CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100490001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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5 April 1951
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Copy No. C
CENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. r
DECLAS-31FIED
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Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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USAID, DIA, DOS reviews completed
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Western delegates in Paris disagree over Soviet proposal of 30 March
(page 3).
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FAR EAST
4. Possible Soviet jet bomber sighted over northeast Korea (page 5).
5. Views of former UK Charge in Peiping (page 5).
6. Chinese Communists again cross border (page 6).
7. Burma shows concern over problem of Kuomintang troops (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Czech Ambassadors not to return to Washington, London, and Paris
(page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Opponents predict defeat of Schuman Plan in French Assembly (page 8).,
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GENERAL
Western delegates in Paris disagree over Soviet proposal of 30 March-
At a meeting of the Western delegations
on 3 April, the chief of the UK delegation
indicated a willingness to accept the Soviet
proposal of 30 March that the NATO and
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US bases be included in the agenda, while the chiefs of the French and
US delegations asserted that the West could not accept the proposal.
After discussion, the UK delegate remained opposed and stated he would
consult London on the matter, It was agreed, however, that (a) the
Western. powers would ask Gromyko for a "further reply" on the new
complete agenda presented by the West on 2 April, (b) possible Western
countermoves would be considered, such as the proposal for an item
on "Soviet support of armed aggression," and (c) the delegates would
consult their governments to determine whether they are ready to op-
pose the latest Soviet proposal to the, point of a deadlock. On 2 April.,
the chief of the US delegation reported he was considering such counter-
proposal items as the Soviet military alliance system and the stationing
.of troops outside the USSR.
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5 April 1951
,Copy No. L-
Correction to
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
(issue of 5 April 1951)
The 'fa.rsL sentence of the Comment in article 4, page 5,
should read:,
No B-45ys were reported to be in the area at the
time of the sighting.
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EVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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4. Possible Sovi? l: Jet buniber si ht.ed over northeast Korea-
plat?.r resembled a US B145 jet bomber and may have b 3en a "Soviet type
27 aircraft.."'
Or 29 March a twin-jet bomber, silver in
color, was observed traveling at 400 miles
per hour over no theastern Korea Wiest of
Sor_?gjir,,, According to field comment., the
Ca rxixne9n.to AB-45's were reported to be in
the area at the time of the sights g? This is the first reported sighting
of an enemy jet bomber in Korea,. The Soviet "type, 27`' aircraft is be-
lieved to be the first: jet bornber produced numbers in the USSR. Although
it appears to have been designed as za light bomber, it could be used for
close support of ground troops.,
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50 Views of former UK Charg i,r,, Pviping,,
Ltt. a conversation with the US Consul General
ij_:n Hong Kong, the former UK Charge in
Pr ping, who is now en route to England,
reportedly stated that. (a) fear of US inten-
tions, toward China was ar importai;t factor in Chinese interver.t ion. in
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strength and by the evening of 2 April were attacking the border post of
Phong Tho (approximately ten air- miles within Indochina). French Com-
mander-in-Chief de Lattre has asked the Military Attache to keep this
information secret until it can be determined whether the troops are
Chinese Communist regulars.
Comment: Smaller forces of Chinese Com-
munists have made two other border crossings in this area in recent
months. One was believed to be a reconnaissance mission; the other
involved an attack on a small French outpost. This crossing is the
deepest Chinese Communist penetration into Indochina yet reported.
The US Military Attache in Hanoi has
learned that on 1 April Chinese Communist
forces crossed the China-Indochina bord r
at Buong Nam Cuong in estimated batta7ioon
Korea, (b) the USSR will come to Peiping's aid if Chinese territory is
attacked, and (c) Peiping will not reduce its terms for a Korean settle-
ment -- although heavy Chinese losses may lead to an undeclared cease-
fire restoring the situation prevailing before June-1950. With respect
to Sino-Soviet relations, the UK Charge noted that Soviet personnel "are
not much in evidence" in Peiping, and maintained that Peiping is unlikely
to submit to Russian dictation but that Western pressure is forcing the
Peiping regime into increasing dependence on the USSR.
Comment: The former Charge's views
are largely in accord with the UK's China policy, which has been ex-
plicitly based on the premise that Western hostility to Peiping would
force the regime into an unnatural dependence on the USSR. In recent
months, as British belief in the solidarity of the Sino-Soviet alliance has
grown, the primary consideration of British policy in the Far East has
been the desire to avoid an all-out war with China.
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6. Chinese Communists again cross, border:
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7. Burma shows concern over problem of Kuomintang t
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The Burmese Commander-in-Chief has in-
formed the, US Military Attache in Rangoon
that, some 3,000 Kuomintang soldiers who took
refuge in. the border state of Kengtung last
summer are moving northward to the Wa
states (also along the Si no-Burmese border)
According to the US Charge in Rangoon, it
is likely that Chinese Communist forces
opposite Wa and Kengtung (numbering about 4,000 to 5,Q00) are aware of
this movement. The US Charge comments that Burmese Government of-
ficials have long been concerned over this problem, fearing that the pre-
sence of these units in Burmese territory might provoke Chinese Com-
munist forces to cross the border or to demand that the units be disarmed.
In case of a Chinese Communist protest or demand for Burmese action,
the Burmese Government might appeal to the UN in order to avoid com-
mitting forces to the task of rounding up the'Koum tang troops.
Comment: The Burmese Commander-in-
Chief, whose troops were committed to containing insurgents in other
areas, was concerned when Kuomintang remnants entered Burma last
summer. At that time, the Burmese Government sought, through US
liaison, to obtain an order from Taipei authorities itstructing the
Kuomintang commander either to surrender to the Burmese or evacu-
ate Burmese territory. Taipei subsequently issued an evacuation order,
which was ignored. The Burmese have been reluctant to request UN
action because they have not wished to publicize the issue for fear of
Chinese Communist reactions.
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Czech Arnbassadorbnotto return to Washir ton, London and Paris:
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On 3 April, the US State Department was
notified informally that Czechoslovak Am-
bassador to the United States4Tladimir
Outrata/would not return to Washington.
According to the US Embassy London, the
furniture of Rudolph Bystricky, Czecho-
slovak Ambassador to Great Britain, has
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been removed from his residence. An un-
confirmed report stated that the Ambassa-
dor's family will leave London shortly. The
US Embassy in. Prague has been reliably
informed that Dr. Adolf Hoffneister, Czechoslovak Ambassador to France,
will not return to Paris and that his family is expected to arrive in Prague
shortly.
Como The above named Czech Ambas-
sadors are three of a larger group of Czech diplomatic representatives
abroad-that was recalled to Prague in mid-February, about a week prior
to the official public denunciation of former Foreign Minister Clementis
as an agent of French intelligence. All of these diplomats have now
either defected, as did the Czech Ambassador in New Delhi and the Czech
First Secretary in Bern, or have been relieved of their assignments.
Since these men were either friends of C].ementis or appointed to their
posts during Clementis' tenure as Foreign Minister, it is likely that the
recalls are associated with the current purge in Czechoslovakia.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Ouponents predict defeat of Schuman Plan in French Assembly-
In a conversation with a representative of
the ECA Mission to France, two key in-
dustrialists and a prominent Socialist deputy
have expressed strong antagonism to the
draft Schuman Plan treaty. The Socialist and one of the industrial leaders
-- the First Vice-President. of the powerful National Employers' Associ-
ation -- declared that the Assembly would not ratify the treaty. The
other industrialist -- the leading spokesman for the French steel. industry
- bitterly criticized the French Government on the gounds that it was
the only European government "maligning" its own steel industry; his
bitterness was also directed at the US, because he felt that Monnet's
repeated 68threat" of the withdrawal of US financial aid had induced the
delegations to support and initial the present treaty draft.
Comment. This report is the clearest in-
dication to date that French industrialists will attempt to prevent ratifi-
cation of the Schuman Plan treaty. It is doubtful whether the Socialist
deputy's opposition to the treaty is shared by a majority of his party's
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bloc in the Assembly. The line-up for and against the treaty in the As-
sembly cannot be determined until the Foreign Ministers of the partici-
pating countries resolve several basic issues at the conference opening
in Paris on 12 April. If this conference is prolonged for several weeks
and if elections are scheduled for June, French ratification of the treaty
will be in doubt until early summer.
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