SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON NSA

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95TH CONGRESS l
18t Session I
ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE
SENATE
f REPORT
No. 95-217
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
together with
ADDITIONAI. VIEWS
MAY 18 (legislative day MAY 16), 1977.-Ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1977
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN(FELLIGENCE
(Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.)
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Vice Chairman
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
DLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois
LLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine
ALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina
GARY HART, Colorado
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JAKE GARN, Utah
IARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
JOHN H. CHAFES, Rhode Island
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, F'x Officio Member
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
EARL D. EISENHOWER, Minority Staff Director
AUDREY H. HAIRY, Clerk
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PREFACE
The Senate Select Committee presents to the. Senate this first annual
report of its work. The Committee has been charged with the responsi-
bility to carry out oversight over the intelligence activities of the
United States. While most of the work of the Committee is, of neces-
sity, conducted in secrecy, we believe.that even secret activities must
be as accountable to the public as possible. This public report to the
Senate is intended to meet this requirement.
DANIEL K. INOUYE,
Chairman.
BARRY GOLDWATER,
Vice Chairman.
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CONTENTS
Page
Preface --------------------------------------------------------------
III
1. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------
1
II. Intelligence and the Rights of Americans-------------------------
5
III. The Collection, Production and Quality of Intelligence-------------
11
IV. Investigations -------------------------------------------------
13
V. Covert Action--------------------------------------------------
17
VI. Secrecy, Disclosure and Classification-----------------.-----------
21
VII. Budget Authorization---------------------------------------.----
23
VIII. Charters and Guidelines------------------------------.-----------
27
IX. The Desirability of Establishing a Joint Committee for Intelligence
Versus Separate Oversight Committee for the House and Senate-
37
X. Summary of Committee Activities--------------------------------
39
XI. Additional Views :
Senator Joseph R. Biden-------------------------------------
41
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan----------------------..---------
43
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1. INTRODUCTION
The first duty assigned by the Senate to the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, when it was created on May 19, 1976, was to
develop effective processes of oversight and accountability for the
intelligence activities of the United States. The most difficult task
facing the committee was to balance the. right of the public and the
Senate to be informed of the government's activities with the counter-
vailing necessity to protect valid national secrets. The Constitution's
design of interaction among the three separate branches of govern-
ment is based on the conviction that the responsibilities for all that
government does, even secret activities, must be shared by the three
branches of government in their appropriate ways. This is the best
protection that the public has that secret activities will not erode our
freedoms.
Intelligence activities, until the past, few years, were the sole domain
of the executive branch. The legislative and judicial branches
played little role in assuring that intelligence activities were function-
ing under the Constitution and the laws. The, abuses of intelligence
agencies of the United States, subject of great concern in recent years,
were in part caused by the failure of the legislative branch to carry
out its constitutional' responsibilities. In light of recent history,
this failure to oversee vital activities, utilizing instruments of con-
siderable power, weakened confidence in our constitutional system.
S. Res. 400 assigned t.o. the Select Committee on Intelligence general
duties in order to make legislative oversight of the intelligence agen-
cies of the United States an effective reality. Those. main duties are :
(1) To oversee and make continuing studies of the intelli-
gence activities and programs of the U.S. Government, and to
submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation and
report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and
programs;
(2) To make every effort to assure that the appropriate de-
partments and agencies of the United States provide informed
and. timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legisla-
tive branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the nation;
(3) To provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intel-
ligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities
are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United
States;
(4) To make a study of all relevant aspects of the effectiveness
of planning, gathering, use, security, and dissemination of
intelligence.
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In addition, S. Res. 400 assigned a number of specific areas for study :
(1) The quality of the analytical capabilities of U.S. foreign
intelligence agencies and means for integrating more closely
anal tical intelligence and policy formulation;
(22) The extent and nature of the authority of the departments
and agencies of the Executive branch to engage in intelligence
activities and the desirability of developing charters for each in-
telligence agency or department; the organization of intelligence
activities in the executive branch to maximize the effectiveness
of the conduct, oversight, and accountability of intelligence activi-
ties; to reduce duplication or overlap; and to improve the morale
of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies; the devel-
opment of a uniform set of definitions for terms to be used in
policies or guidelines which may be adopted by the executive or
legislative branches to govern, clarify, and strengthen the op-
eration of intelligence activities ;
(3) The conduct of covert and clandestine activities and the
procedures by which Congress is informed of such activities;
(4) The desirability of changing any law, Senate rule or pro-
cedure, or any Executive order, rule, or regulation to improve
the protection of intelligence secrets and provide for disclosure of
information for which there is no compelling reason for secrecy ;
(5) The desirability of establishing a joint committee of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on intelligence activities
in lieu of having separate committees in each House of Congress,
or of establishing procedures under which separate committees
on intelligence activities of the two Houses of Congress would
receive joint briefings from the intelligence agencies and coordi-
nate their policies with respect to the safeguarding of sensitive
intelligence information;
(6) The authorization of funds for the intelligence activities
of the Government and whether disclosure of any of the amounts
of such funds is in the public interest.
This first annual report by the committee is an accounting to the
Senate and the public of the performance to date of legislative over-
sight. We have tried in this report to describe fully the processes
developed for effective oversight and accountability. The details of
much that the committee has been involved in remains classified.
While valid national security concerns prevent the committee from
placing these details in the public record, the full record is avail-
able to the Senate in accordance with the provisions of S. Res. 400.
In the eleven months since the creation of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, the committee has been working to meet the obligations
and responsibilities set forth in S. Res. 400. To carry out these re-
sponsibilities, it has created six subcommittees:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
Senator Bayh, Chairman Senator Garn, Vice Chairman
Senator Morgan Senator Case
Senator Moynihan Senator Chafee
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON BUDGET AUTHORIZATION
Senator Hathaway, Chairman Senator Wallop, Vice Chairman
Senator Hart Senator Mathias -
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COLLECTION, PRODUCTION AND QUALITY
LSenator Stevenson, Chairman Senator?Case, Vice Chairman
Senator Hart Senator Lugar
Senator Moynihan Senator Wallop
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
Senator Morgan, Chairman Senator Goldwater
Senator Inouye
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHARTERS AND GUIDELINES
Senator Huddleston, Chairman Senator Mathias, Vice Chairman.--
Senator Bayh Senator Garn
Senator Stevenson Senator Lugar
Senator Biden
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE
Senator Biden, Chairman Senator Pearson, Vice Chairman Senator Hathaway Senator Chafed
Senator Huddleston
The committee has gradually built up a staff to carry out the work
of the committee and the six subcommittees. There are presently 45
staff members, including 23 professionals and 22 support staff. The
staff is composed of men and women of unusually high quality. They
represent a mix of disciplines: history, political science, law, as
well as a number of members with considerable experience in
intelligence.
In addition to having received briefings at the agencies and to hav-
ing worked at the intelligence agencies on committee projects and
investigations, both committee and staff members have traveled within
the United States and abroad to familiarize themselves with field op-
erations and to obtain an awareness of the direction of research and
development efforts and contract performance.
The committee has not yet encountered any serious obstacles to its
work. In general, all of the agencies have been forthcoming in pro-
viding information. There have been some procedural difficulties,
lhowever, in obtaining material related to some areas of intelligence
activity. Examples of this kind of problem are sensitive clandestine
collection activities and the activities of foreign intelligence agents
in the United States. However, in recent weeks the committee has be-
gun to receive the information it needs to deal with activities of these
agencies.
The committee has been developing close relationships with other
Senate and House committees whose work bears on intelligence. On
the staff level, the committee has been working closely with the Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees of both Houses. The need for
cooperation is particularly crucial for the ultimate success of the new
authorization process. There has never before been a specifiic author-
ization bill for intelligence activities. It is obvious that the cooperation
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of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both
Houses, and the creation of a counterpart committee for intelligence
oversight in the House, is required for an annual authorization bill
for intelligence activities to become a reality.
The committee and staff have been at work for the past 11 months
on major problem areas such as counterintelligence and the quality of
the analytic process. They are studying the major forms of intelligence
collection which involve sophisticated technology, so that the commit-
tee can authoritatively support necessary improvements and research'
and development efforts and make judgments about expensive and
potentially redundant systems. The committee is now equipped to
carry out its duties to monitor covert action programs. It is now able,
through its highly qualified and experienced budget staff, to do the
necessary analysis and to understand in detail the funding for opera-
tion of all the intelligence agencies.
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II. INTELLIGENCE AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
The Subcommittee on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans
has particular responsibility for carrying out the duty of the commit-
tee under S. Res. 400
"to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence
activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in
conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
The subcommittee has concentrated its attention upon intelligence
activities which may be directed against Americans or which occur
within the United States. In addition to oversight, the committee has
considered legislation regarding such activities. As mandated by Sen-
ate Resolution 400, the subcommittee is participating in the commit-
tee's study of
"the extent and nature of the authority of the departments and
agencies of the executive branch to engage in intelligence activi-
ties and the desirability of developing charters for each intelli-
gence agency or department." [Sec. 13 (a) (2) ]
A. LEGISLATION
1. S. 3197 (94th Congress)
The subcommittee held hearings on S. 3197, the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1976, on June 29, 30 and July 1, 1976. The
hearings included testimony from the Attorney General, Members of
Congress, representatives of the academic community and various in-
terest groups, and, in executive session, representatives of the intel-
ligence community.
The subcommittee adopted a number of amendments to the version
of S. 3197 which had been reported by the Judiciary Committee. These
amendments were both in response to testimony received in the course
of the subcommittee's hearings and the result of analysis by the sub-
committee itself. A favorable report was ordered on "August 6, 1976.
The subcommittee amendments and some additional amendments were
adopted by the full committee, which on August 10, 1976, ordered
S. 3197, as amended, favorably reported. On August 24, 1976, the re-
port prepared by the committee staff was filed and ordered printed.
The Judiciary Committee accepted the amendments adopted by the
Select Committee on Intelligence, but the bill did not reach the Sen-
ate floor during the 94th Congress. S. 3197 was supported by President
Ford and Attorney General Edward II. Levi. Working closely with
the committee, Attorney General Levi contributed significantly to the
development of legislation in this area.
As originally introduced, S. 3197 would have required a prior judi-
cial warrant for all electronic surveillance within the United States
conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. As amended by the com-
mittee, the bill strengthened the requirement that in each case the
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judge was to make a finding of probable cause that the target of the
surveillance is a foreign agent before the surveillance could be insti-
tuted or continued beyond ninety days. In the case of a target who is
a permanent resident, alien or citizen of the United States, the judge
was required to find probable cause that the person is engaged in
activities which involve or will involve violation of criminal statutes
or engage in the transmission of information to a foreign intelligence
service under circumstances which would harm the security of the
United States. The bill as amended also required the executive branch
to certify that each surveillance is necessary to obtain specific foreign
intelligence information that such information cannot feasibly be ob-
tained by normal investigative techniques.
The committee also amended S. 3197 to provide further safeguards
to protect the rights of Americans. "Minimization procedures' were
strengthened to assure that information which is not foreign intelli-
gence information not be maintained in a: "dossier," and restrictions
were placed on the use and disclosure of any information retained in
files. The judge was required to find that these minimization proce-
dures are reasonable in each case.
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act o f 1977
S. 3197 included a provision urged by the executive branch, stating
that the act did not affect the exercise of any constitutional power
the President may have, subject to determination by the courts, to
acquire foreign intelligence information by means of other forms of
surveillance or where the circumstances are so unprecedented and
potentially harmful to the Nation that they could not be reasonably
said to have been within the contemplation of Congress in enacting
this bill. The provision was a point of controversy, opposed by many
groups as either irrelevant or unconstitutional. Forms of surveillance
not covered by S. 3197 were electronic surveillance targeted against
Americans abroad, the signals intelligence activities of the United
States, physical searches and seizures, and mail opening.
Subsequently the committee gave further detailed study to S. 3197
with the aim of extending the scope of the bill, refining certain defini-
tions, and removing the need for any reference to the question of in-
herent Presidential power. Extensive consultations took place with the
Department of Justice and Attorney General Griffin Bell. Following
these consultations, the administration submitted a new draft bill for
study by the committee on April 28, 1977.
The administration draft incorporated three significant improve-
ments from S. 3197 which had been proposed in these discussions. The
most important change is the broadening of the coverage of the bill,
and the judicial warrant protection, to intentional targeting of the
international communications of U.S. persons who are in the United
States. The effect would be to prevent, by law, such past abuses as the
National Security Agency's use of a "watch list" to.target the inter-
national communications of Americans who were engaged in lawful
protest activities posing no serious threat to national security.
Another major improvement is judicial review of the Executive "cer-
tification" that surveillance of a U.S. person is necessary for specific
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foreign intelligence purposes and that normal techniques are inade-
quate. In addition, the new bill eliminates the "inherent Executive
power" concept by stating that the bill is the "exclusive means" by
which electronic surveillance, as defined, may be conducted.
The original administration draft raised certain other issues. How-
ever, after further consultations, many of these issues were resolved.
Other questions about the new bill will be taken up by the committee
in the course of its hearings.
The most important omission in both S. 3197 and the now bill is
protection for the rights of Americans who are outside the United
States. Until there is legislation regulating surveillance of Americans
abroad, the executive branch can still attempt to claim "inherent Pres-
idential power" to authorize such surveillance. The committee intends
to develop measures, in close consultation with the executive branch,
to close this last gap in the legal protections against unjustified sur-
veillance of Americans.
The committee also intends to add to the bill more detailed report-
ing requirements for the purpose of ensuring effective congressional
oversight. In the interim before such requirements may be established
by law, the committee expects the affected agencies to continue to co-
operate with it in developing effective reporting procedures as required
by the provisions of Senate Resolution 400.
The electronic surveillance bill is designed and is being drafted to
fit into the committee's overall intelligence charter legislation.
3. Intelligence Charter Legislation
The subcommittee is currently engaged in drafting those aspects
of intelligence charter legislation which will set standards for tech-
niques which are directed at Americans or used within the United
States. A bill is intended for introduction in this session. The sub-
committee will then, in conjunction with the Subcommittee on Charters
and Guidelines, conduct a series of hearings on such legislation. Among
the issues to be addressed are: the proper scope and purpose of an-
thorized foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and domestic se-
curity activities within the United States; the jurisdiction of intelli-
gence agencies within the United States, including the CIA, the FBI
and military agencies ; standards and procedures for the use of investi-
gative techniques affecting the rights of Americans; and standards and
procedures for the use of Americans for clandestine intelligence
purposes.
On the basis of its study of these issues thus far, the subcommittee
has found that there are serious weaknesses in the current framework
of authority for intelligence activities directed against Americans and
conducted within the United States. Existing statutes are incomplete
or fail to provide sufficient legal safeguards against improper con-
duct. Executive Order 11905, issued in 1976 by President Ford to regu-
late U.S. foreign intelligence activities was a significant step forward
but still has major gaps and inconsistencies. The committee is of the
view that it is not possible to resolve these problems solely by Execu-
tive regulation, rather it sees a need for the enactment of clear legisla-
tive authorization with appropriate standards and procedures to insure
that the rights of Americans are not directly or indirectly impaired.
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The main problems in developing such legislation involve the proper
mix between statutory provisions and executive branch regulations.
The need for secrecy and for administrative discretion must be
weighed against the desire for clear legal standards which the Ameri-
can people can rely upon to protect their rights. These difficulties are
particularly apparent with respect to foreign counterintelligence
operations designed to protect the security of the United States against
hostile foreign intelligence services and their agents (who may be
Americans) ; the collection of foreign economic intelligence, where
there are connections between American and foreign economic activi-
ties; and the enlistment of the voluntary services of Americans in
clandestine foreign intelligence activities of the United States where
such activities may erode open institutions of our society.
1. Improper Intelligence Activities Affecting the Rights of Americams
S. Res. 400 expresses
"the sense of the Senate that each department and agency of the
United States should report immediately upon discovery to the
select committee any and all intelligence activities which consti-
tute violations of the constitutional rights of any person, viola-
tions of law, or violations of Executive orders, Presidential direc-
tives, or departmental or agency rules or regulations; each depart-
ment and agency should further report to such committee what
actions have been taken or are expected to be taken by the depart-
ments or agencies with respect to such violations." [Sec. 11(c) ]
The committee has advised the Attorney General that it expects
to be so notified, particularly where such violations affect the rights of
Americans.
During the summer of 1976 the Committee established contact
with the Department of Justice regarding the investigation of alleged
illegal break-ins and related activities by agents of the FBI. In Sep-
tember 1976, the committee received testimony from the Assistant
Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division, Stanley Pottinger
and the Counsel for Professional Responsibility, Michael E. Shaheen.
Among the matters discussed with the Justice Department were
alternative procedures for reporting the results of its investigation
where such results might not be disclosed in the course of a criminal
trial. These matters have since been raised with Attorney General Bell.
The committee staff prepared an analysis of the report of the De-
partment of Justice on its investigation and prosecutorial decisions
regarding CIA mail opening activities, which were issued by Attorney
General Levi in January 1977. Although the Justice Department
chose not to prosecute, its report included a strong warning that any
similar activities in the future would result in criminal prosecution.
The report's emphasis on the need for explicit delegations of Presi-
dential authority raised questions about the adequacy of Executive
Order 11905 as a delegation of Presidential authority for certain.
foreign intelligence techniques.
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2. Study of Current Intelligence Activities Affecting the flights o f
Americans
S. Res. 400 expresses
"the sense of the Senate that the head of each department and
agency of the United States should keep the select committee
fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence activi-
ties, including any significant_ anticipated activities, which are
the responsibility of or engaged in by such department or agency."
[Sec. 11(a) ]
The subcommittee is continuing its study of intelligence activities as
they affect the rights of Americans.
In September 1976, the full committee heard testimony at a public
hearing from FBI Director Clarence At. Kelley regarding his reorga-
nization of domestic security functions. In addition to this public
hearing, the staff received briefings from FBI officials regarding the
reorganization and examined materials relating to FBI policies for
domestic security investigations.
Thereafter the subcommittee continued its study of intelligence
activities as they affect. the rights of Americans. The subcommittee
received a series of briefings from representatives of the FBI, the
CIA, DIA, and NSA. As part of this study, the staff has analyzed
the guidelines issued by the Attorney General for certain foreign
intelligence collection and counterintelligence investigations.
A proposal has been made to the Attorney General for regular
oversight reporting procedures. and agreement has been reached on
the reporting of policy and guidelines material. Further consultation
is taking place with the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence on the reporting of case-related materials.
With respect to current executive branch procedures for the super-
vision of intelligence activities affecting the rights of Americans, the
subcommittee has conducted interviews with members of the Attor-
ney General's FBI Investigation Review Unit and the Justice
Department's Office of Professional Responsibility. A study has been
made of the annual report of this office and the report, of its task force
inquiry regarding the FBI and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The
recommendations contained in these reports have received careful
attention.
The subcommittee is also studying current CIA foreign intelligence
activities within the United States. While such activities are not
directed against Americans, they may have indirect effects upon the
rights of Americans. In this area the subcommittee has received
briefings, conducted interviews, and compiled Executive branch mate-
rials regarding policies and procedures. These oversight activities
contribute to the ability of the subcommittee to develop-
evelop appropriate
legislative charter provisions and to recommend more effective legal
safeguards.
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III. THE COLLECTION, PRODUCTION AND QUALITY
OF INTELLIGENCE
The Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality of Intel-
ligence is the first congressional effort to both oversee and evaluate
the process of intelligence production and analysis-the primary mis-
sion of the U.S. intelligence community. Increasingly, the Congress
has begun to utilize substantive analysis produced by the intelligence
agencies in formulating its position on policy issues, ranging from
agriculture to energy to foreign economics. The mandate of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, contained in Senate Resolution 400, directly
reflects this expanded congressional role. The Intelligence Committee
has a key role in insuring that Congress is provided with the intelli-
gence it requires, in insuring that the intelligence community produces
the best quality analysis, and that the American intelligence effort is
being managed wisely and effectively.
The work of the Subcommittee on Collection, Production and
Quality has focused on the preparation of a series of case studies.
These studies are intended to provide the Congress, the intelligence
community, and the public with an understanding of the analytic
process and to illuminate the problems related to intelligence
production.
The following case studies which represent a variety of issues have
been chosen from a series of studies :
(1) The Quality and Utility of Intelligence. This study, based
in large measure on the individual case studies mentioned below,
draws certain principal conclusions concerning the present and
probable future capabilities of U.S. intelligence to produce
accurate, timely, relevant, and objective intelligence in support
of policyma.king; and to be actually and actively used by policy-
makers, rather than virtually ignored as has sometimes been the
case. This study will include specific committee recommendations
for improving the quality of intelligence.
(2) The "A Team-B Team" Exercise. This study will evaluate
the recent competitive exercise between the intelligence com-
munity experts and an outside group of experts on Soviet
strategic weapons that was commissioned by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The subcommittee's classi-
fied report will examine the origins of the exercise, its contribu-
tion to the estimative process, and its significance for future
estimates.
(3) Soviet Strategic Weapons Developments. This study will be
a broad examination of Soviet strategic weapons estimates. It will
evaluate the estimates' performance regarding numbers of strate-
gic weapons, qualitative weapons developments, and Soviet stra-
tegic intentions. The study will also examine the extent to which
these estimates have contributed to policy formulation and the
ways in which the estimative process might be improved.
(11)
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(4) Oil and the Arab Price Hikes, 1973-1974. This case study
will evaluate the intelligence community's capabilities in dealing
with a major political and economic policy issue. The study will
address three specific questions : How well did the intelligence
community alert policymakers to the leading role Saudi Arabia
assumed in 1973 in using oil as a political weapon against the
United States? How well, similarly, did intelligence perform in
gauging the ability of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) cartel to cut production and sustain oil prices
at unprecedented high levels? How well has the intelligence com-
munity performed in identifying the disruptive effects of the oil
price increases on the world economy?
(5) New "Strategic Problems" for the Future. This case study
is a broad examination of present intelligence capabilities in the
areas of food, natural resources, and population pressures. These
are subjects which are not traditional national security issues but
which will require considerable attention from senior policy-
makers in the immediate future.
(6) Portugal, 1973-1975. This case study examines the intel-
ligence community's effort in anticipating rapid political change
and in analyzing its consequences for U.S. policy. The study will
compare the community's coverage of Portugal before and after
the coup d'etat of April 1974. It will assess the sources of infor-
mation which contributed to finished intelligence analysis on the
subject, the quality of that analysis, and the interaction between
intelligence producers and consumers.
(7) China. This case study is a broad examination of the in-
telligence record with respect to China. It emphasizes the process
of anticipating events in China and the principal weaknesses and
strengths in the intelligence record. The study includes examples
of policymakers' disregard of accurate intelligence and recom-
mendations for improving the interaction between intelligence
users and producers.
In carrying out this work, committee staff members have reviewed
extensive written materials and have conducted over 250 interviews
with members of the intelligence community and with senior policy-
makers in the White House, the National Security Council and the
Departments of State and Defense.
It is clear that in the coming months the question of the ability of
the United States to verify arms control agreements such as those
contemplated in the SALT negotiations will be of central concern to
the Senate. The Select Committee on Intelligence is in a unique posi-
tion to address the issue of the capabilities of our national intelligence
system, to verify possible agreements. The committee is engaged in an
ongoing study of the capabilities of our national means of verification,
which will encompass collection and analytic capabilities, and the
mechanism by which intelligence an verification is written and
disseminated.
It is also now clear that, one of the most important questions :Facing
the United States is the quality of U.S. intelligence on world energy
supply, production and use. In this connection, the committee is un-
dertaking a study of the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence com-
munity to collect, analyze and produce intelligence on these vital
aspects of national ener o
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IV. INVESTIGATIONS
In the past year, the committee has received close to one hundred
allegations of improprieties by intelligence agencies. It has followed
up on on all of these allegations, In addition to its own investigative
efforts, the committee has required the intelligence community to sub-
mit formal reports concerning the charges which have been made. The
intensity of the committee's efforts has varied from case to case depend-
ing, of course, upon the validity, gravity and scope of the situation
alleged.
The permanent Intelligence Oversight Committee was created in
large measure as the result of intelligence abuses which were dis-
covered and revealed by its predecessor committee. At the conclusion
of its work (in April of 1976), that committee issued a series of re-
ports about, its findings from investigations into improper intelligence
activities which had occurred from the end of World War II to 1976.
It was that committee's view that abuses occurred partially because
of a lack of accountability and poor executive control over the Intel-
Iigence community, and partially because of a failure of congressional
oversight..
The necessary focus on the widespread abuses of the intelligence
agencies should not, diminish the debt that this country owes to the
vast majority of men and women who have served their country with
dedication and complete integrity. It was clear, however, that a vigor-
ous new system of oversight was required. One of tho chief recom-
mendations of the predecessor committee was to create a permanent
oversight committee in order to restore confidence in the necessary
and proper activities of intelligence.
One year later, it is this committee's judgment that the intelligence
agencies are now functioning under the control of the President, the
Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of the various intel-
ligence entities, and that they are now fully and properly accountable
to the Congress. We are confident that under the procedures for over-
sight that have been developed over the past year, and with the enact.
.went of effective legislative charters which set forth clear and unam-
biguous stanch rds for what the intelligence agencies may and may not
be permitted to do, we will not see a repetition of the widespread
abuses of the past.
The committee recognizes that mistakes of judgment, misguided
zeal, and isolated instances of overreach of power will from time to
time occur, and that investigations of alleged or actual abuse will be
a continuing requirement.
Over the past year committee practice has established general
guidelines to govern its investigations. We believe that these guidelines
will assist the committee in making the choices which must continually
be made to investigate or not to investigate particular allegations. The.
committee, no less than the agencies we oversee, must be publicly
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accountable and such decisions must of course be based upon standards
which reflect our Nation's sense of law, moral Principle, and common
sense. The committee's basic guidelines are as follows :
(1) In allocating its limited time and investigative resources,
the committee will give preference to matters which are alleged
to have occurred since the establishment of this committee or to
those matters which, although alleged to have occurred prior to
the establishment of the committee, have some implications for
the present-day conduct of intelligence activities.
(2) The committee will endeavor not to duplicate any investi-
gation already being conducted by the Department of Justice. The
committee will, however, take appropriate steps to oversee the
adequacy and completeness of the Justice Department's investi-
gation. The committee may institute its own investigation if the
Justice Department's investigation is manifestly inadequate
or if the committee feels that the policy implications of the alle-
gations are significantly broader than the scope of the Justice
Department's investigation.
(3) Except in extraordinary circumstances, the agency which
is the subject of an allegation will always immediately be asked
to submit a formal detailed report to the committee, in writing,
concerning the_ situation alleged. Each report will be reviewed by
the committee to determine whether its report is reasonably com-
plete and responsive. If not, an additional report will be sought,
relevant documentation requested, and/or interviews conducted
of knowledgeable agency personnel. All this will be done as a part
of the committee's own preliminary investigations. If unresolved
issues still remain, a full investigation may be authorized by the
committee.
The guidelines described above were developed from the commit-
tee's experiences of the past year, during which time each allegation
has been handled on a case-by-case basis. As a general rule, the corn-
mibttee has not investigated improprieties alleged to have occurred in
the past. For example, a number of complaints have been received from
persons who have claimed to have been victims of previously revealed
intelligence abuses, such as the FBI's COINTEL program. These mat-
ters have been referred to the Department of Justice for action in ac-
ordance with the Department's stated policy of notifying all COIN-
TELPRO victims. Some allegations have also been received about FBI
"break-ins," said to have occurred in the late 1960's or early 1970's.
'['hose cases were also forwarded to the Department of Justice to be
made a part of the Department's overall ".surreptitious entry"
investigation.
Allegations about military drug experiments in the 1950's have
not been investigated, because experimentation programs were fully
investigated and reported on by the predecessor committee, and indeed
have been admitted by the agencies concerned; because remedial ac-
tions to aggrieved parties are being undertaken; and because this com-
mittee is satisfied, through the present oversight and budgetary review
process, that no such program is being carried out today.
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Similarly, the committee is not independently investigating the
activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency within the United
States, inasmuch as that case is now the subject of inquiry by the De-
partment of Justice and several committees of the House of Repre-
sentatives. The committee is, however, investigating the question of
when, and to what extent, the intelligence agencies of the United States
knew, or should have known, about the KCIA's activities, and whether
our own agencies adequately performed their responsibilities in that
regard. This investigation is still underway. The committee has re-
ceived reports from the agencies concerned, examined relevant docu-
mentation, interviewed witnesses, and asked for additional reports and
materials which bear upon the issues involved. Upon completion of
our inquiry, a committee report will be released.
Numerous allegations have also been received about the activities
of foreign intelligence services of other countries besides South Korea,
such as Chile, Iran, Republic of. China, and the Philippines. With
respect to these matters, the committee has sought detailed reports
from the Attorney General and other witnesses to ascertain: (1) the
truth of the allegations, (2) whether, if true, appropriate prosecutive
or other action is being taken by the United States as a result, and (3)
whether legislative remedies should be proposed to insure that the
United States accords adequate protection to all people in this country
from the activities of foreign intelligence services.
The committee is also seeking to determine whether there has been
any relationship, any quid pro quo, express or implied, between any
alleged activities of such services in this country and the activities of
U.S. intelligence agencies in foreign countries. Several liaison
agreements with foreign governments and foreign counterpart intel-
ligence services have been examined, and the issue has been explored
with intelligence community officials in executive session. The com-
mittee's inquiry into this subject is not yet complete.
In view of the extensive public speculation that the intelligence
service of Chile may have been responsible for the September 21, 1976,
murder of former Chilean official Orlando Letelier, the committee has
closely monitored the investigations which are being conducted by the
FBI and has sought to insure the cooperation of other agencies such
as the CIA. Because those investigations are continuing, the commit-
tee believes that it would be inappropriate to comment on their
progress.
The committee has also continued its examination of the perform-
ance of the intelligence agencies in the investigation of the assassina-
tion of President Kennedy. We are acting upon the recommendations
of the predecessor committee, that the inquiry which was initiated by
that committee be completed. That inquiry is still being pursued.
The Select Committee on Intelligence initiated its investigation of
Central Intelligence Agency activity in Micronesia after December
1976 press reports of alleged intelligence activity caused a local politi-
cal crisis. Micronesian representatives met with Chairman Inouye in
Hawaii in January 1977 and voiced their fears that electronic sur-
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veillance and other techniques had tainted the agreement which had
been reached with the United States. To resolve the many doubts that
were clouding the United States' relationship with Micronesia, and
as a case study of intelligence operations, the committee conducted a
five-month investigation that included extensive testimony, over forty
interviews and review of hundreds of pages of reports and other docu-
ments. The committee's findings were published in its statement, is-
sued recently.
Among the more important recommendations made by the commit-
tee in its statement are :
-More effective guidelines should be established to define those
situations which are appropriate for various clandestine col-
lection techniques.
-Better procedures should be implemented to ensure that infor-
mation collected is of greater use to policymakers and other
consumers. -
-Those who have a role in the collection of the intelligence prod-
uct should not be the ones to conduct or write up user evaluation.
-Sensitive collection proposals should receive wider and more
detailed scrutiny within the executive branch before they are
approved.
-Greater effort should be made to exhaust available and open
sources of information before intelligence operations are
authorized.
-The NSC should develop guidelines to assist policymakers in
judging not only the legality, but also the wisdom and pro-
priety of employing various methods of overt and covert
gathering of information.
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V. COVERT ACTION
Within a few weeks of the establishment of the committee, a pro-
cedure for covert action oversight was implemented. It was developed
in consultation with the agencies of the executive branch, particularly
the CIA. The procedure is based on the authority contained in S. Res.
400, particularly Section 11(a) :
It is the sense of the Senate that the head of each department
and agency of the United States should keep the Select Committee
fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence activi-
ties, including any significant anticipated activities, which are the
responsibility of or engaged in by such department or agency :
Provided, That this does not constitute a condition precedent to
the implementation of any such anticipated intelligence activity.
and the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act :
"Sec. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Activities.--(a) No funds
appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for
operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the
President finds that each such operation is important to the na-
tional security of the United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appro-
priate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.
"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not
apply during military operations initiated by the. United States
under a declaration of war approved by the Congress or an ex-
ercise of powers by the President under the War Powers
Resolution.
Thus far, the executive branch has informed the committee of every
covert action which has required a new Presidential Finding prior to
its implementation.
A. OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE FOR COVERT ACTION OVERSIGHT
1. Notification
When the CIA is informed of a Presidential Finding, the commit-
tee is notified prior to implementation per S. Res. 400. The Select Com-
mittee receives a full report shortly after Presidential approval. CIA
reports on covert action projects have included such information as:
-A summary of the proposal and what it is expected to
accomplish;
-The origin of the proposal : whether CIA, U.S. Ambassador,
host country, etc. ;
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-Policy considerations, citing applicable policy documents;
-Justification for a covert effort and how it will supplement
overt U.S. action;
-Timing and duration of the operation;
-The relationship of the project to decisions of any previous
NSC Committee;
-The risks involved and the possible consequences of disclosure
of the operation;
-A plan of action which appropriate U.S. Government elements
would take in the event of a disclosure; and
-The estimated cost level, the availability of CIA funds and the
need, if any, for new money allocations.
Briefings are given to the committee by CIA, State and any other
relevant agency. Additional documentation, if required, is provided
W relevant agencies or the committee staff. Action by the committee,
any, can include the following :
-Comment to the executive branch;
-Referral of information to other committees, if appropriate;
-Disclosure under provisions of S. Res. 400, Sec. 8; and
-Funding restrictions.
2. Follow-up
Submission by CIA of a termination/evaluation report is en-
couraged by the committee. This can lead to briefings and requests
for additional documentation. Action by the committee, if any, can
include :
-Comment to executive branch; and
-Referral of information to other committees, if appropriate.
3. Semiannual Status Reports on all Covert Action Programs and
Projects
In addition to notification and termination/evaluation reports, the
committee receives, on a semiannual basis, status reports on all cur-
rent covert action projects.
The semiannual status reports can provide a. description of each
project, its purpose and intent, its cost, its proposed duration and the
risks involved. In addition, the status reports include an evaluation of
progress in implementing the project and an assessment of its effec-
tiveness to date. Finally, the status reports indicate the source of
funding for continuing approved covert action programs and -proj-
ects. Briefings by CIA, State and any other relevant agency may be
held, and additional documentation, if required, is obtained from
agencies or the committee staff. Action by the committee, if any, can
include :
-Comment to executive branch ; and
-Referral of information to other Committees, if appropriate.
4. Contingency Reserve Fund Release Notifications
The CIA's Contingency Reserve Fund is an Agency-wide account
that serves as a substitute for supplemental appropriations made to
other agencies. Covert actions not anticipated at the time of budget
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submission are funded through this account. Since 1967, the House
and Senate CIA Appropriations Subcommittees have received notifi-
cation of withdrawals from the Fund within 48 hours of the release.
In 1975, the two Armed Services Subcommittees began receiving the
same notification. The select committee now receives this Contin-
gency Reserve Fund release notification.
5. Continual Consultation Between Agencies and the Coinmvittee Con-
cerning Covert Action Projects and Programs, Including Review
of Project Files, Directives and Regulations
The committee is able to conduct thorough studies of covert action
projects and programs, with complete access to relevant Agency files
and personnel. Members of the committee also receive individual
briefings on matters of interest to them.
6. Annual Authorization Bill Review of Covert Action Projects
In the process of the preparation by the committee for mark-up
and reporting of the first authorization bill for all intelligence activi-
ties of the United States, the committee reviewed all covert action
projects, project-by-project, and has formally voted on every project.
Thus it is clear that the Senate, through its delegated committee,
has been able to review, consider and act on the record in conformity
with Constitutional processes even in so difficult and secret an area
as covert action. If the procedures established during the past year
are continued, there is every reason to believe that whatever covert
action is undertaken by the United States will reflect the national
will as expressed by both the Legislative and executive branches and
not by just the executive branch alone.
Thus far, the committee has been informed of each Presidential
covert action finding prior to implementation. The committee has
been briefed by the CIA on both new and ongoing covert action
projects. The committee is satisfied that it has been able to obtain
the information it has sought on covert action.
B. DISCLOSURE PROCEDURES
Senate Resolution 400 sets forth the means for constitutional ac-
countability and constitutional decisionmaking with regard to secret
activities. The procedures that we have developed under the guidelines
of Senate Resolution 400 can be summarized as follows : When the
executive branch decides that a covert action is required in the national
interest, the President makes such a finding in writing. The Director
of Central Intelligence immediately informs the Senate Intelligence
Committee prior to implementation. The committee then considers the
President's intended action.
The committee can remain silent and do nothing, which in itself
is an action, or it can approve or disapprove. If it disapproves, sev-
eral courses of action are open to the committee, as noted earlier; one
is to move toward public disclosure. In that event, assuming that the
executive branch requests that the information be kept secret, the
committee is required to convey to the President in confidence its
desire to disclose the information. If the President refuses to take
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the advice of the committee and gives the committee written notice
that he objects to the disclosure of such information, the committee
may then take the issue to a closed session of the Senate. The decision
to preserve secrecy or to make a public disclosure is by a vote of the
full body.
C. REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE PROCEDURES
The committee has had the opportunity to review the Executive's
approval procedures for covert action. It is clear that these guidelines
are tighter today than ever before. The NSC Special Coordinating
Committee meets in regular formal sessions; at times in the past,
some covert action projects were approved over the phone. The Secre-
taries of State and Defense now sit on the committee; in the past,
their designated representatives attended. The Attorney General and
the Director of OMB are observers at NSC meetings. The Attorney
General's presence at these meetings has been particularly important
and effective,
There have been other improvements in the review of clandestine
activities by the Executive. For example, certain sensitive intelligence
collection activities are now reviewed by the NSC. In the past, this
was not done. The full NSC now conducts, twice a year, a review of
the "continued appropriateness of ongoing covert operations." Never
before has the full NSC done this.
The review and approval procedures of the Executive are, in the
view of the committee, sound. Increased internal review and thorough
congressional oversight have placed major covert action projects
under constitutionally appropriate control.
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VI. SECRECY, DISCLOSURE AND CLASSIFICATION
In early February, the select committee created a Subcommittee
on Secrecy, Disclosure and Classification. The charge of the sub-
committee is to undertake a study of present secrecy laws and regu-
lations, with a special focus on the espionage statutes and the classifi-
cation rules of the executive branch. It has been asked to develop
recommendations for the committee to consider what new legislation
or executive action, if any, is necessary to strike a more workable
balance between necessary secrecy and the right of the people to be
informed of the activities of governmental agencies.
It is the view of the committee that the questions of what con-
stitutes a valid national secret and to what extent new laws are
necessary to govern the limits of secrecy, disclosure, and classification
are among the most difficult and fundamental issues facing the
committee and the Congress. They are threshold questions for public
debate over congressional oversight and control of secret operations
of the intelligence community. The committee will seek to determine
the public consensus on what can and should be kept secret in the
name of national security.
When the last Congress enacted Senate Resolution 400, it took the
initial steps towards establishing the icongressional branch's first
formal declassification system. It"recognized that oversight protection
of secrets and declassification of information were inextricably related.
The experience of the Watergate Committee, the Pentagon Papers
case, the Marks-Marchetti case, and recent press disclosures create a
compelling record for congressional study of the present security
classifications, executive orders, and criminal statutes. Existing laws
are inadequate, and serve neither the national security nor the people's
right to know. The ambiguities of the law frequently force congres-
sional committees and executive branch officials to act in doubt on
matters relating to national security. In the past, both Congress and
the press have been denied information and accused of irresponsible
"leaks" if they disclose what they learn, and accused of "cover-ups" if
they fail to do so. Clearly, this is a dangerous situation that requires
remedy.
The committee's purpose is to go beyond the debate on "leaks"
or "cover-ups." The subcommittee will begin hearings in the early
summer on the present statutes and proposed remedies. Through this
hearing process and its own analysis, the subcommittee will examine
the nature and substance of the information the intelligence commu-
nity and its critics believe should or should not be withheld from the
public. The committee will make its own assessment of the benefits
or damage, if any, that the disclosure of such information might have
upon the national security. It will also conduct an in-depth study of
the classification system, examining various departmental procedures
in use in the executive branch. To the extent feasible, the subcom-
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mittee will conduct its inquiry in public. At the Conclusion of the
sessions, the subcommittee will make recommendations to the full
committee for revisioin of the relevant statutes and regulations based
on that record.
Congress has not undertaken such an effort since 1917, when it
wrote the existing espionage laws. Those statutes were written in the
heightened political atmosphere of World War I, while the bulk of
current executive branch orders and regulations were conceived in
the post-World War II cold war era.
The committee begins with the premise that there are legitimate
national secrets deserving of protection. The goal of the committee is
to frame statutes and to encourage the development of executive
branch regulations that define with precision what is and what is not
a legitimate national secret. No set of statutes should permit the use
of ambiguous language to stifle freedom of speech or inhibit dissent
within the executive branch, as many contend is the case with present
law. Nor should such statutes permit the disclosure of the names of
clandestine agents, as intelligence community officials claim is the
case with the present espionage statute. Nor would such laws permit
the excessive secrecy which now exists within the executive branch
and which jeopardizes both national security and the right of the
people to know. As Justice Potter Stewart pointed out in his opinion
in the Pentagon Papers case, "When everything is secret, nothing is
secret."
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VII. BUDGET AUTHORIZATION
One of the key powers provided by Senate Resolution 400 for effec-
tive committee oversight of U.S. intelligence activities is annual budg-
et authorization. The authority to review, evaluate, and set limits for
the annual budgets of the intelligence agencies and to monitor agency
expenditures during the year is perhaps the greatest power the legisla-
ture has been given by the Constitution. For the first time in the his-
tory of the Congress, legislation specifically authorizing appropria-
tions for all aspects of intelligence, incluuding a project-by-project
review of covert action has been prepared.
A. SCOPE of SUBCOMMITTEE ACTIVITY
In order to gain an overall perspective, the Budget Subcommittee
reviewed in-depth the full range of U.S. intelligence activities, includ-
ing not only what is called by the executive branch as national
foreign intelligence, but also other intelligence areas importantly re-
lated to national foreign intelligence. The subcommittee reviewed the
annual budgets of the separate intelligence agencies, as well as their
long lead-time programs. The review of future programs was neces-
sary because considerable portions of intelligence are technology ori-
ented and major systems developments involve multiple-year
investments.
Beginning in June 1976, the full committee held a series of formal
meetings with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense, and other senior intelligence community prin-
cipals. These included detailed background briefings on all major
intelligence programs and activities. The Budget Subcommittee and
its staff also undertook a series of follow-up briefings and interviews
to gain an understanding of the substantive nature, capabilities and
interrelationships among the various intelligence programs. Several
Members and staff made field inspection trips, both in the United
States and abroad, to aquire first-hand knowledge of intelligence op-
erations. Concurrently, briefing papers were prepared addressing the
broad structure of the intelligence agencies, their budgets, and their
principal future programs.
The subcommittee reviewed a number of the executive branch's
legislative proposals and new initiatives proposed for funding during
fiscal year 1977. For example, amendments to the CIA Retirement
Act of 1964 were considered to improve the administration and finan-
cial strength of the fund. These amendments were favorably con-
sidered by the full Senate on September 30, 1976, and incorporated
into law on October 1 (Public Law 94-448).
During February-April 1977, the subcommittee conducted review
and analysis of the intelligence community's fiscal year 1978 budget
request. The subcommittee held more than forty hours of hearings,
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involving more than one thousand pages of testimony on the budgets
of the agencies. Because of the highly sensitive nature of intelligence
operations, these hearings, justification material, and questions must
remain classified.
B. SUBCOMMITTEE APPROACH TO BUDGET REVIEW
While the budget for intelligence activities is small compared to
the overall Federal budget, and indeed compared to the budgets of
some Departments, it is unusually complex and difficult to evaluate.
It is difficult first, because the scope of intelligence collection and
analysis extends from the more routine and easily understood func-
tions of maintaining a research library to advanced scientific research
in certain fields of knowledge in which the intelligence agencies are
unmatched in their capabilities. Attempting to weigh and measure
the comparative value of such diverse activities poses a unique chal-
lenge in analyzing the scope and direction of intelligence.
Second, because of the necessary security which surrounds intelli-
gence, available knowledge from outside the executive branch, which
could provide additional objective insights into intelligence opera-
tions is very limited. The subcommittee, therefore, could not draw
upon a large pool of outside experts.
Third, relating particular intelligence programs or projects to their
impact on decisionmaking is difficult, particularly since major pro-
grams often involve substantial commitments of funds over many
years before benefits will result.
The subcommittee, focused its efforts in this first year on obtaining
a broad perspective. To do this, it adopted a four-fold approach.
(1) The subcommittee sought to question in detail the key
managers in the intelligence community. The committee is of the
view that the effectiveness of the agencies is highly dependent
upon the knowledge and managerial competence of these
individuals.
(2) The subcommittee examined in detail the process used by
the .executive branch to develop agency budgets. In particular,
the subcommittee was interested in the degree to which compe-
tition for resources among programs led to real tradeoffs between
different techniques to meet intelligence needs.
(3) The subcommittee identified and examined specific proj-
ects whose funding or management required further question. The
areas of detailed attention ranged a full spectrum from the
processing and analysis of data through the use of highly sophis-
ticated collection techniques.
(4) The subcommittee divided its efforts between an evalua-
tion of this year's budget and a broader responsibility to examine
areas requiring support for the long-range requirements in our
national intelligence.
C. PUBLIC DIsCLOsURE OF AUTHORIZATION FIG}UREs
Pursuant to Section 13 (a) (8) of Senate Resolution 400, which reads :
The select committee shall make a study with respect to the
following matters, taking into consideration with respect to each
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such matter, all relevant aspects of the effectiveness of planning,
gathering, use, security, and dissemination of intelligence :
The authorization of funds for the intelligence activities of the
Government and whether disclosure of any of the a-mounts of
such funds is in the public interest; .. .
the committee held 2 days of hearings on April 27 and 28, 1977, on
the question of public disclosure of authorization figures for the intel-
ligence activities of the United States. The following witnesses testi-
fied: Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner; former DCIs
William Colby and Richard Helms; Senator William Proxmire; Con-
gressman Michael Harrington; Prof. Gerhard Casper, University of
Chicago; Prof. Ralph Spritzer, University of Pennsylvania; Prof.
Thomas Emerson, Yale University ; Morton Halperin, Center for Na-
tional Security Studies; John Shattuck, American Civil Liberties
Union; Rabin Schwartzman, Attorney at Law; Ray Cline, Center for
Strategic Studies; David A. Phillips and John Warner, Association
of Former Intelligence Officers; and General Daniel O. Graham, for-
mer Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The committee's hearings on budget disclosure focused on disclosure
of the aggregate amount authorized for the intelligence activities of
the United States.
D. ACCESS BY TIIE SENATE TO CLASSIFIED BUDGET AUTHORIZATION
REPORT
The committee met on May 12, 1977 and voted to notif every Mem-
ber of the Senate about access to the classified Budget Authorization
Report. It is the view of the committee that the provisions of Senate
Resolution 400 place an obligation upon the committee to inform Mem-
bers of the Senate of the information required to fulfill their duties.
Because the authorization bill for intelligence activities is of necessity
based upon classified information and its details must remain classified,
the committee was of the opinion that any Member who wishes to re-
view the details of the classified report may do so under the provisions
of Senate, Resolution 400.
Accordingly, the committee has made available to any Member of
the Senate its classified report on the annual authorization for intelli-
gence activities in committee offices, G-308 Dirksen Office Building.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 Members are required
to maintain confidentiality of its contents. The committee decided upon
this procedure as a proper balance between the need of the Senate to
know what it is voting for as an authorization for intelligence activi-
ties and the need to keep the details in confidence.
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The need for new statutory charters for the intelligence activities of
the United States has been evident for several years. The CIA charter,
contained in part in the National Security Act of 1947, has been
described by several of its authors as outmoded and in need of recast-
ing. The National Security Agency has no statutory basis for its world-
wide activities. Neither the FBI's counterintelligence mission nor the
goals of the Defense Intelligence Agency are set forth in statute.
Since the committee was created, the Subcommittee. on Charters and
Guidelines has been drafting statutory charters setting forth missions,
guidelines, procedures and prohibitions for each of the intelligence
agencies. Working closely with the executive branch and with former
senior officials of the intelligence agencies and the Departments of
State, Defense, and Justice, as well as with noted legal scholars, the
committee is drafting an "umbrella" charter setting out the structure
for, and the authorities of each of the entities of the national intelli-
gence community; the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, the counterintelligence
division of the FBI, and the other departments and agencies that
provide intelligence to our national policymakers.
In preparation for drafting, the members of the committee and the
staff have spent considerable time at each of the agencies of the intelli-
gence community in order to understand the nature of their activities,
their contribution to national intelligence requirements, and the way
in which their activities may affect the rights of Americans. Members
of the committee and staff have also traveled abroad to observe the
operations of these agencies.
The basic assumption of the committee's charter work is that intel-
ligence activities are necessary for the security and well-being of the
country. Clear statutory guidelines are needed, however, to confer
legitimacy on them, and to assure their accountability and conform-
ance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. To pro-
vide a legitimate base for the intelligence activities of the U.S. legisla-
tion must explicitly provide, unlike the National Security Act of 1947
with its ambigious provisions, for the collection of intelligence and
covert action under strict guidelines and review procedures.
In the course of the committee's inquiry and during the committee's
review of at least eight major studies of the intelligence community,
it has also become clear that the organization of the national intelli-
gence community requires revision. Statutory charters could do much
to rectify the organizational problems that have not been resolved be-
cause of bureaucratic battles within the executive branch.
The committee's studies have included a study of the authority of
the present Director of Central Intelligence. The committee is examin-
ing his central role in national intelligence activities and analyzing
what additional powers and authorities he requires to insure that na-
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tional policymakers can receive the best possible information with a
minimum of waste and duplication while centralization of authority
had been examined. The committee's studies have also considered the
need to assure that strong independent competing centers of analysis
exist within the intelligence departments and agencies so that the best
possible analysis will be provided to our national leaders.
The need to strengthen the Director's authority cannot be separated
from the accompanying need to increase accountability within the
executive branch. Those in charge of intelligence activities should be
accountable to the President, the Congress and the public. They
should be responsible for insuring that the various intelligence activi-
ties serve the national interest, do not undermine openly stated foreign
policy or defense objectives, and are in conformity with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States. In particular, the role of the head
of national intelligence and the role of the Attorney General in the
protection of the rights of Americans must be clear. Legislative
charters must also set our procedures for oversight within both the
legislative and executive branches.
Two elements of the committee's overall charter effort are well
advanced: one title of the omnibus charter, which will outline the
authority and responsibility of the leadership of the intelligence com-
munity and another title, which details provisions to protect the rights
of Americans. Entity charters for the provisions
NSA and other agencies
are also being drafted.
Through all its studies-of centralized authority, increased account-
ability, protection of the rights of Americans, definition of what the
intelligence community can and cannot do-the committee seeks to
draft charters which will insure that intelligence activities are prop-
erly and effectively directed, regulated, coordinated, and administered
and that they do not infringe upon, directly or indirectly, rights pro-
tected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
A. SrHUCTr iv OF A NATIONAI, INTELLTOENcF. ACT
1. The Director
The committee is actively considering focusing responsibility for
intelligence activities on a Director for national intelligence. The
Director would operate under the direction and control of the Na-
tional Security Council.
The Director's authority would be greatest with respect to the na-
tional intelligence activities of the United States. These are the activi-
ties which produce information and analysis relating to the national
defense, the national security, or foreign policy of the United States
which is used primarily by policymakers involved in the formulation
and direction of national policy. These include the activities of the
CIA, the NSA, the DIA, and the special. reconnaissance offices. The
Director would also be responsible, due to their potential impact on
our country, for sensitive clandestine collection and covert action.
The Director's responsibilities would be detailed in any legislation
in order to avoid the ambiguity of the National Security Act of 1947
and more recent Executive orders. He would be given a clear right
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and a duty to review all ongoing and proposed intelligence activi-
ties including military intelligence activities to insure that they are
properly and effectively directed, regulated, coordinated and adminis-
tered, that they are providing the necessary information and analyses
to the executive and legislative branches, and that they safeguard
constitutional and legal rights. This would assure an effective over-
view of all the intelligence activities of the United States.
Among responsibilities which lie could be given are :
-Serving as the President's and the Congress' chief intelligence
officer;
-Controlling the annual budgets for national intelligence activi-
ties thereby increasing his role in resource allocation, replac-
ing the committee-based system of E.O. 11905;
-Producing intelligence estimates for the President and the Con-
gress, making sure, however, that representative views and
disagreements are considered and indicated. In order to have
"competing centers of analysis," any entity of the intelligence
community would be given authority to produce its own anal-
yses of national .intelligence but these would have to be sup-
plied to the, Director;
-stablishing and implementing review procedures for clandes-
tine intelligence activities based on their potential impact on
the national security, national defense, or foreign relations of
the United States;
-Coordinating all clandestine collection of intelligence by human
sources;
-Maintaining relations between U.S. intelligence agencies and
foreign intelligence or security services of foreign governments,
and providing any agreements to the appropriate committees
of Congress;
-Developing security standards for the management and luan-
dling of information relating to intelligence activities.
While the Director's principal responsibility would be to insure that
the national policymakers receive the best possible intelligence he could
also be charged with providing relevant intelligence to the depart-
ments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The departments and
agencies would be responsible for furnishing such national intelligence
as they obtain to the Director.
If the Director of national intelligence were given principal re-
sponsibility for the intelligence community he naturally would be
responsible for reporting violations of law or Executive orders to the
Attorney General and alerting the Congress of such notifications. In
addition, to facilitate executive branch and legislative oversight he
could be held responsible for maintaining a fall and complete record
of intelligence activities and their legal authorities. This would help
to avoid difficulties in obtaining the agencies' "secret charters" or in
finding the "paper trail" of questionable decisions.
2. Funding of Intelligence Activities
In cooperation with the Subcommittee on Budget, Authorization, the
Charters and Guidelines Subcommittee has been studying present
funding practices. All funds for intelligence activities should be an-
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nually authorized. The committee is now studying whether the
Director should be charged with preparing a budget for national in-
telligence activities and controlling the budgets for entities of the
intelligence community.
In addition, to facilitate oversight, the committee is consider-
ing whether all but specifically appropriated "unvouchered funds"
which would be accounted for on the Ihrector's certificate should be
open to GAO audit under appropriate security safeguards. Finally,
the possibility of statutory controls on the Director's Contingency
Reserve and on receipts from CIA proprietaries is under study.
3. Review of Clandestine Activities
Of great concern to the committee has been the procedures for the
review of sensitive intelligence activities including clandestine col-
lection and covert action. The committee believes Presidential ap-
proval should be required by statute for certain forms of sensitive
clandestine activities. The committee is attempting to define such
activities and the standards to be required for Presidential approval.
In addition, the committee is studying the factors, such as the jus-
tification for the proposed activity, its nature, scope, legality, proba-
bility of success, and estimated cost, which should be considered in
any review by the executive branch. The committee is reviewing the
role, if any, to be played in executive branch review procedures by
U.S. Ambassadors to countries which would be affected by such
activities.
The committee is also concerned with statutory provisions regard-
ing congressional oversight of clandestine activities. For oversight
to be effective and for Congress to play its constitutional role, ap-
propriate committees of Congress must be notified prior to the im-
plementation of any clandestine activity. In addition, the Congress
should have available, at least annually, written reports on clandestine
activities.
4. Restrictions on Clandestine Collection and Covert Action
The committee is reviewing possible restrictions and prohibitions
on the clandestine activities of the United States: Among such possi-
ble prohibitions are forbidding entities of the intelligence community
from paying or providing other valuable consideration for information
or operational assistance to :
-any individual following a full-time religious vocation,
-any U.S. grantee abroad, and
-anyone accredited or regularly contributing material to, regu-
larly involved in the editing of material for, or in the setting
of policy of, a U.S. media organization.
Also under consideration is a prohibition on intelligence community
support for public distribution within the United States of any mate-
rials unless such support is publicly announced. This would prevent the
government using the intelligence community to propagandize our
citizens.
Covert paramilitary activities such as those conducted in l:laos are
also under study. One possible reform under consideration is bringing
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such activities under procedures similar to those of the War Powers
Act.
Possible prohibitions on covert action have also been brought to the
committee's attention. Among covert actions which might be prohib-
ited are those whose objective is assassination of foreign leaders,
terrorism, the creation of epidemics and the overthrow of democratic
governments. The committee appreciates the difficulty in defining
these activities. It also recognizes the need to strike a balance between
statutory provisions and executive branch, Executive orders or regu-
lations which can be more detailed but which are still subject to con-
gressional scrutiny.
5. Counterintelligence
The committee believes that the counterintelligence activities of
the U.S. must be carefully reviewed and coordinated. The committee
is considering the establishment of a counterintelligence committee
which would assist the President in the formulation of counterintelli-
gence policy and objectives, assure unified direction of such activities,
and assure that they do not violate the law. Such a committee might
also establish uniform standards and doctrines for counterintelligence
activities and assess the foreign intelligence threat posed to the United
States and the success of the U.S. responses. Also under consideration
is whether counterintelligence activities which may have a significant
impact on the national security, national defense, or foreign relations
of the United States or rights guaranteed or protected by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States should be subject to executive branch
and congressional review procedures similar to those employed for
other clandestine activities.
6. Oversight and Accountability
In order to assure that intelligence activities are carried out in con-
formity with the Constitution and laws of the United States and safe-
guard, and do not abridge, the rights of Americans, there must be
effective mechanisms for oversight. Effective accountability must also
be achieved. The committee is therefore examining existing and pro-
posed oversight mechanisms. One such group, the intelligence Over-
sight Board (established by E.O. 11905), has been reviewed and re-
newed by the President; the committee is considering whether to
provide the JOB with a statutory charter.
Centralizing responsibility for intelligence activities in one individ-
ual would also dramatically increase accountability. The account-
ability to the Congress and the public of congressional committees
charged with oversight of intelligence activities is also under scrutiny
by the subcommittee. Such committees should make periodic reports
on the nature and extent of the national intelligence activities of the
United States to their respective bodies and should promptly call
attention to their respective houses or the appropriate committees on
any relevant matter. At the same time consideration should be given to
having the head of the intelligence community report annually to the
appropriate committees of the Senate and the House; he might also be
charged, by statute, with making annual reports to the public.
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B. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
CHARTER
When the committee introduces a charter authorizing intelligence
activities and establishing the structure of the intelligence. com-
munity, it will also include as an integral part of the legislation,
procedures and restrictions upon foreign intelligence and coun-
terintelligence activities which may affect the rights of Americans. In
addition, the committee will include charter provisions both to an-
thorize and to restrict FBI domestic security activities, which are cov-
ered by the committee's mandate under Senate Resolution 400. In this
same area, the committee will consider prohibitions limiting military
intelligence or law enforcement activities directed at civilians uncon-
nected wth the Defense Department, except where troops are ordered
to a civil disorder or where an activity is otherwise authorized by the
national intelligence charter for foreign intelligence or counterintel-
ligence purposes.
The following fundamental principles will govern charter provi-
sions written to protect the rights of Americans.
(1) Intelligence activities should not be directed against Ameri-
cans solely because they are advocating political ideas, engaging
in lawful political activities, or associating with other persons
J or the purpose of petitioning the Government for redress of
grievances.
(2) All authorized intelligence activities should be conducted
in such a way as to minimize any adverse affects on the privacy
and freedom of Americans.
(3) U.S. intelligence agencies must not, gather and maintain
information on the political beliefs, associations, or the private.
lives of Americans unless the information is clearly necessary for
an authorized intelligence activity.
(4) U.S. intelligence agencies must not disseminate in formatiorf
about Americans for unauthorized or improper purposes, inclucT.-
ing the discrediting of any person critical of the President or of
an intelligence agency.
(5) U.S. intelligence agencies must not use against Americans
the so-called "COINTFLPRO" techniques, such as harassment,
intimidation, holding persons up to ridicule or disgrace, incite-
ment of violence, instigating criminal acts, or any other tech-
niques contrary to fundamental standards of due process under
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
These principles will apply to the consideration of the following
questions regarding foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence
and FBI domestic security activities.
1. Foreign Counterintelligence Activities
The committee believes that the circumstances under which an
American may be targeted for a foreign counterintelligence investiga-
tion should be prescribed. Among the considerations involved are
whether there is a credible allegation, or reasonable suspicion, that the
American may be engaged in clandestine intelligence activities, sabo-
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tage, or terrorism on behalf of a foreign power or foreign-based group.
In addition, standards and procedures should be considered for the
duration of investigations, for the use of particular investigative tech-
niques, for the maintenance and dissemination of information about
Americans acquired in foreign counterintelligence investigations. With
respect to certain more intrusive techniques, the Attorney General's
written approval or a judicial warrant may be required. Such tech-
niques may include the use of targeted covert human sources, review of
confidential records and tax information, electronic surveillance, mail
opening, and unconsented physical or visual searches.
Foreign counterintelligence activities may also include limited in-
quiries regarding Americans who are targets of a foreign intelligence
service or may be able to assist in the conduct of a counterintelligence
investigation.
A principal question, which has also arisen in the context of pro-
posed electronic surveillance legislation, is whether an American who
is not suspected of violating Federal criminal law may be investigated
by the Federal Government in certain circumstances.
2. Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Committee believes that restrictions to protect the rights of
Americans must address the following questions : Should intelligence
agencies target an American for the clandestine collection of informa-
tion about his or her activities, if the American is acting on behalf of a
foreign power and the information is needed for the conduct of foreign
affairs? What standards should govern the maintenance and dissemi-
nation of information about an American acquired, purposefully or
incidentally, from clandestine collection activity? Should covert action
ever be targeted against an American who is acting on behalf of a
foreign power? Should intelligence activities involve the use of false
identification or pretext "cover" to conceal from an American the
government affiliation of an employee of an intelligence agency?
Should covert human sources ever be recruited within an organization
in the United States which is not acting on behalf of a foreign power?
Standards may also be required to regulate the relationships between
private citizens or organizations and the intelligence community.
What procedures are needed to ensure that private citizens who are
used to assist in the conduct of intelligence activities do so voluntarily
and with knowledge of the risks involved? What procedures are needed
to ensure that an organization which is used to assist in the conduct
of intelligence activities does so with the approval of its principal
executive officer and in conformity with its own rules?
Should there be a statutory prohibition against direct or indirect
covert financial support of an American educational or private volun-
tary organization which assists in the conduct of intelligence activi-
ties? Should there be a prohibition against the Government giving a
private citizen or organization who assists in the conduct of intelli-
gence activities any preferential treatment, exemption, or benefit, ex-
cept as may be authorized by law? What should be the standards for
the use of an American religious, educational, artistic, humanitarian,
philanthropic, cultural, or media organization (or person affiiliated
therewith) to assist in the conduct of intelligence activities?
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The committee's charter legislation may also set standards for
background and security investigations of employees or prospective
employees of the intelligence community. With respect to the physi-
cal security of intelligence community facilities or personnel, appro-
priate investigative procedures will be considered. Although entities
of the intelligence community maybe permitted to perform law en-
forcement functions to police their installations and grounds, other
law enforcement functions may be prohibited or, in the case of cer-
tain assistance to Federal law enforcement agencies, regulated closely
by the Attorney General.
3. FBI Domestic Security Activities
The committee is of the opinion that the charter for FBI domestic
security activities should address questions similar to those raised by
foreign counterintelligence investigations, the use of particular in-
vestigative techniques, and the maintenance and dissemination of in-
formation. The issue of whether FBI domestic security activities
should involve measures going beyond conventional criminal investi-
gations is particularly significant. Should the FBI conduct domestic
security intelligence investigations of an American where there is
only an allegation, or reasonable suspicion, that the person will soon
engage, in terrorist activities, and where such activities would violate
state or foreign law rather than U.S. Federal law? Under what cir-
cumstances should the FBI investigate civil disorders or demonstra-
tions? Should the FBI be authorized with prior approval of the
Attorney General, to take certain lawful protective measures to pre-
vent specific acts of terrorism, such as by providing physical protec-
tion or preventing access to explosives?
In light of past abuses in this area, requirements for the closest
possible supervision of investigations and other activities by the At-
torney General may be necessary. Specific safeguards may also need
to be' imposed with respect to the activities of covert human sources,
or informants, and to prohibit so-called COINTELPRO-type
harassment and disruption.
4. Oversight and Accountability
To enforce the provisions of any proposed legislation, special duties
may be imposed upon the Inspectors General and General Counsels
of the entities of the intelligence community. Reporting require-
ments to the Attorney General and to the committees of Congress
having jurisdiction over intelligence activities may be prescribed.
Consideration will be given to charging the Attorney General with
the duty of overseeing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
activities directly affecting Americans to ensure that they are in com-
pliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Among
the questions which arise here are whether an official of the Justice
Department, such as an Assistant Attorney General, might be dele-
gated authority to make certain decisions on behalf of the Attorney
General, and what the relationships should be between the Attorney
General and the Intelligence Oversight Board.
With respect to domestic security activities, the Office of Profes-
sional Responsibility in the Justice Department might be authorized
to inquire into allegations of improper conduct and to evaluate. the
work of the internal inspection unit of the FBI.
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The criminal penalties for violation of the restrictions and legal
remedies for aggrieved individuals are also under review. But here
too there are questions which must be answered. What criminal sanc-
tions should be imposed upon Government officials or employees who
willfully and knowingly violate the charter provisions? What civil
remedies should an aggrieved person have against such officials or
employees or against the Government itself? Should Government
employees have a legal defense if they reasonably relied in good faith
upon orders of their superiors? Should the Government indemnify
the reasonable legal expenses of employees who are found not to be
liable?
In answering these and other questions relating to the protection of
the rights of Americans, the committee is drawing upon its own in-
quiries, upon the recommendations of the Church Committee and, in
some instances, upon the administrative "guidelines" developed by the
Attorney General. The committee is also considering recent proposals
by various citizen groups.
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IX. THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING A JOINT
COMMITTEE FOR INTELLIGENCE VERSUS SEP-
ARATE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES FOR THE HOUSE
AND SENATE
The committee has considered the question of the desirability of
establishing a joint committee of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives on intelligence activities. The committee is of the view
that for the foreseeable future a joint committee does not seem desir-
able or possible. The committee understands that efforts are now
underway through the House Leadership to establish a companion
committee in that body with the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
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X. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
MAY 19, 1976 TO MAY 15, 1977
A. MEETINGS
Full committee meetings : Total 39
Closed meetings : 29 total, 16 of these were business meetings
with no witnesses.
Open meetings : 10 total.
Witnesses and briefers heard : 92 total. Of these 67 in closed
session and 25 in open hearings.
Sub committee on Intelligence and the Rights of American : Total 5
Closed meetings,: 2 total
Open meetings : 3 total
Witnesses and briefers heard : 21 total. Of these 10 in closed
session and 11 in open hearings. All in regard to S. 3197.
Staff interviews conducted : 125
Subcommittee on Budget Authorization : Total 19
Closed meetings : 19 total
Open meetings : none
Witnesses and briefers heard : 44 total. All regarding authori-
zations for intelligence activities for FY 1978.
Staff interviews conducted : 250
Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Qualityi : Total 4
Closed meetings : 4 total
Open meetings : none
Meetings for organizational purposes and consideration of a
staff study. No witnesses or briefers heard.
Staff interviews conducted : 250
Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines : Total 4
Closed meetings : 4 total. All for organizational and related
matters.
Open meetings : None
Witnesses and briefers : None
Staff interviews conducted : 110
Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure : Total 1
Closed meeting: 1 for organizational business.
Open meetings : None
Witnesses and briefers : None
Staff interviews conducted : 12
Subcommittee on Special Investigation : None, to date
Executive branch meetings or briefings : Over 70 meetings or brief-
ings with one or more officials of the executive branch have been
scheduled for one or more members.
B. PUBLICATIONS : Total completed 7
1. Committee Rules of Procedure
2. Hearings on the Nomination of E. Henry Knoche
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3. Hearings before Subcommittee on Rights of Americans, re-
garding S. 3197, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
4. Senate Report 94-1161 on S. 3197
5. Legislative Calendar (Cumulative Record) 94th Congress
6. Hearing on the Nomination of Theodore C. Sorensen.
7. Executive Report 95-5 on the Nomination of Admiral Stans-
field Turner to be Director, Central Intelligence.
In addition Hearings on the Nomination of Admiral Turner
is in page proofs.
C. BILLS REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE: Total 2
1. S. 3197 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976.
Action : Reported favorably as amended.
2. H.R. 13615 to amend the Central Intelligence Agency Retire-
ment Act of 1964.
Action : Reported favorably. Approved by Senate. Public
Law 94-448.
D. BILLS/RESOLUTIONS ORIGINATED BY THE COMMIT-
TEE : Total 1
Senate Resolution 148 authorizing additional expenditures for
the Select Committee on Intelligence.
In addition a bill authorizing expenditure of funds for intelli.-
gence activities of the Government in fiscal year 1978 has been
prepared and reported to the Senate.
E. NOMINATIONS REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE:
Total 3
1. E. Henry Knoche to be Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence.
Action : Public hearing. Nomination approved. Knoche con-
firmed July 1, 1976.
2. Theodore C. Sorensen to be Director, Central Intelligence.
Action : Public hearing. Nomination withdrawn by candi-
date January 17, 1977.
3. Stansfield Turner to be Director, Central Intelligence.
Action : Public hearing. Nomination approved. Turner con-
firmed February 24, 1977.
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN, JR.
I had not intended to file separate or additional views to the annual
report of the Senate Intelligence Committee. However, I have reviewed
the statement of my colleague, Senator Moynihan, and feel an obliga,
tion to respond to the concerns he expresses.
The heart of the Senator's concern is that the members of the Intel-
ligence Committee are not adequately aware of the reality of the
Soviet threat. He points out that nowhere does the committee speak
of the KGB, but it seems more concerned about the rights of Ameri-
cans than the power of the intelligence community in the face of an
implacable foe.
I cannot speak for the whole committee. I can only speak for one
member who has spent hundreds of hours, since I joined this commit-
tee last summer, in committee meetings, staff and intelligence agency
briefings on these matters, especially the activities of the KGB. I must
admit that when I first began, I had some of the concerns expressed
by my colleague. Have we spent too much time on what is wrong with
the intelligence community and not enough on what it is doing right
to counter the real threats to our security ?
I am convinced that the answer to that question is a resounding no.
This committee is probably more aware of the details of Soviet intel-
ligence activities than any other group in the Congress. Both as a
result of my work on this committee and on the Foreign Relations
Committee, I for one have no illusions about Soviet intentions and
capabilities in the world. I share the premise upon which Senator
Moynihan bases his critique-isolationism is indeed a dangerous and
naive foundation upon which to rest our foreign policy or the intel-
ligence community which must serve that policy. However, I vigor-
ously reject the argument that this document has anything to do with
isolationism, mutant or otherwise. I am sure that every member of
this committee believes that we need a world-wide secret intelligence
collection capability. That is the antithesis of isolationism.
In summary I believe that my colleague misses the point. At the
heart of what is wrong with the intelligence community and what
indeed has caused many of the abuses we have seen is the fact that
most officials of the intelligence community do not know what they
should and should not be doing. The watch-word of intelligence offi-
cials is that they are not and do not want to be policymakers. And
most of all, they resent beincastigated for activities which are now
labeled abusive but in which-they engaged in good faith upon orders
of some policymaker.
I soon learned that a serious threat to our national security today
is the intelligence official, faced with a real threat, for example, a real
case of espionage, who is traumatized by the exposure of recent years
and in the absence of precise orders from his superiors is afraid to act.
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42
We will not solve that problem by restating the obvious, that the
Soviets operate a very effective intelligence service, unfettered by the
restrictions of a vibrant constitution. We solve that problem by putting
our time and energy to seeking a workable balance between a strong
and effective intelligence community, and the countervailing values
of our country that make us the light of the world, our civil liberties
and a foreign policy based on honor and a fundamental respect for
humanity and peace.
In the end that means that the ultimate policymakers in a democ-
racy, the people, must through their elected representatives tell the
intelligence community what they can do and what they cannot do.
That means precise legislative charters which incorporate the concept
of streamlined management accountability in a strengthened Director
of Central Intelligence. In essence, that is the agenda of our commit-
tee. In pursuing this strategy, we as a people build our defense upon
the most powerful weapon against totalitarianism and repression, our
creative genius which can only flourish in a strong and robust democ-
racy.
JOSEPH BmEN, Jr.
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
There is nothing in the committee's annual report to the Senate to
which I would take any specific, or even any very general objection.
To the contrary, it seems to me an admirable statement which sets
forth the work of the committee over the past year, and I wholly
endorse that work. The abuses of our intelligence system have been
documented. The violations of the rights of Americans associated with
these abuses have been documented. Clearly the first task of this com-
mittee has been to set our own house in order. Just as clearly, this task
is well advanced, and should be pursued-almost-regardless of the
consequences. (Fiat iuaticia et ruantt coeli ought to be more an abstract
than an applied principle of government..)
I am nonetheless concerned that the committee has unintentionally
produced a profoundly biased political document. It is not political
in the party sense. But it is utterly political with respect to differing
perceptions of the American position in the world today, and by ex-
tension the position of the remaining political democracies.
I would characterize the central proposition of the committee's re-
port in terms of Walt Kelly's now classical aphorism in his comic
strip "Pogo": "We have met the enemy and he is us."
The committee reports on a world in which very simply, the values
which the United States hopefully stands for do not seem to be
threatened by any activity save the activities of the U.S. Govern-
ment, and those of a handful of erstwhile allied or friendly govern-
ments. We learn that the intelligence services of the Republic of Korea,
the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Iran are possibly threat-
ening the rights of Americans. In fairness, Cuban intelligence services
are also mentioned. But nowhere is the Committee for State Security
of the Soviet Union (the KGB) even alluded to.
There is a pattern of avoidance of the reality of totalitarian threat
throughout this document. This seeming obliviousness to the interna-
tional context in which our intelligence activities take place seems less
an aberration than a mutant of classical isolationism. In my opinion,
this may be a comforting world view, but it is a profoundly unreal-
istic one.
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN.
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