CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100180001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A
Approved ForBlease 200M CIA-RDP79TOO97WO01
0 WRE'r
27 February 1951
25X1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Working Paper !!!
Dry Run Only
25X1
25X1
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
State Department review completed
Copy No. 0_
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100180001-0
 25X1A
Approve
SUMMARY
EASTERN EUROPE
1. Gottwald speech confirms Titoist movement within Czech Com-
munist Party (page 3).
WESTERN EUROPE
2. Pleven asks confidence vote (page 3).
3. France unwilling to accept immediate military aid to Spain
(page 4).
4. Franco may approach US and UK on possible changes in Spanish
regime (page 5).
SCANDINAVIA
5. Swedish firm to refuse export of strategic bearings to Soviet
Orbit (page 5).
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100180001-0
 Approve
25X1A
EASTERN EUROPE
1. Gottwald speech confirms Titoist movement within Czech Communist
P
25X1A
of the Party, to change its policy, and to usurp the leadership of the
State." Among those implicated in the speech were former Foreign
Minister Clementis, Moravian Party Secretary Sling, and Deputy Sec-
retary..General Svermova. Gottwald promised that "Czechoslovakia
will not become a second Yugoslavia," called for greater vigilance
by the Party leadership, and reminded all Czechs to remain faithful
to Stalin.
Comment: President Gottwald's address
confirms a long-suspected b he nid b dthe-scenes struggle for power
within the Czech Party. The recent intensification of this struggle,
which has brought it out into the open, probably reflects increased
efforts of the Soviets to extend their control more effectively over
the Czech economy, A virtual ultimatum that Czechoslovakia should
more rapidly integrate its economy into the Soviet master plan for
the Orbit was delivered in February 1950 in Moscow to Party Sec-
retary-General Slansky by Kremlin Politburo members Malenkov and
Mikoyan.
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1A
posal to return the government's compromise bill to committee.
The Popular Republican (MRP) deputies, who must now weigh their
25X1A
arty:
In a recent speech to the Central Committee
of the Czech Communist Party, President
and Party Chairman Gottwald disclosed what
he termed a "widespread plot to gain control
2. Pleven asks confidence vote:
In an effort to postpone an admission by the
French Assembly of its inability to agree on
electoral reform, Premier Pleven is seeking
a vote of confidence on 27 February on a pro-
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100180001-0
 254
consistent rejection of compromise solutions against the odium of
joining with the Communists to bring down the government, have
insisted that the confidence vote Y.e delayed until the afternoon of the
27th in order to allow as much tL a as possible for efforts to reach
an agreement.
Comment: An absolute majority against Pleven
on a vote of confidence would work to the considerable advantage of
the Communists. The resulting elections would be held under the
current electoral system, which gave the Communists nearly 30 per-
cent of the seats in the present Assembly. All non-Communist parties
are intent on reducing this representation, and the MRP will probably
support Pleven on the scheduled confidence vote, although the party's
subsequent course is still in doubt.
25X1A
ern defense. With an eye to the forthcoming elections, the govern-
ment is unwilling to risk the sort of propaganda with which the
Franco regime habitually exploits favorable developments in its
foreign relations. The Socialists, in particular, will oppose any
steps beyond those already taken to restore full diplomatic relations
with Madrid, which they accepted grudgingly. Embassy Paris be-
lieves that if the 1951 French elections produce a more stable govern-
ment, a concrete proposal with possibilities of prompt military imple-
mentation, advance )i--!ferably through NATO, might be more readily
acceptable.
According to the Director of Political Affairs
in the French Foreign Ministry, the present
French Government is not in a position to wel-
come publicly a Spanish contribution to West-
Comment: Foreign Minister Schuman declared
last summer that the question of utilizing the strategic potentialities
of Spain could be solved only by admitting Spain to NATO. French
popular opinion has been deeply disturbed by the possibility of a de-
fense line established at the Pyrenees. Some French army officers,
however, would welcome the integration of Spanish combat units into
a European Army.
25X1A
3, France unwilling to accept immediate military aid to Spain:
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100180001-0
 25X1A
Approve
4. Franco may approach US and UK on possible changes in Spanish
regime:
25X1A
ing of the base" of his regime. Such an approach is thought by the
Foreign Office to be connected with negotiations between Don Juan
and Franco, who may meet in the near future. The Foreign Office
feels that Franco may desire (a) to gain Monarchist support, thus
destroying the non-Communist opposition coalition and possibly
driving the moderate Left into the Communist fold, and (b) to involve
the US and UK in Spanish political intrigue.
Comment: There is evidence that Franco recently
offered Cabinet posts to Don Juan Monarchists, but without success.
Although he has also approached Don Juan regarding a meeting, h-a is
not willing to relinquish his political control. He may feel that, qtr-
cause of his improved relations with the US, he will be able to gain
Monarchist support with a minimum of concessions on his part.
The British Foreign Office understands that
Franco may sound out the US and British repre-
sentatives in Madrid regarding the attitude of
their governments toward a possible "broaden-
SCANDINAVIA
25X1A
5. Swedish firm to refuse export of strategic bearings to Soviet Orbit:
Europe for non-standard bearings or for certain types and sizes of
standard bearings defined as strategic by SKF.
The Swedish Foreign Office has informed US
Embassy Stockholm that SKF will undertake
not to accept any new orders from Eastern
Comment: This constitutes the first instance
of a definite commitment on the part of the Swedes to give "Interna-
tional List I treatment" to any commodity. This new and more co-
operative attitude undoubtedly stems largely from a fear that Sweden
might otherwise suffer in the allocation of raw materials from the
West.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100180001-0