WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BURUNDI: THE LONG, HOT SUMMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: September 22, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Burundi: The Long, Hot Summer
CIA
S
ecret
6:~ t1 :r,ul r n Ng 653
FILE CO P
Approved
22 September 1972
No. 0388/72A
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Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
William Butler Yeats
Throughout the summer, the Republic of
Burundi outdid itself in the violence that has been
Burundi's trademark since it achieved independ-
ence from Belgium in 1962. On 29 April, some
2,000 poorly armed Hutu dissidents quixotically
attempted to spark a nationwide revolt against
the divided, Tutsi-dominated government of Presi-
dent Michel Micombero. Although the army
quickly suppressed the rebels, the insurrection
aggravated deep-rooted fears among the minority
Tutsis that they would be wiped out by the
Hutus. The government whipped up a campaign
of reprisals against the Hutu population that
lasted all summer. As many as 200,000 Hutus
may have perished and perhaps another 100,000
were either left homeless throughout Burundi, or
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crowded into jerry-built refugee camps in neigh-
boring countries.
Burundi's recovery from this major up-
heaval-the fourth in a decade-will be slow, pain-
ful, and, in all likelihood, temporary. Although
the vast majority of Burundi's three million Hi tus
refused to support the insurrection, the fears of
the country's 600,000 Tutsis have not been
diminished. Many members of the ruling Tutsi
elite continue to call for harsh repression as the
only way of staving off a Hutu revolt. The
Micombero government is going through the mo-
tions of promoting national reconciliation, but in
some instances its policies are deliberately ob-
structive.
Things Fall Apart
The events in Burundi this summer capped a
long history of tribal tensions and political in-
fighting. For over four centuries, the aggressive
Tutsis constiioted a warrior caste supporting four
royal clans that produced Burundi's kings. The
Tutsis acted as an instrument of coercion against
the country's docile, pastoral Hutu majority.
Rival princes of royal blood, competing for the
throne, formed alliances with powerful Tutsi
chieftains, promoting regional Tutsi factionalism
that has survived to the present day. At the same
time, however, the royal princes, distrustful of
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Tutsi power, fostered the growth of a counter-
vailing Hutu elite. Four centuries of dynastic con-
flict eventually brought about the destruction of
the royal clans and opened the way for post-
independence power struggles between Tutsis and
Hutus and between rival factions within these
tribes.
A sharpening of Hutu-Tutsi tensions in
Burundi was foreshadowed in 1959 by a Hutu
revolution in neighboring Rwanda that violently
dislodged Rwanda's dominant Tutsi minority.
Tens of thousands of Tutsis were killed or forced
into exile, and Burundi's Tutsis came face to face
with the realization that it could happen to them.
The assassination in September 1961 of Burundi's
prime minister - designate, Prince Rwagasore,
only two weeks after elections were held to select
the post-independence government, shattered
hopes of future tribal unity and national unity.
Although a Tutsi, he was linked to the Hutus by
marriage. Upon his death, leaders from the two
tribes struggled to establish themselves as his legit-
imate successor.
Burundi's first four years of independence as
a constituticnal monarchy thus were marked by a
succession of assassinations and attempted assas-
sinations. The attempt on the life of a Hutu prime
minister in 1965 provoked Hutu elements in the
army and gendarmerie to try a coup. Micombero,
a Tutsi and an army captain, quickly put down
the attempt, and a bloody repression of the Hutus
followed.
When Micombero finally seized power and
abolished the monarchy in 1966, he felt a need
for national unity. He sought a reconciliation
with the Hutu elite. He allowed Hutus back into
the country's only political party, the civil serv-
ice, and the government-although important
positions were reserved for Tutsis. In suppressing
the monarchy, Micombero created a political void
that was quickly filled by a horde of Tutsi op-
portunists whose pursuit of power and aggran-
dizement has few rivals in Africa. It led to a bitter
rivalry between a strongly anti-Western and anti-
Hutu extremist faction concentrated in southern
Burundi, and a pro-Western, technocratic, north-
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em faction that also harbors fears of Hutu revolu-
tion but prefers conciliation to repression.
The see-saw political struggle between these
two groups continued until the fall of 1971. The
southern faction, using its control of the justice
and foreign affairs ministries and its influence
within the army and bureaucracy, successfully
engineered the downfall of a number of ranking
moderates within the cabinet on charges of plot-
ting against the government. At the same time,
the foreign minister, who himself had spent time
in prison in 1967 for allegedly plotting against the
government, overrode moderate opposition and
pushed through a resumption of diplomatic rela-
tions with Peking, suspended since the alleged
Chinese involvement in the coup plot of 1964.
Micombero, caught as usual between the ex-
tremes, sought to replace the shattered moderate
faction by setting up an army-dominated
Supreme Revolutionary Council. But the army
was also caught up in the factional disputes and
the council quickly slipped into nothingness. By
early 1972, the Micombero government was all
but paralyzed; disunity within the Tutsi oligarchy
was on public display.
On 29 April 1972, Micombero tried to re-
gain political momentum by dismissing his entire
cabinet along with a number of other high-
ranking government officials. He only went half-
way, however, and failed to name any replace-
ments. His move was immediately eclipsed when a
Hutu insurrection broke out in southern Burundi.
The rebels doubtless hoped to take advan-
tage of the growing disunity within the Tutsi
oligarchy.
The rebels, perhaps 2,000 strong, struck in a
series of attacks against major population centers
and army garrisons in southern Burundi. Among
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BURUNDI
ukavu
. Lilima
Major refugee
ZAIRE . :oncentration
Major refugee
concentration
Uvira~_Bujumbura
/ j3ururi
umonge
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the areas hardest hit was Bururi Province, the
home area of President Micombero and the
stronghold of the southern extremist faction.
Virtually all Bururi provincial authorities, who
were gathered for a political rally near the provin-
cial capital, were assassinated. The rebels failed,
however, to kill the justice and information min-
isters, who had gone to Bururi to investigate
reports of local unrest.
The rebels failed to gain any popular sup-
port, despite appeals for Hutu unity, forced con-
scription, and liberal doses of black magic.
Burundi's 3,000-man army struck back hard and,
after several weeks of fighting, pushed the rebels
into isolated pockets along the coast of Lake
Tanganyika. Despite the crisis, Micombero took
no steps to name a new government, and the
extremist members of his previous cabinet appar-
ently continued to act in their former capacities
and to use their influence to direct much of the
anti-rebel and later anti-Hutu campaigns.
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The Tutsi elite was divided over where to
p!ace the blame for the insurrection
Officially, the govern-
ment claimed that the rebellion was the work of
imperialist agents from neighboring countries in
league with monarchists intent on restoring the
former king. The king had been lured back from
Uganda in early April on assurances of amnesty.
He was immediately arrested on charges of plan-
ning a mercenary invasion and was executed on
orders from Micombero on the eve of the insur-
rection. Extremist Tutsis within the government
also attempted to place blame for the insurrection
on Westerners, particularly the Belgians.
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even students in the capital were arrested, "inter-
rogated," executed, and buried in mass graves
outside the city. Although the government
claimed it uncovered evidence of an extensive
Hutu plot, probably no move than a handful of
the victims were actually involved.
The systematic purge of Hutus in the capital
quickly spread throughout the country, parti-
cularly in the south. The army, under the pretext
of searching out rebel survivors, began a campaign
of open liquidation of the Hutus. Regional of-
ficials, the party-particularly its headstrong
youth organization-and, finally, the Tutsi popu-
lace in general all took their cue from the central
authorities, and the extermination became whole-
sale. Despite the ferocity of the pogrom, the
Hutus fought back on only few occasions, ex-
hibiting a fatalism born of four centuries of
feudal subservience to Tutsi authority. It left for-
eign observers stunned.
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h n May, after a month of killing,
stimated that about 100,000
u us a been murdered or left homeless. Large
areas of southern Burundi had been devastated.
By late August, when the repression had begun to
run its course, perhaps as many as 200,000 Hutus
had been killed. In addition, international relief
workers estimate that 50,000 had fled to Zaire,
20,000 to Tanzania, and 5,000 to Rwanda, and
that the number of Hutu refugees is still rising. By
way of comparison, the abortive insurrection that
sparked the devastation killed an estimated
1,000-2,000 Tutsis.
The economic loss to Burundi has been in-
cidental. Although thousands of Hutu peasants
were driven off, their crops and homes burned,
Foremost in the Tutsi mind, however, was they were mostly subsistence farmers who made
the specter of a nationwide Hutu uprising, remi- little corit,-ibution to the national economy.
niscent of the 1959 bloodbath in Rwanda, and Bujumbura, the capital and major commercial
`.; what it thought of as narrow escapes in Burundi center, was hardly affected by the violence; busi-
itself following the coup attempts of 1965 and ness continued without interruption. Coffee,
1969. These fears led the government to embark Burundi's major cash crop, is grown in the north,
upon a systematic purge of the Hutu elite. Civil which was little affected by the violence. The
servants, party functionaries, army personnel, harvesting and processing of this year's crop has
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been hindered somewhat by disruption of trans-
portation and storage facilities and by the loss of
many Hutu workers in the coffee industry.
Covering Up
The political costs have been extensive.
Despite fervent appeals from the diplomatic com-
munity in Bujumbura, outraged editorials in the
Western press, and private pressure from Zairian
President Mobutu Sese Seko and Tanzanian Presi-
dent Nyerere, Micombero steadfastly refused to
curtail the anti-Hutu repression. In the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, he in-
sisted on portraying events in Burundi as a des-
perate stand by an embattled Tutsi minority to
stave off extinction. He argued that at least
20,000 rebels had initiated the insurrection and
that their ranks had been swelled by extensive
Hutu support. Micombero railed against the for-
eign press, particularly Belgian, for playing up the
repression of Hutus and ignoring Tutsi claims of
self-defense.
While Western observers were appalled by
the violence, most African leaders were apathetic,
and Micombero has been able to use this apathy
to advantage. He has openly expressed gratitude
for short-lived support provided by Zaire and
Tanzania in the early weeks of the summer, im-
plying that both countries accept his version of
events. Following the outbreak of the insurrec-
tion, Mobutu answered a request for assistance
from Micombero by temporarily supplying a bat-
talion of paratroops for guard duty in the capital
and several jet fighters for aerial reconnaissance.
obvious, Mobutu refused to supply the Burundi
Army with much-needed ammunition. Tanzania
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also initially made some small arms and ammuni-
tion available to the Burundi Army, but later
refused further aid. Nevertheless, Micombero has
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The failure of the Organization of African
Unity to take up the issue of repression in
Burundi during or after its summit meeting in
Rabat last June also gave Micombero a psycho-
logical boost. Although some African leaders have
privately expressed dismay at what happened,
they have failed to involve themselves, ;ndivid-
ually or collectively, in any way, preferring to
view the affair as an internal Burundian matter.
In late June, Micombero accepted a mission
from the UN sent to investigate the possibilities
of assistance. Again, the Burundi Government
played up the visit as a gesture of international
support. Although the mission's subsequent
report presented an objective account of the hor-
rors there, it failed to gain widespread attention.
Secretary General Waldheim has been vainly try-
ing to get Burundi to accept a permanent UN
representative.
The government has placed restrictions on
international relief efforts. These restrictions af-
fect primarily the Hutus and are part of the
government effort to play down the extent of
Hutu need. The supplies are being diverted to the
Tutsis. In late August, the International Red
Cross threatened to withdraw from the country
rather than submit to this sort of treatment. At
present the Red Cross is continuing its operations,
but only in heavily populated Tutsi areas in the
south.
On 14 July, more than ten weeks after the
slaughter began, President Micombero announced
the formation of a new cabinet. Its broad nature
stood in sharp contrast to the repression then
taking place. As a conciliatory gesture and to
counter Western charges of anti-Hutu policies,
Micombero weighted his new cabinet in favor of
the moderates and included several token Hutus
who apparently had been saved by the govern-
ment for just this purpose. The bureaucracy re-
mains dominated by Tutsis, and no Hutu minister
will have any real power.
Shortly after the new cabinet was an-
nounced, Micombero also shuffled the army com-
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mand. This curtailed, if only temporarily, a fac-
tionalism almost as intense as that plaguing the
government. Among those dismissed was the
deputy army commander, who had directed the
army's campaign against Hutu civilians and had
also led a purge of moderate Tutsi troops. He was
replaced by a northern moderate.
Plus ce change...
Though the killings have slowed down and
Micombero has made some cosmetic alterations,
not much has really changed. All the elements of
further tragedy are still there. President Micom-
bero is caught in the middle, preoccupied with
perpetuating himself in office. He presides over a
government which, despite its relatively moderate
bent, seems headed for the same violent fate as its
predecessor. Micombero must go on trying to
balance rival factions intent on destroying each
other i;egardless of the consequences.
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The Tutsi oligarchy continues to be obsessed
with the specter of its own destruction and is
incapable of recognizing that it may indeed be
engineering conditions in which the prophecy will
be fulfilled. The new prime minister, stumping
the countryside immediately after his appoint-
ment, kept old fears and hatreds alive. He told his
predominantly Tutsi audiences that peace had
been restored, but virtually in the same breath,
reminded them that "traitors" continued in their
midst. Extremists have kept up appeals to anti-
Hutu sentiment, and isolated incidents are con-
tinuing throughout the countryside.
Virtually all Hutus with any degree of educa-
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education is likely to make it virtually i
ousan s o re ugees have settled in an eastern
area of the country where Zairian rebels linger.
Moreover, both Zaire and Tanzania harbor large
numbers of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda who did
not go to Burundi following the bloodbath of
1959. This raises the possibility of clashes be-
tween the two tribes in their host countries.
Although the Tutsis in Burundi have man-
aged a sort of unity in the face of a common
threat, political factionalism seems as strong as
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ever. Moderate Tutsis belatedly recognize that the
extremists took advantage of the anti-Hutu re-
pression to thin moderate ranks within the army
and bureaucracy. The extremists, already influ-
ential within the army and the bureaucracy, are
attempting to pack both with still more of their
supporters. The new cabinet cannot be expected
to pull together on many issues.
Although international relief efforts are get-
ting under way, the Burundi Government con-
tinues to restrict distribution of relief supplies
and to requisition internationally donated sup-
plies for its own use, no doubt for distribution to
Tutsis.
The Belgian Government, appalled by the
violence, has been reappraising its role as
Burundi's major foreign supporter. Brussels does
not wish to be further identified with a repressive
government; this, together with political disagree-
ment in Burundi, has brought about a deadlock in
renegotiations on Belgian aid, particularly educa-
tional and military assistance. This situation is not
likely to change.
Micombero so far has taken only stopgap
measures to patch up the country's divisions, and
indeed that may be as far as he can go. Given the
deep-rooted tribal tensions and political rivalries,
seriously aggravated by recent events, the govern-
ment may never be able to move toward a
genuine reconciliation between Tutsis and Hutus
or between extremist and moderate Tutsis. These
must somehow be reconciled if Burundi is t
forestall an even more violent upheaval
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