CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100230001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No, 4 -7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMEN ~.NO.
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AUTH. FLAT 7O->
DAT )24I ' G~JRLWE'N C;:
Office of Current Intelligence
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TOP SECRET
State Department, FBI reviews completed
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4 March 1951
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Anonymous source reports Soviet plans to enter Korean war
(page 3).
FAR EAST
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3. Political wrangling continues in Indochina (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslavia hopes Council of Foreign Ministers will not con-
sider Trieste issue (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. French Communists appeal to "neutralists" on German neu-
tralization question (page 5).
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GENERAL
1. Anonymous source reports Soviet plans to enter Korean war:
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An anonymous letter received by the New
York field office of the FBI warns the US
Government that the USSR intends to use
the forthcoming Four-Power Conference only as a smoke-screen
to hide its offensive preparations. The anonymous source alleges
that "an old World War II friend, now in a UN Iron Curtain group,"
told him all "Iron Curtain UN delegations" were informed late in
February that the USSR plans to enter the Korean war in full force
in April. The source's friend believes both Japan and Alaska will
be invaded and that Mao Tse-tung has been in Moscow getting final
instructions.
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Comment: No evidence exists to support
the statements in this letter; it seems unlikely that such plans would
be communicated to Satellite delegations at the UN.
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3. Political wrangling continues in Indochina-
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When asked why he did not remove the Premier, Bao Dai replied that
even though Huu's mismanagement of the Defense Ministry would re-
sult in three or four months' delay in the formation of a Viet Nam
army, he could not "risk" disposing of the Premier at present for
fear that Huu, abetted by the French, would start a separatist move-
ment in Cochinchina. Bao Dai commented that Huu's incompetence
would eventually become evident.
Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai has informed
US Minister Heath he is strongly opposed to
the policies of his Premier, Tran Van Huu.
Minister Heath comments that the Bao Dai-
Huu conflict is a "sort of civil war" between the legal central
government (headed by Huu) and a second "cabinet" (consisting of
the Emperor and his personal following). Heath considers this de-
velopment gravely detrimental to Vietnamese national reconstruction,
to the formation of a national army and to the prosecution of the ":real"
civil war against the Communists.
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EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslavia hopes Council of Foreign Ministers will not consider
Trieste issue:
Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Mates
has informed US Ambassador Allen that
the Yugoslav Government hopes the Trieste
question will not arise at a possible Council
of Foreign Ministers, since any likely Soviet proposals would cer-
tainly be opposed to Yugoslav interests. In the event that the question
does arise, however, Mates said he wished US authorities to know
that the Yugoslav position had not changed since last summer and that
his government still favored a settlement of the Trieste question
through direct negotiation between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav
Government, however, does not feel that the time is ripe for direct ne-
gotiations since, as long as the Italian Government does not genuinely
wish settlement, formal discussions of the issue would only exacerbate
public, opinion and reverse the present favorable trend in Italian-
Yugoslav relations.
Comment: In the summer of 1950, the Yugo-
slav Government indicated to the Italian Government that it was willing
to discuss the Trieste question on the basis, in principle, of Zone A to
Italy, Zone B to Yugoslavia, with minor modifications along ethnic
lines. In his recent Reuters interview, Tito said he preferred that the
question be tabled for the present, since it was not an urgent problem
and there was no mutual desire to settle it. The Italian Government,
likewise, would prefer no international discussion of the Trieste issue
at this time; it continues to insist upon the implementation of the West's
Tripartite Declaration of 20 March 1948, which promised that the en-
tire Free Territory of Trieste would be returned to Italy.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. French Communists appeal to "neutralists" on German neutralization
question:
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Ady a "neutralist" mass meeting in Paris on
1 March, Pierre Cot, speaking for the
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Communist-front Progressive Union, seemed mainly interested in
creating a favorable climate of opinion for some eventual Soviet
proposal to neutralize Germany. This emphasis in his speech re-
ceived approving comment from "orthodox neutralists." It was
evident from the speeches that the Progressive Union has not yet
had much success in winning "orthodox neutralists" to the support
of the Soviet peace policy and, hence, Cot and his followers can be
expected to increase their efforts to exploit neutrality sentiment
during the next. few months. At the same time, the French Communist
Party is understood to be conducting a covert struggle to prevent the
spread of "neutralism" and national deviattonism within its ranks.
Comment: This is the first report of a mass
meeting sponsored by both "orthodox" and Communist-front "neu-
tralists" and the first indication that the French Communist Party is
failing in its propaganda campaign with respect to the "orthodox neu-
tralists." By shifting its emphasis to the neutralization of Germany,
it probably hopes to accomplish two objectives: to convince those who
favor neutrality to support the Soviet peace offensive and to avert de-
fections within the Party itself,
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