ELINT REPORT OF MISSION 3025

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00569R000100060015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 27, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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ELINT REPORT OF MISSION 3025
Handle Via TALENT Control Only
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Z / CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Office of Scientific Intelligence
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WARNING
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the meaning of the espionage laws U.S. Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The low prohibits its
transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use
in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign
0 government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U.S. personnel especially indoc-
trinated and authorized to receive TALENT information. Its security must 6e mnintnined in neenrdnnee
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TCS-8832-61
TTC/ O/ELT/SPEC -05- 61
Copy no. _of 75.
PREFACE
This report is the product of Headquarters.
ELINT Processing Center and is based on a
mission over the SOUTH CHINA SEA, LAOS,
SOUTH VIET NAM and NORTH VIET NAM.
The acquisition of additional information
from this mission or from the area covered
will be published as it becomes available.
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TCS-8832-61
T T C / O/ELT/SPEC-05-61
Copy no. ___j -Of 75.
ELINT REPORT OF MISSION 3025
PARAGRAPH
GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . 2
INTERCEPT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . .
P-BAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
L-BAND .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3b
OUTLINE MAP (APPENDED)
I. GENERAL:
a. Mission 3025 was flown on 16 January 1961. The countries
of LAOS, NORTH VIET NAM and SOUTH VIET NAM were overflown
in the course of the mission. The accompanying map depicts the
flight path of the intercept vehicle with the times noted at various
intervals.
b. The System VI Collection Configuration was employed
which operates in the frequency range from 50 me/s to 14 kme/s.
This range is covered by four separate receivers the limits of
which are given in the intercept summaries of the individual bands.
c. The take-off time was 0030, 16 January 1961. (All times
stated herein are ZULU.) Two minutes after the take-off the inter-
cept equipment was activated. The total flight time was seven hours
and ten minutes. The equipment was in operation for six hours and
33 minutes of this period.
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2. EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE:
The equipment functioned properly throughout the entire mission
with no serious malfunctions or lose of sensitivity in any band.
P-Band (50 me/s-300 meIs)
(1) The first signals intercepted in the P-band occurrad
six minutes after the take-off. The intercepts, possibly from
British vessels in the SOUTH CHINA SEA, gave indications of
originating from an area close to the flight path of the vehicle.
The signals were intercepted for a period of one hour and eighteen
minutes. These intercepts also had some of the characteristics
of the ChiCom SCR-270 radar which have been received from
locations at sea in the past. No sightings of the shipborne SCR-
270 have been made, although intercepts continue to be reported
of radars of this type in the east CHINA coastal area. The para-
meters of the signal during this mission were approximately those
listed for the SCR-Z70 with the exception of the scan time which
was somewhat fast. In this case, a time of eight seconds was
obtained. Previous intercepts have usually been between eleven
and thirteen seconds.
(2) The intercepts in the INDOCHINA area indicated that
the SCR-270, KNIFE REST A and KNIFE REST B types are the
principal radars used in detecting and tracking aircraft. The
SCR-270 types appear to be the most widely used of the three and
usually are intercepted for longer periods and at higher signal
strengths than the KNIFE REST types.
(3) The ELINT derived from the mission indicates that
the vehicle was probably first detected by the HAINAN sub-sector
at approximately 0147 when 90 NM south of P'AN-SHIN SHU in
the PARACEL ISLANDS. Tracking appeared to be lost in the same
area when the aircraft was on the return flight. The nearest known
location of an SCR-270, which was the type intercepted in this area,
is at LINCSHUI on the island of HAINAN. Coverage from this
point was by two SCR-270 radars until 0230 just prior to the
northward turn in southern LAOS. A KNIFE REST B radar was
intercepted at 0152 and continued to be intercepted during the
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first turn and remained active until the aircraft was in the area
directly west of HAINAN. Also intercepted shortly after the turn
were two additional KNIFE REST Bs and two SCR-270 radars.
Coverage from this point northward was very dense. As many as
nine P-band radars were received simultaneously in several areas.
{4) At the point near the NORTH VIET NAM border a
very strong signal was heard and continued until 0440 when the
vehicle was near PHUC NHAC. NORTH VIET NAM. The radar
was tenatively identified as an SCR-588, known to be possessed by
the ChiCom's. The signal indicated that the plane was being
manually tracked for long periods of time but on several occasions
the set would break lock and go into an irregular scan rate. hater-
cepts of signals of this type have been received on past missions
in the same area but never of the high strength of this intercept.
(5) The following is a list of the signal intercepts in the
P-band.
SIG TIME TIME
NO. *ANT UP DOWN
SCAN
TIME
RADAR
TYPE
Approved or Re least'',
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4. CONCLUSIONS:
a. The mission verified previous estimates of the number of
long range P-band radars in NORTH VIET NAM and the South and
Southwest Air Defense Districts of CHINA. Judging from the
strength of the intercepts, detection was probably made prior to the
entry of the aircraft over the coast of SOUTH VIET NAM on the first
leg of the flight. At the time of the entry near BONG SON, SOUTH
VIET NAM, two SCR-270 and two KNIFE REST E radars were
illuminating the vehicle. In the areas over NORTH VIET NAM and
LAOS the vehicle was covered by several radars at all times.
b. No tracking by NORTH VIET NAM or the Southwest CHINA
Air Defense District was evident on the mission.
C. The lack of S-band ChiCom equipments in either NORTH
VIET NAM or LAOS is further illustrated by the results of this
mission. The failure to intercept the TOKEN in the SOUTH CHINA
area which had been intercepted on previous missions is not parti-
cularly significant since this set appeared to be at a great distance
and probably had not seen the mission aircraft on these previous
missions. The question of the identity of the two signals in S-band
similar to the AN/APS-20 is interesting. It is, however, of rela-
tively low importance unless further intercepts or collateral Infor-
mation prove these vets to be other than friendly which they now
appear to be.
d. The ELINT gave no indication of fighter reaction to the
flight.
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