CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000500220001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 9, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 January 1952
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Copy o0 47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMENT NO
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NO CHANGE INCLASS.
C7 DECLASSIFJE, OW
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T REVIJrw OAT E:
DATE
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Soviet representative again urges Security Council talks on Korea
(page 3).
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2.
FAR EAST
3. Burmese insurgent leaders reportedly to meet in February (page 4).
NEAR EAST AFRICA
4. US Ambassador in Cairo opposes British inaction in Egyptian
situation (page 4).
5. British -interested in Iraqi solution to Egyptian situation (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6., .Yugosi.av Foreign Minister cautions US on consequences of insufficient
aid (page 6).
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GENERAL
1. Soviet representative again urges Security Council talks on Korea:
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In conversation with the US delegation, Soviet
UN delegate Malik asserted that it was necessary
to "raise the level" of Korean discussions in
view of the attitude of the US negotiators. The
Soviet delegate alleged that the USSR's proposal for a Security Council
meeting attended by "responsible political leaders" was intended to help the
negotiations in Korea and not to terminate them. Malik argued that con-
sultation with numerous UN delegations had revealed, "a great deal of
interest" in the Soviet proposal.
Comment: The Soviet call for a Security
Council meeting is apparently a not r attempt to force UN discussion of a
Korean political settlement while the military armistice negotiations are
being held.
The Soviet package proposal provided for dis-
carding the year-old Western blueprints for an increase in the UN's capa-
bility to meet new aggressions. The USSR was apparently dangling before
the UN the prospect of immediate big-power talks on the prolonged Korean
negotiations in the hope of drawing support away from the Western collective
security project.
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the Communists in Korea are still preparing for. prisoner exchange,
suggesting a continued interest in an armistice,
FAR EAST
2.
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3. Burmese insurgent leaders reportedly to meet in February.
purpose of signing an agreement for united military action against the Bur-
Mese Government. The primary objective of the Communist campaign in
the immediate future is to deny the current rice crop to the government.
Comment: Reports of conferences to increase
cooperation among insurgent elements have. been recurrent for several
months. There have been indications of growing unity among the insurgents
in their efforts to overthrow the Burmese Government, but there is no firm
evidence that they have been able completely to submerge the serious differ-
ences, personal and ideological, which heretofore have kept them separated.
Leaders of Burma's two Communist parties,
together with the Peoples Volunteer Organization
and the insurgent Karens, are reliably reported
to have scheduled a meeting in February for the
Control of Burma's rice, the country's chief
source of wealth, has always been a Communist objective. To date, however,
the Communists have been only moderately successful in this effort.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. US Ambassador in Cairo opposes British inaction in Egyptian situation:
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eless be taken.
The US Ambassador in Cairo believes that, while
domestic political considerations make it diff i-
cult for Britain to make new offers in the Sudan
controversy, some positive action must never-
If the British remain adamant on the Sudan, he argues,
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Egypt will make no concessions on the Middle East Command
proposals,
The British suggestion that Anglo-Egyptian
negotiations depend on the end of terrorism in the Canal zone is not
realistic. According to the Ambassador, the Egyptians believe that they
can eventually force the British to withdraw by continuing their commando
tactics, and are therefore in no hurry to negotiate. He points out that the
British base at Fayid is not operative at the present time, and he warns that
it eventually may even become untenable.
The Ambassador reiterates his previous
warnings that events in Egypt cannot stand still but will continue to deteri-
orate, with the prospect that they will ultimately lead to "reoccupation,
revolution, and general chaos. 11
5. British interested in Iraqi solution to Egyptian situation:
British Foreign Office officials are agreeably
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solution of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis and are
considering recommending that Foreign Secre-
ary Eden encourage the Iraqi Prime Minister in his efforts. They hope
that the suggestions can be brought more into line with the Middle East
Command proposals.
The Foreign Office does not like the Iraqi
idea of an alliance restricted to five years nor the flat statement that
Egypt could take over the air defense of the Suez Canal zone at some future
date. It believes that Egypt will reject the suggestion that the Sudanese be
left to decide on their future relations with Egypt free from either British
or Egyptian pressure,
Comment: The parts of the Iraqi proposal
appealing to the Foreign Office are evidently those stipulating that terror-
ism in the Suez Canal zone be ended and an allied military storage depot
be established there. A depot would satisfy some of the requirements of
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the Middle East Command proposals, which the British have consistently
seen as the mu t suitable arrangement for the defense of the Canal.
Should agreement be reached on essentials, the
British would- apparently be willing to evacuate some of their troops accord-
ing to their own time schedule. The British are, however, unwilling to con-
cede that Egypt alone is capable of undertaking any aspect of the defense of
the Carft1 zone.
EASTERN EUROPE
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6e Yugoslav Foreign Minister cautions US on consequences of insufficient aid:
its economic and defense programs and raised doubts over the attitude of
the three powers towards the tripartite aid program,
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj has informed
Ambassador Allen that the initial Allied grant
of only 25 million dollars for the first half of
10r.9 Hoc iso>cee.rl l,ie+
Kardelj expressed the hope that the three powers
would reconsider their decision and accord Yugoslavia adequate funds now to
meet its current minimum necessities and thus avoid weakening its internal
economic and political structure.
Comment: Yugoslavia has requested 86 million
dollars in tripartite assistance to cover its trade deficit for the first six
months of 1952. This figure exceeds last year's request for the corresponding,
period by some 36 million dollars. Yugoslav officials justify this increase on
the grounds of larger defense commitments and higher import prices.
American economic officials in Belgrade es-
timate that unless a grant of approximately 65 million dollars is made early
this year, Yugoslavia will be forced to curtail its import program sharply,
thereby handicapping its defense and economic efforts. Britain, in line with
its generally critical attitude toward Yugoslav economic policy, opposes any
commitment in excess of 45 million dollars.
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