CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000200090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 April 1951
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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GENERAL
US Embassy In Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by yeas" s
setbac'ts (page 3).
2. UK Foreign Office fears impact of possible Soviet b ak at Paris
talks (page 3);
FAR EAST
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Coalition cabinet formed in Indonesia (page 6).
NEAR EAST
Comment on the fall of the Iram.an Government (page 7).
9. Israeli broadcast calls for army action (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
100 Oatis may be used in possible Clementis trial (page 8).
110 Yugoslavia favors regional Peace Observation Committee (page 8)a
tSit l`71l U( oj'E
12. French Communist "peace" policy now tacitly admits inevitability of
war (page 9).
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US Emba sy in Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by years
setbacks
The Embassy is convinced that Western Europe is still the center of
danger for the US, but that threats to Asia and the Middle East are of
"serious import. "
weapons in the prosecution of a total war against the free world, The
Embassy anticipates that the Soviet Government, . in carrying out its
present policy, is prepared to incur major risks of precipitating global
hostilities a However, probably because the Soviet leaders are presently
uncertain of victory in war, they wish to avoid committing their own armed
forces. Instead, they prefer to apply continued pressures of the types
mentioned, believing this will eventually create a situation more favorable
to "engaging their ultimate weapon. " Nevertheless the Embassy, and
particularly the service attaches, feel that the USSR' s present relative
military strength, which will be diminished in the future as a result of
Western defense efforts, could lead the Soviet Government to "cast the
die without delay. " The Embassy feels that Korea and the implementation
of the North Atlantic Treaty have been setbacks to the USSR during the
past year, but concludes that maintenance of the present uneasy balance
and eventual improvement of the situation depend on Western determination
and unity in rapidly increasing resistance forces to. the extent necessary
to convince the Politburo of the inevitable disaster of a military adventure.
In its preliminary annual report on Soviet in-
tentions, Embassy Moscow notes that the USSR
is employing separately and in combination
political., psychological, economic and military
2. Foreign Office fears impact of possible Soviet break at Paris_ talks:
A high UK Foreign Office official has expressed
to the US Embassy in London his fears that the
Gromyko propaganda blast in the 25 April meeting
of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris may be
the prelude to the Soviets' breaking off the agenda talks tot he tune of
violent accusations against the intransigence of the West. The official
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said that such a development would put the UK cabinet in a difficult
position, but that it would ride out the storm. US Embassy London
comments that the official exaggerates the possible impact of a break
in.such circumstances upon public opinion?
Comm ent? Expression of these fears, albeit
exaggerated, could foretell new conciliatory moves by the UK at Paris
to protect its propaganda position. In the past week, however, the UK
Paris delegation has been stiffening its position, at least partly in re-
action to increasing evidence of Soviet uncooperativeness?
FAR EAST
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7. Coalition cabinngt formed in Indoncsia-'
After 37 days of negotiations, a coalition
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between the Masjumi (Moslem) Party and
the Indonesian National Party (PIN)--the
two largest parties in Indonesia--was announced on 26 April. The new
government is headed by Sukiman, Chairman of the Masjumi, with Suwirjo
of the PNI as Deputy Prime Minister. Although three outstanding moderate
Masjumi leaders of the old cabinet were excluded from the new cabinet,
US Ambassador Cochran believes that US relations with the Sukiman
government can be as good as, or even better than with the former
government. Chief advantages of the new cabinet are its working majority
in Parliament and the support of President Sukarno.
Comment, The new cabinet includes in
key posts at least two persons known formerly to have had Communist
associations, and the entire cabinet composition generally appears less
capable than that of the previous government. However, strong parliamentary
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support should enable the government to take decisive and neces?ary
steps toward the achievement of law and order, currently the outstanding
problem of the Indonesian Republic.
NEAR EAST
The resignation of Prime Minister Ala and his
cabinet on 27 April may postpone parliamentary action on the oil
question. The Shah, who will have a difficult time finding a satisfactory
successor, might resort to appointing Seyyid Zia, the most prominent
candidate. Since Seyyid Zia is popularly viewed his 25
appointment would be followed by widespread disapproval and unrest.
Even if the Shah meets the crisis in some other manner, the situation
will remain tense and popular irritation over the oil issue will continue
to contribute to any government's instability.
8. ~'omment on the fall of the Iranian (oyernment:
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9. fsraeli broadcast calls for army action:
US Legation in Damascus is unable to judge whether the broadcasts were
"authoritative, " it notes that there is local concern that the present lull
in the UN Security Council proceedings might permit Israel to present
the world with another fait accompli. UN officials and observers have
expressed disillusionment and frustration to the Legation over lack of
guidance on the basic points at issue and have also let their opinions
be known to the press. The Legation has been informed by a Syrian
Army staff officer that the Syrian Army will open fire if Israeli Army
units "invade" the demilitarized zone.
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Tel Aviv broadcasts on 23 April heard in
Damascus called for decisive action by the
Israeli Army to deal with the "intolerable"
situation in the demilitarized zone. While the
Comment, Despite threatening Israeli broadcasts
and strong statements by the Syrian Army, there is no specl fic data which
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would indicate that large-scale hostilities are likely to break out.
EASTERN EUROPE
Oatis may beaus used in possible Clementis trial:
11.
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,
cluding the Fields, with important, albeit undisclosed, issues and purposes,
He states that charges against Oatis follow the usual Communist pattern,
that there is practically no chance of obtaining Oatis' release prior to the
trial, and that his cgnviction is virtually assured regardless of his innocence.
Briggs advises that a protest alone would be futile, but he cautions that
the US must recognize the limitations and possible consequences of actions
that it may take, such as a rupture of diplomatic relations.
0
US Ambassador Briggs cables from Prague
that the arrest of William N. Oatis may be
part of Communist plans for a trial involving
Clementis and numerous others
possibly in-
Upon instructions from Tito and Kardelj,
Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler has informed
Ambassador Austin that Belgrade would be
interested in establishing a regional Peace
Observation Commission (POC) to cover a broad areas including perhaps
Morocco, Berlin, Greece, Turkey and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Bebler
declared, however, that Yugoslavia was resolutely opposed to any military
observer group limited to Yugoslavia since it would appear provocative
and might create panic in Yugoslavia. He added that Yugoslavia would
accept a POC to observe Yugoslav-Satellite borders only if the Satellites
agreed to admit such a team. Bebler also reported that Belgrade was
considering having a POC or some other' UN body send a diplomatic
mission to Belgrade and., 'atellite capitals with a,view- to examining the
causes of tension and attempting conciliation.
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ComMentm A regional POC appears to have little
immediate prospect for success. Neither Turkey nor Greece can see any
necessity for the introduction of such a team within their borders. The
UK has expressed the opinion that a regional team might tend to increase
world tension.
WESTERN EUROPE
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becomes less favorable to the "imperialist" camp. He reportedly failed
to state that war was not inevitable~? , declaration made on similar occasions
by Thorez in September and Duclos February. Lecoeur went on to exhort
French Communists to be prepared to undertake general strikes and even
revolution as a way to "defend peace. "
Auguste Lecoeur , French Communist Party
politburo member, has told the party"-s Central
Committee in a keynote speech that the threat of
war is growing constantly as the balance of power
Comment. Lecoeurt s statement presents no new
facet of French Communist, :policy, but is noteworthy for its confident tone,
particularly in the sharp reminder of what is expected of the party in an
internationaVerUls. Some of this militancy, however, may be explainable
as an atteAipt on Lecoeur's part to regain the favor of top Communist
leaders;, since he was reportedly admonished on 12 March for "deviationist"
ideas;
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