths participate in bomb damage repair work or
in air defense activities under military leader-
ship. In addition, it is also possible that
youths below the draft age have volunteered and
have been accepted for military service. The
occasional North Vietnamese soldier captured in
South Vietnam who claims to have been drafted at an
early age possibly is either understating his age
to obtain leniency or had originally been a
volunteer. Finally, the recent reports of the
very young being drafted are not new. Similar
claims had been made in 1965, a period when it
is generally agreed there were no serious man-
power problems in North Vietnam.
16. Statements by the North Vietnamese regime
during the last year which mention a manpower
problem in North Vietnam are similar to complaints
the regime has been making for many years and
do not necessarily indicate a worsening manpower
situation. An article in Hoc Tap of July 1965
used almost the same terms to describe the man-
power situation in North Vietnam, as did an article
in Hoc Tap of July 1967. Despite the diversion
of manpower that had occurred since the bombing,
Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi in the July 1967
Hoc Tap article still referred to the large labor
potential of the country, he serious waste of
labor, and the present great volume of idle labor.
The regime has been complaining for many years
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that the North Vietnamese work force is poorly
organized, that manual workers make up too large
a percentage of the labor force, and that this
condition must be corrected.
17. Similarly, the recent statements from
Hanoi that women are participating to a greater
extent in the labor force are a continuation of
statements that the regime has been making for
years. The current degree of participation of
females in the labor force results from trends
established well before the bombing started.
As far back as 1962 the regime boasted that
women accounted for 60 percent of the work force
in agriculture and for most of the working staff
in light industries.
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The War Supporting Role of Manpower
in South Vietnam and World War II Germany
This appendix analyzes the manpower situations
in South Vietnam and in World War II Germany to
assess the extent to which these countries were
able to commit their population to war supporting
activities. The case of South Vietnam is very
similar to that of North Vietnam, yet the govern-
ment of South Vietnam, with fewer population
resources, has sustained a much greater manpower
commitment than has North Vietnam. A'.though
World War II Germany cannot be directly compared
with North Vietnam, it was chosen to provide
some insight into the extent to which a highly
industrialized state can commit its population
to war supporting activities. The situations in
South and North Vietnam are not completely
parallel and of course the comparison of the
German experience with that of North Vietnam must
be.a cautious exercise. Nevertheless, the
experiences of other countries are of value in
helping to assess the manpower drains that an
economy can stand during wartime.
Manpower in South Vietnam
1. The estimated population of South Vietnam
was about 16 million at the end of 1964 and more
than 17 million at the rand of 1967, At the end
of 1964, only about 7 million people were under
the control of the Government of Vietnam (GVN);
by the end of 1967, the controlled population
totaled 11 million to 12 million. In recent years
the population available to South Vietnam to meet
its manpower requirements has been equal to from
40 to 70 percent of North Vietnam's manpower
resources.
2. Despite this much smaller population base,
the government of South Vietnam has been able to
maintain a full-time military force nearly 1.5
times that of North Vietnam. GVN military forces,
including paramilitary and national police, have
grown from about 610,000 at the end cf 1964 to
about 740,000 at the end of 1967. This force is
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nearly 6 percent of the population controlled by
the GVN. North Vietnam's armed forces, on the
other hand, are only about 3 percent of its
population. There are, of course, differences
between North and South Vietnam which make absolute
comparisons questionable. However, in major ways
there are parallels. For example, the industrial
base which supports the war effort in both countries
lies outside Vietnamese national borders -- in
the United States for South Vietnam and in the
USSR and Communist China for North Vietnam.
Second, both Vietnams are essentially labor
intensive, s'.,wsistence agricultural countries
that supply most (but not all) of their food
needs. Third, both North and South Vietnam
have made considerable use of women in their
civilian labor forces. Fourth, the war has
contributed to a decline in agricultural pro-
duction in both countries. Finally, foreign
military engineering forces are an important
bolster to the logistic supply lines within each
nation.
3. South Vietnam has more men in uniform
than the North, as shown in the following tab-
ulation, but it is difficult to equate full-time
military :Forces in South Vietnam to those in the
Million Persons as of
January 1967
South Vietnam
North Vietnam
Population
10 to 11 a/
18.3
Civilian labor force
5.6
9.6
Agriculture
4.0
7.0
Non-agriculture
1.6
2.6
Military forces
0.7
0.5
a. GVN contro Ze population only, which compares
with ar estimated total population of 17 million as
of 1 January 1967.
North. For example, North Vietnam has about a
400,000 part-time armed militia in addition to
its nearly 500,000 full-tiros military forces.
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South Vietnam's Popular and Regional Forces
L,esemble militia in organization, training, and
mission, but they serve full time.
4. South Vietnam's success in maintaining
such relatively large military forces is particu-
larly significant in view of its greater desertion
problem, the large number of casualties, and the
difficulties of maintaining control over the
population. The GVN armed forces have had nearly
60,000 men killed in action in the last seven
years and another 140,000 to 250,000 wounded
during the same period. In addition, they have
experienced a desertion/defection rate of about
100,000 a year. Although some of the latter
losses are not permanent, South Vietnam has had
to maintain a large flow of new recruits into its
armed forces. The military mobilization program
has been accomplished by a government that has
been much weaker than the Hanoi regime. South
Vietnam has not yet drafted men below the age
of 20, although it intends to. North Vietnam has
fully mobilized its 18 and 19 year olds.
5. Despite the large numbers of manpower
mobilized, the refugee problem, and the general
insecurity in the country, economic production
has not suffered drastically. Rice production
in 1967 was down less than 20 percent from the
relatively high level achieved in 1964. Employment
in agriculture fell from 5.7 million in 1960 to
4 million in 1966. Although the loss of manpower
clearly has affected rice production, numerous
other problems related to the war also have
contributed to the dscline in output. For example,
rice production would probably recover substantially
if security in the countryside improved. If, in
addition, the approximately 2 million refugees
could be resettled and assigned to productive
tasks, the agricultural manpower problem would
disappear. Therefore, the existence of a 740,000-
man armed force and a rapidly increasing non-
agricultural labor force -- which roughly doubled
from 772,000 to 1,575,000 during 1960-66 -- do
not appear to have had a significant effect on
agricultural production.
6. The big growth in South Vietnam's non-
agricultural labor force began with the commit-
ment of US combat forces in mid-1965 and the
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contractors still directly employ about
130,000
'Vietnamese. The demand of US personnel
for
continuing need to support the increasing number
of troops. Until 1967, demand for unskilled as
well as skilled labor outpaced the supply. For
example, there was a shortage of Vietnamese
construction workers to help build airfields,
bases, and storage facilities for US forces, as
well as a lack of transport workers. As a
result, wage rates in construction and transport
rose markedly. The rapid growth of non-farm
economic opportunities, along with persistent
insecurity in rural areas, stimulated a large
migration to urban areas. In addition, non-
agricultural labor was diverted to these
priority industries. South Vietnamese coastal
shippers diverted their boats from hauling
rice to moving supplies for US troops. Although
the demand for Vietnamese labor, particularly
unskilled labor, has leveled off since the end of
1966, US military and civilian agencies and their
services and handicrafts has also created
numerous new jobs for Vietnamese.
7. Although the GVN has been able to meet
a considerable proportion of the demands on its
manpower, resources, it does have some problems
and has received vital support from its allies.
The United States provides manpower directly for
military logistical support and for medical and
other highly skilled services. The United States
is also largely responsible for the construction
and maintenance of roads. bridges, and other
transport faci'.ities. In addition, the US-financed
import program is to some extent a substitute for
domestic labor.
Manpower in World War II Germany
8. World War II Germany and present-day North
Vietnam are two highly disparate economies. Germany
was a highly industrialized state with its own
munitions and war supporting industries. North
Vietnam has an essentially subsistence agriculture
economy that is almost comple;:ely dependent on
external sources for the materials and munitions
needed to sustain t; e war.
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9. The fact that the Germans sustained their
massive war effort for the most part from their
own resources meant that in almost every respect
the German commitment of manpower to war supporting
activities far exceeded that observed in North
Vietnam today.
10. The German armed forces, for example,
reached a peak of 10.2 million during World
War II, or about 13 percent of the population.
North Vietnam's full-time military forces total
480,000, or less than 3 percent of the population.
Germany committed about 6 percent of its popula-
tion -- 4.5 million persons -- to air defense
and repair activities, compared with approximately
500,000 persons, or less than 3 percent of
North Vietnam's population. The manpower drain
in deaths as a result of enemy action was also
proportionately far greater in Germany. An
estimated total of at least 3.8 million Germans --
about 5 percent of the population -- were killed
by enemy action. The manpower drain in North
Vietnam as a result of enemy action through the
end of 1967 is estimated to be 0.5 percent of
the population, or only one-tenth of that
sustained in Germany.
11. Although the German manpower commitment
constituted an obviously heavier burden than that
noted in North Vietnam, there is little evidence
that the availability of manpower was a meaningful
restraint on Germany's ability to carry on large-
scale military operations -- at least up to the
last year of the war. The breakdown of distribution
systems, the destruction of power sources and key
industrial facilities, and the loss of territories
were the kev factors underlining the collapse of
the German war machine.
12. During World War II, more than 12 million
men were taken into the German military service.
Despite this mass transfer from the civilian labor
force and other war-related manpower drains, Germany
never fully mobilized its total manpower resources.
Manpower pressures were not critical until the
last months of the war, when Allied forces had
already assured a total military victory.
13. Manpower pressures in World War II Germany
were alleviated by a number of factors, one of
the most important being the abundant use of
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foreign labor and prisoners of war. At the end of
the war the use of upwards of 8 million foreigners
and prisoners of war accounted for about one-'fourth
of the civilian labor force. They accounted, for
example, for 22 percent of the agricultural labor
force of about 11 million persons, which was
substantially unchanged from its pre-war levels.
The rest of this captive labor was used in the
non-agricultural labor force, which had declined
by only about 10 percent during the course of
the war.
14. The failure of Germany to mobilize addi-
tional labor to offset military mobilization
programs is thus explained in large part by the
use of foreign labor. It is also explained by an
increase of 23 percent in labor productivity from
1939 to 1944.
15. Significantly, the Germans apparently
found it unnecessary to increase the use of women
in industry during World War II. At the end of
1939, German women accounted for about 37 percent
of the German civilian labor. The number of
women employed in the German labor force remained
practically unchanged throughout the war, in
contrast to the increased reliance placed on them
in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The German experience is in even sharper contrast
to North Vietnamese practice. Hanoi encourages
the employment of women in all sorts of economic
and war-related activities, and women may account
for more than one-half of North Vietnam's labor
force. If the German government had found it
necessary to increase the use of female labor
even to the extent that the United Kingdom did,
then it could have added more than 2.5 million
persons to the labor force.
Approved For Release 2005/01$hFTDP85T00875R001500220004-4