LETTER TO THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH FROM DANIEL INOUYE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00983A001300020009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 29, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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The 4dashin ton Post
September 23, 1976
CnLLeaiL Boiith Victim Toid PB
Of Threats to Life, Frieu!s Satv:
I t/
By Stephen T. 1?Lynlon
and Rona!(! l e-s ter
1Jna'.:InEio _; Pos: 5t U h~: azrs
Orlando Lete]icr, former
Chilean ambassador to the
United States for the Marx-
ist. A I I e n d e government,
told ? his friends and co-
workers, that he had rc-
ccived repeated t h r c a t s
aganst his life before he
was killed here Tuesday by
a bomb in his car.
Anonymous callers, some
speaking in Spanish, had
continually warned him for
more than a year that he
would be killed unless he
stopped criticizing the mil,
itary junta that ousted the
late 1'resident Salvador-'
Atlcnt~c,Scpt: 1!, 1.973 Leto-.
tier's colleagues said ycster.
day. ;,.? . ? .
Last w c c k. Letc]ier re-
ceived a letter from a well
'laced Chilean, his cow?or?k-
rrs said. The letter allegedly
reported a high-level discus,
sion in the present Chilean
government over whether
Letelier should be killed be.
cause of his outspoken crili?
cisms of the current regime
in Chile.
The government in Chile
has disavocrcd any link with
Letetier?'s death and has dc?
plin,?ecl the bombing.
Letelier, 44, who screed a.r
Allende's foreign minister
and minister of defense in
1973 after his tenure as anr?
Ilassador to the U n i t e d
:;tales, was killed when a
bonni-, exploded undecncath.
'his cat as he drove to work
,throu ;Ir Sheridan 01-60 1M
W
Tuesday morning with . two -
colleagues. Ronni --and., Ali)
chael Moffitt, Ronni Mortrtt'
was also ' killed. Ifcr hus-
hand was hospitalized. brief-
ly for shock.
,11I 6rcc worked for the
Institute for'holicy Studies,
a private research "t p i n k.
tank." where Letctier ' di-
rected a foreign affairs re.
search program.
Lilian S. Montecino,
Lelelier's assistant. said in
air interview yesterday that
lie had told her of receiving
thrcats against his life about
twice a month. "It, usually.-
caure at odd hours (at his office) or at
' home, she said. The message, in, es-
sence, she added, was that if he con-
tinned his activities against the present
junta.of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, Letelier
would be killed or "eliminated."
;?;; :)'aril Weiss, charnran of the Institute
fqr Policy Studies, recalled that bete-
i er.;last, April had told him three or
four times of warnings ,by callers who
rraid, "We're going to get you."
,. James Petras, a political scientist at
the State University of New York; re- -
counted a conversation with Letelier
last'April. Letelier said, according to
this. account, that he had been warned'
,by the Chilean Embassy itself that he
would face what Pet ras described as
"unforeseen difficulties" if he con-
tinucd his attacks on the junf.a.
...,The existence of the letter in whIclr
Letctier was allegedly alerted to a
VhUcan government debate over
whether he should be assassinated
'was disclosed by, Egbal Ahmed and
other coworkers at the Institute for
Policy Studies. They did not produce,
the letter itself, however.
.Abrned and otherinstitutc offic.r1,-,
gejro. asked not. to be identified, also
?ttecllned to name the Chilean v,11-30
'rc`rdte the letter, saying they wanted
to avoid endangering him. The letter
' -re- said to have recounted It debate
-b&t. c'een Chilean "hawks" who wanted
f, ,feller killed, and "Cloves" es" who oh-
'j@'ctcd. to his suggested :assassination.
t was unclear yesterday whether
Letelier had reported-the recurring
threats against. him to the F131 or
sought F BU protection. A spokesman.
for the I'13l's Washington field office,
which is taking part in the investi,;a-
tion?of his death, denied that Letelier.
had. told the FBI of any such threats.
';airs. Montceino said, however, that
Letelier had told her he had reported
the, warnings to the Fill. In Rome ycs-
' -tt`dny, Agence France-P;-esse quo'cd
lortensia Allende, the former Chi-
an president's widow', as saying
,,Letelier had repeatedly requested k131.
' rotection.
According to Mrs. Alontecino, Leta
?Zier had said FBI agents visited hint
rTegularly and were notified when he
'pranged his residence.-"The F131 told:
Irbim if' anything unusual happened to
deport it to the F131," sho said.' =? >?
But Mrs. - Trontecino and others
noted that Letelier dill not take any
.special security precautions himself.
"I-fe felt, "If I'ni going to be afraid of
anything, I won't do, a thing, " site-
said.
Rafael Otero, counselor- for-public
.affairs at the Chilean Embassy, said
in air interview yesterday that no one
front the embassy had lreerr ques-
tioned by either the F13I or the Dis-
trict police about the bombing.
Otero said that the Chilean arnbas-
sador to the- United States, Manuel
Trucco, had contacted the State Be-
partrnent to offer "full cooperation"
in the Investigation. "We're very inter-
ested its going on with this investiga-
? tion because this is the worst thing
that could happen to my country at
this momeut." Otero said.
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Otcro su}.vested that L.etclier's rnur-
der, and those of other Chilean exiles
in other countries that preceded it,
have come in the fall and were timed
to coincide with the opening of the
United Nations General Assembly ses-
sion., '?
"We are asking to help. It's the first
opportunity to find out who is making
this attack a,!,I st the. Cb,ileard peo
pie," Otero 5,11d.
When awed about reports of
threats wade here and reportedly in
Chile against Letelier; Otero referred
to the. IL(ling of.Leteli_r's Chilean riti-
~~
. DVS on 10 by ti
i:over rraiit Otcro said. the
"Clii?.Carl gonernment doesn't need
other means" beyond revoking a per-
son's, citizenship.
Otero, a short, stout earl, was calm,
rdur?ing much of the interview until in-
formed ' that lie was being widely de-
scribed by Chilean exiles and leftists
in Washington as being the represent-
ative of the National Directorate of
intelligence (DINA), the most impor-
tant secret police agency in Chile.
Rearing this, Otero responded. with
laughter and said that this report was
"very funny." Otero denied having any'
role in DINA. The reports, he said,
were a way "for the extreme left to
point the finger" at him, and lie said
lie would report the Information to
the U.S. State Department today since
he took it as a threat against him.
Otero also raised and denied 're-
ports that he was affiliated with the
CIA in Chile. Describing himself as a
journalist, Otero said he had pub
fished .SEPA,. an anti-Allende maga-
zine, and that he had been Imprisoned
28 times "during Allende."
Otero raised the question as to why.'*
the explosion of Letelier's car occur.
red within 100 feet of the Chilean am-
bassador's residence ' at 2305 ? Massa-'
chusetts Ave. NW.
At several points during the inter-
view, Otero repeated his - assertion
that the Chilean government had not
had anything to do with ? Letelier's.
murder. "We know we don't have any,,
thing to do with this murder," Otero.
said. "We know . . . It's the.worst
thing that can happen."
City police and FBI officials ~re-
ported no significant developments
yesterday in their investigation of the
bombing, "This is not going to be eas-
ily'solved," said Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney Eugene Propper, who is coon
?dinating the investigation. Results of
laboratory studies of evidence col.
lected after the explosion will not be
available for a week or more, he said.
Sources close to the investigation
previously said the blast appeared to
have been caused by a skillfully con-
structed plastic bomb that was shaped
to concentrate the main impact of the
explosion upward into the' driver's
seat. The bomb was apparently atta-'
ched to the car's unclercarriage, these
sources said, and may have been set
off by a remote-contro:.lecl radio de-
vice. .
Propper met for about 1r/r hot rs
yestcrday with D.C. police and FPf of-
ficials involved in the investigation.
Invgslk,'ator?s, he. said, are interview:
_
ii. and Viiint rs of the junta (that distinction must
be reserved for the air force's ~e l':r;ll Gustavo Leigh), bill
he is certainly the most forceful, an([ he has created a
whcilw new apparatus to reinforce his power. Its key corn-
portents are the military C'o,r'iirr .lsrscrr, headed by General
Labarca, the DINA, and the looser group of civilian ad-
visors (the freinq rislas, as they have come to be nick-
na:ned) anion g whom Jaime Gtizrna-r, the dedi,:ated young
Catholic corporatist; is preeminent.
The balance among the armed services is preserved
within the cabinet, where jobs are still assigned according
to a tacit quota system, but here the. simmering rivalry
betweee the navy and tilt. `flr_
ila`? SS'L,:h w is the d; i in ttrr;.i. ;. eh r:) th co' , m ci
started out with a clear' ascendancy within the government
=encompassing the overall control of economic policy,
plus the `finist.ie.; of Defense and Foreign Affairs..--has
been steadily drivers back. The future of the present
Foreign Minister, Admiral Patricia Carvajal, an honorable
and likable man, but a singularly undynamic minister, is
now in doubt. (A much doughtier figure is Admiral Arturo
Troncoso, who is making a mark as it finister of Education
by his system of loans for university students---on a sliding
scale that varies from zero for sociology students to the
full cost of education for engineers.)
But all in all,
it is a grave attempt that deserves more
understandin'----and active support-
from what remains of the
capitalist world
The rivalries within the military establishment cannot be
interpreted, by and large, as policy battles. There is skep-
ticism about the economic program among some middle-
ranking officers, but General Pinochet has given it his
imprimatur, and his authority is now uncontested within
the high command. Nor are there signs that the old po-
litical parties have much influence over military thinking.
The Christian Democrats, for example, are often said to
have important friends in the army, but many of the
senior officers of my acquaintance tend to echo the views
of the general who told me, with brutal simplicity, that
"there are two ways to get to Moscow. One is the direct
route. The. other "oes via Rome."
Such statements begin to suggest the huge ravine that
has opened tip between the junta and the old-style political
Icaders of Chile-with the exception of some figures from
the National Party. The gulf may be dangerously wide, in
the sense that the regime has become intellectually isolated
and closed to criticism, and in the more specific sense that it
cannot afford an all-out conflict with the Christian Demo-
crats. The overweening influence of a tiny conventicle of
civilian advisors of a /rungi:isru tendency that sometimes
ct: ;es r!n the theoc:r;ttic is dikurbing-;tall yet, in the
pies ni c (ini;tte, it t;tn: almost t:nt h tflenrtc cf. J'c~~ltTc: like
luiiitc: Citi,.t fan (a hrillim,t }vu:rg; hrtcltcclnnat r:ti 1 trove
1: nuwrt ansl liked sines his d .ry; as :r student activist in the
he I : '1g; inst Ilt:ncle) now represent, and colt for, a land
of total commitment to the system and an ecitraliy total
rejection of 'mien" ideas tlia' is fundanrnenlally: at. odds
with (he luiuc'a-f;u.crr trodilim of Chilean society. If tftay'
hacl theft- way, they wutilrt be likely to turn Chile into an
introveried, absolutist society where Morality and educ:a-
tieit were nleterminctl by the state: and it: pticstly a,rlvisots
-a kind of Parts;arty.
OR C uLe, a highly sophisticated country whose prima
asset has always been the creative quality of its peoples.
the pursuit of such goals reflects a very stunted :trnhitior,.
And the suppression of tire free intcrcl;::nc~ of ideas. is
nqu;+!!y
d!irter; Illy I ce t visit t': (ra aU: n'i i';
the weakncss of the liberal democracies is that the
leaders do not make the basic distinction between sub-
version (which cannot he tolerated) atut dissent (wltct'r
must be tolerated), bitt the weakness of an authoriiaiian
society stay be precisely tine- same--except that, this tirne,
dissenter-, are hounded as subversives. The loss of a capacity
for self-criticism is the beginning of social stagnation.
Chile must devise a system that will allow more liberty
and creativity than the present one. It vould be a tragedy
if the end result of the revolution against Marxism in Chile;
turned out to be just another Military dictatorship based
purely on bayonets. Chile is living through another' transi-
tional phase, whose outcome is far from clear anti will
depend on many factors over which the Chilean% them-
selves do not have control-the world price of copper, the
intentions of the Cubans and the Russians, the support
(or lack of it) from the. United States. I am fairly con-
fident of the junta's capacity to Will through evert, if the
international situation deteriorates further. Remember
Franco's post-1945 isolation and the economic stagnation
of Spain through thoic difficult postwar years when. the
UN would not acknowledge its existence: yet Franco. is
still there, and Spain has become a rich country- But I ant
less confident about the construction of a civilized political
system in Chile unless there is an urgent reappraisal of the
country's institutions and the possible models for a new
constitution. However, if that reappraisal is made, it is
possible that we will have a great deal to learn from the
future experience -of the Chileans in devising a "post-
disaster system. -
General Pinochet told me that he has come! to see
Chile's future political system as a "nee-dcrnocracy," which
would appear to mean a system of representative govern-
ment without political parties. The president would be
elected. The legislature would be elected from a list of
candidates selected-by an appointed caucus--on the basis
of their "qualifications." flow their qualifications would be
determined remains unclear. It is possible that General
Pinochet is inching toward a conception similar to Brian
Crozier's idea of a "profession of politics" that would
admit particularly distinguished men from various defined
occupational categories. If this is the idea, it will clearly
not appeal to Chile's civili.in politicians, above all the
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Christian i)cc.nocrats. Sti!I, there is no e.eaping the dilemma
that I stated brietty c;arliei: aft,.r :,!! that has happened,
vtb ,';r tcrlings of hatred and reven!,y that have hcc:ri
generat:cd, tend with the painful proccssof economic re-
cons:ruct ion that has to be undergone, you cannot bring
back the system that )vas destroyed just by waving a magic
wand. And if you can't do that, it brc:oines inclisp zns,ible
to clap out a political system (provisioned or permanent)
that will allow scope for public p:tr(ic:ipation in decision-
making and for le:aceful political change in the absence of
the party system.
The weakness of the liberal
dTerraocracies is that their leaders do not
inane 1h3 basic (lisiinct. on l)etfveern
r
v:tbir?e1'r,to>.r. (wili r%cart)'.oz be. r?,olei(itecJ)
(lilit (CSse t (zvizicl rnnus- be toltsialed)
What course is Chile likely to take now? It may be
useful to sketch out half a dozen possible scenarios, in
ascending order of probability. They are by no means
mutually exclusive. Scenario 2 could lead on to scenario
4.i. I; scenario rr b could be wedded to scenario s.
1. The revohrtior, script. This is very hart to devise,
since there is no serious military threat to the regime inside
Chile-although armed leftist groups could play an im-
portant role in the event of an external attack, possibly by
Peru. The Communist Party's strategy is based on stealthy
penetration of the administration, the Church, the Christian
Democratic Party-and the armed forces. Its lone-range
success; however, would appear to hinge on the demoraliza-
tion of the armed forces and their voluntary withdrawal
from power rather than on armed insurrection.
2. The "Argentine" scenario. It is always possible that
the Chilean armed forces, finally convinced of their
incapacity to cope wi?L1 the country's economic and social
problems and tinder intense pressure from the U.S. and
the UN, will one day decide to retire to the barracks-as
General Lanusse retired in Argentina in 1973, or as Ibanez
retired in Chile in 1930 (as the distinguished editor of
El Mercurio reminded his readers in a remarkable article
the other day). Such a decision could also be influenced
by revulsion against the brutal techniques of a section of
the security forces (as in Greece). Chilean politicians
hopeful that this scenario will come to pass point to straws
in the wind, like the fact that officers are more reluctant
to appear in uniform in the streets now than they were in
the heady days after the coup, when they were being hailed
as saviors. The current state of semi-civil war in Argentina,
however, has not escaped the attention of the Chilean
military, and the fear that something similar might result
in Chile (necessitating, in the end, a new period of military
in(ervention) is likely to discourage them from bowing out
in the near future. (The Argentine armed forces, according
to Illy Buenos, Aires informants, have a plan to assume
power again for an initial period of six *years.)
3. The "U.S. Embassy" scenario appears to be that, per-
haps not long from now, a predominantly Christian Demo-
cratic cabinet might be sworn in-still within the framework
of authoritarian rule, but essentially as a first step toward
returning to constitutional rule. I do not cnnsitier this Ilk
to occur, at any rate not in that way. and any ctforl
outsiders to flourish big sticks over the he.uds of fire n
in the Diego I'urtales building will make it less, rather th
more, likely to happen.
4. The "Peruvian" scerrrrrio. Under this scenario, cc
tinned economic: recesxion will finally induce the stati
in the army to abandon the present experiti-ent in marl
economics and go over to a Peruvian-type economic r
tionalism, possibly within the franiewetrk of a corporal
constitution. The regime would -continua to be stront
tinti Communist, but would now wiry the applause of e<
comic nationalists throughout the Thircl 'orld--possit
to the extent of getting some aid and invekstment frc
Venezuela, Libya, etc.
5. The ;ter; ;norlel. It is possible (and devoutly to
v i;^e