CHINA: PATTERNS OF POPULATION MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000600040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1973
• Content Type: IR

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Confidential
China: Patterns of ' Populatiori. Movement
Confidential
CIA/BGI RP:73-1
June 1973
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Page
SUMi lA1~Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Internal. Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Voluntary Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Dural-to-Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Parmt- t o-Market . . . . . . . . . . 4
Seasonal Agricultural Work . . . . . . ;;
Tourist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Military Induction and Deployment . . . 6
Enforced Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Scope of Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Types of Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . 9
International Movement of Population . . . . 11
Legal Travelers . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Illegal Travelers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Other Transborder Movement . . . . . . . . 13
Future Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
APPENDIX -- Refugees From the China Mainland
Table 1 -- Hong Kong: Total Number of Arrests
of Illegal Immigrants By Method of Travel
Table 2 -- Hong Kong: Approximate Number of
Arrests of Illegal Immigrants by Month and
Method of Travel
MAPS (following Appendix)
Railroads
Civil Aviation Routes
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1973
CHINA: PATTERNS OF POPULATION MOVEMENT
Security controls are so pervasive in China that
voluntary internal movement is difficult and external
contacts are virtually prohibited. Short-distance
travel--for agriculture, local industry, and familial
visits --probably continues, however, much as in the
past; and, despite official barriers, an uneven but
massive rural-to-urban flow has been in progress since
1949 and has created a serious problem for the Chinese
leadership. To alleviate this situation and to further
its long-range economic development plans, the regime
has forcibly moved millions of people to the sparsely
populated frontier regions of the north and west and
to other rural areas. Legal traffic abroad has been
extremely limited except for that moving through Hong
Kong. International movement into and out of the
country will probably increase, however, as China's
diplomacy and trade expand.
Traditionally, population movement within China
was extremely localized and involved mostly village-
to-market trips, reflecting a limited transport net
and a largely rural populace. War, famine, and floods
often distorted this pattern, causing widespread pop-
ulation dislocations. Since the establishment of the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, these major
causes of unpredictable population movement have been
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largely controlled or eliminated, while increased mobility
has been made possible by a greatly expanded and improved
transport net. Movement has been restricted, however, by
government control measures.
Beginning in the mid-1950's, the PRC began to transfer
large numbers of people, principally youth, to the country-
side in programs designed to provide work for underemployed
Lrban dwellers, to purge "bourgeois" attitudes, and to re-
claim agricultural land in frontier provinces. The latest
intensification of this long-term urban-rural resettlement
program began in 1968 and reached a peak the following year.
By 1971 the program had leveled off, but probably more than
20 millfon persons, mainly students and other young people,
had been sent to rural areas. This recent "down-to-the-
countryside" movement is a more complex and seemingly far-
reaching program than earlier ones. Political objectives,
including the "tempering" of youth in the countryside to
create selfless Mao-motivated citizens, have been stressed.
The upgrading of living conditions in the countryside also
is an objective. The introduction of educated youth plus
some teachers, medical personnel, and technicians (the
latter usually on a temporary basis) may help reduce rural
illiteracy, improve health standards, and bring modern
technology to agricultural production.
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Internal Movement
1. Population movement in China today can be divided
into two general categories, voluntary and enforced. The
voluntary pattern of movement includes rural-to-urban flow,
farm-to-market trips, tourist visits, and travel required
to meet the needs of seasonal agricultural work. Since
military service is highly popular, movement for military
induction and deployment purposes is also included in this
category. The second category, enforced movement of people,
is comprised principally of urban-rural transfers and is
often effected under the guise of a voluntary program. The
most recent example of this type of movement in the PRC is
the "down-to-the-countryside" program, which has several
political and economic goals.
Voluntary Movement
Rural-to-Urban
2. The regime has a variety of mechanisms to control
population movement including mandatory registration of the
individual, the issuance of grain ration coupons in conjunc-
tion with registration, and the requirement of official per-
mission to initiate most travel or change of residence. Each
person is required to have papers indicating his residence in
a certain commune, town, or city. Travel permits, issued by
a local government unit or employer, stipulate the time and
place of arrival and departure, and approved travel between
town and country is fairly common to visit relatives and
friends or see local attractions.
3. Although the PRC attempts to control all internal
movement, a continua illegal flow of people to the cities
has been under way since 1949, though no estimates are
available on the size of this migration. "Black people"
(non-registered residents) live in all major cities, their
number recently swelled by the backflow of "down-to-the-
countryside" youths and others displaced during and after
the Cultural Revolution. This is recognized as a serious
problem to the regime, and it reflects the ineffectiveness
of PRC control measures, particularly their enforcement by
local authorities. Quantitative information on the backflow
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however, is almost totally unavailable. If these illegal
migrants are apprehended by the police, they are returned
to their villages. The difficulty of sustaining life
without work permits and r; ,`.ion cards--unless they can
steal them--and the strains involved if friends o? rel-
atives provide help force many to return voluntarily to
the countryside. Others try, some successfully, to escape
to Hong Kong.
Farm-to-Market
4. Temporary short-distance movement, necessary for
marketing and other agricultural tasks, continues much as
in the past. Rural markets, where local produce raised
on private plots may be sold or exchanged, were banned
during the days of collectivization of agriculture and in
the initial stages of the commune system but were rein-
troduced in the early 1960's. The amount of movement
represented by this traditional rural activity is enormous
in the aggregate, but distances traveled by each individual
are short and in most cases by foot.
5. Longer distance travel has been facilitated in
rural areas by the establishment of transport units con-
sisting of a few state-owned trucks (boats in a few areas)
which move grain and other products from the villages to
processing, collecting, and distributing points. Some
individual communes and factories also in a few vehicles,
and public bus service is available in most rural areas.
The availability of modern transportation has had only a
limited effect upon normal patterns of population movement;
it is most often used by cadres* and officials to conduct
their affairs. The ordinary worker only occasionally uses
the public bus system for village-to-market travel or for
personal trips.
*All -,,dose, both within and outside the Party, who
hold any posts in the bureaucratic hierarchies in China,
from top to bottom.
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Seasonal Agricultural Work
6. There are no migratory farm workers in China.
Harvesting, planting, and other farm chores are usually
carried out by the local people, Most of the rural
schooling is done during the slack farming season, en-
abling the rural young to receive some education without
jeopardizing the agricultural, economy. If help is needed,
the local People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit or students
from nearby cities "volunteer" their services. Even when
help is not needed, urban students have at times been sent
to the surrounding agricultural areas for "work experience."
Tourist
7 . Tourist mo-rement within China is minimal . I t
consists predominantly of trips by upper Achelon govern-
ment and military personnel and a few foreign visitors.
Only during China's three national holidays--May Day
(May 1), National Day (October 1), and the Chinese New
Year Spring Festival (January-February)--is there an in-
crease in movement to the larger cities, especially to
Peking. At these times a 2- or 3-day holiday enables
people to travel to see the sights and celebrations. Two
areas often visited because of their historical importance
in Chinese Communist history are Yen-an and Shao-shan.
Yen-an, the "cradle of the Chinese revolution," located
in the bleak highlands of northern Shensi, served as the
Chinese Communist capital from 1935 until 1946. Shao-shan,
near Chang-sha in Huran Province, is M: o's birthplace and
a much publicized and visited attraction.
8. Foreign (non-Chinese) travelers normally are re-
stricted to a limited number of the larger cities and a
few standard attractions: Peking, with a trip to the Ming
Tombs and the Great Wall ; Canton, where the biannual in-
ternational trade fairs are held; and the i nd'is tri a1 area
around Shanghai. Others major cities may be included on
tourist itineraries; visits to Szechwan, Sinkiang, Tibet,
and sensitive frontier areas, however, are discouraged or
prohibited. Depending on their interest, status, or prop-
aganda value, visitors may tour a model commune, a school,
university, industrial plant, and/or hospital.
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Military Induction and Deployment
9. The PLA has an estimated strength of 3 million men.
Each year approximately 10 million reach the conscription
age of 18, but fewer than 1 million are inducted. Terms of
service are subject to change but since late 1969 have been
approximately 2 to 3 years for ground forces, 4 years for
the navy, and 5 years for the air force.
10. Induction usuz !y occurs during the slack agricul-
tural season, December to February. In 1967, in an effort
to recruit more youths from urban areas, a summer induction
period was introduced to coincide with the period of school
vacation for urban students. Rural youth, however, still
constitute the bulk of inductees. After induction, new
troops are generally sent to military camps within their
province for one or two months after which they are perma-
nently transferred to regular units elsewhere in China.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the normal practice was
to post inductees to another province within the military
region from which they came. Since the beginning of the
Cultural Revolution, however, military units have frequently
been rotated out of their home military regions.
11. Ground force units are deployed unevenly throughout
China, corresponding roughly to the pattern of population
density: troops are generally located near major urban areas
and along rail lines. Until the spring of 1967, most ground
force units had remained in place since the termination of
the Korean War. Between 1967 and early 1969, however, major
redeployments were carried out, primarily in ccnjunction with
the Cultural Revolution, to maintain order in areas affected
by factional disputes and clashes. Additional changes oc-
curred in 1968-69 when several armies in Szechwan, Yunnan,
and Kwangtung were rotated among these provinces to break
ties between military personnel and the local population.
Since 1969 still other shifts have been under way to increase
armed strength in the military regions adjacent to the Soviet
Union.
Enforced Movement
12. An uneven but continuous flow of people from the
countryside to the cities has been the most persistent and
serious population movement problem since the establishment
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of the PRC. A desire to escape from the spartan conditions
in rural areas to higher wages and better living conditions,
particularly during the collectivation and conmune formation
period (1954-58), has proven a powerful stimulus to the rural-
urban flow. Poor harvests in 1954 and in the 1959-61 period
further quickened the pace to the cities. Concomitantly,
urban youths reached working age and graduates from all ed-
ucation levels entered the labor market. Unemployment and
underemployment developed rapidly.
13. To reduce urban populations and provide employment
for the surplus citizenrr?, the PRC initiated population pro-
grams in conjunction with long-range economic development
plans. The regime initially encouraged, then forcibly and
ystematcally began settlement of sparsely populated frontier
regions of the north and vies t. Not only did the regime reduce
excessive population densities in the eastern provinces, par-
ticularly the urban areas, but, equally important, it brought
arable wasteland in the frontier provinces under cultivation.
A likely additional important consideration was the desire to
populate certain border sectors--particularly in Sinkiang--
with Han Chinese colonizcrs to better control indigenous
minority groups. Urban dwellers, most of them from the pop-
ulous eastern cities, also were resettled to rural areas
within their native provinces.
14. Political recalcitrants, unemployed workers, and
students form the majority of those forced to move. Some
demobilized soldiers are transferred to quasi-military units,
most of them engaged in various types of land reclamation
projects situated in the frontier provinces. Because of the
forced nature of the moves and the failure of the Government
at times to aid the settlers, a backflow--probably sizable--
has been a feature of all these resettlement programs.
15. Travel restrictions were relaxed when the Red Guard
movement was launched in August 1966, and the Government en-
couraged long-distance movement. Millions of youths, both
urban and rural, answered the call to journey to Peking, while
large numbers of resettlers seized the opportunity to leave
their posts and return to their home towns. Many of those
sent to the countryside apparently believed that the reset-
tlement programs were tied to Liu Shao-chi's policies and that
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his downfall (1966) signified an end to their own rustication.
Existing programs for rural development and population dis-
tribution were in abeyance during the ensuing political up-
heaval of the Red Guard movement and the Cultural Revolution,
but, with the gradual recovery of political stability in
1968, the government again focused its attention upon pop-
ulation transfers and the continuing problem of educated
unemployed youth.
16. The "down-to-the-?countryside" program initiated in
mid-1968 is comparable to previous urban-rural movements in
China. The initial goal, for short term political expedi'ncy,
was to remove disillusioned youths and the Red Guard from the
cities and disperse them in small, controllable groups in the
countryside. A second reason was to change the belief of the
educated youth and cadre that fundamental differences exist
between mental and physical work and between urban workers and
peasants. Finally, the program was intended to upgrade living
conditions in the countryside by improving rural educational
levels and providing technically trained individuals.
Scope of Movement
17. Only rough estimates are available to indicate the
scale of past and present enforced movements. FPpproxi mately
10 million people were moved to the border provinces and other
rural areas during the 1950's and early 1960's. From 1968 to
1971 it is estimated that more than 20 million were moved.
The gaps in reporting are so great that the actual number of
persons affected may be much larger. Within the past year
the focus of the program has changed, with current emphasis
on urging 1973 middle-school graduates to go to the country-
side voluntarily. The regime has acknowledged that work in
rural areas is not popular with urban youth, and attempts
apparently have been made to make rural service more palatable.
Provision of adequate housing for new arrivals, for instance,
is now being stressed in several areas as important to the
success of the rustication program. Nev rtheless, nurnbers
involved during recent months appear to he far less than in
the 1968-71 period.
18. Five major cities--Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin,
Wu-han, and Canton--contributed many of the "sent-down"
personnel destined for the more backward arei s and those
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on the frontier. These five cities conL"rain large industrial
complexes, national universities, and technical schools. In
line with the Government's objectives of regional self-
sufficiency and economic development of the border regions,
it is probable that many sent from those cities are techni-
cally trained students and workers.
19. During the 1950's and 1960's China's population
movement programs aimed at long-distance, inter-province
migrations from the over-populated east coast to the sparsely
populated regions of the north, west, and southwest. The
"down- to- the-countryside" movement in its earlier stages
(1968-1969) also focused on long-distance migration, but
later the emphasis changed to short-distance intra-province
movement. Both types still exist, but short-distance move-
ment now accounts for a larger percentage of the total.
Movement out of the larger cities into isolated and backward
rural areas within the same province generally covers only
50 to 150 miles. These remote areas often are situated in
mountainous terrain, are cut off from the major transport
links in the province, and lack most basic government ser-
vices--schools, health clinics, and agricultural extension
services.
Types of Personnel
20. Five occupational categories of personnel are
involved in the present-day movement: students, cadres,
teachers, medical personnel, and technical personnel. Each
of these groups has been transferred for a different reason;
some of the people have been transferred permanently and
others temporarily, depending upon the nature of the work
and the problems involved in the transfer.
21. Students. Students form by far the largest
category of personnel, perhaps as many as 70 percent of
all those transferred. Some 90 percent of the middle-
school and university students of the classes of 196G
through 1971 were sent to PL/1 farms, state farms, rural
construction projects, or rural communes. The majority
of these transfers were permanent, although some students,
after serving a 2- or 3-year stint, did have the opportunity
to return to school or apply for work in the city. Since
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1971 urban jobs have increased and provided a reprieve
for more university students. For the most part, students
from lower school and some from middle school are still
assigned permanently to comnunes and rural construction
projects. Since 1968, tens of thousands of middle-school
graduates from Peking, Sion, and other urban centers re-
portedly have settled near Yen--an.
22. Cadres. The transfer of cadres to temporary
or permanent assiqnweent in rural areas seems largely
directed toward reforming the politically "errant," but
the regime also seems interested in teaching them the
requirements of agricultural production and in redirecting
those who are superfluous in their administrative posts.
In particular, cadres have been sent to Yen-an, usually
for 6 months to 2 years. Such transfers have accompanied
most earlier reform movements, but a larder number of cadres
may be involved in the current movenont than was the case in
earlier years.
23. In the early part of the movement cadres were
assigned permanently to posts in the administration of
agricultural brigades or communes, but by mid-1969 most
were being assigned to May 7th schools for relatively
short periods of time. The majority of these schools,
the first of which was established in May 1968, are ac-
tually farms set up in relatively primitive rural areas.
Cadres sent to these farms are expected to undergo rig-
orous political training, including self-criticism, as
well as manual labor.
24. Teachers. Teachers have been sent to the
countryside for ideological reform" and to provide
faculty for additional schools in rural areas. In
addition, the regime hopes that the "sent-dawn" teachers
will be able to make more efficient use of local re-
sources and thus lower the cost of establishing and
maintaining the rural schools.
25. Medical Personnel. Since 1968 medical per-
sonnel have been transferred to rural areas on both a
temporary (6 months to 3 years) and permanent basis to
establish medical service cooperatives. They provide
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medical care, improve rural sanitation and health, and
disseminate birth control information and devices. They
also train health personnel, rudimentary Para-medics
called "barefoot doctors," who ar--t, predominantly "down-
to-the-country" youth.
26. Technical and Scientific Personnel. Various
factories, finance and i relic uni is , and scientific and
technical services centers have organized teams of tech-
nically trained workers, scientists, and engineers for
temporary visits to rural areas. The practical experience
provided by touring rural areas is supposed to provide
information to their sponsoring organizations on agri-
cultural problems and on the specific needs of the area
they serve. The teams train peasants and contribute their
skills to such problems as pest co,itrol, the construction
of small plants, and the maintenance of agricultural tools
and machinery.
International Movement of Population
Legal travele-;
27. The international traveler is a rare though
increasing sight in the PRC. Movement into and out of
China is small, and tourist facilities are limited. The
majority of China's international visitors are business-
men, government personnel, and Overseas Chinese. Others
include seamen, who are seldom allowed off their ships,
a handful of Asian scholars, an occasional journalist,
and a few tourists.*
28. There are approximately 20,000 official or
semi-official Chinese personnel stationed abroad--2,000
diplomatic and 18.000 economic, technical, and military.
Most of the 18,000 are involved in building the Tan-Zam
Railroad. Approximately 350 foreign diplomatic personnel
resided in China in 1970; some of these commuted frequently
between China and their home country.
*An important aspect of China's expanding diplomacy is
the program that encourages foreign scientists and engineers
to visit China: more than a thousand, of various nationalists,
have been to China since mid-1970.
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29. Initial contact with China by outsiders
usually occurs at the air terminals in Peking, Canton,
Shanghai, flan-ninq and K'un-ming; through (long Kong;
or at the seaports. Trans-border movement between
the PRC and her immediate neighbors other than Hong
Kong is negligible. Tourist,` government, and business
travel is largely by air or through Ilong Kong rather
than by sea, and seamen predominate among foreign
visitors to port cities.
30. Hong Kong is the most important entry/exit
point for legal novenent, and Overseas Chinese and
Japanese businessrn comprise the hulk of travelers
through this port. The volume of Overseas Chinese
traffic remains fairly s teariy throughout the year.
The majority of these travelers or their ancestors
originally lived in southern China, especially
Kwangtunq and Fukien Provinces, and their visits
are restricted to their former home village and to
areas where their relatives reside, or to major cities .
31. In contrast to the steady flow of Overseas
Chinese through Hong Kong, the travel of businessmen
to the PRC peaks with the Spring and Autumn Trade
Fairs, held at Canton in late April and in October.
More than 25,000 foreigners attended the Spring
Trade Fair in April 1973. Most businessmen crust
travel through Hong Kong since the Chinese air links
with other countries are so limited.
Illegal Travelers
32. Hong Kong continues to be the major haven
for illegal refugees from the mainland. After the
mass exodus in the spring of 1962 the outward flow
declined, principally because of more stringent
Chinese security measures and more stable internal
conditions. Increases in the number of refugees in
1971, however, reflected the growing political dis-
affection of the urban youth forced to settle in the
countryside. Almost 90 percent of the 3,894 refugees
apprehended by Hong Kong authorities in 1971 were
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"down-to-the-countryside" youth.* Most refugees arrive
by swinmind or by small boat, but a handful walk across
the heavily patrolled border.** The peal; refugee period
is in the warmer months, April to November, when swim-
ming is most feasible. Refugee movement into Macao is
small, averaging 25 per month. Macao, as does Hong Kong,
has an extradition agreement with the PRC to return es-
capees to mai i.l and custody, but it does not rigorously
honor the agreement.
Other Transborder Movement
33. Transborder movement, other than with Hong Kong
and Laos, is minimal because of restrictions placed on
border crossings by both China and its neighbors., Sizable
numbers of Chinese workers have moved into northwest Laos
in recent years to construct roads. Chinese construction
troops apparently have left North Vietnam, and current
transborder movement there is slight. To the west, the
China-Burma border is officially closed, but an unknown
amount of tnoverr,2nt is connected with anti -Burmese Gov,ern-
ment insurgents who control large areas of northern Burma
and periodically cross into China to obtain arms and
guerrilla training.
34. Movement along routes across the South Asian
border, once heavily traveled by traders and religious
pilgrims, is no longer permitted. A small amount of il-
licit movement probably occurs, particularly ny herdsmen
who recognize good pasturage but not international
boundaries and by Tibetans filtering into Nepal and India.
*This total is approximately one-fourth of the illegal.
immigrants. The [long Kong Government has an immigration
quota of 50 immigrants a day from China (al,7rrximate ly
18,000 per year), but a few persons have been allowed to
leave China legally in recent years. Hong Kong is therefore
willing to tolerate illegal immigration up to that level
without serious concern.
**See Appendix.
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The Chinese, by agreement, ions tructed two rnotorable
roads across their border: one is through the Karakoram
Mountains into Pakistan(Karom Highway) and the other
through the Himalayas into Nepal (Kathmandu-Kodari High-
way). Transborder movement on these roads is neglegible.
35. Rigid security measures are in effect along
the USSR, Mongolian, and North Korean borders, and in
recent years only a trickle of movement, legal or illegal,
has been reported. The last known major movement was the
exodus from Sinkiang in 1962 of thousands of Ui ghurs and
Kazakhs to the Soviet Union. Most of the motorable roads
linking the PRC with its neighbors cross these borders,
but with the possible exception of North Korea the roads
are closed.
36. Passenger rail traffic between the :'RC and its
neighbors is scant except for that between Hong Kong and
Canton. Almost all transborder movement by rail is freight
traffic.
Future Trends
37. Internal population movement probably will
continue at present levels. Although expansion and
improvement of the transportation network and public
transport are anticipated, they will be 1 i ttl s used
by the vast majority of the PRC's citizens. Strict
controls will continue to prevent much travel other
than that sanctioned by the government--transfers of
industrial and other urban workers, military-related
travel, and the movement of cadres and government
officials.
38. The government-planned, usually forced trans-
fers of literally millions of people that have taken
place since the mid-1950's seem destined :o continue.
Still present are the problems of urban growth and lack
of urban employment, the principal reasons for these
periodic resettlement programs. The brunt of reloca-
tion programs will probably continue to fall upon youth,
both educated and uneducated, who enter the labor force
at a yearly rate of 15 to 20 million.
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CONFIDENTIAL
39. Forced resettlement to physically harsh and
intellectually sterile environments will continue to
produce negative reactions. Massive doses of political
indoctrination on the benefits of socialist construction
and "making revolution" in the countryside will na;:
overcome a lack of enthusiasm. Political discontent
and cynicism among those moved will have to be balanced
against the need to reduce urban pressures and aurnnent
the rural labor force, particularly for land reclama-
tion and conservation projects. The latest rustication
program has added a nei?r dimension, however, with its
emphasis upon providing an infusion of relatively high-
skilled and well-educated persons into the rural economy.
This program may make short-range sense, but accomplish-
ments and long.-range effects are still unclear.
40. Illegal population movement presumably will
continue, its magnitude dependent on many factors. The
number of persons involved in rural resettlement pro-
grams and the degree of coerci ors used will influence
the size of the eventual backflow. Poor crop years
spark additional movement to the cities or to the exiles'
native provinces even if the alternative upon return is
to live "black." Illegal movement and residence also
depends upon the strictness with which local officials
and security personnel enforce rec0ations: at times a
"look-the-other-way" attitude has permitted a significant
and successful backflow from the countryside.
41. Until recently, exit from and entry to China
was almost as difficult as it was during the late 18th
century, the heyday of the Manchu dynasty. Exit permits
for PRC citizens still are infrequently granted, and
even petty border trade--traditional along some sectors
of China's long international frontier--has virtually
ceased to exist. Improved PRC foreign relations have
allowed a small influx of travelers, many of whom the
Chinese consider to be important opinion-makers, to
tour selected areas in China. A continuing albeit slow
and carefully regulated increase in commercial and
tourist traffic is probable, barring further political
convolutions such as the Cultural Revolution.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000600040001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX
Refugees From the China Mainland
CONFIDENTIAL
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1 ~
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000600040001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
Table 1
Hong Kong: Total Number of Arrests of Illegal
Immigrants By Method of Travel
(1968-1971)
Method of Travel
1968
1969
1970
1971*
Totals
By Swimming
200
724
1,163
1,070
3,157
By Boat
2,339
515
413
117
3,384
By Land
50
34
99
78
261
Totals
2,589
1,273
1,675
1,265
6,802
*Total number of arrests for January through June only.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12: &MPEB TITA00875R000600040001-7
Table 2
Hong Kong: Approximate Number of Arrests
of Illegal Immigrants by
Month and Method of Travel
Method of Travel
By Swimminq*
B Boat*
By Land*
Total
January**
0
598
30
628
February
5
885
32
922
March
27
581
28
636
April
164
132
29
325
May
586
84
13
683
June
601
62
25
688
July
431
20
12
463
August
436
364
10
810
September
336
65
15
416
October
414
108
12
534
November
153
183
20
356
December
4
302
35
341
TOTAL
3,157
3,384
261
6,b02
*Figures were derived by totalling monthly arrests made during
the years 1968-1971. Figures are approximations and are intended
to show peak periods of arrival by the various methods of entry.
**Total number of arrests from January through June 1971 included.
Data for July-December 1971 not available.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000600040001-7
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000600040001-7
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