CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No. s-
15 February 1951
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Working Paper 111
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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1, Possible future Soviet diplomatic tactics reported (page 3).
KOREA
2. fears for the future (page 4).
INDOCHINA
5. Vietnamese official reveals plan for ousting French (page 5).
YUGOSLAVIA
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6. Tito officially doubts USSR will take aggressive action in Europe
soon (page 6).
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 GENERAL
1. Possible future Soviet diplomatic tactics reported,
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regarding the plan of diplomatic
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action to be followed by the USSR if the West does not make concessions
on Germany. According to the report,.. Soviet chiefs of mission in the
Satellites were informed in late December 1950 that no early Soviet
armed action was contemplated in the West. Western refusal to meet
Soviet demands on Germany would be countered by the following program,
(a) intimidation of France and Great Britain by vigorous diplomatic
pressure on the question of German remilitarization; (b) denunciation of
the military restriction clauses in the Satellite peace treaties; (c) a cam-
paign to intimidate the West German Government and people in order to
elicit a more favorable reaction to East German "unity" proposals; and
(d) a rupture by Poland and Czechoslovakia of diplomatic relations with
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gressive stages, and that the. steps would probably be taken in the order
listed. The order might, however, be changed or modified by circumstances.
Comment, The USSR has already embarked on a
diplomatic campaign to intimidate France and Great Britain. The Soviet
notes of 15 December 1950 and 20 January 1951 stated that French and
British action regarding West German remilitarization violates the
Franco-Soviet Agreement of 1944 and the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942.
These notes contained an implied threat of Soviet denunciation of the
treaties. Communist efforts to elicit a favorable West German reaction
to East German "unity" proposals have as in the past been limited to
propaganda and agitation. There has been no reported sabotage or at-
tempt to apply the East German law "for protection of the peace' to West
German citizens although. a few West Germans have been designated as
"warmongers" ~y the East German press.
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KOREA
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Recent actions and statements by officials
reflect fear on the part of South Korean leaders
that the particular interests of the Republic of
Korea may be overlooked or even sacrificed for
the sake of larger Western objectives. President
Rhee has declared his firm intention to continue
fighting even if the UN should order a cease-fire and his desire to obtain
arms for "every Korean man, woman and child." The Chief of Staff of
the ROK Army has advocated that, "because the Chinese have been branded
as aggressors," UN forces should advance across the Yalu and capture
Peiping and Nanking. Meanwhile, the ROK Government is continuing to
exert every effort to obtain arms, even at the cost of expending a portion
of its dwindling foreign exchange account.
Comment- While some of the irresponsibility in
such statements reflects President Rhee's character, the
mounting international seriousness of the Korean conflict has created a
genuine fear among ROK officials that the West may overlook the ROK's
paramount interest in any settlement of the conflict.
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a6 fears_ for the future-
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INDOCHINA
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5. Vietnamese official reveals plan for ousting French-.
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has informed US
Legation Saigon unofficially that, while it would be
illogical and unjust to deny the French a voice in
the control of Vietnam's economy during the present period of French
military and financial support, the ultimate objective of Vietnamese
nationalists was the "ejecting of French interests," not by force of arms
but by diplomacy. The official, at the Pau Conference,
had there supported the tactic of E conceding o e ranch a veto power
in the quadripartite economic commissions, so that the Vietnamese, in
turn, could use their own veto power to sabotage the quadripartite struc-
ture at an opportune moment in the future. In the official's opinion,
this opportune moment might. come with the re-establishment of Viet-
namese control over the rich rice-producing regions of Cochinchina,
now in Viet Minh hands, and the consequent lessening of Vietnamese U%
economic dependence on the French.
ment: This is an unusually frank admission of
ultimate Vietnamese objectives which derives added significance from
the fact that it comes from an official in high favor with the French-
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supported Vietnamese Premier. The report highlights the known fact
that few, if any, Vietnamese officials have any real loyalty toward
French interests.
YUGOSLAVIA
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6. Tito officially doubts USSR will take aggressive action in Europe soon*
In a conversation with US Assistant Secretary of
State Perkins, Tito and Foreign Minister Kardelj
agreed with a recent estimate by US mission chiefs
in the Cominform countries that neither the Satellites nor the USSR were
preparing an imminent attack anywhere in Europe. - Tito added that his
knowledge of Russian and Soviet psychology made him doubtful that the
USSR would take action which would label it an aggressor in world opinion,
Comment: In other recent official statements,
Yugoslav leaders have expressed the opinion that Germany was a more
likely target than Yugoslavia for attack in the spring of 1951. Reluctance
to be labelled an aggressor in world opinion did not prevent the Soviet--
sponsored aggression in Korea.
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