THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980 SECTION BY SECTION DESCRIPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00988R000200160008-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: REGULATION

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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980
Section-by-Section Description
TITLE I--AUTHORIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
PART A--FINDINGS; PURPOSES; DEFINITIONS
Sec. 101. Findings. The findings stress the necessity
for intelligence acti vvities, the need to avoid waste and
unnecessary duplication of effort, and the importance of
supervision to ensure support for U.S. foreign relations and
to protect constitutional and legal rights.
Sec. 102. Purposes. The principal purposes are to authorize
necessarytelligence activities and replace the intelligence
provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. The purposes
also stress consistency with U.S. defense and foreign policy
interests, proper and effective management, the need for high
quality intelligence, accountability and conformity with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Sec. 103. Definitions. The definitions fall into three
categories : first, terms describing the intelligence com-
munity's authority; second, terms used for national intelligence
coordination purposes; and third, terms that clarify particular
provisions of the Act.
The terms describing the intelligence community's authority
include foreign intelligence, foreign intelligence activity,
counterintelligence, counterintelligence activity, counter-
terrorism intelligence, counterterrorism intelligence activity,
international terrorist activity, special activity, intelligence,
intelligence activity, and intelligence community. These defini-
tions substantially parallel current definitions in Executive
Order 12036. The "special activity" definition clarifies legal
ambiguities created by the Hughes-Rayn Amendment of 1974, which
treated as covert action CIA operations to counter the clan-
destine intelligence activity of foreign governments or to
counter international terrorist activity. "Special activity"
in this Act excludes counterintelligence or counterterrorism
intelligence operations.
The terms used for national intelligence coordination
purposes include national intelligence, national intelligence
activity, national intelligence budget, and tactical intelli-
gence. "National intelligence" means foreign intelligence which
is collected, retained, processed, or disseminated by intelli-
gence entities for use in the formulation and direction of
national policy. "National intelligence activity" means any
foreign intelligence activity the primary purpose of which is
to collect or produce national intelligence, any other foreign
intelligence activity designated by the President, and any
special activity. The "national intelligence budget" means
funds for the CIA and the Office of the :;NI ; for the Consoli-
dated Cryptologic Program, the programs of the offices within
the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized
national intelligence through reconnaissance programs, and
the General Defense Intelligence Program (except such elements
of these programs as the DNI and the Secretary of Defense agree
should be excluded); and any other program or programs of any
department or agency designated by the President or jointly
by the DNI and the head of such department or agency. The
On file NSC release instructions apply
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definition of "tactical intelligence" serves to exclude from
national intelligence the collection of. information required
by the armed forces of the United States to maintain their
readiness for combat operations and to support the planning
and conduct of combat operations by the United-States. How-
ever, tactical intelligence programs may be included in the
national intelligence budget.
The terms used to clarify particular provisions of the
Act include communications security, cover, departments and
agencies, proprietary, United States, and United States person.
"Communications security" is defined for National Security
Council policymaking and National Security Agency charter
purposes. "Cover" and "proprietary" are defined to clarify
particular CIA, FBI, and NSA authorities. "Departments and
agencies" and "United States" are defined for jurisdictional
purposes generally. The definition of "United States person"
differs in three respects from the definition adopted in Execu-
tive Order 12036 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978. First, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence may be presumed to have lost United States per-son status
under this Act after one year of continuousresidence abroad
until -information is obtained which indicates intent to return
to the United States as a permanent resident alien. Second, an
unincorporated association abroad may be presumed not to be a
United States person unless information is obtained which indicates
that a substantial number of its members are United States citizens
or permanent resident aliens. Third, a corporation which is in-
corporated in the United States is not a United States person if
it is a corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad
or controlled by a foreign power abroad.
PART B-- GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Sec. I1".. Authorization for Intelligence Activities. The
entit1es'of the intelligence community are authorized to con-
duct intelligence activities, under the direction and review of
the National Security Council, but only in accordance with the
provisions of this Act. Title I does not prohibit any department
or agency from collecting, retaining, processing, or dissemina-
ting informat:ion if such department or agency is otherwise
authorized to do so. Nor do-es Title I-prohibit or affect any
activities of any department or agency that are not intelli-
gence activities. Except as expressly provided, nothing in
this Act affects or alters existing responsibilities under law,
including responsibilities to the Ambassador in a particular
country under 22 U.S.C. 2680a. Nothing in this Act authorizes
any entity of the intelligence community to conduct any activity
for the purpose of depriving any person of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
Sec. 112. National Security Council. The NSC is to pro-
vide tFe highest level review of , ui ance for, and direction
to the conduct of intelligence activities. The responsibilities
of the NSC (or such committees of the NSC as may be established
by the President) are to establish national intelligence require-
ments and priorities, to review the responsiveness of program
and budget proposals to intelligence requirements and priorities,
and to review the quality of national intelligence products and
develop appropriate policy guidance. The NSC or its committees
is also to develop policy, standards, and doctrine for the con-
duct of` counterintelligence and counterterrorism intelligence
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activities; and to formulate policy for communications security.
Additional NSC responsibilities are assigned under Part 0 of
Title I and sec. 213 of Title II.
The President is authorized to establish such NSC com-
mittees as may be needed to discharge these responsibilities;
and the President may determine the membership of such com-
mittees, designate a chairman, set requirements for attendance
of members, and prescribe other standards, procedures, and
specific duties for the NSC and its committees to discharge
their duties under this Act.
(NSC membership and attendance requirements are prescribed
by Part C of Title Iand sec. 213 of Title II for specific pur-
poses. This Act does not repeal existing law on basic NSC
membership and other NSC responsibilities, under sec. 101 of
the National Security Act of 1947.)
PART C--AUTHORIZATION AND PROCEDURES FOR SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
AND OTHER SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Seecc. 12 . Purpose. The purpose of this Part is to
ensure that special activities are undertaken only in support
of important national security interests when overt or less
sensitive alternatives would not be likely to achieve the
intended objective; when such activities are consistent with
the aims, values, and policies of the United States; and when
the anticipated benefits of such activities justify the
foreseeable risks and likely consequences.
Sec. 122. Conduct of Special Activities. Special activi-
ties may be conducted on y by the CIA, by the Defense Depart-
ment in a period of war or to the extent necessary for
hostilities under the War Power Resolution, or by any agency
when the President determines that the intended objective is
more likely to be achieved. Any agency may provide support
for special activities involving substantial resources, risks,
or consequences if the President determines that such support
is necessary. Any agency may provide support for other special
activities if the NSC or a committee thereof determines that
such support is necessary.
Sec. 123. Authorization for S ecial Activities. Special
activities -Mall be authorized y the President. Authorization
for any special activity that involves substantial resources,
risks, or consequences shall require a Presidential finding
that each such activity is important to the national security
and consistent with the purposes of this Part. Authorization
for any other special activities may be by category and shall
require a Presidential finding that such category of activities
is important to the national security and consistent with this
Part. The NSC or a committee thereof shall be responsible for
the supervision of each activity in the categcry and shall
ensure that it is consistent with the Presidential finding.
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Presidential authorization shall be preceded by a review
by the NSC or a committee thereof, including an assessment
and recommendation as to whether the activity or category of
activities is consistent with the purposes of this Part. Such
recommendation shall include any dissenting views. No decision
or recommendation to the President may be made unless the fol-
lowing officers, or if unavailable their representatives,
were present: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Attorney General, and the DNI. Any special activity which
lasts more than a year or substantially -changes in form or
purpose must be reauthorized by the President and-reviewed
by the. NSC or a committee thereof.
The President may delegate presidential responsibilities
under this section to the Secretary of Defense with respect
to special activities conducted'by the military in time of
war or to the extent necessary for hostilities under the
War Powers Resolution.
Sec. 124. Other Sensitive Intelligence Activities. The
PresiUent shshall establish procedures for the approval of sensi-
tive foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or counter-
terrorism intelligence activities which may require review
or findings by the President, the NSC, a committee thereof,
the DNI, the head of an intelligence entity, or any other
designated official.
Sec. 1215 Congressional Notification. Each special
activity involving substantial resources, risks, or consequences,
and each category of other special activities, such be con-
sidered "significant anticipated activities" for the purpose
of fully and currently informing the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees under see. 152. When essential to meet extra-
ordinary circumstances affecting vital United States interests,
the President may limit prior notice for forty eight hours to
the chairman and ranking minority members of the intelligence
committees, the Speaker and minority leaders of the House, and
the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
PART D- LIMITATIONS ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
SEec. 131. Assassination. No person employed by or acting
on be aT o 'the United States Government shall engage or con-
spire to engage in assassination.
Sec. 132. Integrity of Private Institutions of the U.S.
The President' is to establish public guidelines for intelligence
activities designed to protect the integrity and independence
of U.S. private institutions. Intelligence entities may not
use the following for cover to engage in foreign intelligence
activities or special activities: U.S. religious organizations;
U.S. media organizations; U.S. educational institutions; the
Pace Corps; or U.S. Government cultural exchange programs.
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These restrictions do not bar voluntary contacts or volun-
tary exchange of information between these persons and intelli-
gence entities. The President may waive these restrictions in
wartime or to the extent necessary for hostilities under the
War Powers Resolution, if the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees are notified.
Sec. 133. Covert Domestic Publication. Intelligence
entities may not pay for or otherwise knowingly cause or
support distribution of any book, magazine, article, periodical,
film, or video or audio tape, for the purpose of influencing
public opinion within the United States, unless the involvement
of the U.S. Government is acknowledged.
Sec. 134. Contracting. Intelligence entity sponsorship
of contracts or arrangements for goods or services with U.S.
organizations may be concealed for routine service contracts,
procurement contracts, or transactions under the Economy ct.
Unless the organization is an educational institution, entity
sponsorship may also be concealed pursuant to procedures
approved by the Attorney General, if concealment is necessary
for authorized intelligence activities.
Sec. 135. Indirect Activities. Intelligence entities t/
and their employees may not request or encourage anyone, directly
or indirectly, to engage in any activity on behalf of the U.S.
Government in which that entity is prohibited by this Act from
engaging. This restriction does not bar an intelligence entity
from requesting another U.S. Government agency to engage in
an activity that is within the authorized functions of that
agency.
PART E--OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Sec. 141. IOB, Re orts on Violations Disci linar
Proce ures. An Intelligence Oversight Board
is to be appointed by the-President. As prescribed by the
President, the IOB is to report to the President on questions
of legality and propriety, have access to information in the
custody of any intelligence entity, and conduct inquiries into
the activities of intelligence entities. Each entity is to
have a general counsel to review the legality of its activities,
rules and regulations; and an inspector general to investigate
its activities to determine whether they nay be performed
more effectively and to determine the facts and circumstances
of any alleged wrongdoing. The general counsel and inspector
general are to report to the IOB any intelligence matters as
specified by the President.
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.The Attorney General is to report to the IOB any intelli-
gence activity that involves a question as to whether there
has been a significant law violation, and report to the
President any intelligence activities that involve serious
questions of law. The President, the IOB, and the appropriate
entity head are to be informed by the Attorney General of
decisions or actions taken in response to reports on intelli-
gence activities. The Attorney General is also to keep the
IOB and the entity general counsels informed of Justice Depart-
ment legal opinions affecting intelligence community operations.
Entity heads must ensure that the -general counsel and
in-spector general have access to necessary information; pro-
vide information required to fulfill the Attorney General's
duties under this Act; report to the Attorney General evidence
of possible federal criminal-violations by entity employees of
agents; and report to the Attorney General evidence of possible
violations by other persons of federal criminal laws specified
in guidelines adopted by the Attorney General. All entity
employees are to cooperate fully with the IOB, the general
counsel and inspector general, and the Attorney General; and
are to report pos-sible law violations to the entity head and
inspector general or general counsel or to the IOB. Entity
heads are to ensure such full cooperation. No employee who
so reports in good faith or so cooperates may be subject to
adverse personnel action solely on that account.
Entity heads are empowered to take disciplinary action
against employees who violate this Act or the procedures or
regulations established under this Act, including any regula-
tion, procedure, or obligation to provide for personnel,
document., communications, or physical security to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Sanctions include suspension without pay for up to 180 days,
reduction in salary or grade, and dismissal. Employees have
a right to present evidence on their behalf. Existing legal
authority of entity heads to terminate employment or take
other disciplinary action is not affected.
Sec. 142. Congressional Oversight. Consistent
with all applicable authorities and duties, including those
conferred by the Constitution upon the executive and legis-
lative branches, the head of each intelligence entity shall
keep the House and Senate Intelligence Committees fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities which are
the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for
or on behalf of, that entity, including any significant antici-
pated intelligence activity; but Committee approval is not a
condition precedent to the initiation of any such anticipated
activity. Similarly, each entity dead shall furnish any
information or material concerning intelligence activities
in the possession, custody, or control of the entity or its
employees whenever requested by the House or Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, and report in a timely fashion to the Intelli-
gence Committees information relatin-g to intelligence activities
that are: illegal or imporper and corrective actions that are
taken or planned.
Entity heads shall maintain a complete record of all
le'gal authorities, published regulations, and published
instructions pertaining to the intelligence activities of that
entity', and shall establish procedures to ensure that a record
is maintained of each authorization or approval required by
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law, regulation or procedures approved by the Attorney General
under sec. 204 with respect to any intelligence activity. The
Intelligence Committees shall be furnished all record schedules
which intelligence entities are required by law to furnish to
the Archivist of the United States, including any modificaitons.
The President may establish such procedures as the Presi-
dent determines may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this section.
Sec. 143. Disclosure Provisions. The House and Senate
Intel ig~ e'nceCommittees are to report annually to their
respective Houses on U.S. intelligence activities and call to
the attention of each House, or the appropriate committee, any
intelligence matter which should have its attention. Such
reports are to be made in a manner consistent with national
security interests and are to be made public to the extent
possible under H.Res. 658 or S.Res. 400 disclosure provisions.
No information provided to the Intelligence Committees that
has been classified or that the Executive Branch has requested
be kept confidential may be made public, except under H.Res. 658
or S.Res. 400 disclosure provisions. These provisions may be
changed by each House in the same manner as any other rule of
such House. Intelligence Committee employees must agree in
writing and under oath to be bound by H.Res. 658 or S.Res. 400
disclosure restrictions and must receive security clearances as
determined by each committee in consultation with the DNI.
Sec. 144. Apropzjations Requirements, No funds may
be appropriated of r national intelligence, counterintelligence,
or counterterrorism intelligence activities of intelligence
entities unless authorized by prior legislation, except for
appropriations by continuing resolution or required for pay
raises.
Sec. 145. Comptroller General Audits. The Comptroller
General may` audit and review intelligence activities upon the
request of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Each intelli-
gence Committee must approve requests for such audits by other
committees of each House; and the results may be made avail-
able to the requesting committee only in accordance with the
H.Res. 658 of the 95th Congress or S.Res. 400 of the 94th
Congress. Audits are to be conducted under security standards
prescribed by the DNI, and the DNI may exempt particular
activities from audits if the DNI finds such exemption is
essential for the nation's security and notifies the Intelli-
gence Committees.
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TITLE II--STANDARDS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
PART A-?-PURPOSES AND DEFINITIONS
Sec. 201? Purposes. This title provides statutory auth-
orizaf hn for activities of intelligence entities that concern
United States persons, establishes standards for such activities
and means to ensure that they conform to those standards, and
delineates responsibilities of government officials to ensure
that such activities are conducted in accordance with the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States. (The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 already authorizes and regulates
electronic surveillance in the United -States for intelligence
purposes. Title VIII extends that Act to physical searches in
the United States.)
Sec. 202, Definitions. The most intrusive techniques
are d Lned by the terms foreign electronic surveillance,
foreign physical search, extraordinary technique, and covert
technique. "Foreign electronic surveillance" is defined to
mean targeting U.S. persons abroad by wiretaps, microphones,
and other techniques and monitoring devices that would require
a, court order in the United States under the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act. "Foreign physical search" means
searches abroad of U.S. persons and their property, and open-
ing mail abroad of U.S. persons. "Extraordinary technique"
includes foreign electronic surveillance, foreign physical
search, and any other technique directed against a U.S. per-
son abroad that would require a warrant for law enforcement
in the United States. "Covert technique" means any extra-
ordinary technique and any other category or_type of collection
activity designated by the President for the purpose of protecting
privacy and constitutional rights from significant intrusion.
Additional intrusive techniques defined for this title
are directed collection, mail cover, and physical surveillance.
"Directed collection" means obtaining information concerning
a U.S. person by requesting or directing any person to acquire
the information by exploiting or developing a relationship
with a U.S. person without disclosing that the information
will go to an intelligence entity. (Placing employees in
domestic groups is excluded to permit separate procedures in
sec. 214(b) for that technique.) "Mail cover" means systematic
and deliberate inspection and recording of information from
the exterior of envelopes in the mails. "Physical surveillance"
means unconsent.ed systematic and deliberate observation of a
person on a continuing basis, or unconsented acquisition of
nonpublic communications by means other than electronic sur-
veillance.
Other defined terms are collecting agency, employee,
foreign power,"
ower, and minimization procedures. "Collecting
agency" and "employee" are defined to clarify the application
of procedural requirements. "Foreign power" is defined sub-
stant Lally as in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
to i nr. lude Corciign govcrnmen is , Coreign factions not substantially
composed of U,S. persons, entities known to be directed and
controlled by foreign governments, international terrorist
groups, and foreign-based political groups not substantially
composed of U?S. persons. "Minimization procedures" for
extraordinary techniques abroad is -al-so defined as-in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The procedures must
minimize acquisition and retention and prohibit dissemination
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of nonpublicly available information about unconsenting U.S.
persons, consistent with the need for intelligence. Foreign
intelligence identifying a U.S. person may be disseminated
only if such identity is necessary to understand that intelli-
gence or assess its importance. Evidence of a crime may be
disseminated for law enforcement purposes.
PART B--AUTHORITY FOR ACTIVITIES THAT CONCERN U.S. PERSONS
Sec. 211. General Authorities. Intelligence entities
may engage n the following activities only in accordance
with this Part and only to fulfill their lawful functions:
(1) collection, retention, or dissemination of intelligence
concerning U.S. persons; (2) any other intelligence activities
directed against U.S. persons; (3) collection, retention, or
dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons who are
targets of clandestine intelligence gathering activity of
a foreign government; (4) collection, retention, or dissemination
of information concerning U.S. persons to determine the suita-
bility or credibility of potential sources of intelligence or
operational assistance; and (5) collection, retention, or dis-
semination of information concerning U.S. persons to provide
personnel, document, communications, or physical security for
intelligence activities.
Intelligence entities may conduct activities that affect
U.S. persons with their consent, and may collect, retain, and
disseminate publicly available information concerning U.S.
persons for lawful purposes. Information concerning a U.S.
person may be retained and disseminated if the person is not
identified. Information concerning U.S. persons collected in
violation of this Act must be destroyed, unless the collecting
agency head or a designee determines that it (1) should be
retained for oversight, accountability, or redress; (2) evidences
physical danger to any person and is used only as necessary to
protect against that danger with notice to the Attorney General
or a designee; or (3) is required by law to be used for legal
proceedings of which the agency has prior notice.
This title does not affect the use of security guards,
access controls, identification credential requirements, or
inspection of materials entering or leaving intelligence entity
installations for security purposes. Nor does this title pro-
hibit voluntary provision of information to an intelligence
entity by anyone not employed by or assigned to it. Nothing
in this Part prohibits, limits, or otherwise affects activities
of any agency other than those described in this section.
Sec. 212. Procedures. Procedures established by intelli-
gence entity head and approved by the Attorney General are
required for intelligence activities that concern unconsenting
U.S. persons, except where information is publicly available or
where a U.S. person's identity is not retained or disseminated.
The procedures must protect constitutional rights and privacy.
Officials must be designated to initiate or approve particular
activities and to review them at timely intervals. Records must
be maintained of all approvals. Minimization procedures geared
to particular techniques must limit acquisition and retention
and prohibit dissemination consistent with the need for informa-
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tion to serve lawful governmental purposes. Foreign intelli-
gence may not: be disseminated in a manner that identifies a
U.S. person unless the identity is necessary to understand
that intelligence or assess its importance, or-is evidence of
a crime disseminated for law enforcement purposes.
The procedures must also prescribe reasonable requirements
for the scope, intensity, and duration of particular types of
activities.taking into account the nature and quality of informa-
tion on which the activity is based and the importance of the
U.S. objective. Collection is to be conducted with minimal
intrusion consistent with the need for information of the nature,
reliability, and timeliness required. Certain categories or
types of collection activity will be designated "covert tech-
niques" by the President, triggering specific restrictions in
,sections 213 through 217, and the procedures will implement
the President's determinations. Procedure-s are specifically
required to govern the conduct of employees under cover engaged
in activities within the United States or directed against U.S.
;.persons abroad. The procedures and any changes are to be sub-
mitted in advance to the Intelligence Committees, unless the
Attorney General determines immediate action is required and
notifies the Committees immediately.
Sec. 213. Collection of Foreign Intelligence. A pre-
sumption established against collection of foreign intelli-
gence by targeting U.S. persons with covert techniques (-foreign
electronic surveillance, foreign physical search, other tech-
niques that require a warrant for law enforcement, and additional
categories or types of collection activity designated by the
,?resident to protect privacy and con-stitutional rights from
significant intrusion), unless the person's activities meet
counterintelligence or counterterrorism intelligence standards
under sec. 214. However, exceptions are made for extraordinary
cases.
The first exception is where the President finds that
extraordinary circumstances require such collection to obtain
foreign intelligence that is essential to the national security
and that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means. The NSC
or a committee thereof must review such collection before it
is approved; and recommendations to the-President may not be
made unless the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney
General, and the DNI, or if unavailable their representatives,
are present. Any such collection lasting more than a year or
substantially changed in purpose must be reaffiremd by the
President and reviewed by the NSC or a committee thereof.
The second exception is where a Presidential designee
finds that the target is a senior official of a foreign govern-
ment, a -corpozation or other commercial entity directed and
controlled by a foreign power, or an entity directed and con-
trolled by a :Foreign government and that unusual circumstances
require such col-lection to obtain foreign intelligence that is
important to the national security and cannot reasonably be
acquired by other means. The Attorney General must be notified,
and the NSC or a committee thereof must review such collection
periodically.
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This section also regulates the collection of foreign
intelligence within the United States by any clandestine
means directed against unconsenting U.S. persons who are
in the United States. Such collection may be conducted only
(1) by the FBI, with notice to the Attorney General or a
designee; (2) by the military services when directed against
military personnel; (3) by NSA when directed at foreign
communications, as defined in Title VI; and (4) with Attorney
General approval by CIA through established sources and pretext
interviews when the U.S. person is a senior foreign official or
an entity directed and controlled by a foreign power or a
foreign government under the second exception. All the pro-
cedural requirements of sec. 212 apply to such collection.
Sec. 214. Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism
intelligence Activities. These activities
may be directed against unconsenting U.S. persons only on the
basis of facts and circumstances which reasonably indicate
that the person is or may be engaged in clandestine intelli-
gence activities on behalf of a foreign power or international
terrorist activity. Placing employees (including informants
under the "employee" definition) in domestic organizations
requires a finding by a senior official that such participation
is necessary to achieve significant intelligence objectives
and meets the requirements of the procedures under sec. 212.
Those procedures must establish independent means for audit
and inspection of such participation. Use against a U.S.
person of mail covers, physical surveillance for purposes
other than identification, recruitment of persons to engage
in directed collection (such as informants and undercover
agents), or access to financial records requires a finding
that such techniques are necessary to achieve authorized
intelligence objectives and meet the procedural requirements.
The Attorney General or a designee is to be notified of these
findings with respect to activities which the entity, based
on guidelines established by the Attorney General, concludes
may involve significant collection of information concerning
political or religious activity.
Sec. 215. Targets of Clandestine Intelligence Gathering
Activity. Information about unconsenting U.S.
persons may be collected only if a designated official makes a
finding, with notice to the Attorney General or a designee,
that the person is the target of clandestine intelligence
gathering activity of a foreign government and such collection
is necessary for counterintelligence purposes and meets the
procedural requirements. Covert techniques and mail covers
are prohibited.
Sec. 216. Potential Sources. Information about persons
under consideration as potentis, sources of intelligence or
operational assistance may be collected, without the consent
of a U.S. person against whom such collection is directed,
only in accordance with procedures which limit the scope.
intensity, and duration to that necessary to determine in
a timely manner the suitability or credibility of the potential
source. Such collection is limited to interviews (including
pretext interviews), physical surveillance for identification
purposes, checks of government records, and other techniques
approved by the collecting agency head with notice to the
Attorney General or a designee. Covert techniques and mail
covers are prohibited. -
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Sec. 217. Collection for Security Purposes. Information
may be collected to provide personnel, document, communications,
or physical security for intelligence activities, without the
consent: of a U.S. person against whom such collection is directed,
only in accordance with procedures which govern the categories
of persons who may :,e subjects of collection by particular
agencies, and which limit the scope, intensity, and duration
to that: required (1) to determine the suitability or trust-
worthiness of employees, contractors or applicants for con-
tractor status, employees of contractors or. proprietaries,
applicants for employment or for access to information or
facilities, consultants, or persons detailed or assigned
to an entity, when requesting the person's consent would
,jeopardize the security of an intelligence activity; (2) to
protect: against breaches of security regulations or contractual
obligations applicable to such persons, except that collection
to protect against breaches of contractual obligations is
limited to that necessary to refer the matter to the Justice
Department; (3) to protect against a direct or imminent threat
that may be posed by the person's activities to the physical
safety of personnel, installations, property, documents or
other materials related to intelligence activity, except that
such collection in the United States is limited to that
necessary to refer the matter to a law enforcement agency;
and (4) to determine whether proposed intelligence activity
sites meet appropriate physical security requirements.
Covert techniques and mail covers are prohibited. Collection
by clandestine means requires a finding by a designated official
that such means are necessary for authorized purposes and meet
the procedural requirements.
Sec. 218. Review of Activities. Activities directed
against: particular U. persons that are authorized pursuant
to sections 213 thorugh 217 for longer than a year must be
reviewed at least annually by the entity head or a designee.
:Except for collection under sec. 217 concerning entity employees,
a report of such review must be submitted to the Attorney Gen-
eral or a designee or, for activities of the military services
directed at military personnel, to the Service Secretary or a
designee.
PART C--STANDARDS FOR EXTRAORDINARY TECHNIQUES
Sec. 221. Extraordinary Techniques Outside the United
States. Extraordinary techniques sears or
surveillance that would require a court order in the United
States) may not be directed against a L.S. person abroad to
collect intelligence, except pursuant to a court order similar
to that required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 197-8. Orders are issued by the seven federal district
judges designated under that Act. There are four significant
differences between the Foreign 'Intelligence Surveillance
Act and the ;requirements for search or surveillance of U.S.
persons abroad. Two are contained in this section, and the
others are in sec. 222 on cooperative arrangements and
sec. 223 on emergency procedures. (Title VIII deals separately
with physical searches within the United States.)
The first difference is that the standards do not require
evidence of criminal law violation. In exceptional cases when
the use of covert techniques has been approved under sec. 213
to collect foreign intelligence, an order may be issued if
the court finds that the information sought is foreign intelli-
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gence_and there is probable cause to believe that the
U.S. person possesses the information sought. A court order
may also be issued if the court finds that significant counter-
intelligence or counterterrorism intelligence is likely to
be obtained and there is probable cause to believe that the
U.S. person engages or is about to engage in clandestine
intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, inter-
national terrorist activity, or activities in furtherance
thereof. In all cases the court must find that less intrusive
means cannot reasonably be expected to acquire intelligence
of the nature, reliability, and timeliness that is required,
and the court must approve the minimization procedures.
The second difference is that military judges designated
by the Secretary of Defense may issue orders under these
standards for extraordinary techniques directed against mili-
tary personnel abroad. The Attorney General must be informed
of all such applications and orders.
The requirements to identify the target, to state whether
physical entry may be involved, to specify duration (up to
90 days), and to grant extensions are substantially the same
as under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, although
the court receives less information about the technique to
be used. No order may authorize more than one unconsented
entry into real property except for entries to install, repair,
or remove surveillance devices. The court is to observe the
procedural, administrative, and security provisions established
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and that Act's
provisions on use of information, wartime authority, and con-
gressional oversight apply to extraordinary techniques under
this section. The court of review established by that Act
has jurisdiction to hear appeals; and its decisions are subject
to review by the Supreme Court.
Sec. 222. Cooperative Arrangements. The third difference
from thhe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is the provision
that disclosure to the court of information concerning coopera-
tive or liaison relationships between U.S. Government agencies
and foreign governments is not required, if the DNI determines
such disclosure would jeopardize that relationship. If a
determination of facts relating to a probable cause finding
would require disclosure of such information, the Attorney
General may substitute a certification of facts based on a
determination that such information reliably supports the
certification of facts. The court is to base its probable
cause finding on the Attorney General's certification and
any other available information, and the court may not refuse
to make a finding of probable cause solely because protected
liaison information is withheld.
Sec. 223. Emergency Procedures. The fourth difference
from the oreign Intelligence Sruve'illance Act is the three-day
emergency provision. Extraordinary techniques that would meet
the standard for a court order may be approved in emergency
situations by the senior agency official in the country where
the technique is to be used. This same procedure applies to
the use of other "covert techniques" that would otherwise
require Presidential approval under sec. 213. (By contrast,
the Foregn Intelligence Surveillance Act limits emergency
surveillance in the United States to 24 hours and requires
the Attorney General's approval.)
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PART D-..REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS; OTHER PROVISIONS
Sec. 231. Criminal Sanctions. The criminal penalties
in theme Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act are applied to
employees of the United States who intentionally engage in
foreign electronic surveillance or foreign physical search
directed -aggainst U.S. persons, except as authorized by statute.
It is a defense that the surveillance or search was authorized
by a court order or search warrant. It is alsoa defense
that the defendant-was a law enforcement officer engaged in
official duties and there was no statute or established judicial
procedure concerning authorizations for the type of surveillance
or search involved.
Sec. 232, Civil Liability and Jurisdiction. The civil
liabi:y provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act are applied when sec. 231 is violated. Except for this
provision, nothing in this title or in any guidelines or pro-
cedures established pursuant to this title creates a civil
cause :):E action for equitable relief against the United States
or a civil cause of action against any officer, agent, or
employae or former officer, -agent or employee of the U.S.
Government, not otherwise available under the Constitution
or laws of the, United States. Except as provided in this section
regarding extraordinary techniques, nothing in this Act or in
any guidelines or procedures established pursuant to this Act,
creates any substantive or procedural rights and no court has
jurisdiction over a claim in any proceeding, including a motion
to quash a subpoena, suppress evidence, or dismiss an indictment
based solely on an alleged failure to follow a provision of
this Act or of guidelines or procedures established pursuant
to this Act.
Sec. 233, Privileged Communications. No otherwise
priviT ed co.munication shall lose its privileged character
as a consequence of this Act.
Sec. 234, Administrative Rulemaking. The DNI and the
head o eachi.nte igence entity shall, in appropriate con-
sultation with the Attorney General, promulgate regulations
necessary to carry out the provisons of this Act. Any
promulgation of -a standard, rule, regulation, or procedure
to implement this title shall be exempt from the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 553, the Administrative Procedures Act.
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TITLE III--THE INTELLIGENCE COitK IUNITY
Sec. 301. Purposes. The purposes are to provide for
appointm elf a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and
to ensure proper direction of the community. In addition,
the DNI is held accountable to the President, Congress and
the people.
Sec. 302. Presidential Designation of National Intelligence
Activities. The President is to determine from'
time to time which foreign intelligence activities, if any, in
addition to those specifically defined as national intelligence
activities, shall constitute national intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Director and Deputy Director of National
Intelligence. The Office of the Director of
National Intelligence is established, to be headed by a Director
and a Deputy Director appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The rra,ximum terms for
the DNI and Deputy DNI, respectively, are ten years. The pro-
visions for appointment of military officers parallel existing
law. Provision is made for an acting Director or Deputy Director
during their absence or disability or during any temporary
vacany in their offices.
Sec. 304. Duties and Authorities of the DNI. The duties
and authorities of the DNI genera ly reflect the responsibilities
presently assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence under
Executive Order 12036, other Presidential directives, and the
National Security Act of 1947. The CIA charter (Title IV)
allows the President the option either to keep the DNI as CIA
Director or to split the "two hats" by appointing the Deputy
DNI.or an Assistant DNI as CIA Director. The FBI Charter
(Title V) gives the FBI Director primary responsibility for
counterintelligence and counterterrorism intelligence activities
conducted within the United States. The NSA charter (Title VI)
assigns the principal responsibility for signals intelligence
to the NSA Director.
The DNI is to serve, under NSC direction, as the principal
foreign intelligence officer of the United States. The DNI is
responsible for coordinating national intelligence activities
and counterintelligence and counterterrorism intelligence
activities abroad, for evaluating the quality of national
intelligence, and for reviewing national intelligence activities
to ensure that they are properly and effectively carried out.
To coordinate national intelligence collection, the DNI is to
develop objectives and targets to meet NSC requirements,
establish procedures to increase the national intelligence
contributions of agencies outside the intelligence community,
and coordinate all clandestine collection abroad.
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The DNI is also responsible for the production of
national intelligence, including estimates and other community-
wide analyses. This duty includes ensuring that any diverse
points of view are presented fully, considered carefully, and
expressed clearly for policymakers. The DNI may levy analytic
tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations
(such as the Defense Intelligence Agency or the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research), in consultation
with those organizations. The DNI's responsibility for the
dissemination, under appropriate security procedures, of
national intelligence includes duties to ensure that all
agencies and military commanders receive national intelligence
relevant to their duties, to establish procedures to increase
the usefulness to all agencies of information collected., pro-
cessed, and analyzed through national intelligence activities,
and to ensure access of each intelligence entity to national
intelligence relevant to that entity's authorized activities.
Other DNI functions include ensuring appropriate implemen-
tation of special activities and other sensitive intelligence
activities abroad, coordinating intelligence relationships
with. foreign governments under policies formulated in consul-
tation with the Secretary of State, and promoting the perfor-
mance of services of common concern by particular agencies
for the intelligence community.
The existing responsibility of the Director of Central
Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure is transferred to the
DNI, with additional authority to establish for all agencies
minimum security standards for the management and handling
of information and material relating to intelligence sources
and methods. Administrative and personnel authorities of
the Director of Central -Intelligence under current law are
carried over, with some technical revisions, to the Office
of the DNI.
To carry out the DNI's specific duties, the DNI is
authorized to audit the national intelligence activities of
intelligence entities, to obtain additional information from
any agency in accordance with applicable law, to review all
research and development that supports intelligence activities,
and to review all intelligence activities.
Sec. 305. Assistant DNIs, General Counsel, Committees
and Boards. The President may appoint up to
five Assistant DNIs, no more than two of whom may be military
officers. The President may also appoint a General Counsel
for the Office of the DNI and the CIA, by and with the advice
and consent: of the Senate. The DNI, the Attorney General,
and the heads of intelligence entities may establish committees
and boards to assist in carrying out their duties under this
Act, any may establish advisory committees and waive the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Sec. 306. Departmental Responsibilities. All agency
heads are responsible for ensuring that national intelligence
obtained by their agencies is promptly furnished to the DNI
or to an intelligence entity designated by the DNI.
Sec. 307. Annual Report of DNI. The DNI is to make an
annual -pub is report on the national intelligence, counter-
intelligence, and counterterrorism intelligence activities of
the intelligence community. Such report need not disclose
classified information or the names'of individuals engaged
in such activities.
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Sec. 308. National Intelligence Budget. The DNI, con-
sistent with app i~ cab e aw, has to and exclusive authority
to approve the national intelligence budget submitted to the
President. The DNI provides program and budget guidance to
the agencies,-and agency heads must ensure timely submission
of their budgets and other necessary information to the DNI.
With the advice of the agencies concerned, the DNI develops
the budget, presents it to the President in consultation
with OMB, and justifies it to Congress. The DNI has comparable
reprograrrmning authority. Implementation of overall budgets
by departments that include intelligence entities must have
no significant predictable adverse effect on implementation
of the national intelligence budget.
Sec. 309. Appropriations Requirements. The DNI may account
for lawful expen itures of the fice of the DNI by certificate.
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TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PART A--PURPOSES
Sec. 401. Purposes. The purposes are to clarify the
statutory authorites;unctions, and responsibilities of
the CIA; to authorize the CIA to perform necessary intelligence
activities; to ensure that those activities are properly and
effectively managed; and to ensure that the CIA is accountable
and that its activities are consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
PART B--ESTABLISHMENT OF AGENCY; DIRECTOR; DEPUTY DIRECTOR;
GENERAL COUNSEL; INSPECTOR GENERAL; FUNCTIONS
Sec. 411.. Establishment of CIA. The CIA is established
as an independent establishment in the executive branch, which
acts under the direction of the NSC and subject to intelligence
plans, objectives, and requirements set by the DNI.
Sec. 412. Director and Deputy Director. The CIA Director
is appointer by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The
DNI or Deputy DNI is to serve as CIA Director unless a Deputy
or Assistant DNI is appointed and confirmed by the Senate. The
Deputy CIA Director is also appointed by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate. The provisions of the National Security
Act of 1947 regarding appointment of military officers are
retained., Both offices may not be held simultaneously by active
or retired military officers.- A military officer appointed to
these positions is not subject to military control and may not
exercise military functions.
The duties of the CIA Director are to ensure that CIA
-activities are conducted in accordance with this Act and with
the Constitution and laws of the U.S.; to ensure that CIA
-activities are properly and efficiently directed, regulated,
coordinated, and administered; to perform dutiesassigned by
this Act to the head of each intelligence agency; to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
and to specify which CIA officials may act in the absence of
the Deputy Director.
Sec. 413. General Counsel and Inspector General. The
CIA General Counsel is appointed by the Presi ent, confirmed
by the Senate and discharges general counsel responsibilities
for the office of the DNI. A Deputy General Counsel may act
in the General Counsel's absence. An Inspector General is
appointed by the CIA Director.
Sec. 414. Functions. All CIA activities, duties, and
re:sponsi i sties must be performed in accordance with this Act.
The CIA has three basic types of functions.
Its intelligence functions are to: (1) conduct foreign
intelligence activities including collection by clandestine
means, (2) conduct -counterintelligence and counterterrorism
inr?4ligence activities including activities by clandestine
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means, (3) conduct special activities, (4) process and analyze
national intelligence collected by any intelligence agency,
(5) produce, publish, and disseminate intelligence to meet
the needs of the President, the NSC, the DNI, and other
agencies, including national intelligence estimates and simi-
lar analyses coordinated with other intelligence agencies,
and (6) to develop, conduct, and support technical and other
programs, including signals intelligence and reconnaissance,
to collect intelligence abroad.
The CIA also performs functions for the intelligence
community at large: (1) to act as the DNI's agent in the
coordination of counterintelligence, counterterrorism intelli-
gence, and clandestine foreign intelligence activities abroad
by other intelligence agencies, (2) under the direction of
the DNI to conduct liaison with and provide assistance to foreign
governmental agencies and act as the DNI's agent in the coordina-
tion of such relationships by other intelligence agencies, and
(3) to conduct services of common concern on behalf of the
intelligence community as directed by the DNI.
Ancillary CIA functions are: (1) to conduct or contract
for research, development, and procurement of systems and
devices-related to its other functions, (2) to perform inspec-
tion, audit, public affairs, legal, legislative, and other
administrative functions to support its activities, and pro-
vide such support to the DNI's Office as directed by the DNI,
and (3) to perform functions otherwise authorized by this Act
to be performed by each intelligence agency.
Within the U.S., CIA may collect foreign intelligence
by clandestine means only in coordination with the FBI, under
standards agreed upon by the Attorney General and the DNI,
and may direct such collection against unconsenting U.S. persons
only as permitted by sec. 213(d). Within the U.S., CIA may
conduct counterintelligence and counterterrorism intelligence
activities by clandestine means only with the approval of
the FBI Director or a designee, and must keep the FBI fully
and currently informed, in accordance with sec. 504(d).
PART C: AUTHORITIES OF CIA: AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
Sec. 421. General Authorities. To carry out its func-
tions, the C has three types o general authorities: security
functions, personnel functions and ancillary functions.
Under the heading of security functions, the CIA is
authorized to: conduct background investigations; to maintain
its own printing plant; to operate secure communications sys-
tems; to protect Agency personnel, installations, and equipment;
to maintain cover; to conceal and protect the relationship
between the Agency and any of its officers, employees, sources,
or activities, to hire security officers; to allow employees
to carry firearms when necessary to protect information,
persons or property of the CIA; provide transportation when
normal means of transportation are unsafe; to carry firearms
in the discharge of their official duties in limited circum-
stances. In addition, no provision of law is to require the
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Director of the Agency to disclose the name, official title,
salary or affiliation of any person employed by or associated
with the Agency. The Agency is also largely exempted from any
law (e.g., FOIA) which requires disclosure of its operations
or technical systems, except insofar as they deal with finished
foreign intelligence analysis or with information requested
by Americans an themselves.
In dealing with personnel matters, the Agency is auth-
orized to be reimbursed by other agencies in connection with
the detailed personnel tour from the Agency; settle pay claims
for civilian and military personnel; pay for expenses in con-
nection with membership in national societies; provide or pay
expenses of training; have assigned or detailed to the Agency
employees of other departments; have a person who has been
separated receive a position in Civil Service.
Various housekeeping authorizations are also granted to
the CIA including authorization to exchange funds; rent premises;
construct buildings; perform inspections, audit, public affairs,
legal, legislative, and other administrative functions; receive
sums of money, and use a seal. In addition the Agency is per-
mitted to carry out any other duties granted to all entices of
the community under title I.
Sec. 423. Proprietaries. The Agency is authorized to
establ ;hand"operate proprietaries in the furtherance of its
responsibilities. Excess profits and funds generated by the
liquidation of a proprietary shall be returned to the miscellan-
eous receipts of the U.S. Treasury. Major transactions involving
Agency proprietaries shall be reported to the Intelligence
Committees.
Sec. 424. Relationships with Other Government Agencies.
The Agency` is .aut prize to receive assistance rom,state and
federal law enforcement agencies in conducting background
investigations on prospective employees. It is authorized to
cooperate with and receive technical assistance from the State
Department Passport Office, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and other federal, state, or local agencies.
Sec. 425. Admission of Essential Aliens. The Agency is
authorized to instruct the Immigration an Naturalization
service to grant up to one hundred essential aliens permanent
resident alien status in the United States in any one fiscal
year. The Agency is to provide necessary processing and re-
location assistance to these persons as required.
Sec. 426. Authorizations for Appropriations and Expenditures
In. u tilling its awfu responsibilities, the Agency may
expend the funds authorized and a.-propriated to it. It may only
expend such funds as are authorized by legislation enacted in
the same or the two preceding fiscal years. A Contingency Fund
is established for any lawful intelligence needs not anticipated
at the time the Agency's budget was submitted. The withdrawal
of funds from the Contingency Fund is to be approved by the Office
of Management and Budget and reported of the Congressional
Intelligence Committees, either 72 hours before the transaction,
or in extraordinary circumstances within 48 hours of the with-
drawal.
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PART D--TRAVEL AND OTHER ALLOWANCES; RETIREMENT SYSTEM;
DEATH GRATUITIES
Sec. 431. Travel, Related Expenses and Death Gratuities
for Certain Agency ersonne In accordance
with procedures esta ishe by t-e.irectorof the Agency in
cooperation with the Director of National Intelligence, employees
of the Agency stationed overseas are to receive the same bene-
fits, travel allowances and death gratuities as Foreign Service
officers receive under existing statutes.
Sec. 432. Retirement System. In general, employees of
the Agency a 1 under the Feder a civil service retirement
system. However, certain employees of the Agency who either
have highly specialized skills or hazardous duties in support
of Agency activities overseas shall be eligible for special
benefits under the provisions of the 1964 Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act for Certain Employees.
PART E--TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL, PROPERTY AND FUNCTIONS; STATUTES
REPEALED; EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT LAW
Sec. 441. Transfer of Personnel, Property and Functions.
All personnel, contractual obligations, rules, regulations
licenses, pending lawsuits, and functions of the Agency effective
the day before enactment of this act shall be transferred to
the Agency as described under this legislation.
Sec. 442. Statutes Re ealed; Effect of Subsequent Law.
Certain sections of this bill are not to be superse a or
amended unless specifically mentioned. In addition, super-
seded sections of the National Security Act of 1947 and the
Central Intelligence Agency of 1949 are hereby repealed.
PART F--CRIMINAL PENALTY
Sec. 443. Criminal Penalty. Under Title IV, anyone
using the in tials CIA, the name Central Intelligence Agency,
or the seal of the Agency to convey the false impression that
a document or production is endorsed or authorized by the Agency
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year or both.
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TITLE V--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Sec. 501. Purposes. The purposes are to authorize
the FB1, subject to Attorney General supervision and control,
to perf'orm certain intelligence activities; to delineate
responsibilities and authorities of the FBI Director; and to
ensure that FBI intelligence activities are properly and
effectively managed, accountable, and consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Sec. 502. Supervision and Control. All FBI intelligence
authorities are to be exercised in accordance with this Act
and under the Attorney General's supervision and control.
The Attorney General is to be guided by NSC policies and
priorities and responsive to foreign intelligence requirements
sed by the DNI. The Attorney General and the Director are to
review FBI intelligence activities annually and publicly
designate officials to discharge general counsel and inspector
general functions under this Act.
Sec. 503. Duties of the Director. The FBI Director is
the prl-nclpa officer of the Government for the conduct and
coordination of counterintelligence and counterterrorism
intelligence activities within the United States. He is to
ensure conformity with the law and efficient management,
to keep the Attorney General informed, and advise the Attorney
General and the NSC on counterintelligence and counterterrorism
intelligence matters. The Attorney General is to provide by
regulation for an Acting Director.
Sec. 504. Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism
Intelligence functions. The FBI is to collect and disseminate
counterintelligence and counterterrorism intelligence. Any
other counterintelligence or counterterrorism intelligence
activities must be necessary for lawful purposes. FBI liaison
with foreign governments is to be in coordination with the DNI.
FBI activities abroad are to be in coordination with the CIA
and, if unrelated to activities within the United States,
require Attorney General. or a designee's approval.
The FBI coordinates counterintelligence and counter-
terrorism activities in the United States by other intelligence
entities. Except for activities by the military services
ag-ainst, military personnel on military installations, another
entity may conduct clandestine activities in the United States
only with written FBI approval and notice to the Attorney
General or a designee.
Sec. 505. Foreign Intelligence Functions. The FBI
may collect foreign intelligence within the United States in
the course of authorized collection of counterintelligence and
counterterrorism intelligence. The FBI may also conduct
activities in the United States in support of foreign intel-
ligence: collection programs of other intelligence entities.
and may produce foreign intelligence in coordination with the
DNI.
FB foreign intelligence activities for other entities
must be based on a written request by an official designated
by the President, with notice to the Attorney General or a
designee. The Director must approve each support activity.
Clandestine activities directed against U.S. persons require
notice to the Attcrney General or a designee, as under
,section 213(d.).
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Sec. 506. Cooperation with Foreign Governments.
The FBI may collect counterintelligence or counterterrorism
intelligence on the written request of a foreign government,
and assist foreign government officials collecting intelligence
in the United States, under two conditions. First, if the
FBI would be authorized under this Act to do so in the absence
of such a request. Second, it the Attorney General or a
designee determines that, as a matter of comity, it is in
the interests of the United States. Thus authority is
subject to all the requirements of Title II. The FBI must
keep the Attorney General or a designee informed of all
intelligence collection in the United States by foreign
government officials that is assisted by the FBI.
Sec. 507. General and Special Authorities. In general,
the bureau may procure necessary property and ecilities,
establish and maintain necessary cover, establish and operate
proprietaries, deposit public moneys in banks; conduct or
contract for research and procurement of technical devices;
and protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure
in accorcance with DNI standards.
Proproetary profits are to be deposited in the Treasury,
and the disposition of proprietaries valued more than $150,000
is to be reported to the Attorney General and the Intelligence
Committees. FBI procurement of property or services may be
conducted in a manner concealed from the public when
necessary for security purposes.
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TITLE VI -- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
PART A--PURPOSES
Sec. 601. Statement of Purposes. Title VI establishes
the National Security Agency (the gency") and provides
authorization for signals intelligence ("SIGINT" -- information
gathered through the interception of electro-magnetic signals)
and communications security ("COMSEC" -- protective telecommuni-
cations measures denying access to national security information
to an unauthorized person). The Agency is to be accountable to
the President, the Congress and the people of the United States.
Sec. 602. Definitions. This section defines the terms rela-
ted tc NSA-mission including "communications intelligence",
"cryptographic system", "cryptology", "electronic intelligence",
"foreign communication", "foreign instrumentation signals intel-
ligence", "signals intelligence", "signals intelligence
activities", "unauthorized person", and "United States signals
intelligence system".
PART B--ESTABLISHMENT OF AGENCY'S DIRECTOR; DEPUTY DIRECTOR;
GENERAL, COUNSEL; INSPECTOR GENERAL; DUTIES
Sec. 611. Establishment of NSA; Function. The Agency, an
entity w3Lt'thin the Department o De ense (DOD), is authorized to
conduct SIGINT and COMSEC activities for the U.S. Government and
to serve as the principal of the U.S. SIGINT system.
The Secretary of De tense supervises the functions of the Agency
and responds to COMSEC policies and intelligence objectives and
requirements established by the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI).
Sec. 612. Director and Deputy Director. The Director and
Deputy isector o the Agency are appointed by the President
with the advice: and consent of the Senate. Either the Director
or the Deputy Director must have cryptologic (i.e., coding and
ciphering) experience, and only one of the two may be a commissioned
officer. Such an officer will neither possess DOD authority, nor
be under military department supervision; rank and grade held
prior to acceptance of appointment will be maintained. Neither
the Director nor the Deputy Director may serve for more than
six years, unless reappointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The maximum term for either office
is 12 years.
Sec? 613. Duties of the Director. As the principal SIGINT
officer of the Government and as the executive head of the
Agency, the duties of the Director will include the management,
supervision and. dissemination of SIGINT requirements and activi-
ties. The Director is to prepare the U.S. SIGINT program budget
for each fiscal. year. To this end, the Director will receive
budget guidance; from the Secretary of Defense in tactical and
departmental intelligence programs, and the DNI will provide
budget guidance in the preparation of national intelligence pro-
grams.
Sec? 614. General Counsel; Inspector General. The General
Counsel as principa legal advisor to the Director, will review
activities, rules and regulations of the Agency; the Inspector
General will conduct investigations to promote effectiveness
in, the legal functions of the Agency.
PART C - -GENERAL AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE :AGENCY; AUTHORI-
ZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
Sec. 621. Authorization and Appropriations. The Agency may
rent, rea.se, and alter ui ings with respect to the prescribed
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functions of the Act. A waiver of limitations on the Agency's
authority regarding the foregoing is to be in writing. The
Agency is further authorized to establish cover for Agency employ-
ees and direct the transfer of cryptologic equipment among
various entities of the intelligence community.
Sec. 622. Procurement Authorit . The Agency may procure
property goods and services with wide discretion in the name
of the DOD. However, if procurement is not under the auspices
of DOD, it must be pursuant to Sec. 134 ("Restrictions on Contract
ing ") .
Sec. 623. Printing and Binding. A full-scale printing
plant is authorized for theprodu is on of cryptologic materials.
Sec. 624. Education and Training. In order to accomplish
the crypto ogic missions of the Government, the Act provides
authorization to arrange for, fund, and provide the necessary
training needed to accomplish the various functions of the Agency.
Sec. 625. Authorizations for Appropriations and Exlenditures.
Funds appropriate for t e Agency must be authorized by legis-
lation "during the same or one of the two immediate preceding
fiscal years." Funds expended under sections 701-708 of title 31
U.S.C. (consolidation of unexpended appropriated funds into a
common fund) are not subject to the above limitation. In addition,
funds initially appropriated to the Secretary of Defense may be
provided to the Agency by the Secretary for the sole purpose of
meeting emergency expenses.
PART D--TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES; SPECIAL FACILITIES; RETIREMENT
SYSTEM-RELATED EXPENSES; AND DEATH GRATUITIES FOR CERTAIN
AGENCY PERSONNEL
Sec. 631. Travel. In consultation with the DNI, transpor-
tation and su sistence expenses may be paid to employees assigned
to stations within the United States. Employees assigned to
stations in foreign countries will receive the same expenses that
are provided to employees of the Foreign Service (per title IX
of Foreign Service Act of 1946).
Sec. 632. Commissary and Mess Services and Recreation Facil-
itiesInn the absence o commissary and recreation faci itlties
outside the United States, the Director is authorized to establish
such services. They will be accessible to employees of govern-
ment contractors, as well as to employees of other government
agencies. However, the Director may not authorize further estab-
lishment of facilities where other departments operate such
services, unless they are deemed necessary.
Sec. 633. Retirement System. With the exception of Agency
employees i volve in hazardous duty, Agency employees will par-
ticipate in the regular Federal civil service retirement system.
Those involved in hazardous duty may receive a special annuity.
Sec. 641. Special Delegation Authority. The Director will
have operational control over activities required for SIGINT
direct support to military commanders. The authorities of other
departments and agencies for final evaluation and dissemination
of SIGINT is preserved. After review by the Director and with
approval of the DNI, the CIA may conduct SIGINT activities in
support of clandestine operations; the FBI may conduct such SIGINT
activities in the United States. An organization operating outside
of the U.S. SIGINT system must receive NSC authorization to engage
in such activities.
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PART F--TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL, PROPERTY AND FUNCTIONS
Sec. 651? Personnel, obligations, and contracts -- employed
or in etfectlthe day before the effective date of this title --
will be transferred to the Director. The foregoing will apply
also to rules, regulations, and any action in effect prior to
the above date:.
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TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNDERCOVER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND
SOURCES
Sec. 701. Criminal Penalty. Criminal penalties of
a $50,000 fine or not more than ten years imprisonment or
both are imposed on persons who have or have had authorized
access to classified information that identifies an under-
cover intelligence agent and violate their obligation to
protect its secrecy. This statute goes beyond current law by:
(1) punishing disclosure of this category of classified
information by present or former government employees to any
unauthorized person, not just to foreign agents; (2) eliminating
the Espionage Act requirement of proof of an intent by the
employee or former employee to harm the national security; and
(3) establishing the extraterritorial application of the
statute to citizens committing the offense abroad.
It is a defense that the United States has publicly
acknowledged or revealed the undercover relationship of the
person who is identified. Persons who have not had authorized
access to the information cannot be prosecuted as conspirators.
It is not an offense to transmit information directly to the
Intelligence Committees, and nothing is to be construed as
authority to withhold information from the Congress.
Sec. 702. Presidential Responsibility. The President
is to ensure that personshaving authorize access to such
classified information be informed of this criminal penalty.
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TITLE VIII--PHYSICAL SEARCHES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Sec. 801. Amendments to the Foreign Intelli ence
Survei anee Act. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 is re-titled the Foreign Intelligence
Search and Surveillance Act. The court order procedures of
the Act are extended to "physical search," defined as any
search of property located in the United States and any open-
ing of mail in the United States or in U.S. postal channels,
under circumstances in which a person has -a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes. The procedures of the Act for surveil-
lance without a court order approved by the Attorney General
are extended to physical search directed solely at property
or premises under the open and exclusive control of an "official"
foreign power, but no property or: mail of a known U.S. person
may be seized and there must be no substantial likelihood that
the search will involve the property of mail of a U.S. person.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1979 is also
amended to-permit the Attorney General to authorize physical
entry of property or premises over the open and exclusive control
of an "offici-al" foreign power for electronic surveillance pur-
poses. -
The standard-s for court orders are basically the same as
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.- There
must be probable cause of criminal activity by any U.S.- person
whose property or mail is to be -searched. Noorder may authorize
more than one unconsented physic-al entry except for entriesto
install, repair, or remove surveillance devices. Whenever more
than one search of property or the opening of more than one item
of mail is to be conducted under an order, the court must specify
the authorized scope of the searches or opening of mail, All
other provisions of the Act concerning electronic surveillance,
including criminal penalties and civil liability, are extended
to physical search. Numerous technical amendments are necessary
for this purpose.
Sec. 802. Amendments to Chapter 119 of Title, 18
United States Code. These are technical con-
forming amendments to changes made by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
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