CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000500550001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 16, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
16 February 1952
copy 110. 4113
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I ; DrCLASS11F1ED
CLASS,
NAEW CHANGED TO: T.
NEXT R RE DATE:
'ViApaf
DATE REVIEWER:
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DOS review(s) completed.
DIA review completed.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
4.
5~
Soviet Union seeking trade with Burma (page 4).
French plan attack on "third force" group in Indochina (page 5).
NEAR EAST. - AFRICA
6. Attempted assassination of Iranian Shah reported (page 6).
7. Iranian Prime Minister considers armed forces unfriendly to his
party (page 6).
8. Egyptian student groups to act against government (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. . Italy suspends strategic exports to Rumania (page 8),
10. Britain recommends hands-off policy in Saar dispute (page 8).
2. South Africa plans to ground its air squadron in .Korea (page .
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FAR EAST
2. South Africa plans to ground its air squadron in Korea:
The Union of South Africa has told the United
States that it will ground its air squadron in
Korea beginning 31 March for three months,
after which it will review its position. The
South African officials explained that failure
to obtain jet aircraft for the squadron necessi-
tates this step, which does not involve re-
patriation of the personnel.
South African Prime Minister Malan, when
reminded by the American Ambassador that such a move might start
a chain reaction among other contributors to UN forces in Korea,
assured him that South Africa does not "want to act in a hurry," but
that the high loss rate and subsequent recruiting difficulties compel
this move.
Malan stated that the decision could be re-
considered if his government had definite assurance of receiving jets
within six months.
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Comment: Last September South Africa
hinted at a possible grounding should it continue to fail to secure jets.
Subsequently the United States informed South Africa that the squadron,
which is using American-owned F-51 Mustangs, would be equipped
with jets at the same time as similar American units.
4. Soviet Union seeking trade with Burma.
The American Embassy in Rangoon reports
that the Soviet delegation to the recently-
concluded ECAFE conference is prolonging
its stay in Burma and is contacting local
firms to promote trade with the USSR. The supply of illustrated
pamphlets used by the Russians and the arrival of a TASS corre-
spondent just before the conference ended causes the Embassy to
suspect that these Soviet activities were prearranged.
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Comment: While the USSR has made broad
offers of trade to India, Thailand, l Ceylon and Indonesia, Burma is
the first country in which it has attempted an ove 74- - r anized
a roach at economic penetration of South Asia.
Since Burma' s imports are strictly controlled
by licensing and almost all established business firms have trading
channels with the West, Soviet success" will depend largely upon
collaboration by the Burmese Government.
i
French plan attack on "third force" group in Indochina,.
with other political groups which are both anti-Viet Minh and anti-
French.
The's force is small, he has achieved a network of tentative alliances
French troops may shortly launch offensive
operations in Cochinchina against the jungle-
based 7,000-man "army" of the nationalist
leader, Colonel Trinh Minh The. Although
The American Legation believes that a French
attack would be risky and "cannot vouch" that it would not provoke a
general uprising of Vietnamese armed groups which have ostensibly
been loyal to Bao Dai, possibly driving some of them into the Viet Minh
camp.
Comment: Colonel The, formerly chief of staff to
the armed forces of the influ ntial Cao Dai politico-religious sect,
renounced any cooperation with the French in mid-1951 and established
"third force" headquarters on the Cochinchina-Cambodia border, His
clandestine radio transmitter has broadcast violent attacks against
both the French "imperialists" and the Viet Minh.
Colonel The's principal propaganda theme,
a demand for complete freedom from all foreign intervention, has
an enormous emotional appeal for the Vietnamese, and he could
probably count on some support from the Cao Dai group, i hose ad-
herents number in the tens of thousands.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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6. Attempted assassination of Iranian Shah reported:
Two men tried to assassinate the Shah on the
fight of 10 February. One of the assassins
was captured in the Shah's living quarters,
but no information has yet been obtained from
him. The Iranian Government is maintaining
close sec ecy,
Comment: The Shah's assassination would
remove the focal point for conservative opposition to the Mossadeq
government. Since the Shah does not have a son and since there is no
designated successor to the Iranian throne, his death would precipitate
a major political crisis.
. Iranian Prime Minister considers armed forces unfriendly to his party:
ranking Iranian officer who had not been or was not still in British
service."
Prime Minister Mossadeq considers the
Iranian Army unfriendly to the National
Front and has accused it of interfering in
the elections. He told the American Am-
bassador that he had yet to find one high-
The Shah is responsible for the Army's
conduct, but Mossadeq has asserted that he could not tolerate army
interference in civil affairs and that he might have to take steps to
counteract it.
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Comment: Mossadeq and the National Front
are determined to reduce the power of the Shah and to put the armed
forces under direct control of the government rather than of the ruler.
Since the Shah and the armed forces are the focal point of conservative
opposition to Mossadeq's government, their neutralization would
remove the most important non-Communist opposition.
An attempt by the National Front to penetrate
the air force has recently been reported by the US Air Attache in
Tehran. He adds, however, that National Front officers who were in
important positions have been removed. The Chief of Staff, backed
by the Shah, is upholding their dismissal in the face of strong pressure
from National Front leaders.
Egyptian student groups prepare to act against government:
that student opposition tote new Egyptian Government, though still
small-scale, is likely to increase rapidly if there is no visible
progress toward solving the Anglo-Egyptian impasse. Under the
Wafdist regime, Egyptian students played an important part in the
anti-British demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria, as well as in
terrorist activities against British troops in the Canal zone.
all anti-British-activities.
Other university students, members of the
Wafd Party, are ready "to declare war on the new government" if
such action is approved by the party' s Secretary General.
Comment: These reports seem to show
Egyptian university students who are members
of the terrorist "Liberation Battalions" are
considering demonstrations against Prime
Minister All Maher's policy of suppressing
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WESTERN EUROPE
9. Italy suspends strategic exports to Rumania:
The Italian Government is suspending the
issuance of export licenses to Rumania in
an effort to obtain the release of an Italian
Legation employee arrested in Bucharest
on espionage charges. Italy is not blocking shipment of embargoed
equipment already licensed and paid for, however, on the grounds
that such action would jeopardize the success of negotiations. for the
employee's release. It believes that the temporary non-issuance of
export licenses may obtain the desired result, especially since Italy
has allowed its debit trade balance with Rumania to mount to
350,000 dollars.
Comment: Italy has consistently opposed
American proposals for joVr representations by the Western powers
to Bucharest on the general problem of immunity of western nationals
in diplomatic missions in Rumania. It argues that such a step would
hurt its own negotiations for the. release of the employee.
10. Britain recommends hands-off policy in Saar dispute:
The British Foreign Office has drafted for
Foreign Secretary Eden's approval aproposal
that Britain and the United States urge Germany
and France to solve the Saar question between
themselves, The Foreign Office believes that discussions with the
French and Germans might result in Anglo-American commitments
as well as arouse French and German resentment at being pressed
into an agreement.
A Foreign Office spokesman stated that politi-
cal considerations would probably not allow Chancellor Adenauer to
postpone negotiations on the Saar until after the problem of Germany's
status in the European Defense Community has been settled and con-
tractual relations have come into effect.
Comment: West German officials had suggested
that the United States and Britain Press Bonn and Paris for a settlement
of the Saar dispute, which is a major obstacle to agreement on Germany's
participation in Western defense.
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