CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 19, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No. /,b
19 February 1951
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Working Paper!!!
Dry Run Only
fox
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
.A S8 FIED
(:?-L- NGED TO: TS S C
--
N~".:!" DATE:
AM "K. H: HR 70-2
DATE.k/.(i!l.. r1EVIEWER:
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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Dutch official reports European reevaluation of Soviet intentions
(page 1).
YUGOSLAVIA
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4. Tito desires to remain aloof from West (page 2).
USSR
7. Commentary on Stalin's interview with a Pravda correspondent
(page 4).
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GENERAL
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that, except for the possibility of a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia,
a direct attack against Western Europe is extremely unlikely within
the near future. In their opinion, Soviet leaders are greatly concerned
over the progress of NATO and the rise of national deviation tendencies
in Western European Communist Parties and are, as a result, secretly
pasting to the defensive. Although the urgency for a speedup of
European defense is still generally recognized, I ointed out 25X1
that these circles feel a breathing space is more possible than is
believed in the US.
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chief advisers, reports that European higher
civil and military circles are coming to believe
Comment: is probably in a position 25X1
to judge the changing currents 1 uropean opinion, and his report may
reflect the views of certain Dutch Socialists who believe in a defense
program commensurate with Dutch recovery needs. While there have
been reports from other sources reflecting lessened apprehension in
European circles: regarding Soviet intentions, this is the first Dutch
report of this nature.
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1. Dutch official reports European reevaluation of Soviet intentions :
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YUGOSLAVIA
. Tito desires to remain aloof from West-
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In recent conversations with US Assistant
Secretary of State Perkins, Tito pointed
out that he would remain aloof from any
bloc so that the Yugoslav people, in the
event of a Cominform attackuld not
blame their government for, provoking the
action. To avoid a public debate regarding Yugoslav military supplies,
Tito said he hoped to obtain them through commercial channels by
means of long-term loans. He added, however, that if he became con-
vinced that a Cominform attack was imminent, this caution might vanish.
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USSR
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7.
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Commentary on Stalin's interview with a Pravda correspondent:
The Stalin interview with a Pravda correspondent
generally adheres closely to often repeated Communist
propaganda themes. Its. emphasis on the "peace cam-
paign" and its efforts to contrast the aggressive West with the peace-
loving USSR may be timed to coihcide with the forthcoming East Berlin
meeting of the World Peace Council. This organization has been repre-
sented in.. Communist propaganda as much more representative of the
people of the world than the UN. The denunciation of the UN as an or-
ganization-acting for "American aggressors" may be intended to set
a contrast with the expected moves for `d~eace" by the World Peace
Council and to raise the prestige of that organization. The absence of
any reference to those Middle and Far East countries which voted to
brand Communist China an aggressor contrasts sharply with the
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designation of the North Atlantic Pact and Latin American countries as
the "aggressive core" of the UN. In his prediction tat the Anglo-
American forces in Korea would ultimately be defeated because' the
unpopularity of the war among American and British. soi s?. 10W..
attempts to
governments--a normal Communist technique that has
lay
d
p
e
*AUT
portant part e
world "peace" campaign. Stalin's prediction may
e
likewise hav rested toward encouraging China in connection with
the current c'lebration of the first anniversary of the Sino-Soviet
Friendship Treaty.
The Soviet leader has made previous public state-
ments regarding the inevitability of war and the possibility of peace-
ful coexistence and cooperation between the capitalist and communist
.worlds. In these statements, Stalin has implied that war was not in-
evitable if the capitalist world would cooperate. The latest statement
adds the point that while war is not inevitable, "at least not at the present
time," it may become so unless &e people. o world ,.erhaps through
the World Peace Council) take the cause of pea Into thei own hands
Comment in Stalin's speech on the German question
'is significantly absent.
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