WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 23, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special 'Report
China and International Narcotics Control
>CIA
Pe,
V'I
T SFR11Ij&S BRANCH
ALE COSY
Secret
N2 666
23 June 1972
Mn 0375/72A
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CHINA
AND
INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS
CONTROL
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SECRET
"Poisoning the Chinese people with opium was a pernicious means employed by imperialism in its
attempt to subjugate the Chinese people.... We have within a short period of time eradicated the serious
poisonous effects of opium smoking throughout the country brought on exclusively by imperialism over
the past century and snore. This fully demonstrates the firm determination and explicit polic y of the
Chinese government and people and also shows the sup.?riority of the socialist system ill solving problems ill
this field. "
(Speech of Chinese delegate Wang Jun-sheng to the Social Committee of
the 52nd Session of the UN Economic and Social Council, 16 May 1972)
In a speech on 16 May, China's representa-
tive to the UN Economic and Social Council
indicated that his government was considering
participation n international attempts to control
the production and consumption of narcotics. He
placed China on record as supporting stC.:t con-
trol of narcotics. It is China's position, he said,
that each afflicted country should, through its
own efforts, strengthen domestic controls and
educate its people on the dangers of drug abuse.
Nevertheless, the Chinese delegate left room for
China's participation in international narcotics
control by saying that Peking is willing "to give
serious attention to the attainment of certain
joint feasible international agreements and the
exertion of joint efforts on the basis of respecting
the sovereignty of various countries."
Other Chinese representatives have recently
told UN officials in private that the question of
active participation in UN drug control work is
"under study" in Peking. They have said that
while China continues to adhere to the Opium
Convention of 1931, it does not consider itself
bound by similar instruments signed in China's
name by the Chinese Nationalists at the UN.
Peking may be contemplating signing of the re-
cently amended Single Drug Convention of 1961,
cooperating with the International Narcotics Con-
trol Board, and contributing to the UN Drug
Fund. As a classic historical example of a "victim
country," China might, for the benefit of the
international narcotics control efforts now under
way, disseminate its experiences in solving its
domestic drug problem. It is doubtful, however,
that many countries would be willing and able to
adopt the harsh measures employed by Chinese
Communists. From the point of view of Peking,
such participation would help to offset efforts on
the part of Nationalist China and the USSR to
portray China as a ringleader in the illicit nw-
cotics traffic.
Opium: "Imperialist Instrument"
More than a century of unhappy experiences
has given the Chinese an aversion to opium-and
by extension, all narcotics-that contrasts mark-
edly with the more usual Asian view of its use as a
minor social vice.
In the early 19th century, the British solved
a trade imbalance with China by producing opium
in India and promoting its sale to China. The
Chinese were already acquainted with the drug.
Opium sold so well in China that by the 1830s;
the British deficit had been replaced by a trade
surplus in the form of a large drainage of silver
out of China. Alarmed by the financial loss and
morally outraged by the rapid spread of opium
addiction, the Manchu dynasty, which ruled
China at the time, determined to cut off opium
imports. The seizure and burning of opium be-
longing to British traders in the Canton region set
off the so-called Opium War of 1839-42. China
was defeated in its attempt to cut off the opium
trade, and opium came to be regarded as an
instrument of "imperialist aggression." Cultiva-
tion of opium poppies in Manchuria during the
Japanese occupation of the 1930s reinforced the
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Chinese tendency to associate opium usr' witl-
"imperialism."
When the People's Republic of China was
established in late 1949, its leaders moved quickly
against opium traffickers and the huge addict
population, then possibly the world's largest. The
elimination of addiction was regarded as symbolic
of the freeing of the Chinese people from foreign
bondage as well as a social and economic neces-
sity. On 24 February 1950, the State Administra-
tive Council issued an order, Concerning the
Strict Prohibition of Opiu,n and Other Narcotics.
The order specified that anti-opium measures be
initiated in an area the moment military opera-
tions had been completed. Government organs at
all levels then proceeded to set time limits within
which owners could turn in opium stocks for
compensation and addicts could register for treat-
ment of their habits. Severe punishments, includ-
ing summary shootings, were meted out to those
who did not comply.
The initial anti-opium measures were. soft-
ened for the ethnic tribesmen in the southern
border regions. The life patterns of these tribes-
men were intricately bound up with opium cul-
tivation, and the regime wished to gain their
loyalty. For them, Peking set elastic time limits,
based on local circumstances, for abolishing culti-
vation or shifting to cultivation under government
auspices. By the mid-1950s private cultivation
and consumption of opium had been effectively
eliminated in all parts of China.
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The caption of this 19th century woodcut ex-
plains that in 1839, Imperial Commissioner Lin
Tse-hsu burned 20,283 chests of opium belonging to
foreign firms in the Canton area and later captured 23
boats used by foreigners to smuggle opium into
China. His actions precipitated foreign intervention
and war. Tire caption also exhorts the Chinese to
think back upon these events and to eliminate the
evils of opium.
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China An Internatior;al Trafficker?
In the past few years, China has beE.n ac-
cused, largely by the Chinese Nationalists and the
Soviets, of supplying the world illicit market with
huge quantities of row opium and its derivatives.
Over the past three years, Nationalist China has
inspired a number of articles throughout Asia
purportedly documenting Peking's involvement in
the illicit narcotics trade. In 1971 an exhibition
was held in Taipei of narcotics said to be of
mainland origin. These materials have often
served as the basis for charges carried in the US
press. The USSR, for its part, seems to have been
responsible for the planting last year of a story
quoting Chou En-lai to the effect that China was
engaged in poisoning the free world in general,
and US troops irr Vietnam in particular, with
opium. Soviet broadcasts to Africa in March and
to Southeast Asia in May have portrayed China as
an active participant in the illicit narcotics traffic.
Most of the charges focus on the historical record
of opium production ;n China and the foreign
exchange earnings that Peking supposedly garners
from the illicit export of opium.
Country
Total Opium Consumption
Approximate Consumption
(tons oi~ raw opium equivalent)
per million population
(kg)
India
Japan
60.9
USA
188.8
USSR
425.0
1,770
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Opium-Growing Capabilities
China has the capability to grow very large
quantities of opium, and the suppression of do-
mestic addiction was not designed to eliminate
opium cultivation. Like other countries, China
requires some opium for the production of phar-
maceutical drugs. Peking may also have a main-
tenance program for long-term addicts who could
not be cured of their habits.
Peking does not release data on the
country's opium or pharmaceutical production,
and a firm estimate is not possible. However, a
minimum pharmaceutical requirement for opium
in China can be inferred from data provided by
other countries. Countries that subscribe to the
1961 UN Single Convention on narcotic drugs
report data on licit opium production, con-
sumption, and inventories to the Internationai
Narcotics Control Board. The board's figures
yield the opium use findings listed in the chart
below:
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CHINA. Former Opium Gretwing Areas
Wuhan
f`t
l\
Canton
10HONG KONG
',? MACAO IU.K.I
IPOKT.1
Percent of crop area in opium
0-9 1 40-79
10-39 80-100
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Of the four cocintries, India is probably the
closest to China in the availability of modern
public health and medical services. If Chinese
pharmaceutical requirements for opium are com-
parable to Indian requirements, China's annual
opium need would be only about 100 metric
tons. At the other extreme, if China consumes as
much medicinal opium on a per capita basis as thu
USSR, China's opium requirement each year
would be about 1,500 tons. The acreage required
to grow either amount would be only a fraction
of a percent of the roughly 150 million hectares
sown to all crops each year in China.
Communist troops occupied China's primary
opium growing regioi, in Yunnan Province in Jan-
uary 1950, but, since a special dispensation was
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made for the ethnic tribesmen to give then, rime
to adju;i, a harvest was gathered in May-June
1951. This harvest may have amounted to some
2,500 metric tons-roughly equivalent to the total
estimated amount of opium being produced in
the world today iur licit and illicit markets com-
bined.
Private cultivation and consumption in.Yun-
nan continued until 1956, when it was banned.
Opium produced there had been consiime;; lo-
cally cr sold through Burmese s to buyers in
Thailand. The quantities that found their way out
of China, however, had apparently been small,
and, because the sales were illicit, the government
presumably had received no tax or other revenue.
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Heroin seized in New York in November 1970
bearing the World Twin Lions trademark. This mark-
ing is known to date back to 1937, when it appeared
in the Customs Agency Service Narcotics Manual and
on bags of smoking opium originating from Macao,
but now apparently is used by traffickers outside of
Communist China. Narcotics bearing this trademark
were seized on several occasions during 1971.
Opium as an Export Commodity
Although China retains a capability to pro-
duce large quantities of opium, China is not
known to have sold opium on the licit market and
probably has sold very little, if any. Furthermore,
there is no evidence of sales to Japan which is
urgently seeking additional sources of licit opium
for its own pharmaceutical industry.
The particular Chinese aversion to opium
may in itself be enough to bar opium sales
abroad. Additionally, Chinese earnings from
either licit or illicit sales of opium would not
likely be large. In the licit market, the Chinese
would have to compete with established suppliers
such as India-which in 1970 provided 90 percent
of total licit exports ^f 885 tons. Chinese sales
would therefore be unlikely to exceed a few hun-
dred tons. In the illicit market the earnings from
10,000 tons-China was once accused of peddling
that amount-would be perhaps only a mere $25
million. This is about equal to one percent of
Peking's current export earnings. Furthermore,
nothing like 10,000 tons of Chinese (or any
other) opium could be absorbed by the world
illicit market. Current estimates suggest that the
world illicit market is using about 1,200 metric
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tons of raw opium a year. This comes chiefly
from Southeast Asian producing areas, where
there appears just now to be a sizable surplus
available, and secondarily from Pakistan, Afghan-
istan, and Turkey.
The draconian suppression of opium use in
China, the small financial stakes in licit or illicit
opium dealings, and the recent move towards
cooperation in international narcotics control
work all suggest that the Chinese regime is not
now and is not likely to become a factor in the
illicit narcotics traffic. Positive proof of this nega-
tive proposition is, not surprisingly, lacking. For
example, narcotics have been seized bearing main-
land brand markings with histories dating back to
at least the 1930s, but there is evidence that
traffickers in Southeast Asia have appropriated
the brand names for their own locally produced
products. Narcotics traced back to Hong Kong,
whose proximity to the mainland led some ob-
servers to suspect that China was implicated,
turned out to have originated in Southeast Asia.
The many sources that provide information on
world il:icit narcotics developments have so far
failed to unearth good evidence of official Chi-
nese involvement in the drug traffic.
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