INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS -- WEEK OF 3 FEBRUARY - 9 FEBRUARY 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01082A000100010034-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: February 9, 1948
• Content Type: PERRPT

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OFFICE CF REPOPTS AND ESTIVATES, CIALASS. CHANGED TO: TS S25X1
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INTELLICITCE EIGHLIGETS V2EY OF 3 FEBRUARY - 9 FEBRUARY 1946
GENERLL
Chinese hostility to US policy toeurd Japan
117?deeperne 1.01:Mt of the Chinese A-tioral ,7overnment is further indicated
by its erceine tendonoy to ineite anti-foreignism as a devioe to rally popular
support see to counter eedesreead donee ti disoontent. This reckless oourse, for
which Chinas history offers ereoedents, has found exprescion recently not only
in Vee obviously inspired demenetrations in Canton and Shanghai, but in the
current Chinese precs iticks on US policy toward Japan. These attacks have now
acquired special signifilance (e) beoaese their prevent virulence coincides with
the visit to the US of t7le Chine se Toohninal )Lion headed by Pei Tsu-yi, and
USeChina discussions of ,L; ail to China; erd (b) because the current attaoks are
speerheaded by the nenspeeer Ta Rung Pao, which has a traditierai reputation for
fairminded objectivity and ehl6E-Yrra;71t5fied by the Chinese people with Kuomin-
tanc4s Political foienoe lroue. This Groep, notwitestanding the streng Party
position of the "CC Clique," remains promiuent in the direction of the Chinese
Governnent and ite foreign reletioni. This seeming paradox of condemning a
prospective benefactor may be explained as a design to fen popular chauvinism to
the point there the Chineee Geeernment cae disclalm. responsibility for the oon-
sequences if it is pushed too far toward vooepting unpalatable conditions in
international meeotiatione? -in thia case neenbiations on the Japanese Peace
Treaty0
It is noteworthy that Chiang Yai-shek, when addressing university professors
at Peipine in Decenber 1D47, euted the vie," that the US was supporting the
rebuilding of an aggressive JInan, and emphasised that the most important need
for China was the regainine or its on strength. Tionever, the Ceneralissimole
impatience reearding US ald for China, and the critical domestic situation, may
explain his apparently taAt aoquieseence in the present anti-US criticisms.
'indoel,tedly, Chinese farm of a resurgent Japan are genuine and deep-seated
China has for lone been 4 victim of Japanese eartial ardor and urge for expaneion
which the intolerable coneestloa of the home islands, coupled with a progressive
and adventurous national spirit, impell. -China is persuaded thet these fund-
amental Japanese attribenzs remein and oar be easily revived to the point of loss
of control., ;loreover, China le conscious that its chronic internal dissensions
and inherent raelonal xeeknosees have reduced it to impotency and to the throes
Of a- strugglefor si ivaL ina3.ly China envisions itself as a pawn in the US-
Soviet struggle for world power, and sees a threatened abandonment by the US of
China as a Great Power and a renoe in internaleonal affairs. Hence its efforts
to promote its self-inte(eets by playing on the designs and apprehensions of both
the t1S and the USSR throeeh supaesting the iwortanee,of its position as prospeot-
ive erbitee or ally.
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Nevertheless, these genaine and legitimate Chinese fears of a resurgent
Japan do not entirely expiate the present rampant arti-US press and the Chinese
manifestations of xenophobia. A complete explanation for these demonstrations
must be sought in the motives discussed above which arise from the exigencies
of deteriorating internal coeditions.
Re arations discussions still deadlooked in the MC
Tt is naa believed t.atlaW70E-frEig-555rEhat the USSR will alter its
stand on the reparations issee. After a year's discussion in the PEG no solution
is it sight despite reoent efforts an the part of the US, Australia and New2ea-
land to resolve the question. In November 1947 the US-announced that it wOuld
put 18 percent of its reparatione shares into a pool for subsequent distribution
among the other tan countries. Australia and New Zealand endorsed the idea and
agreed to contribute to the paol.
The USSR share although raised by this proposal to 4 percent, still falls
far short of the Soviet demand for 12 percent and the USSR has categorically
stated it trill not accept leas. Meanwhile the US has pointed out the value of
war booty the USSR has removed from Yanchuria, the Russian acquisition of Kuriles
and South Sakhalin and special rights and privileges Obtained elseetere in, north-
ern Asia arising out the Yalta agreements.
..samaio......
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JVAN
Japanese Cabinet restenation anticieated short. It is expected that the
resignation of Katayana'e coa1ilon Cabiit wfl1be ormally announced this
week. The resignation largely results from dissension within t:e Social
Democrutic Party between right and left minLs culminating in differences over
the supelementary budget bill. Social Democratic leaders feel that continuance
in office right lead to a complete breakdown in the party while, as the opposi-
tion, t'ese differences can be ironed out.
The Cabinet will probably rlsign on bloc rather than lull for coneral
elections. This'political maneuver is based on the Gradually decreasine,
populurity of the Social Democrats and the defeat tleywoeld incur in any
dectsion at the polls. If successful in hireling over the government to a more
conservati.ve croup without elections the Social Democrats will not suffer a loss
in Diet membership while the succeeding Cabinet inhorits the erecent problems
without a fiat from tho electorate.
It is anticieated that Shigeru Yoshida, the President of the Liberal Party
? (conservative), may be invited to form a Cabinet. The Liberals are currently
trying to activate a new eniargel consereative combination to be known as the
liaeional Salvation Party. Such an organization might become the plurality
party but it is doubtful if they could command a clear cut Diet majority since
Bitoshi Ashida, head of the Democratic Party (conser4ative), has political
ambitions and is also trying to form a new right wing combination in company
with the Peoples' Cooperatives. This grouping is tentatively labeled the
Central Renovation Party and aepeals to the sane conservative Diet minorities
that the Liberals are trying to neld,tecether.
The new Cabinet will probably be a coalttion of conservatives more troubled
by political opportunism t' an by the ideology mtioh helped undo ltatayanaes
coalition or the Social Derocrats with the conservative Democrats and Peoples'
Cooperatives*
?
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TORA
Public dtaorders in US Zone The wave of strikes, terrortam, and sabotage
illiChts currently dleturbin6 the US Zone of Korea is clearly Conmuntst-inspired
and has been timed to aecomplish three Irebable objectives: (1) to make the
situation apeeer so complexand explosive as to discoera,;e the UN from takine
any decisive action eine() tat body will be averse to identifying itself with
a- probable political fiasco; (2) to eebarrast the US eccueaLion-aut'orities by
forcing them to take repressive measur7.:s and thus' aemr3ntly substantiate 'Soviet
oharos that; the US has erected a police state in South Korea which will not
tolerate freedom of exprecsien;'and (3) to iortify 1.Ao vrostio of the north
Korean rejne internally and internatienally by Ltviet; the disorders the ,
tujpearanco of beint; a spontuneoue all-Korean demand for UU reeojkition of the
lejtieacy of the Uorth Korean People's Coemittee. .(,The-disordurs were carefully
Vmod to coinelde with a natic,nal holiday so that the 3-day "perulysts of
economic activity could be advertised as the result of a enoceserul, general
strIke).
Thus far tne extent of the disturbances is kparettly lirited and it !.8
improbable that they will momentum and culminate in a wave of wholesale
riotint; such as the bloodY i_nsurrections of October, 1940. However it should
be noted that rightist counter-measures, if insuffioiently restrained by the
police, could 2roduee an evor-widenint vertex of violence into which ev r-greater
segments of the population would be drawn until an insurrectionary steeps was
attained.
The ?apparent failure of the South Korean Communists to -produce a iml7ticul
.crisis is hardly surprisini; and should not be taken as a South Korean "vote of
confidence" in US Military Government*. On the contrary, the results thus fur
achieved ik.;pear quite re!:arkable when tt is corsidered that the Communist
orGanisation in the US Zone, since AlLust, 1947, has been subject to 411 the
repressive eorce that eoull he mobilize! aoinst it by the rihtist 'police force
and fanatically rightist youth groes. ? That it. has been able to aehieee even
the present dislocation-of economic and .;olitical life in South !Cored, on the basis
of completely clandestine prLanization, is-not:so much dee to the skill of the
CommunIst (vomiters as to the fact tat they were sorini; fertile. soil. The
Cortmanists have b: OA able to 1.72 -al to he traditional Korean hatred of the
ri6htist police force - a hatred which is unfortUn.itely laroly justified.
Woreover they have been able to call ai;tention to the inequities in tho South-
Vcroan economy, nervily: tho failure to onact a land rtforft law and the L.allopirt;
cosi; of Index. While it is true that both of tLeso.latter situations are
partially attributable to lack of cFrtulnty eencernin6 Soeth Korea's political .
-fUturo, the fact remains tat as loN; as this situation continues, the South
Korean COtiunists will have the capabir.ty of proeokirL dIscrders
whenever the need ar:sos.
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CHINA
lWlitary
Communist troops in /4anchuria to* another turn of the scree,
tightening the military ring around litikden, when they captured tianyang,
south of the city, and forced the hhtionaliste to abundon ell points along
the Peiping-Eukdentailway between. Chinchou and Hsinmint ..With this rail
line .out, the Communicts are new intent on preventing the reinforcement of
thoi Vationallet'e 7Jukden pocket by the troops of Fan Han-chiehe COscaunist
troops from recently captured Hsinlitun moved south and southwest of that
city, captured Shihshen? Koupangtze, Ianshans and Talinghoeand ere now at-
tackles Chinchou, a concentration of Communiet forces in the Ihsien urea
is teturther threat, to the tationelist position in Chinchou and Hulutece the
last remaining important port of entry into Uanchuria- for the -National
Government.
Nationalist troops of Fu Teo-yi are presently concentrated at
Choheien, midway between keiping and Faoting, uhile the Comtunists are dis-
eeraci in the gra...s south and southwest of the latter city. No major actions
took place in this theater during the past week. Scattered fighting was,
re2orted in northern Jhansi eith the Nationalists claiming the capture 01
e number of small towns. South of the Lunghai railnay, Chen Ti was forced
by Mtionaliet.preseure to move further south into the Yoncheng, Huaiyung
re4on but -there were no large-scale actions.
Diternal afairs
-
The recent disturbances in Shanghai ere symptomatic of the increas-
ing unrest and disillusionment with the National Government. Three najor
civil disturbances, in the period from 29 Januery to 2 February, culminated
in mob violence, destruction of property, and some loss of life. 71hi3.e the
Communists -- eh? are reported to have infiltrated into atanghai Libor
unions and even into the garrison headquarters -- doubtless have exploited
these develoestnts to the fullest, the basic cauee is, as usual, the re,
suit of the National'Government+is alienation of support through malpractice
and euministrative ineptitude. These specific, local conditions in
Shanghai mirror the Gevernmentss predicament on a nutional level, Where
the Government continues to apply to worsening conditions the-only,reme4
it,huethus far been able to devise: force ' -
The United States continues to attract attention in the restless
atmosphere of Teiwun. A.th the US Army Advisory Group training Government
soldiers on the island, Chineue sources have expressed fear that the in-
fluence of the US is encoureging separatist elemental; these-elements,
however, actuulle,find strength in the National Gevernment policy toward
Taiwan.. The Chinese authorities, attempting to maintain their none too
secure hold over the Taiwanese, are taking steps to Suppress any Communist
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tendencies among the Taiwanese (steps which will probably speed the epread
of Communism on the island), and are preparing to prevent a demonstration
reportedly planned for 28 February. The removal of the Chinese Governor,
4ei Tao-nd,ng, hue bmmainmen.44, with no sustaining evidence yet available.
bcternal Folitical
In connection with previoue reports that certain Chinese elements
favored USSR mediation in Chinese civil war, it is interesting to note
that Youth rarty leader Tseng Chi has attacked USSR policies as Fusciet,
seeking world domination and disregarding Chitati sovereignty; and he has
asserted that Russian insolence to Chinese was similar to that of the
Japanese. He agrees with Hsu Shill's statement that the USSR is a fearful
force for auression. Lxpreseions of anti.amdAdieentiecnt among Chinese
has become more frequent recently,. according to HS naval Attache, Nanking,
who believes this partly genuine and partly for US consumption. The
Shun kao (KET "CC" Clique) charged Russia with beginning new aggression
in p]a.nto build railroads completelY surrounding the northeast and Outer
General Sung, Sinkiang garrison commander, has recently stated
that he has 100,000 troops in the province., The US Consulate at Tihwa be-
lieves that in view of this and the receipt of additional supplies of
munitions, Sung feels he has little reason to fear simple revolt of natives,
although anYuppreciable Soviet assistance, even though covert, would can,
pletely chance the picture.
Chinese newspapers have featured the Chinese reply to British
Foreign Vinister Bevin on Kowloon incident, in which Chinese reiterated
their sovereignty over Kowloon City, and put the responsibility for the
Incident on the Hong Kong Government.
London Timms states the Chinese Government should have negotiated
the Kowloon jurisdiction issue earlier with the British Government and if
this was not satiefectory could have resorted to the United Nations or the
International Court.
US &hussy, Nanking, delivered a note to Chinese Fremier, 31
January, expressing growing concern and demanding prompt action on failure
of Chinese Government to fulfill Surplus Sales Agreement and Supplement
of July 1946, by handing over to US titles to property therein provided.
The flunking Bureau of Trade Earki and Patent* has informed the
EMbassy that preparations could not be uade to accept applications for
patents by 1 January 1948, but that full details ana sample forum for
filing applications would he submitted to 1,;mbussy tin the nearest future".
In connection with Government Infornution Directly Hollington
Tang's criticism of the alleged onesided and unfavorable to China releases
of the USIS, the US &hasay issued a statement to the prose, 28 Januery,
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alto
quoting statistics and other data to show that USIS releases *present a
fun and fair picture of American coment bused ,on a weekly analysis of
press opinion".
Economic
Current . The official "open" US dollar selling exchange rate
TAB ain raised on 3 February'to CH (.133,000. This is the third upeurd
revision Since 30 LeceMber 1947 when it stood at CH 00,000 to US a. The
"open" rate is now more in line with the Shanghai blackmarket rate uhidh
confined its average daily fluctuations during the week to between
CU ,150,0U0 and 170,000.
The Shan0ai blaokmarket interest rate was reported at 21ra per
month on 6 February, compered with the previous high of 30. !Ism, is
comparatively easy on the allandiai mrket in spite of the pre-lunar year
stringency.
Incus. Although the US. dollar blaciasarket exchange rate main..
tained a farrly steady level during the week Shanghai commodityrreices re-
sumed their rising tendency. :lice sole at a new high of CM Z1,600,000 a
picul on 6 February, after dcalers refused to re/ease stocks at the old
ceiling of GU 0.,94000, due to rising costs. Daily receipts of rice at
Shanghai are now reported to be meeting only two-thirds of requirements.
Rice prices went up sharply at Canton in spite of a recent good harvest.
%Orkers cost of living index in Shanghai went up thsrply to
95,200, based on the pre-ter level.
US Aid. The State Department has recommended a relief programa
for the ChMir-eGovernment reported totaling US 010 million. This program,
subject to alteration and Congressional approval, would allocate ftnds to
China for wheat, cotton, petroleum, rice grains, tobacco and flour, over
a 15 month's period beginning I. April. This China proposal is described
as a "holding operation" only, designed to prevent the Chinese atonally fraa
becoming worse, and would not be a permanent cure for her manifold economic
ills.
Private Foreign Lxchange naldingp. The US Government has an..
naunced it vali. assist western European countries to pry loose private
dollar assets held by their citizens in US bunks and brekeruge homes.
Undeclared satiety may be taken over by the US Government and turned over
by Congress to the western Luropean nations seeking aid under the pro-
posed Liarshall Ilan. This would be of considerable help to many countries
now in urgent need of foreign funds. Such a move brings new hope for
China in receiving similar help. It is roughly estimated that Chinese '
citizens now had convertible assets amounting to US C200 million in the US.
The Thtionel Government first appreached the '4edemeyer Mission last summer
for US help in calling in private funds, but the US Government was then
unwilling to interfere with "our free private enterprise system'. Chinese
,Government reaction to this late change in US policy is not yet clear.
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eat.
It is generally believed, however, that the Swot and Nang families ehe
decimate the National Goverment scene, have substantial holdings in the
US and would privately oppose the plan. If the plan were istAsmentedmit
is likely that some af the prdmute holdings could not be traced because
of odumme stomas.
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BURMA
' Since Aung San's eosaesination in 7uly 1947, inoreasine friction has
developed within the Anti.Fescist Leaeue (WL) beteeen two of its ocemonents,
the :Socialist Party and the Peoples' Voluntaer-Oreanization (WO). The .
PVO's membership is nada up of former nenbers of the Burma lndependenee
Army, Burma Defense Force, Burma national Army, and the Burma Patriotic
Forces (all one end the same organization) under Aune San's leaderthtp.
After the war, those who were not accepted by the rerular Burma Arpy formed'
the PVC, loyal only to Aung San, and became the LPL's armed eine, in effect,
Anne San's erivate Army. Prior to his death, 'lane San?freeuently stated
that after independence the PV0-would rive nr its adlitary status and beecne
an unarmed rational Serviee Corps; however, since his death the oreanization
has continued without chanee. With the areroach.of independence, an attempt
was made early in Deceeber 1947 to merge the rvo with the Socialists and
form. a Marxist Immo within the at1 to strenethen the latter oreanizationia
The proposal received only a cool reception from the !VO. Premier Thakin
Thi himself stepped into the nerotiations before an oren break occurred
between the two eroura and a satisfactory conpronise seemed to have been
reached whereby the formation of the rarxist Lea-n? was rostnoned until
next April and the PV0 agreed to eive up its military statue. -
Recently, however, it has been reported that sale IVO leaders, one of
them a cabinet nbee, have resiened from the AFL and the 70, and have
threatened to oreanize a rival political party. This turn of events restate
from the fact that a considerable section of the rvo is opposed to further
cooperation with the Socialists. Undoubtedly, the basic issue between the
two groups is political jealousy. The rank and file of the 1.110 are uneducated'
entralla rustics, many eaneyine themselves another Anne Ban, whereaS a number
of Socialists and Socialist sympathizers are fairly hirhly trained non, and
better qualified for top-level eovt service. Conseeuently, Socialists hold
a majority of the important port positions, probably out of proportion to
their numereial streneth. austly, or not the PVO's feel sliehted by not
beine given a fair share of eovt jobb and believe that the Soctalists are
attempting to give them the brusheoff, and that they can best serve their
own Interosts'by breakine away from the Socialists and formine their own -
party, perhaps an "tame San Party."
e serious split within the PV0 and between that eroup and tho. Socialists
could cause erave reeercussions throuehout Burma. Stability in Burma, at _
least in the foreseeable future, depends on the continuance in office of the
present eovt supported by a strone aaL. Disinteeration of the AFL, throueh
just such actions as are contenplated by t1eso,nr0.mambers will result in
several snail, feudine political parties etrueeline anowthereelves for
political dominance. Tae chaos created by such a state of affairs would
present the communists, the only other well orranized noliticel-earty in
Surma a clear mortunity to increase their influenca. It is possible that
Thakin Itt or sone of the cooler heads in the eovt nay he able to prevent
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puma (Continued)
any rash station on the part of either group, but their ability to compromise
and make concessions is limited by their fear that such concessions will -in
themselves weaken the AFL. AND rseetine is sehoduled for 15 lebruary, at
whish time it may very well be determined whether or not there will be a
serious political crisis in Burma.
S/AM
' The minuscule Siamese Communist Party ended a low' period of relative
inactivity with the publication on 25 eanuary of a Gonmunique frcal its
Executive-Committee which denounced the policies of the regime in power glee*
the Novaiher coup, attacked effort/et by "Imperialist* nations - Enema. Frenoe
and the DS - to enslave Siame and set forth the policy of the Conmetst Party.
The policy statement among other things called for (a) the establiehment of
a Peoples Front to fight for complete independence; (b) the introduction of
a new democratic politica. system; (a) the promotion of the people's economic)
welfare by the elimination of the influence of imperialistic countries and
(d) the use of armed forces solely for national defense, and their removal
tram politics. This connunique and renewed activity by Siamese Communists
coincides closely with the arrival in Banekok of two'nembers of the Soviet
diplomatic mission to Siam.
INDONESIA
Structural ohanree in new epubliean cabinet. The Indonesian Ripublieen
cabinet or into Senuary as a numor O7'..4.7crrferewhich may enable it to operate
with more facility than its predecessor, neerred rAtta, who heads the now
cabinet,. isbelieved to be entirely free from personal eolitical ties,, and
it is anticipated that he will remain aloof from any partisan differences
which nay develop in the future. Radical "Left....7Aw parties have been ex-
eluded from the cabinet and the majority of portfolios have been divided
anon the moderate it Party, the sonewhat ultra-conservative Majoemi
(::eslem),Party, and non-partisans, with the remainder of the posts MAW te
Minor croups of a non-communist nature. Eeeeptene the six rasjoame party
members, the political canplexion of the recent cabinet is quite conservative.
In past performance the allegedly pro-Dutch thsjoemi Party has always demanded
a major share in the Republican coverenent and it has developed such an cx-
trenely afeetistepositiee that it has succesefully blocked past aereenents
rith the Patch chiefly because thee 'were neeetiated by a Lefte7ine dordnatod
ceveentent. The -Republican novernment's statenent that the cabinet ie not free
from party strife will, therefore, have to be tested by time.
AM:de from purely political considerations, the current cabinet has
been streamlined to approxinately one-third the size of the former unwieldy
cabinet. leduction of posts vas accorelisbed by elindnatior of vice min-
istries and the consolidation of other relatively unineortant ministries.
Externally at least, the new cabinet fulfills Topjakertate claim that it
is a "presidential business cabinet." Another trend noted by a study of
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113:0ZIESIA (continued)
cabinet structure la added emphasis in reeard to social betterment of the
populace ae evidenced by -a ethane in nooenclature from the "linietry 9r ?
Sdooation. Poole]. Uplift, and Culture" to tho "rinistry of aocial Uplift,
Ed:option and Culture."
PHILIPPI/MS
&gem expreeseeApientointment at IX "failure! to keen heavily garrie
sone, bagpa 120Ulluptpas. In an unscheduled interview 5 February rith a
high rankirg US Krprofficer, ?resident Boxes expressed surprise and dira?
pointment that the US had failed to take edventege of opportunities to keep
heavily gerrileoned baser-in the Phil/entree stating that r.tention of the
Centr,1 Luzon US Army bare wee inadequate. The President seemed rutzled by.
continual withdrawal of US forcer era was amazed that the US Navy had deacti-
vated its Samar base in favor of Guam. Appearirg to eneekeeat leant in part-'
for US coneumetion, Preeidert ROXSS stated he believed the State Department
and Congrepr favored etrong Philippine barer but that fulfillment seemed
blocked by US Military Staff Fectionr who eenenred to him to be neglecting
considerations in the Vhiii-pires of friendship, rich land eroductivity, and
maneower.
. iee . . Reprerertatives of FL0
and the Tihilie-ine Government eigred an agreement in Merile on 6 February
which authorizes President Hexer to call for bide on dip-bee of approximately
92,000 long tons of surrlus VS ground and aviation ammuritior in the Philip-
pines. Under the egrrenent, which su-erreder a cortrnct corcluded 19 January,
(see FE/P reekly 13-19 Jrnuary) the ammuritior must be demilitarised and scree,
metal must be exported to the UE. Inaddition, the US ie to receive-701 of net
proceeds from sales to third -artier rhile the Phil- aire Government retains
301 plus all exeort tax recette. Estimated to coat originally more than 70
million, the ruralue ammunition is ex,erted to erovide eeeroximetely 24,000
toe., of ex-Aloe/vet, 7,000 tore of brass, and 58,000 tone of steel rewrap. The
Philiepine Government, which must sesume ruperviaory and security reeponeie
bility for the disposal ero,lect, exnecte to realize at least 4250,000 from
exeort collections on the outgoing ecrap and will retail', the salvaged porde
for commercial pureopet.
?The agreement cells for sealed bids to be ererented by 20 February ord
provides that the Phili-eine Gov-rnmert !..sy reject .11 Ws if rot satisfied
that the contractor is competent to eerie, out tee terms. Henry J. Kaiser
and former Albarador 7au1 V. McNutt are reeortrd aeong i-teterted bidders.
The Philippine Governe
ment recently put into effect legislation barring aliens from city owned mar-
kets in Manila by cancelling the licenser of some 1000 ,Chinese rtall?holders.
'."The stalls rere auctioned off to Fili-incs during Semler, despite legal action
which included an unsuccessful aepeal to thelSupreme Court end official repre-
sentations from the Chirere Government.
(1.11110kila.
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While nrotettp ove Active fro e the cityeorred merketr continue a
rev rource of friction bee r1oei. hinere verdere o-erating rtandr on
privately oened lend ir 17eni1e have reeorted to court action in ar ettem-t
to prevent threatened eviction. Thi e rill tort furth,r the Thilieeine Govern
mentie effortr to tic 1t theNreteil trele.
0 1140 .; e ? i e ? . The Philipeine
',..: .
f fAeL"
?Venateeon 5 Februery votrd 12 to 2 in fPvor of Prepident -CAMP embert7 Pro'
dametion eerdonirg eoliticel rpd economic ccal-Uoretorp. The House of :Apre-
rent-tivre rsr exeected to vote in fevor of tho reroletion on 9 l'ebrunry. Cone
ourrence by both:Rourer of Coegerrs le recerpnry before the 7ereridertia1eproe
demotion grenting ernerty to eeeroximetely 1,00C ecoromic Rnd eoliticel col"
leboretore ip efeetive.
Alt'eoueh Congrerriorel coreurrence ene ce tcteds opeoeition to the nearure
hap been greeter then rnr enticireted. The eort ?ebated ferturer of the no
eoeed anrerty in both Houser rere itr conetitutionelity mei ite reetricted
kepreeentetive Allem! of VSrile claimed that the TO 'ore tmrerty ir urconetie
tutiorpl ce the greunde thnt reneety meenp eardor to pereonr corvicted of eriper.
In thir erre pOirtp CAA that no indicte, socueed of eoliticel or economic
coll-boretier hPr been corvicted. enntor Lorerzo ?reredos former elicitor
Geners1 of the Peoele's Court (seeciel court ret U. efter liberstioe to try
colletoretorp), chellenged the erodenetio- on it rco-es deolsring that it
see direritiretorye unjurts ere vegue. He rteted t,e)t it ',out- eerden wile:bee
rating officiele while ignerirg the eoors ignorsnt eUbordinatep and 'lein eitie
zenp who carried out their orderrs ped "would confirm the groeieg helief snore
our eole that thir iP q overemert of big ehotrs by big rhotes and for Mg
ehote." .
Chief amone amrerty oeeorentr outride Cangrer:, Ilne been -kueerto Xergleors
currently Secretere of Tetiorel :4.feet:es er6 Itirirg the occu rtions a lead i'
in the reristerce movement. It he teen reeorted that enould the vinnrirty
move succeeds he eoulr; reign eopition in '1,otert.
?
?
gemeszekzegfinejeleefejazted. The US Conruletestioumeas has reported
that there iP POMO evidence that etestel?auttoritiee in Ler Caledonia are Oen-
poring 115 rail. Americen residertp of 1:oumee hive renorted dircreeencier to
the Consulate involeinedelny of irconieg mail and no -delivery ce both in-
coming and outgoing leen.
The ttnte Derertment in en etteneteto determine ehetter or not eertor-
rhip ir actuelly ocUrrirgs is re-ring cTrtnir lettere- to the Corrulete through
the oeen meil.
25X1X
25X1X
25X1
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1J4
? -
III
Lt. Gen. Lob-ton is renortedly sttemnting to 7ersuade the n Govern-
ment.to leave M troo..-s in RI after July 191X. !Ws fietr s'llserot rill
remain there In any cr-e.
The U1TR hr tnir of rool fit e ,-.-ost of 1,50C,COQ parent's
from th,r4 cnrrent -4; rool clip.
Aw-tralier Ulitary 71ssion of 9 Ar-y officers erd 5 AirTorne officers
left rriptans: 5 frbrunry to ss-ist in slw*rvision of the Atch Indonesian truce.
. The 'atersideHorkers 'ruve arrounced thfir intention to extend their bnn
on Dutch ehilipirg to ircludeorrgo. or theirgs-ore,Austrrlint run if the letter
is resumed in Narch.? The tan rill ro4.1.s lifted or modified until ruthoriied
by tte Indoref-ien Trede Union "i.;ovme,-t, which originary reonestA it.
Incre:7sed trede betrren Australis anr5 ?skiptrn if forlseen by ?akistan
officisle in Australia. V.r. Arthur Hall, Director General of Pakist-,n Esil-
roedr, said that Pakistrn ;-rouced.r,r mnterisir such as jute in cotton
Thich Aurtralie reededp.rhile Austr-!lis could ruppiytYfetsn .ith roolW gtOde
erd machinery. The .ialartn Trade Comnissioter, t4v. A' red ;41ber.? claimed theft.
In 2 years Pnitistan ooulr rovide sll of imstralia's jute.aupplier nr0 lame
quantities of linseed oil ard rool for cnrpet making.
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