CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300290001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rele a 201 04 : cS TA00 0290001-6
1 August 1951
Copy No. ^q
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENTNO 3
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
[i DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2X3 7
AUT HR
DATE .14SEVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
61 A
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GENERAL
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Soviet "peaceful coexistent
" policy considered likely (page 3).
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French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees
in Indochina. (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
Impressive mass attendance at Cardinal Sapieha's funeral (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
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10. Austrian Foreign Minister looks with favor upon reopening of treaty
talks (page 9).
11. Soviet motives in Berlin trad* r*strictiG (page 9).
12. Norway-Netherlands atomic energy collaboration (page 10).
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Soviet "peaceful Coexistence" policy considered likely:
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The US Embassy in London suggests the possi-
bility that the USSR will now seek a period of
"peaceful coexistence" in which to increase its
own Itrei gth while the West is weakened by
unpreparedness, complacency, or economic crises. Recalling the prece-
dent of Soviet policies in the 1920's and 1930's, the embassy characterizes
the coexistence policy as a middle road between a "genuine general retreat"
and an imminent showdown with the West.
The USSR may even, for the time being, re-
frain from further local aggressions through Satellites, since the risk of
thereby precipitating a general conflict may be greater than the USSR cares
to incur.
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The embassy considers that a. renewed at-
tempt to achieve..an.Austrian Treaty should be used to test the new Soviet
protestations of a desire to. cooperate.
Comment: The. only evidence of a, possible
.change in Soviet foreign .policies, aside.from. a professed willingness to
settle the Korean: War, lies in the trade and. cultural fields, but, activities
in, these fields have :not so. far involved any real concessions on the part of
the Soviet Government. . They. have coincided .with, a .rather sharp shift in
Soviet propaganda, apparently designed to persuade susceptible non-
Communist governments that a costly Western alliance against the Soviet
Union is no longer necessary..
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6French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina:
The French Foreign Office appears to be re-
ceding from its. opposition to the repatriation
to Formosa of Chinese Nationalist troops
terned in Indochina,
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Although emphasizing that General de,4attre
and the next French Cabinet must approve any decision regarding the intern-
ees, a Foreign Office official hinted to a US Embassy official that it might
be possible to repatriate a few groups and then await the Chinese Communist
reaction,
Comment* The Chinese Nationalist Govern-...
meet. has been attempting periodically during the past two years to obtain
permission for the internees to leave Indochina for Formosa. The French,
however, have firmly refused all requests, fearing that the proposed action
might provide the Chinese Communists with a pretext for intervening in
Indochina.
._6_
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EASTERN EUROPE
Impressive mass attendance at Cardinal Sapieha's funeral.
The immense power of the Polish Catholic
Church was demonstrated on 27 July when
nearly a million persons attended the funeral
rites for Cardinal Sapieha, despite Commu-
nist warnings against absenteeism and suppression of information concern-
ing the rites. The fervor of -the public's mass demonstration derived from
the fact that Sapieha +symbolized, for the Polish people, national and spirit
ual independence. Polish Primate Wyszynski's funeral oration indicated
that the Church, wh ile not seeking open conflict with the government, was
determined to resist,, with the firm backing of the mass of the Polish
gnu p any further Communist incursions into the spiritual life of the
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The TJS.: Embassy in Warsaw comments that,
in death, the Cardinal made his mostcrucial contribution to the unity and
strength of the Polish Catholic Church's struggle against Communism.
r at> Cardinal, ..Sapieba was nationally
revered as, the spiritual,. leader of the Catholic. Church in. Pola Because
of his grekt,age (he.. was 86 when he died),. he stepped aside several years
ago so that. Archbishop Wyszynski, who was younger and stronger, could
become Poland's Primate.,
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25X1 A 10,E Austrian Foreign Minister looks. with, ,favor upon reopening of treaty talks:
Austrian, Foreign..Mi ter. ;Gruber has wel-
.eomed. the US suggestion, that. negotiations be
resumed on the ..Austrian treaty, of the
grounds.. that the continuity of. four -power
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treaty efforts should. not be interrupted. altoge.ther4 He. believes that. there
is not. at present any urgency for a meeting of the deputies, but that it might
be important to hold a session in September, depending on developments of
the next few weeks.
Comment, In. tune. of this year Gruber hoped
for agreement on the Austrian treaty at a Big Four meeting, and therefore
regarded the deputies, sessions as unnecessary. Now, with no prospect of
a Big Four meeting, Gruber has changed his attitudes
11. Soviet motives in Berlin trade restrictions.
US officials in Berlin feel that the success of
Soviet restrictions on Berlin trade., which
were originally related to immediate problems,
may have influenced the USSR to continue the
restrictions as a means to wider economic. and political objectives. These
officials foresee a tenacious Soviet campaign to retain.and. develop the pre-
sent harassing restrictions, and estimate that the._USSR, could. resist the
effect of present and proposed Allied economic countermeasuresfor another
two months. If, however, broader objectives appear feasible., the USSR
would be willing to persist much longer.
Comment: The use of a limited air lift to re-
lieve the large backlog of stalled goods is in prospect, and some commercial
air freight shipments on a small scale have already been made. Neverthe-
less, a firm Allied stand' on the issue continues to be delayed by French re-
luctance to extend present countermeasures for fear that the "bluff would be
called" by the USSR. Present countermeasures now include. the refusal to
approve the new interzonal trade pact and the institution of partial embargo
of shipments to East Germany.. 'French officials fear that Allied counter-
measures will so discourage the USSR over the possibility of a restoration
of normal trade that it will be willing to incur the economic loss involved
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in the imposition of a. blockade...
The East German economy would be serious-
..ly. harmed by a considerable extension of the present partialen3bargo of
key goods from...We.st Cer,many, because, under normal trade. conditions,
the legally authorized trade has always provided an excellent cover for
illegal: shipments that, have benefited the East.
120 Norway-Netherlands. atomic energy. collaboration.
The joint.. Norway-Netherlands, experimental
uranium pile at Kjeller, Norway, was
operated for the first. time. on 30. iuly.
Comment* Operation. of this. experimental
uranium pile represents the first major technical achievement by the
Norway-Netherlands Joint Commission. The contract for the project was
officially signed on 12.April. 1951.
Because this is strictly. an. experimental
pile and its plutonium output will be negligible, it can provide only for
the production of radioactive isotopes for tracer and medical use, and
will have no military implications.
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