IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500190010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
Implications of China's Current Economic Problems
ER IB 73-10
August 1973
ILLEGIB Copy No. 99
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IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Summary
Agricultural difficulties over the past two
years, along with a slowdown in industrial growth
and an intensified need for foreign technology,
have forced Peking to retreat from the Maoist ideal
of self-reliance. China's abruptly increased
dependence on the world economy -- notably on
American granaries and on Japanese and Western high-
technology industries -- is evidenced by:
? costly increases in imports of grain,
cotton, and other agricultural prod-
ucts, from $450 million in 1972 to an
expected record level of $1.2 billion
in 1973; more than one-half of the
1973 total will be supplied by the
United States;
? a substantial expansion in investment
in agriculture and supporting indus-
tries, which requires foreign plants,
equipment, and technology;
? a willingness to relax the self-imposed
policy of no foreign debt by incurring
medium-term obligations on foreign
plants; and
? a drive to develop new sources of for-
eign exchange to help pay the mounting
import bill.
Peking's heightened reliance on foreign sources
of food, machinery, and technology almost certainly
will extend through the remainder of th% current
Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). Agricultural pro-
duction in the first eight months of 1973 has been
hampered by drought in the north and floods in the
south and may not greatly surpass the disappointing
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publica-
tion are welcomed. They may be directed to
of the Office of Economic Research,
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1972 level, which was roughly 5% below 1971. In-
vestment in agriculture must be beefed up substan-
tially if the long-run trend of
2%
--
approximately
equal to the population growth
rate
--
is to be
maintained. The industrial, transportation, and
military sectors remain dependent for their modern-
ization on foreign technology, for example, in
steel, petroleum exploration and refining, elec-
tronics, chemicals, and machine building.
The implications of China's current economic
problems for the United States lie especially in
agriculture. Because of worldwide food stringen-
cies, the United States almost overnight has be-
come the PRC's principal supplier of agricultural
products and its third leading trading partner be-
hind Japan and Hong Kong. In industry, the United
States is a latecomer to a market shared by Japan
and the leading industrial nations of Western
Europe. So far the United States has sold com-
munications equipment, ten Boeing 707 aircraft,
and, now, three ammonia plants. As for technology,
the Chinese will continue to rely on several major
non-Communist industrial. nations, with the United
States having an advantage in high-technology
branches such as civil aircraft, advanced computers,
communications equipment, and oil-drilling equip-
ment. China will not, however, enter into joint
ventures with foreign firms and will seek to mini-
mize the number of foreign technical specialists
on Chinese soil. With regard to China's willing-
ness to incur medium-term debt, Peking could readily
increase its debt several fold above the present
$200 million to $300 million. Nonetheless, it will
move cautiously, and the US share in the financing
of industrial purchases will be tiny in absolute
amount. The United States will share the impact
of the PRC's efforts to raise its foreign exchange
earnings. Peking is trying to widen its market in
the United States for silk textiles, specialty
foods, objets d'art, and handicrafts.
Regardless of who eventually succeeds the aging
Mao and Chou, China's economic problems pose con-
straints on political action. Any regime would be
under strong pres:,>re (a) to retain the United
States as the key backup source of food and cotton
merely to maintain the spartan living standards of
the vast population, (b) to look to the outside
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world for modern equipment and technology in order
not to lag farther behind international technical
standards in industry and agriculture, and (c) to
improve its military capabilities on the basis of
foreign support in the fields of communication
equipment, transport equipment, instruments, and
metal alloys. The rhetoric of political contro-
versy will continue to exhibit wider swings than
actual economic policy, which generally will re-
flect these economic realities. Nonetheless, the
history of political conflict in the PRC casts
doubt on straight line forecasts of economic poli-
cies based simply on a calculation of economic
necessity.
Discussion
Background
1. The Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, Mao's
attempt to revitalize the revolutionary spirit in
China and to bend the Party and government bureau-
cracies to his will, did little permanent damage
to the economy. In particular, the Cultural Revo-
lution was mainly an urban phenomenon and caused
only small disturbances in the agricultural sector.
In spite of political invective hurled at private
economic activity, the peasants' small plots re-
mained intact, and the policy of supplying the
countryside with an increasing volume of ferti-
lizers, pumps, and agricultural chemicals con-
tinued. Little damage was done to industrial
plant facilities as the result of the Cultural
Revolution. In 1967-68, however, industrial pro-
duction dropped 10% because of sporadic strikes,
street fighting, power shortages, and transporta-?
tion bottlenecks.
2. The years since the Cultural Revolution
have been marked by pragmatic economic policies
and a return to regularized central economic plan-
ning. The restoration of order in the economy has
been accompanied by the reappearance of a number
of planners and economic ministers dismissed in
the purges, the gradual resumption of high-level
technical education under Maoist guidelines, and
the partial restoration of scientific publications
and ties with scientists of other nations.
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3. In late 1970, Premier Chou En-lai announced
a new Fourth Five-Year Plan for 1971-75. We have
almost no details on the targets in this plan. On
the basis of fragmentary information, we estimate
that the annual rates of increase projected in the
plan are a step higher than the long-term growth
rates of the PRC under the Communists -- 2% in agri-
culture (or approximately the same as population
growth), 8% in industry, and 4% in overall output.
4. In 1971-72, the first two years of the new
plan, agricultural difficulties, along with a slow-
down in industrial growth and an intensified need
for foreign technology, brought about new efforts
by the Chinese leadership to "speed up the pace of
socialist construction."* The need for reconsidera-
tion of economic policies had strong political con-
notations and rekindled longstanding arguments over
(a) the primacy of agriculture versus industry,
(b) the authority of the ideological leader versus
the technically oriented specialist, the "red versus
expert" controversy, and (c) the importance of self-
reliance in economic and technical affairs as op-
posed to the gains to be had from drawing on the
advanced technology of the non-Communist world.
5. The unexpectedly rapid re-establishment of
communication between China and the United States,
beginning in 1971, was a major political develop-
ment for both nations. Within the PRC, this de-
velopment quickly became linked with the issue of
self-reliance when China had to turn to the United
States for sizable quantities of grain. The
present discussion summarizes China's current
economic problems and some of the implications of
these problems for the United States. A table of
general economic data is included as an appendix.
Agriculture: Renewed Priority
6. In the first decade of Communist rule over
China, agriculture was conducted essentially as a
holding operation. The restoration of peace and
order in rural areas and the supposed advantages
of collectivist organization would, it was argued,
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enable the agricultural sector to feed the growing
population and provide materials for industry and
export. This policy collapsed in the disaster
period of 1959-61, when China's population suf-
fered a 20%-25% cut in already meagre rations and
when discontent spread even to the ranks of the
People's Liberation Army. In an important turn-
about in policy in 1962, the agricultural sector
was accorded substantial and increasing support
from the modern industrial sector in the form of
chemical fertilizers, agricultural machinery,
irrigation equipment, and pesticides. This new
policy was modified in the Cultural Revolution,
when much of the burden of supporting agriculture
was passed down to the farming units themselves.
Locally financed small-scale factories produci:,ig
low-grade chemical fertilizer, simple agricultural
implements, and irrigation pumps sprang up by the
thousands. Bumper harvests in 1967 and 1970 ap-
peared to convince the Chinese leadership that
(a) the flow of resources from the modern indus-
trial sector to agriculture could be safely leveled
off, and (b) the imports of grain from Canada,
Australia, and France -- which had amounted to
5 million to 6 million tons annually beginning in
1961 -- could be safely cut and ultimately elimi-
nated. The leadership wished to concentrate on
spurring the industrial modernization program.
7. But farming weather turned unfavorable in
1971 and was worse still in 1972. Grain production
i.tled to grow in 1971 and then fell by 4% in 1972.
A reduction of grain imports from 4.6 million to
3 million tons in 1971 proved decidedly premature.
Imports bounced back to 4.8 million tons in 1972
and will reach a record 7 million tons in 1973.
Cotton output was hit even harder, dropping by
perhaps 6% in 1971 and as much as 25% in 1972.
Imports of cotton jumped from 94,000 tons in 1971
to 160,000 tons in 1972, to an expected 500,000
tons in 1973. Production of key oilseed! also
declined in both years.*
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8. Two disappointing harvests in a row spot-
lighted problems that had gone unnoticed because
of the generally good crops of previous years:
? gains in Chinese agricultural produc-
tion still depend vitally on good
weather coupled with competent manage-
ment of rural resources;
? makeshift products such as low-grade
fertilizer from small rural factories
are poor substitutes for high-quality,
modern inputs;
? without large and systematic increases
in the application of modern techniques
and modern inputs, China's limited
farmland cannot yield the grain, cotton,
and oilseeds needed for China's growing
consumption and industrial needs; and
? no matter what corrective measures are
initiated now, the country must con-
tinue to import sizable quantities of
farm-support products for the next sev-
eral years.
9. Prospects for grain currently indicate a
moderate increase over 1972 but no bumper harvest.
Only the summer grain harvest (wheat, barley, and
lentils), which accounts for almost 20% of China's
grain, is-completed. The yields of these crops
were not as high as expected. Peking's reference
to this year's summer harvest as equivalent to the
record summer harvest of 1972 should be interpreted
in light of the substantial expansion of acreage.
Preliminary reports on the early rice crop, which
also accounts for almost 20% of total output, do
not suggest an unusually good harvest. Further-
more, the hasty readjustments of crop rotations
have left crops more vulnerable to unfavorable
weather, especially in north China where the fall
harvest of coarse grains will be unusually late.
The shift of sizable acreages of farmland from
cotton and oilseeds to grains will limit the out-
put of these important crops in 1973.
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10. In addition to changes in crop patterns,
Peking has taken the following actions:
? tightened individual rations of food-
stuffs and textiles;
decreed that no more than 5% of a com-
mune's labor can be devoted to commune
industries;
assigned additional middle-school
graduates to the countryside and
stepped up programs for agricultural
research and the training of agricul-
tural specialists;
purchased from abroad a record $1.2
billion in grain, cotton, and oilseeds
for delivery in 1973, compared with
purchases of $450 million in 1972;
arranged for the import of more than
$200 million in chemical fertilizers
in 1973; and
contracted for the import of four huge
fertilizer manufacturing complexes and
six man-made fiber facilities costing
about $450 million.
11. More than half, or about $650 million, of
China's imports of agricultural products in 1973
will come from the United States, compared with $75
million in 1972. By value, 60% of the grain, 35%
of the cotton, and almost all of the vegetable oil
and soybeans purchased by the PRC in 1973 will be
of US origin. As a result of these sales, the
United States suddenly has become China's principal
supplier of farm products and its third ranking
trading partner. American firms also are supplying
China with a small volume of fertilizer and syn-
thetic fibers, as well as three complete plants
for the big fertilizer complexes.
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Industry: Technological Needs
12. China's overall growth in industrial pro-
duction has slipped from an estimated 13% in 1971
to 8% in 1972. Provincial reports of industrial
gains in the first half of 1973, when compared to
parallel reports for 1972, suggest that industrial
production for the entire year will fall below 8%.
The slowing down of industrial growth is attrib-
utable to a number of factors which have affected
the Chinese economy and whose impact will be felt
for some time to come:
? The stimulative effects of the large
injection of Soviet plant, equipment,
and technical know-how in the 1950s
have worn off;
? capacity idled during the worse dis-
orders of the Cultural Revolution of
1966-69 has been fully re-employed;
? reserves of easily assimilated tech-
niques and easily available natural
and human resources have been largely
exploited; and
? the dependence on labor-intensive
methods in extractive industries,
construction, and transportation has
led to imbalances in the output mix
-of machinery and equipment.
13. The Soviet assistance program provided
China with the nucleus of a major industrial base --
metallurgical plants, power stations, machine tool
plants, etc. The Soviet pullout in mid-1960 left
the Chinese with unfinished construction projects
and in many cases only partially equipped shops.
Nonetheless, the groundwork, in the form of initial
training, plans, and prototypes, had been laid for
a substantial capital goods industry. During the
1960s the Chinese gradually completed and put into
operation most of the unfinished Soviet-aid plants.
The PRC turned to Japan and Western Europe, not for
across-the-board support of the Soviet kind, but
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for several d)zen key plants in the electronics,
chemical, and other modern industries.
14. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution,
production from established factories and mines was
restored to normal, and investment projects whose
construction had been delayed were completed. Thus,
a large element of catch-up, non-recurring gains
was contained in the high industrial growth rates
of 1970-71.
15. Increases in output henceforth often will
require larger increases in capital investment.
For example, because most of the easily mined coal
and iron ore deposits now are being fully exploited,
large investment in capital equipment will be needed
to overcome the shortages of coking coal and iron
ore confronting China's metallurgical industry.
Large new industrial complexes being built in the
hinterland entail unusually large construction and
transportation costs. The exploitation of offshore
oil deposits -- first in shallow, then in deep
water -- will require costly specialized equipment.
With the nearly complete participation of the
population in economic activity, those industries
that have been prominent users of labor-intensive
methods need larger amounts of capital goods to
maintain satisfactory growth rates. In order to
produce more mining, construction, and transporta-
tion equipment, plants for building new types of
machinery need to be built and old plants must be
re-equipped to alter their product mix. Under these
conditions, rates of growth in the output of machinery
and equipment for manufacturing and other industries
are likely to decline.
16. Confronted by these problems, the Chinese
are looking to imports as a stimulant to growth
and modernization. The list of requirements for
complete plants and equipment in basic as well as
high-technology industries is a long one, however,
and Peking is moving cautiously and selectively in
concluding purchase contracts. Thus far in 1973
the Chinese have contracted for a record $450 mil-
lion in whole plants, nearly all of which will be
expended on fertilizer and fiber facilities. They
also have just signed a $43 million deal for the
purchase of British mining equipment, apparently
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intended for the coal industry. In addition, firms
in West Germany, Japan, and the United States are
now compe tiag for a contract to sell China some
$300 million worth of whole plant equipment which
could raise the PRC's finished steel capacity from
17 million to 20 million tons annually. In electric
power, the Chinese have been negotiating with
several suppliers for nuclear and conventional
steam power station equipment which could total
$500 million. Numerous other negotiations entail
smaller outlays designed to upgrade China's industry,
transportation, and communication systems.
17. In view of the pressing need for agricultural
imports, Peking may have to postpone some of these
negotiations over the next two or three years. If
so, the burden of supplying needed machinery and
equipment will fall even more heavily on China's
own domestic machine building industries. China
has a fairly large capacity for producing general-
purpose equipment for small and medium-sized plants
in basic industries. This equipment is generally
obsolescent, however, compared with equipment
available abroad. Mining equipment appears to be
in especially short supply, although Peking claims
to be rapidly increasing production from a small
base.
18. Even if the Chinese should quickly conclude
several pending deals for metallurgi.:al, mining,
and construction equipment, deliveries of this
equipment will be spread out over the next three
years at. least, and new facilities thus could not
become operational until the latter half of the
1970s. In the meantime, Peking is exhorting managers
of factories and mines to exploit the "latent
capacity" of existing facilities -- that is, to step
up production without adding either capital equip-
ment or labor. But fewer reserves of this type re-
main to be discovered in China's industry today
than in earlier periods.
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Foreign Trade: Financing Imports
19. The question arises as to how China -- with
an economy so dependent on agriculture and the
weather -- can si+ tultaneously finance continued
costly imports of agricultural products, chemical
fertilizer, whole plants for making fertilizer and
man-made fibers, and whole plants and equipment for
basic industries. Indeed, Vice Premier Li Hsien-
nien raised this issue late last year when he told
visiting industrialists that he would rather import
more metallurgical And mining equipment than grain
because the former helps expand China's industrial
base whereas the latter "can only be eaten."
20. One answer is that China has relaxed its
strictures on the acceptance of foreign credits.
Of the $450 million in complete industrial plants
contracted for thus far in 1973, at least $230
million will be financed by medium-term loans re-
payable in installments over five years following
delivery of the facilities. Peking also has ob-
tained short-term credits for purchases of US grain
and possibly cotton as well. The Chinese -- were
they willing to do so -- undoubtedly could obtain
sizable additional credits.
21. At the same time, Peking has taken other
steps aimed at increasing China's earnings of foreign
exchange. These include price increases of exports
in strong demand, measures to enlarge remittances
and bank deposits of overseas Chinese, and plans
to develop new markets both in new areas such as
the United States and in new products such as petro-
leum.* Nevertheless, in 1973 China probably will
run a hard currency deficit of as much as $300 mil-
lion in its trade with non-Communist countries. As
a result, China probably will draw down its foreign
reserve holdings this year and -- if it follows
past practices -- will cut back on imports of less
crucial capital goods next year in order to redress
the deficit.
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22. Faced with dim prospects for an expansion
of agricultural exports, Peking in the long run
must find additional new sources of export earnings.
An eye toward export potential may be indicated by
China's continuing expansion and modernization of
its oilfields and refineries and recent interest
in developing its offshore drilling capabilities.
China is likely to have considerable interest in
the United States as a supplier of advanced petro-
leum equipment and technology. Japan presumably
will stand ready to buy all the petroleum that
China can produce above domestic requirements.
The Political Dimension
23. Periods of agricultural difficulty generate
powerful pressures within the Chinese bureaucracy
to treat economic problems in purely technical
terms. Such pressures are obviously operating to-
day, as they were even more obviously in the early
1960s after the Leap Forward debacle. At the same
time, such difficulties also stimulate counter-
vailing pressures to seek political solutions to
economic problems.
24. Two political issues are immediately apparent
in the approach the Chinese seem to have adopted in
the past year or so. The first revolves about the
issue of autarky -- whether China in the long run
will allow itself to be dependent on purchases from
abroad. In the past there have been powerful voices
in China demanding something close to complete au-
tarky; such a position can be buttressed by pointing
to the troubles to which China was subjected follow-
ing the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid and techni-
cians in 1960. There is, however, no good indica-
tion that the argument for complete autarky is being
pressed with any vigor in China at this time. To
some extent, critics of current policies probably
are being mollified by the careful attention paid to
the division of China's foreign purchases among a
number of states, which keeps Peking from being
truly dependent on any one of them. Furthermore, Pre-
mier Chou En-lai has been careful to disavow an in-
tention of joint economic ventures, such as the pro-
posed Soviet-Japanese ventures for exploiting Soviet
oil and gas, and only a handful of foreign techni-
cians have been permitted to enter China to help
with the installation of imported equipment.
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25. The second political issue involves an
argument over the appropriate pace of planned eco-
nomic development and the extent to which economic
and technical considerations should govern devel-
opment policy. There have been a number of recent
indications that the developing technical elite has
drawn fire from fundamentalists wedded to "Leap"
style reliance on mass action. A prominent outcrop-
ping of this internal doctrinal struggle is the
present uproar in the press over a hard-working
youth in the countryside who was so busy at farm
tasks he had no time to study for the university en-
trance examinations. Under the revived policy of
entrance examinations, the ranks of the universities
will be filled by bookworms', it is argued, instead
of by dedicated young workers. As a result of this
criticism, the university entrance examination sys-
tem has been revised to make political suitability
the major prerequisite for admittance. The histor-
ical precedents since 1949 suggest that each swing
of the pendulum builds increasingly strong counter-
vailing pressures that eventually cause it to swing
in the opposite direction. This historical experi-
ence makes it extremely difficult to adopt with
confidence a straight line forecast of Chinese eco-
nomic policies based simply on a calculation of
economic necessities.
26. But the swings in the Party line on economic
questions are wider than the swings in economic
reality. There are lags and foot-dragging in imple-
mentation; the directives become diluted and misin-
terpreted as they pass through administrative
channels; the directives prove impractical; or the
whole change in policy is overtaken by events. As
mentioned above, political invective against the
private plots during the Cultural Revolution was
not followed by their dismantlement; indeed, word
was quietly passed to rural cadres not to let their
political zeal override the practical necessity of
retaining the plots. Similarly, in spite of all
the talk about autarky, the PRC has made much of its
economic progress, first, on the basis of Soviet
industrial plants, and, later, on the basis of tech-
nology embodied in Japanese and West European plants
and equipment.
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27. The continuation of China's present economic
policy depends heavily on Chou En-lai, inasmuch as
his demise could pave the way for a strong radical
resurgence. Thus Chou's ability to get his followers
appointed to key policy positions at the forthcoming
Tenth Party Congress may well be a key factor in
shaping future Chinese economic policy.
Implications for the United States
28. Regardless of who eventually succeeds the
aging Mao and Chou, China's present economic prob-
lems will pose constraints on political action. In
order to get back on the agricultural trend line,
the normal annual growth rate of 2% must more than
double during 1973-75. The situation is worse
than it looks if grain alone is considered, because
grain output has been propped up by the transfer
of acreage from other crops. Moreover, the austere
grain and clothing rations are already so low that
they cannot be substantially cut without internal
repercussions. Indeed, genuine revolutionary ardor
is an increasingly scarce commodity among the rank-
and-file, who have had to be content with small
gradual increases in living standards. The impli-
cation seems clear -- China will have to continue
large-scale imports of grain to feed the large
cities of northern and central China. Some erosion
of the US position as the principal supplier of
agricultural products to China would accompany a
return to normal international supply conditions,
particularly in Canada and Australia. Even so,
Chinese actions suggest that the United States --
with its unriv4led supplies of a wide variety of
grains, cotton, and oilseeds -- will remain an
important factor in the PRC's agricultural trade.
29. A second implication for the United States
concerns China's need to refurbish and expand its
industrial plant. At China's present stage of
technology, most of its requirements were being
readily met by Japan, France, the United Kingdom,
West Germany, and other West European nations
before the rapprochement with the United States.
In various high-technology items -- the Boeing ?707s
are a case in point -- the United States will have
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an advantage over other industrial nations. The
devaluations of the US dollar over the past two
years will improve the competitive position of US
exporters of industrial equipment. But the Chinese
policies against joint ventures and large numbers
of foreign technicians will apply doubly to the
United States, which is still billed in the Chinese
press as the leading capitalist-imperialist power.
These political considerations could favor Japanese
or West European suppliers in deals where tech-
nicians need to be stationed in the PRC and where
other considerations are roughly equal.
30. In the matter of China's military efforts,
the PRC seems to have been,able to import practi-
cally all the machine tools, instrumentation, and
other equipment needed to support defense produc-
tion, provided that the item was not blatantly and
exclusively military in nature. China now produces
a variety of modern weapons, including jet military
aircraft, submarines, guided-missile patrol boats,
tanks, and armored personnel carriers.
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Product Ion
Import.
Machin. tool. Itlwu..nd unlt.l
Trucks (thousand units)
tocomutlv.. )unit.)
rrslght car. (thousand unit.)
Cotton cloth (billion hour m.t.rs)
Torsion trod. (nilllon currant US 1)
Total
L.port?
Import.
.rn plant. _n y.
1997 1997 196 1959 1960 1961 1962 1960
42 06 99 96 94 75 11 16
570 611 657 672 665 695 704 716
to, Ill 191 111 117 101 111 170
194 INS 100 165 160 160 173-100 175-180
1.1 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.9 0,9 0.9
SI 100 111 166 161-161 107-110 106-111 Ill-Ill
1.IS 5.15 9.0 10 11 1 9 9
66.5 1)0.7 210 100 710 110 100 190
7.] 19.) 28 42 47 11 30 31
0.44 1.46 2,1 ],7 4.6 4.3 5.0 5.5
2.06 6.16 9,3 11.0 9.0 6.0 7.5 7.1
0.4 1.9 1.0 1.1 0.1 2.1 1.1 4.9
0.2 0.0 1.1 1.9 2.5 1.4 2.1 2.9
0.2 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0
1 J.1 21.1 30 13 11 10 25 15
0 1.5 16.0 I?,4 15 1 14 16
20 167 190 500 600 100 25 2S
5.9 7.) 11 11 23 1 4.0 5.9
1,61 5.05 5.1 7.5 5.0 4.0 4.2 4.5
1.09 1.06 7.76 4.29 3.99 3.02 2.61 2.77
0.69 1.62 1.91 2.21 1.96 1.51 1.57 1.57
1.01 1.44 1.92 2.06 2.01 1.19 1.19 1.20
1954
94
711
129
110-195
1.1
I11-112
10
200
16
6.9
9.5
1965 1966 1961
107 Ill 106
111 761 760
116 144 I16
190.195 195-200 210-215
1.5 1,6 1.8
118-160 116-112 116-151
11 1) 10
210 240 190
42 30 45
a t0 I0
11 12 10
1.7 6.8
1.3 1.5
1.2 2.J
]6 11
26 34
25 50
5.7 6.6
1.9 5.4
3.22 3.81
1.75 2.04
1.47 1.84
6.0 0.7
5.S 4,4
2.5 1.1
41 60
47 14
110 200
7.5 6.9
6.0 1.1
1961 1964 1910
105 117 117
191 111 837
117 111 199
195-700 200-205 270-225
1.6 1.1 1.1
147-166 178-200 200-241
12 15 Is
200 So 100
50 60 72
11 14 20
10 12 It
10.3 12.]
6.3 6.2
4.0 4.1
40 45
)1 60
240 260
6.7 11
1.1 6.5
4.24 3.90 3.76
2.21 1.95 1.91
2.01 1.95 1.12
Approved For Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500190010-1
1971 1912
119 179
957 619
I6) 159
110-225 210-215
1.6 1.7
211-277 249-295
11 21
125 340
86 9s
16 ]0
14.5 IS.S
14.1 16.4 11.9
10.0 12.3 14,7
4.1 4.3 1.2
s0 55 60
70 96 100
210 200 220
12 14 IS
7.5 7.5 7.5
3.16 4.29
2.01 2.03
1.11 2.24
4.70 5.00
2.42 3.06
2.26 2.74