WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE STRUGGLE FOR A YUGOSLAV NATIONAL IDENTITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 10, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Struggle for a Yugoslav National Identity
CIA
flOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE COPY
DD NOT DESTROY
Secret
N2 634
10 March 1972
25X1
25X1
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The Struggle for a
Yugoslav National Identity
Deep-rooted nationality rivalries have handicapped Yugoslavia since its
creation at the end of World War I I n the l
st t
i
th
t
l
f
a
wo years
e
n
erp
ay o
., government reforms, continuing economic problems, and a freer political
climate has led to a resurgence of bitter regional and nationality animosities.
These antagonisms threaten President Tito's efforts :o build a system that
will promote the survival of an independent, non-aligned Yugoslavia once he
The new burst of national animosities has set back Tito's efforts to
create a decentralized socialist state that would grant wide-ranging freedom
of expression. A shaken Communist Party finds itself once more looking for
a way to enable the more than 15 nationalities within the Yugoslav borders
to live and work together in harmony. Tito will be 80 in May; time is not on
his or the party's side. A great deal remains to be done. Foremost, the party
must recognize the paradox in its past attitude toward the nationalities: the
encouragement of ethnic individuality works at cross-purposes with Yugoslav
unity. As long as this paradox exists, nationality tensions will continue.
'e'T EFI'~'
In its simplest form, the Yugoslav nationality problem has been a
struggle by non-Serbians against Serbian hegemony. During the period be-
tween World War I and 11, the monarchy treated Yugoslavia as an extension
of greater Serbia. The suspicion and distrust resulting from that experience
still color the outlook of many Yugoslav minorities-most particularly the
Croats. The Communists, who led the partisan resistance in World War II
under the banner of "brotherhood and Unity," believed, perhaps naively, that
the creation of a federal government of six republics and two provinces at
the close of World War II would solve the nationalities problem. The
problem did in fact fade during the first two decades of Communist rule, but
this was more the result of Tito's leadership than the system.
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THE STRUGGLE FOR A YUGOSLAV
NATIONAL IDENTITY
*See fold-out map at end of article.
Special Report
Yugoslavia was spawned by the decadent
Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires. The new
countrywas built around the kingdom of Serbia.
History had given it few unifying traditions. The
country is a crazy quilt of ethnic, linguistic, reli-
gious and cultural differences. No other country
in Europe is as ethnically complex. The problem
is so complicated, the differences so great, the
passions so intense, and the people so outspoken,
that it defies easy solution. *
To the north and west are the Catholic
Slovenes and Croats, whose hist 'rical ties to the
West and economically more advanced societies
nurture feelings of superiority. To the south and
east are the Serbs around whom modern Yugo-
slavia was formed. The Serbs are, for the most
part, members of the Orthodox Church. The
Serbian monarchy dominated the inter-war
Yugoslav government, and even today the Serbs-
many of whom feel they have been chosen to
play a leading role in the nation-predominate in
the federal administration. There are also Alba-
nians in Kosovo, who demand national recog-
nition and equality; Montenegrins, with a proud
and independent past all their own; and Mace-
donians, whose national consciousness has been
encouraged in Tito's Yugoslavia.
The rivalry between Serb and Croat is the
most notorious and has the bloodiest history. It
cuts across republic boundaries and can be found
wherever the two live side by side, i.e., in the
republics of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, and
Croatia.
President Tito has been more succ.:ssful than
any previous Yugoslav !eader in keeping nation-
ality antagonisms at bay. He did so for more than
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25 years, leading some observers to speculate that
he had found the secret for making Yugoslavia's
diverse nationalities work together. Such specu-
lation proved premature. The system he built was
unable-short of his direct, personal inter-
vention-to cope with rampant Croatian nation-
alism late last year.
The socialist revolution in Yugoslavia, then,
has not adequately come to grips with t;ie coun-
try's nationality problem. The old antagonisms
are still very much alive. Croatian nationalism is
just one part of this complicated problem, which
will undoubtedly flare again and could reach
massive proportions in the succession period.
The Party and the Army
Throughout most of the 1950s and the
1960s, the official party line reflected the naive
attitude that the "nationality question" no longer
existed because the political-social system pre-
cluded domination of one nation over another.
Vestigas of "bourgeois nationalism" were ac-
knowledged but were treated as isolated phe-
nomena. Failing to perceive the magnitude of the
problem, the party did not act appropriately.
Communist educators failed to meet the challenge
of teaching new patterns of relations based on
social and class rather than national and regional
interests. The Communists did give Yugoslavia a
federal government, establish ethnic republics,
and grant certain rights to individual peoples. But
at that point they stopped. Their system whetted
national appetites and in many instances left an
unfilled craving for more.
In the fall of 1970, Tito unveiled reforms
u;llike any that had been seen before in a Com-
miinist country with the possible exception of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Decentralization in the
govc.:rnment and economy, already under way for
some time, was to be dramatically accelerated by
an extensive two-stage constitutional reform.
Most of the remaining vestiges of doctrinaire
Communism were tossed overboard in favor of a
Special Report
freer, more open system and society. The reforms
were Tito's effort to create a system that would
enable a self-managing, non-aligned Yugoslavia to
survive his passing.
The party was the critical ingredient in these
plans. Under the decentralization, the burden of
maintaining unity and cohesion was to fall
squarely on the federal party. It is here that the
program broke down. In the heady atmosphere of
frank, open political discussion, regional nation-
alism flared. The federal party could not cope
with the challenge of a nationalist infested Crua-
tian party leadership in the closing months of
1971. Tito had to intervene personally, the Croa-
tian party hierarchy was purged, and the federal
party was left shaken by its inability to deal with
the Croatian challenge.
The party now must find a way to reassert
itself and in so doing guard against a recurrence of
nationalism in its own ranks. Tito has made it
clear that he does not want to discard his reforms
and that he still regards decentralization as the
best way to ensure the survival of an independent
Yugoslavia once he is gone. As a first step, this
will mean putting some teeth into the party ap-
paratus concerned with enforcing discipline.
The military, like the party, has been a main-
stay of the regime. There is one basic difference;
the army is a Serb stronghold. The army has
traditionally supported Tito's policies, and, at the
height of the Croatian crisis when the federal
party seemed unable to cope, Tito turned to the
military once again. He sought and received army
support for his move against the Croatian leaders.
With the party still searching for solutions to
its problems, the importance of the military as a
unifying force has increased. In fact, the success
of the whole decentralization process could ulti-
mately rest on the army during the post-Tito era.
This means that the army will be in a good
position to demand at some future date a share of
power with the political leaders.
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Serbia Proper
92.5% - Serbs
7.5% - Other
Special Report
Where It Began
Serbian nationalism is intense and strongly
identifies with the Yugoslav federation. Serbs
tend to be aggressive, political realists who see in
Yugoslavia the fulfillment of their 19th century
dream of a union of the south Slavs. They aye
clannish to a fault, and more than five decades of
predominance in the federal government have
given them a firm grip on the levers of power
which has only recently been challenged by Tito's
plans for extensive decentralization.
Cognizant of the role their republic played
in creating modern Yugoslavia, the Serbs tend to
view themselves as the champions and guardians
of the state. The boldness of their past actions
and their lack of concern for the rights of the
nation's minorities have raised suspicions about
their intentions and alienated others-in particular
the Croats. This has weakened rather than
strengthened the federation. The Serbs may point
with pride to the fact that they were the nucleus
around which Yugoslavia was formed in 1918.
Others cannot forget that inter-war Yugoslavia
was not a federation of equal nationalities. It was
in fact the kingdom of greater Serbia. Serb
oppression and mismanagement of the nationality
question, particularly under the royal dictatorship
from 1929 to 1939, was a direct cause of the
disaffection of the Croats when the Germans
invaded in April 1940.
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Special Report
Concern over Serbian hegemony has per-
sisted since World War 11. Prior to July 1966, the
guardian of Serb interests was Aleksander
Rankovic. A doctrinaire Communist and then vice
president of Yugoslavia, he maintained tight con-
trol over the state security service and was con-
sidered Tito's heir-apparent. From this power
base, Rankovic kept a close eye on Serb interests.
He used his office and access to Tito to bloc
attempts at decentralization, which Serbs tend to
view as an attempt to weaken their position.
Rankovic, who began to take his role as heir
apparent too seriously, was dismissed in 1966.
Since then, the winds of change have begun to
blow in Serbia. Under the enlightened leadership
of Marko Nikezic, the Serbian party has struck a
pose of moderation. The Serbs officially advocate
a path between the extremes of tight centrali-
zation and complete republic autonomy. A very
capable party secretary, Mrs. Latinka Perovic, has
aided Nikezic in his efforts. Sensitive to the na-
tion's highly volatile nationality problem, Mrs.
Perovic has pledged he. pelf and her fellow Serbs
to work for unity. She warned tha+ Serbia must
avoid giving the impression of trying to impose
"anything" on others. She went a step further
and expressed faith in the governmentz& and eco-
nomic reforms. She cautioned against their
abandonment by describing the problem ahead as
one of rebuilding unity, without returning to
"centralist reforms" and "greater state hegem-
ony."
Others, such as the Croats, refuse to see any
change in the Serbs. Indeed, there are differences
between the Serbian leadership and segments of
the populace. An undercurrent of opposition to
Nikezic and Perovic is discernib'p. Some Serbs
argue that the reforms have gone too far and
point to the Croatian crisis last December as
proof. These same critics see greater autonomy
for Kosovo and Vojvodina (both part of Serbia)
as an attempt by the republic's enemies to
weaken Serbian power and influence.
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Croatia
80.3% - Croats
15.0% - Serbs
4.7% - Other
The Croats, because of their cultural, histori-
cal, and religious ties to the West, feel superior to
the rest of the nation, save Slovenia. They are
determined to count as Croats and as a result
push for nearly full republic autonomy. Zagreb,
their republic capital, is haunted by the fear that
any attempt to strengthen federal authority will
mean a return to Serbian domination. The Croats'
position on autonomy, which would turn the
federal authority into a flimsy facade for six or
even eight tiny Balkan states. wins little support
elsewhere in Yugoslavia.
The Croats are generally admired for their
efficiency and business know-how, but their rec-
ord on the nationality question has won them
little love or respect. Their chauvinism burst forth
in fratricide during World War 11 when a Nazi
puppet regime ruled the republic. Croatian fas-
cists conducted a witch-hunt against the repub-
lic's Serbian minority, slaughtering thousands
who refused to give up the Orthodox religion.
Even the Croatian wing of the Yugoslav Commu-
nist Party during that period was tainted with
nationalism.
More than a quarter of a century of Com-
munism has not dampened Croatia's nationalist
zeal. The relative ease with which nationalist
elements caught hold in the Croatian party and
won popular surport for their defiance of the
federal party illustrates this. Moreover, the mag-
nitude of the resulting purge, which brought
down the republic's highly popular young leader-
ship and cost some 400 officials their jobs, only
heightened republic nationalism. The ousted
leaders have now taken on an aura of martyrdom.
Should Tito not prove his charges of emigre ties
to top republic leaders, they may well return to
the center of the republic's political stage in the
succession period.
Special Report -6-
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Bosnia and Hercegovina
42.9% - Serbs
21.7% - Croats
25.7% - Ethnic Muslims of unspecified nationality
8.4% - Undeclared Yugoslavs
1.3% - Other
Special Report
Mountainous Bosnia-Hercegovina is in many
respects a microcosm of Yugoslavia's nationality
make-up. Its inhabitants are nearly equally
divided among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims,
leading some to label the republic an artificially
created cordon sanitaire between the rival Serb
and Croat republics. National chauvinism conjures
up terrible memories of the Yugoslav civil war
during World War Il-a great deal of which was
fought in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The scars are deep,
and the republic's post-war efforts to establish
nationality equality have been only partially suc-
cessful.
The resurgence of Croatian nationalism last
year had an immediate impact in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Extremist students from Zagreb
crossed into the republic to seek support from
their Croatian kinfolk. Simultaneously, the Croa-
tian cultural association Matica Hrvatska began
distributing nationalist propaganda. Nationality
relations were particularly strained with the pub-
lication of the brochure, Siroki Bri/eg, which
extolled as martyrs a group of Croatian nation-
alists who died at the hands of the partisans in
World War II. Aware of the potential appeal of
such activity, republic officials in Sarajevo
quickly squelched it.
The Muslims are the key to keeping this
republic's nationality problem in check. They are
hypersensitive to both Croatian and Serbian na-
tionalism, having been caught between the two
before. They are determined that it should never
happen again. The Muslims insist on full equality
within Bosnia-Hercegovina and parity represen-
tation with the Croats and Serbs in the republic
government.
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Montenegro
81.4% - Montenegrins
6.5% - Slovenes
5.5% - Albanians
6.6% - Other
Special Report
In Montenegro, as in Serbia, a new brand of
leadership has emerged typified by such men as
presidium member Vidoje Zarkovic. These leaders
are willing to compromise to benefit the feder-
ation. They support the governmental and eco-
nomic decentralization. As in Serbia, there is a
gap between the leadership and the basically na-
tionalistic population.
The Montenegrins, situated in a small quar-
ter of Yugoslavia along the Adriatic Coast bor-
dering Albania, are ethnic Serbs who settled in
the Black Mountains in the Middle Ages. The
Montenegrins successfully fought off the Turks
and remained independent throughout the 500
years of Turkish dominance in the Balkans. These
tough mountaineers thus view themselves as
superior to the rest of the Yugoslav peoples.
The republic harbors strong pro-Russian
sympathies dating back to the days of Peter the
Great when sailors of the first Russian Navy
trained in Montenegro. From that time on, Mon-
tenegro and Russia periodically cooperated in
waging war against the Ottoman Empire. Even
today, similarities between the Soviet and the
Montenegrin approach to Communism are ap-
parent. The Montenegrin Communist Party, for
example, is one of the most conservative in
Yugoslavia and favors many elements of a more
orthodox Communist political and economic
system. Montenegrins, like many Serbs, favor
strong central authority.
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Tito's long-time friend and adviser, that the aging
chief of state turns for theoretical justification of
Yugoslavia's unorthodox policies.
Slovenia
95.6% -Slovenes
4.4% - Other
Kardelj
Mainstay of the Federation
Croatian-style nationalism, with its under-
current of separatist sentiment, has never had a
strong appeal for the Slovenes. During the period
between the wars, the Slovenes tended to favor a
strong government in Belgrade. Since World War
11, a good argument can be made for the case that
the Slovenes have done more to shape Yugo-
slavia's non-aligned and self-management policies
than any other people in the federation. A great
deal of this is due to the talents of one man,
Edvard Kardelj. While others in Slovenia may
have greater popular support, it is to Kardelj,
Special Report
To a great extent, the current decentrali-
zation and constitutional changes embody long-
standing Slovenian demands for greater republic
autonomy, including increased control over taxes,
more rapid progress toward a market economy
and a larger voice in foreign affairs. The expla-
nation is twofold. First, as part of the Austrian
empire the Slovenes learned that, to achieve their
objectives, they had to work within a political
system rather than against it. Second, the
Slovenes recognize that their prospects for suc-
cessfully going it alone outside the federation are
poor; Slovenia completely disappeared as an
entity during World War II when Italy and Ger-
many each took part of it.
The Slovenes are proud of their cultural and
national heritage, so much so that they often
offend other minorities who accuse them of being
self-centered. Though from time to time there
have been expressions of discontent and rumbling
of nationalism, the Slovenes rarely resort to
extra-legal means to gain their objectives. For the
most part, the complainers accuse the federation
of inhibiting Slovenia's economic development or
argue that the republic gives too much to the
federation for what it gets in return.
National minorities are practically non-
existent in Slovenia, and the people themselves
appear content to see their own cultural and
national identity flower within the Yugoslav
system. They want the new decentralized
Yugoslav system to work. This fact can be seen in
the republic's own constitutional reforms. Ljubl-
jana took the lead in proposing that the federal
plan for a collective government leadership be
adopted at the republic level. Underlying
Slovenia's ties to the federation is a belief in the
Yugoslav "idea" and a faith that a federation of
equal nations will produce a stronger, viable
Yugoslavia.
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Vojvodina
54.9% - Serbs
23.9% - Hungarians
7.8`Yo - Croats
13.4% - Other
? Kosovo
67.0% - Albanians
23.5% - Serbs
9.5% - Other
Kosovo: Aspirations of a Primitive People
Reverberations from Croatian nationalism
were felt strongly in the predominantly Alba-
nian-inhabited province of Kosovo. Here, Serb-
Albanian antagonisms have long simmered.
Kosovo is one of the two autonomous provinces
attached to the republic of Serbia. The Serbs dnd
Albanians disagree c',ier what the region's rela-
tionship to Serbia should be. Indeed the Alba-
nians question whether it ;hould have any ties to
Special Report
the republic at all. For the Serbs, the province is
hallowed ground, the site of their defeat by
invading Turks in 1389. Moreover, the first
Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, established in
1346, is located in the Kosovo town of Pec. Most
Serbs feel, if only for historical reasons, they
should have a say in the running of the province.
The Albanians, on the other hand, make up 74
percent of the population. They claim that, as
descendants of the Illyrians, they are the original
inhabitants and that the Slavs are interlopers.
Albanian aspirations stirred in the latter half
of 1960 with the ouster of Rankovic and the
gradual easing of the political climate in Yugo-
slavia. Demands for language -ind employment
equality, increased economic aid, and greater
political autonomy were followed in 1968 by
public demonstrations. Since then, federal au-
thorities have put new emphasis on solving Koso-
vo's problems and have singled the region out for
massive economic assistance. They reason that if
the province's enormous problems can be over-
come, then the federation will have passed a
major hurdle in reducing the gap between the
"haves" and the "have nots."
In fact, with the federal government putting
so touch of its money and prestige on the line in
Kosovo, the province may become the bellwether
for Yugoslavia. The attitude of Serbia will be
crucial. Nationality disti'-bances involving Serbs
living in Kosovo could have serious repercussions
in Serbia proper, alienating that republic from the
whole reform process. Thus, the federal au-
thorities must satisfy the demands of the basically
primitive and highly explosive Mbanians without
offending Serbian sensitivities.
The nationality tensions in the province are
ready made for foreign meddling. Tirane, which
for years flooded the area with its particular
brand of Marxist-Leninist propaganda, recently
toned down broadcasts to Kosovo following
improved Albanian-Yugoslav relations. Tirane,
however, has not given Up its claim to speak out
on behalf of its fellow Albanians in Yugoslavia.
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Vojvodina: Emerging "Yugoslavism"
Serbia's other autonomous province, Vojvo-
dina, is the breadbasket of Yugoslavia. This ethni
cally complex province contains over 900,000
Serbs, 500,000 Hungarians, 150,000 Croats,
90,000 Slovaks, and 65,000 Romanians; the
remaining 236,000 inhabitants are Germans,
Russians, Ukrainians, and Ruthenians.
Vojvodina, despite its diverse national
make-up, has been remarkably free of chauvinism,
and its Croatian minority was not aroused by the
recent events in Croatia. In World War II, indig-
enous German and Hungarian elements com-
mitted a number of excesses against the local
Serbian population. But in the post-war period,
the province has succeeded in developing an
exemplary relationship among its naticnalities.
Nowhere else in Yugoslavia is the feeling of
being a "Yugoslav" as well developed as here. A
remarkably high number of mixed marriages have
contributed to this. The tranquility of the prov-
ince's Hungarians and Romanians is in part a
by-product of Yugoslavia's good relations with
neighboring Romania and Hungary.
Special Report -11-
Macedonia
71.2% - Macedonians
13.0% - Albanians
9.4% - Turks
6.4% - Other
"Recent data indicates a drop to 11%.
MACEDONIA
Macedonian nationalism is inextricably
linked with the existence of a Yugoslav nation.
The Macedonians have nothing to gain and every-
thing to lose should the federal system fail. Only
through membership. in the federation has the
distinctness of the Macedonians been recognized
and allowed expression. Although Macedonia may
at times have sympathized with Croatian posi-
tions, the republic's nationalism has never run
counter to the basic interests of the federation.
Situated at the southeastern end of the
country next to Bulgaria, the republic of Mace-
donia was established after World War II. Sofia
refuses to recognize the existence of a Mace-
donian nation, culture, and language-a refusal
most Yugoslav Macedonians read as an expression
of age-old Bulgarian claims to the region. Bul-
garian needling over the "Macedonian question"
has only heightened the republic's sense of na-
tional identity and solidified its ties to Yugo-
slavia.
The only minority problem within the
republic centers on the Albanians who comprise
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approximately 11 percent of the population.
They are an irritant in Yugoslav-Albanian rela-
tions. In late 1968, at the time of the demon-
strations in Kosovo, violence erupted in several
predominantly Albanian towns in Macedonia,
including the fairly large community of Tetovo.
Since then, however, the situation has been calm.
Nationalism and the Economy
Economic problems have in recent years
severely complicated the nationality problem.
Enmities will persist at least as long as there are
economic disparities between the different re-
gions of Yugoslavia. Belgrade recognizes this and
has become a clearing house tor redistributing
capital from richer to poorer regions in an effort
to close the gap between the "haves" I "have
nots." The policy has had only minor . :cess,
creating nearly as many problems as it has solved.
There is a huge income gap between the richer
north and poorer south. There is also a a basic
contradiction in national policy intended to re-
solve the problem: the political objective of
closing the gap conflicts with the economic goal
of achieving a more efficient, stable economy.
The result is a compromise and not much progress
toward either objective.
FEDERAL FUNDS FOR
UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONS
1966
$ 39,600,000
1967
92,160,000
1968
110,240,000
1969
115,600,000
1970
147, 520,000
The funds are divided almost equally between
Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina and
Macedonia.
Special Report
Economically advanced republics such as
Croatia complain loudly that they are being bled
dry of the investment resources and foreign
exchange needed to modernize and expand their
own industrial plant. Nationalists in Croatia raised
this argument prior to the political upheavals
there. Even so, the provinces and the republics
that do get the money are dissatisfied The dif-
fering socioeconomic backgrounds, the disparity
in natural resources, and the varying rates of
population growth make it clear that the eco-
nomic disparities will persist and continue to
complicate the nationality question indefinitely.
Maddling from Abroad
Belgrade is acutely aware of its vulnerability
to outside meddling. The Yugoslavs must contend
not only with the highly volatile community of
Yugoslav emigres in the West but also with the
Soviets. On the latter, Yugoslav apprehensions
have roots which pre-date the Tito-Stalin break of
1948. In 1934, the Comintern proposed the
dismemberment of Yugoslavia along nationality
lines. The willingness of Stalin and subsequent
Soviet leaders to prod Belgrade on Bulgarian
claims to Macedonia has kept Yugoslav concern
alive.
There are reports of Soviet support for Croa-
tian emigres in the West. Although conclusive
proof of Soviet involvement is lacking, one fact is
clear: throughout 1971 Croatia was subjected to
an unprecedented volume of emigre separatist
propaganda. Rumors have since circulated that
some of the top leaders who were ousted in
Decen,her had direct ties to these emigres and in
some unspecified way played a part in activities in
Croatia.
There are fascist emigre groups, collectively
known as the Ustashi, which have a brutal history
of bombing and killing. Last April, they assas-
sinated the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden and
wounded several members of the Yugoslav
Embassy staff in Stockholm. They apparently
were responsible for four bombings in January
which took 27 lives and caused numerous injuries.
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040010-7
SECRET
YUGOSLAVIA
?Zagreb
Percentage Distribution of Ethnic Groups, 1961
SOUTH SLAV
Serbs 42,1 Macedonians 5.6
Croats 23.1 Montenegrins 2.8
Slovenes 8,6 Undeclared Yugoslavs 1,7
Ethnic Muslims of unspecified nationality 5,2
NATIONAL MINORITIES
Albanians i',J
Hungarians t,7
Other 3,0
HERCEGOVINA
Sarajevo
ITALY
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MONTE :GRO ~^.
Pristina? Sofla
Titograd Poo
? so V0
~~'1 ~~ f,..r? BULGARIA
Skopje e a,
GREE
 Approved For Release 2005/RVV ZC PIRDP85T00875R001500040010-7
The struggle to create a Yugoslav national
identity will continue. After 27 years in power,
Tito is still trying to forge a nation in which the
constituent ethnic groups set regional prejudices
aside in the interest of the federation as a whole.
Yugoslavia has made some progress toward this
goal. Nevertheless, Croatian nationalism late last
year provided a sharp setback to the one body
that supposedly had rid itself of republic nation-
alism-the Communist Party. The federal party
has Leen shaken by its inability to handle the
situation. The League of Communists of Yugo-
slavia now has to face cold reality-the post-war
successes of Communism are mainly attributable
to the leadership of Tito rather than the ap-
plication of Marxism-Leninism.
The party has set about recovering lost
ground, focusing its initial efforts on Croatia and
to a lesser extent on Kosovo. Elsewhere, for
example in Slovenia and Vojvodina, there is a
high degree of political maturity and willingness
to put regional nationalism aside in an effort to
work within the decentralized system. Even
Serbia is displaying significant flexibility in set-
ting aside past national prejudices.
There are forces at work that augur well for
the federation. Social mobility and, to a lesser
extent, internal migration stemming from rapid
industrialization are chipping away at regional
prejudices. The mixing and fusing of peopi:s goes
slowly, but it has been speeded up since tie end
of the war and ultimately could save Yiigoslav
unity. In recent years, the regime has consulted
the populace on numerous problems concerning
the nation's future. This dialogue and the fact
that some decisions are being made by consensus
at high levels in the party and government give
the country's diverse nationalities a voice and a
stake in a unified future. These efforts already
may have paid dividends in helping prevent the
Croatian nationalist example from spreading to
other regions.
No high-ranking Yugoslav official, least of all
President Tito, wants to throw over this un;que
system. The chief executive is nearly 80 and in a
race against time. Opportunities to bring the force
of his personality to bear as a stabilizing factor
will be limited. And, at the same time, a major
shift in power relationships is taking place. The
armed forces, which have consistently been loyal
to Tito, have taken on a broader political role as a.
major unifying force. Symbolic of this status is
the fact that the military now has the right to
participate in a non-voting capacity in sessions of
the federal party executive bureau. The military
stands ready to step in either now or in the
succession perifrl to aid the regime in maintaining
the federation.
25X1
Special Report
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