CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000200380001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 June 1951
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Copy No. -I
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 13ULLET$N
DOCUMENT NO.
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
2" It-
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I 1 DECLASSFIErj
AUT HR ~u-
PA7
FiEViEVVER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Indonesia, reluctant,to classify rubber as strategic (page 3)
SOUTH ASIA
20 India expresses concern over Sino-Tibetan agreement (page 3)
50 Western diplomats cons d er? imminent os i r -els, agams ugOs .av1La
. unlikely (page 6)
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Dispute Over Saar's status subsides, (page 7)
7. French election picture appears somewhat brighter (page 7)
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 FAR EAST
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Indonesia reluctant to classify rubber as strategic:
on the list of strategic materials ow being drawn-up in connection with
the UN embargo on shipments to Communist China. He pointed out
that other countries might classify rubber as non-strategic, and
that he, in any case, was under the impression that the US would be
satisfied "if Indonesia adhered to its "historic pattern" in foreign
trade. The US Ambassador notes that Indonesia is unlikely to commit
itself publicly to a full embargo on rubber so long as there is reason
to doubt that the British will go that faro
Comment: Indonesian officials have
pointed out that the Indonesian economy is highly dependent upon the
incoane derived from rubber exports and that,. in any event, Indonesia
has not shipped rubber directly to the Soviet Orbit in the pasts The
bulk of Indonesian rubber has gone to Malaya for re-export; figures
are not available on the amount of Indonesian rubber included in
Malayan exports to China and the USSR.
the Indonesian Ambassador to the US,
presently in Djakarti has admitted. to
US Ambassador. -Cochran that Indonesian
officials are reluctant to include rubber
SOUTH ASIA
2. Indi
The US Minister Counselor in New
Delhi, in discussing the recent Sino-
Ttbetan agreement with the Secretary-
General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs)
Affairs, received the impression that the Indlwn. over^nment (a) was
disappointed over the Tibetan failure to secure better terms, but
(b) felt helpless in the face of developments and is likely to adept
the agreement without protest. When pressed, the Secretary-General
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admitted that the. agreement had fair-reaching implications for his
government. He added that a governmental committee, appointed
to survey the problem of defending India's northeastern and eastern
borders following the Communist Chinese invasion of Tibet last
autumn, had recommended strengtheftg':t : border.po$ts, 'improv...tgg
communications and raising the conditions and morale of the in-
habitants of the area who had always been neglected, He added that
India was not a military power and there. were definite limits to
what-it could do.
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5. Western diplomats consider imminent hostilities against Yugoslavia
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According to the US Legation in Bucharest,
Western diplomats in Rumania agree that
an attack on. Yugoslavia this summer appears
unlikely, although the situation is always
explosives The Legation acknowledges that more reports, largely
unconfirmed, of Rumanian and Soviet troop movements are now cir-
culating than at any time since last spring, but points out that move-
ments into critical areas such as Western Rumania are customary
during spring maneuvers. Thus, the departure of Rumania's only
armored division from Bucharest in early May is in itself not
considered alarming. The fact that there are no mounted anti-
air craft_gunus and no air raid directives in Bucharest is cited in
support of the Western diplomats' estimate.
Comment. For over a year travel
restrictions have limited the personal observations of Western
diplomats to the immediate vicinity of Bucharest.. In addition,
numerous arrests and trials of Rumanians on "espionage" charges
because of their contacts with Western missions have drastically
curtailed sources of information available to Western diplomats. These
,factors tend to weaken the factual basis of any Western diplomatic
estimate of military activity In the country. The fact that rilitary
maneuvers in the spring are traditional. in the Balkan, countries could
fur:p.ish convenient cover for any military activity, but there is no
firii indication of an imminent attack against Tito.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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Proportional representation, which the
new French electoral law was designed
to reduce in the 17 June national elections,
is expected to obtain in about two-thirds
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6e Dispute over Saar' s status subsides:
Schuman Plan author Monnet has told the
US Embassy in Paris that he believes (a)
a dangerous situation has been created in
the Saar by the banning of the Saar Democratic
Party, and (b) further actions of this sort
could cause difficulties for Adenauer, whose
political position is dependent on Franco-
German friendship. On the other hand.
French Foreign Office officials claim they would have been "placed on
the skids" if they had failed to act against the Saar Democratic Party.
They add that they anticipate no additional steps in the matter.
Meanwhile, in the six-hour debate on the
Saar in the West German Bundestag on. 30 May, a temperate atmosphere
prevailed, due chiefly to the mild tone of the addresses by both
Chancellor Adenauer and Socialist opposition spokesman Carlo Schmid.
Comment. The, Saar Democratic Party, a small
group favoring the return of the Saar to Germany, was banned on the
grounds that it was, unconstitutional. The Bonn Government wants to
support a Saar party working for union with Germany, but feels it cannot
back the Saar's Socialists, 'many of whom favor such a union, because
in West Germany the Socialist Party constitutes the chief opposition
to the government. Unfortunately for Bonn, the Saar Democratic Party
is reportedly exhibiting neo-fascist tendencies and, furthermore, in March
of this year sent representatives to the first meeting of the German Congress,
an organization attempting to coordinate the activities of groups opposing
German remilitarization.
French election picture appears somewhat brighter:
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of the electoral contests of France. This is largely due to De Gaulle?s
unwillingness to form electoral. alliances with the other non-Communist
parties. Because of his intransigence., the newly organized Rightist-
oriented ,".Fourth' Force" has been obliged to form numerous electoral
alliances with the middle-of-the-road "Third Force", which had
managed to maintain a government despite the opposition of both extremes
in the last Assembly. This development further reduces the chances for
a Gaullist landslide and makes it somewhat less likely that the Gaullists
and the Communists can obtain a majority between them. It is probable,
however, that the combined Communist and Gaullist representation will,
be larger than the 210 seats hold in the last Assembly.
Co mm If all non-Communist parties
united for the elections, they would obtain majorities in most districts
and Communist representation in the National Assembly would be almost
wiped out. De Gaulle's strategy is calculated to reduce the strength of
the middle-of-the-road parties by scaring the electorate into voting
for his party as the only effective opposition to the Communists. This
strategy will, however, also encourage those leftist voters seeking to
counterbalance De Gaulle's strength to vote for Communist candidates.
While the number of electoral alliances among Third and Fourth Force
parties now indicates that a middle-of-the-road majority is still
possible, this does not guarantee that a workable gov:rnment will results
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