CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100150001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 22, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

0001-3 /
February 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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1. US Embassy Moscow comments on Stalin interview (page 3).
3. Chinese Communist trade delegation joins Satellite delegations
in Moscow (page 4).
YUGOSLAVIA
4. Tito instructs Communist Party members on need for rapproche-
ment with West (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5, French Government crisis in Pleven's hands (page 5).
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GENERAL
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1. US Embassy Moscow comments on Stalin interview'.
US Embassy Moscow believes that the 16 Feb-
ruary Stalin interview is an attempt by the USSR
to recapture the diplomatic initiative taken from
it by the effective inauguration of the Western defense program. The
interview may have been timed to affect prospective Council of Foreign
Minister talks and the forthcoming meeting of the World Peace Council.
It attempts to exploit the economic burdens of rearmament and to en-
courage Asiatic countries, especially India., to split away from the NATO-
Western Hemisphere groups.,
In the Embassy's opinion, the most significant
aspect of the interview is the statement that war can become inevitable
if the warmongers succeed in deceiving the people. This statement
clarifies the Soviet propaganda line, which until recently has stressed
that the peace forces would be victorious over the war camp, and ser-
ves notice to the Russian people and to others that war is now a pos-
sibility. With respect to the UN, Stalin's comments presumably imply
that only a peace pact between the five permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council would reestablish the UN's moral authority and avoid a
withdrawal of the Soviet bloc and certain Asiatic countries. Although
Stalin hinted that the seating of the Chinese Communists is now less
important to a Korean settlement, US withdrawal from Formosa and
Chinese participation in a settlement arranged outside the UN still
appear to be indispensable conditions.
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3. Chinese Communist trade delegation joins Satellite delegations in
Moscow.
Yao I-lin had arrived in Moscow. The USSR trade representative in
the Chinese People's Republic, V. P. Migunov, arrived at the same
time.
The Soviet press reported on 19 February
that a Chinese Communist trade delegation
headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade
Commenr. All Eastern European Satellites
have already sent special trade delegations to Moscow, headed by
Ministers of Foreign Trade or other high-ranking officials (see
Current Intelligence Bulletin 21 Feb 51). The arrival of the Chinese
delegation suggests that China may now be included in the Council
for Economic Mutual Assistance and that China's foreign trade may
be integrated with that of the entire Soviet Orbit. During the past
year, China signed bilateral trade agreements with Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Poland and Hungary. Chinese trade with the Satellites
has expanded in recent months, especially with Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia.
A further reason for the current trade talks
is the need to renew the Sino-Soviet trade pact, which expires in
April 1951.
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4. Tito instructs Communist Party members on need for rapprochement
with West: ~
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The US Embassy in Belgrade considers that
Tito's 17 February speech to the Communist
Party group of the Guards Division was dir-
ected primarily at a Party minority which
finds the Yugoslav rapprochement with the West difficult to accept,
While the Embassy does not believe that the speech indicates serious
disunity within the Party, it speculates that the speech may fore-
shadow disciplinary action against members who oppose the new line
on foreign policy.
Comment: In his speech, Tito stressed that
rapprochement with the West aids rather than endangers the effort to
achieve socialism in Yugoslavia. Going beyond his previous state-
ments on foreign policy, Tito asserted that "a localized war in
Europe is most unlikely" and that Yugoslavia will "fight against ag-
gression in general and aggression toward (Yugoslavia) in particular"
The last statement may be in answer to recent pressure from the UN
and US for a definition of Yugoslavia's attitude in event of war.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. French Government crisis in Pleven's hands:
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The issues on which the survival of the Pleven
Government depends are coming to a head, and
the outcome hangs chiefly on whether Premier
Pleven decides to postpone a crisis. There is
widespread agreement in the French press that the government may
fall this week on the electoral reform question, but Embassy Paris be-
lieves that the decisions to-be made later on the wage-price problem
are fundamentally more dangerous. Despite continued recognition by
non-Communist leaders that electoral reform is essential before elec-
tions are held, the growing indifference of the coalition partners to the
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fate of the Pleven Government is "ominous," and members of almost
every party are declaring that the present Assembly itself is "worn
out,"
Comment,- It still appears unlikely that a suc-
cessor to Pleven can be found without a new Assembly election. The
present government will probably continue until a way has been found
to eliminate Communist participation in the pre-election caretaker
government and to minimize Communist representation in the next
Assembly.
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