TERRORISM IN SOUTH AMERICA
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00353R000100310004-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 16, 2004
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 9, 1976
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP85T00353R000100310004-8.pdf | 423.07 KB |
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t''~r`ui E',CT ~ Terrorism 1 n South America
`J a
1.r._;c 11;34. `9 A 1'_976
( vroriem fiourish.ee on the hone of poZiti cs.
i the de4u2 -,ion nf those who have lost the
( a'nacily to d , 't bn,;;ween hone and death.
nrl Ilowe "The IIZti7nat:r- Price
of t7arndom Terror?'
Modern terrorism invites repr_essaon. The cxuer-
il1a ..; _i.ntcen"t-. on p=:ovc)k1nq his en.c mv- he ~fc~~re n -
r 1 `;:Ch, ti_ t. .fl acts ol: ('f ?]1nte { e ' ro ~.; :%14 so
~7?_(1nf'7 p7?^(?r3C~.
rkrl sC that the crenoral. uh T_e 's
Prom {be? Qavernmenlt and '-.31,-, (;u h--
'Vhn -r)
C ..: ,F.` ] `" ;; l.'" a'. ;Lchela n t hr n J.nin. fra:, it 4-i:I Ti! C7'''~" t;.-rhi: xi
In.
?. i!_ 'C , 7 (' ?.~5a "the f & ' ';:J_C? 1 p. 'sua ion ()
d'. ? r'ountry Tf .. ,l hec'( me a MiTit,-U-V Ina 1,10
rt C~ vri.Cllenco, tho mistaken an (I v-ar._nuur
_it .~_ upo e ~ eon i e t?:R_l be ptut down to
_D'? F'ke.. (overJ7uen ?. ~7C?(lF,rquards , ra
As ejJ_oienc(- h('qe .s Vi of onc(?, aceorrlinq to thin
Oor.tr ,. ne n the c , Sri of Society i tor13. T1T~i:z.1"i: s de?mn-
(`;'',L ' !_c t..Tlf3t~ {,lt{,.1.(? n ci..,pc watt to a.nthnr7.tm i an rlr( r-ronn y
mod. r(?pr_e? can bapp ~~xIfi r) c)j t.:'..c-1
9.}?n r.im of tf r.3:61T'.7_ 7Y1 is to make life uribe hie + r~?".
ordinary People, in the hope that the--_v will even{--u,-0l l v
This paper was prepared by the O,f fice of Current
Inteil-teence, We ter,na Ilern~,.s )here? Diviojon of the Central
t ;.~ e t t iaence Agent,.
F
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become embittered and exasperated with their government
and clamor for change. Such a situat:ion, IViarighela
rgue L, could lead to the seizure of power by t.ihae c;uerril-
a :.n what:. he de described as "a climate of collapse. "
i ~p n ,"~ed against colonial re.Cj mes , such tactics have
i~ ,c~ c, a, succe ;sf'L11, as in British-mandated P,-iles-,tine, and
r3. rus . This hope has not been fulfilled, however,
1a c n American nata on. Yet, it is precisely in
4-1 countries where political violence has becomme the
major policy prnoccupation--tTr_uguav and Ar_genti.na-?--thati_
has b:-en o-*.ne st:rongc~;t single catalytic :_o_rce
in recent military coups .d? teat.
.~ a. polit.ic:al. weapon modern terrorism dates from
-? he French Revolution where- it was employed by the n?--
s ? P
qovernm.ent to instill. _oar and respect
for new authority in the gen.erai. populace. `Then, as
?,c w, terror consisted of symbolic act.-_s designed to
in- political behavior by extraordinary mreans, en-
1:.-__,1. :i.acg the a ae or threat of violence. For example,
1. A1. (t _atemala, Uruguay, and Argentina, leftist guer_ _ illas
i-,.t.?_ce d heavy emphasis on the symbolic nature of their
sl.o ~_c r~,t acts--kidnaping and killing military o -f:a cers
and Police chief:, foreign diplomats, and wealthy bu;si-
.?jr.s -s ^r1--both domestic and foreign.
concept of terror may be old, but its effects
are magn.i.fiecl by modern technology. The modern terror-
`~ot?Lta.st~cat~,~c.L
includes incendiary devices,
s a.rssenal
and hand--.held missiles . Modern psvcho.togical
tu_cti_es have pr vi.ded new techniques of 1..i1t c:r::Clgetion
and intimidation. More important, the conditions 01'
contemporary living and :pace-acge cortmunic . on s systems
ha. v%- f=acilitated the growth and the impact of urban
paca:t_i @:i.Cal violcen.c.e. Today terrorists reed on the :.`:rus--
-ra.tions generated by crowded ving conditions doil-
p.e ti_nd fay and dependent on technology, and thrive on in-
,tantaneous dramatic communication of their acts by the
electronic media.
Television and, to a lesser extent, radio have
given new meaning to the 19th Century anarchist view of
t .er.rori_sm as propaganda by deed. Now guerrilla groups
can attract national or even world attention to their
ca.@a.se. 'I'he term "guerrilla theater' is an apt descrip
. nce terrorism is often drama consisting of-
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Carefully staged kidnapings, as in the ahcl.uction
of the Born brothers, two wealthy Argentine i.n-
7 t.ual. trials and executions, such as the now
famous killing of US AID official Daniel Mitrione
the Trparniros in Uruguay, or the capital pun--
ment'." of US honorary consul John Egan. after
Argentine authorities failed to meet terrorist
dem`:.nds to show several captured guerrillas "alive
and well" on television.
Newspapers have also been exploited by Latin American
euerrillas. One of the conditions for the release oT the
Porn brothers was the publication of a Montonnro adver.-?
a_:d.:: nment in prominent newspapers all over the world.
! berto Santucho, the recently slain leader of the Ar-
rie mine Peoples Revolutionary Army, invited correspond-
onto to guerrilla press conferences. One spectacular
operation in J973 saw guerrillas seize the editor o A a
prominent Buenos Aires newspaper, and insist that the
pupo " print terrorist acverti >ement.s---i_n direct violation
of a 7 _ncentl.y enacted ban on news of auerr;l_,)_:1 a acf i v?...ties .
?'7":v newspaper complied with the demands to secure the sale
r a-e-u2-n o its editor, and in retaliation right-w:?s_nq coi'n-
c:cr--;-.nrrorists sabotaged the printing presses. Parther
afield, the terrorist attack at the Munich O1vrnnicy Unman
gained its perpetrators the services of sate ..l.i::e--rel_avod
.n -ernati_onal television.
Such events dramatically illustrate the fact: that
terrorist tactics are aimed primarily at the people
watching and only incidentally at the victims----who often
a .re innocent bystanders. The random quality of the ,rie-
ience heightens the terror and often exaggerates the
actual threat posed by the guerrilla. in reality, guer-
KIM groups in South America have never posed a dirnot-
ck al.:l..enge to any government. Most of the groups have
been too small and weak to engage security forces directly,
and in the battles that have occurred, as in Argentina,
t4e guerrillas have taken most of the blow,,. An one
scholar has observed, "terror may be the weapon of lonely
fanatics or a huddle of conspirators intent upon forcing
history through their own self-sacrifice and other ceo-
pie e i ~Jloo , but rarely is it the weapon of mass movements
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engaged in public politics."
on .':?.F" Colombians or. Foreigners who are hC'..Lct for ransom
two most prominent examples of South American
nations where terrorism currently c_xi rts---?-Colomh i a and
Argentina----Support: thin viewpoint. Terrorism in C'_olom---
la. ,t::.i.1 has many of the characteristics of banditryn
'en7 groups, most 7t of them based in rural areas
Imra.it?: 3_ 'o ? e b
ales , armed assaults on police on0yorts and
vi , 7.''"TnR, patrols, and kidn .pings --occasionally of
001t_ion ? s treasury, once estimated in mil lions of
The querri] la hands do not constitute
` arrinr nlllwers ive thrnat, hot they are a continuinq
Erie( of irritation anf&l concern for security oI';'7.C'"1a ln o
in Argentina, the Peoples Revoiutionarv Armv (EPP)
has lost its image of invincibility after more than a
%ear of harassment by military forces. Hundreds of
guerrillas have been killed--including the leader,
}:?obert rz Santncho--and even more are in Arisen, The or-
ars, is said to have dwindled to about 0100,000.
a.d 1 a tion , the ERP has lost hideouts, weapons,, emmu-
l i n_.y.rn ? and documents containing valuable onerritional. in-
or prominence,
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.zlR i`.~_on It is doubtful that the EPP will over regain
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-s South America, therefore, political. extremists
will probably continue to establish links, and form a1.-
Arkcc,s, only for the sake of convenience in parti_culazr
Aioe-cat.ions. The development and deployment of sophist'-i.-
at ?t~ small arms and precision-cru-i_dec? munitions a.~ad their
acquisition by terrorists is a er .ous new $_h reat_.
C ,a71 the other hand, the fear that terrorists will obtain
~:tnd >.:pl ode nuclear weapons seems to he exaggerated. The
"viva) of any guerrilla movomant is contingent_ on som
public support. Mass murd.er would be chunte pro-
tG;n -'E 1. evCertheless, the pfd.,s h.i.1.i v that guerrillas
t_:a..i threaten to use nur,l.ear weapons J n order to take
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advantage of a mass hostage situation cannot be ruled
,sat.
Until now 1_efti_st guerrillas in South America have
not been complet-.ely indiscriminate in their use of
ter- tactics, but have restricted their targets to
teltifiect political enemies. _n contrast, counterter-
-ori_sts and in some cases government forces have threat-
(',need or murdered Prominent liberal members of society
rot linked in any known way to the guerrillas. This is
s,a.aa:se the response that the guerrillas seek. Yet
in repressive measures are officially iusti.fied and
accepted by a frightened population on the grounds that
1h.?.ev redo the effectiveness and attractiveness of ter-
, r.'i.s zz. Greater government controls over the news media
with regard to reporting terrorist incidents would di--
- J_n.:ish the publicity that terrorists apparently crave.
azac he'r.- official stance on granting political asylum
:oaady evident in Argentina and Uruguay ;, and South
ri-enn countries in general have taken an increasllctly
her stance on yielding to terrorist demands.
`-j'?,rrorism poses a continuing threat to human lib-
c ati! es and to human life. Last year more people died
il.rgenti_na as a result of political violence than have
en killed in Northern, Ireland in the past five years0
a..ll, strategies of terror, there is an inhezrent: tend.--
,:.c (To beyond the limits previously accep ed, formally
ct:orexally, by both rulers s and ruled. "it is lust this
J.-UP r1.n , to some pF ople, exciting. Except, perhaps, in
to most disciplined hind, of actions again t precisely
f::lrc `:c cl individual targets , the strategy o _ t e:r_x or can
:c eeei 0n1 v through a steady abandonment of moral rest
I'.egard:I ess of, the intentions the, terrorist
-.~-tng to their act. it tends, out of desperation and
,ay-ongh repetition, to become i_ncreasinccly unselective;_
it is precisely the increasing un selectivity that
1 kes ter,rori um so f:r:'_cthtening.
There are, however, political limits to the cf
fecsa t ivaness of terrorism. Over forty years ago, one
z},cthol.ar, J. B. Hardman, defined those limits:
An a complete revolutionary tactic terrorism has
never attained: real success. Governments, whether con-
ervati.ve or revolutionary, arc not inclined' to retreat
hofore acts, of terror directed again ztt key persons. The.
?. t to power is not weakened by the exercise of power,
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and positions made vacant through:, the explosion. of
homh:- are readily f _l ed, On the other hand,, the will
o rcvo_LntInn a equires a stronger force than tl e hero sm
n `' d solatect individuals or m7,(-?n of small s w.T-_ 7j -rircan.i_;?ed
croups. The art of revoi ut i_on must be sustn i n(~.a by the
ntea r ted will, of a large proportion of the -copuul.ation
e, nd by c onC.er :ec mass operations., H
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