EXTRACTS FROM THE CIA PUBLICATION, 'A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 8, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000200110018-5
Extracts from the CIA Publication,
"A Review of the Situation in Vietnam"
dated 8 December 1967
Declassified by~
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Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP90-00 000200110018-5
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i Extracted from the CIA Publication
5X1 dated 8 December 1967,
VtC40-
"A of The Situation In Vietnam"
Section III. Pages III-1 thru 111-3
III. COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Force Levels
1. The strength of Communist forces in regular combat
units in South Vietnam is estimated at approximately 118, 000, of whom
some 54, 000 are in North Vietnamese Army units and 64, 000 in
Viet Cong main or local force units. In addition, there are estimated
to be at least 35, 000-40, 000 administrative support troops who back
up the combat regulars. The strength of Viet Cong village and hamlet
guerrillas is believed to be in the 70, 000-90, 000 range. The combined
total of these forces is estimated at between 223, 000 and 248, 000.
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3. It is also possible that our estimate of the number of
North Vietnamese Army troops within the total strength figure for
the regular combat units is low. Captured documents and prisoner
interrogations indicate that an increasing number of North Vietnamese
soldiers are serving as replacements in regular Viet Cong units.
A study in late 1966 of Viet Cong forces in the III Corps area north
of Saigon revealed that in some units at least 23 percent of the
personnel were North Vietnamese Army infiltrators. This percentage
is probably higher now, and Viet Con- units in I and II Corps probably
contain a correspondingly greater percentage of northerners--
perhaps 50 percent in some instances.
4. There is no evidence that North Vietnamese Army troops
are present in significant numbers in the delta, or among the
guerrilla force, although a few may be serving as cadres or advisors.
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5. Apart from the military forces described above, the
Communists make a strong effort to organize much of the total
manpower under their control into various work forces and
semimilitary organizations. Among the most significant of these
organizations are the local "self-defense" forces. These units
are mainly charged with the protection--in a defensive sense--
of Viet Cong - controlled villages and hamlets. They apparently
do not participate very often in offensive operations against allied
forces. Moreover, the self-defense forces include a large number
of people of both sexes who normally would not be fit for regular
combat duty. Some have firearms, but many others do not. They
are only partially trained, and usually do not serve full time.
Their existence, however, poses an impediment to allied sweeps
and pacification, and they do inflict casualties on allied forces.
6. There is no officially accepted estimate of the strength
of these self-defense forces. However, Communist documents
indicate that the enemy estimated their strength in early 1966
at around 150, 000. They probably have suffered some attrition
since that time, both from casualties and by the induction of some
self-defense personnel into the regular armed forces or the
guerrilla forces.
Effects of Losses and Recruiting Problems
7. During the past year Communist manpower problems
within South Vietnam have become more serious as their loss rates
have increased and their ability to recruit in the South has diminished.
Analysis of loss and recruitment data suggests that the Communist
force level, which increased substantially during 1965 and 1966,
probably has stabilized or possibly has been reduced somewhat during
1967.
8. It is difficult to assess the exact extent to which Communist
force strengths in South Vietnam have declined over the past year
and any estimate of these losses is subject to wide margins of error.
It is clear that most of the decline is at the lower levels of the
Communist structure. This is due not only to increased casualties,
but to the Communist practice of drawing on the lower levels to help
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..maintain the strength of Regular Force units. There is some
evidence that guerrilla forces have declined considerably in
some provinces where allied activity has been most intense. In
other areas, particularly in IV Corps, the guerrilla structure may be
almost as solid as before.
9. The number of VC troops in Administrative Service Units
has probably also declined from a year ago. This assumption is
based on the increased share of combat being assumed by North
Vietnamese Army units; the need to use administrative service
troops; to provide combat replacements; and the increasing tendency
of main and local force troops to perform more of their own
logistical support.
10. Increasing casualties, illness, and other hardships are
known to be causing considerable morale problems for both Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese troops. The number of Viet Cong returnees
under the Chieu Hoi program this year is well above last year's .
total, although the rate for the past seven or eight weeks has dipped
below the comparable. period last year. Prisoners and documents also
indicate that desertions are a growing problem.
11. As of 1 December, the US military command in Saigon
estimated that only 85 to 115 of the 194 enemy maneuver battalions
accepted in the official order of battle are combat effective; the
remainder are listed as ineffective or marginally effective. Judgments
on combat effectiveness are admittedly arbitrary, however, and are
subject to rapid individual change as enerriy units receive replacements
and new supplies.
Conclusion
12. Although the manpower problem apparently has been more
acute in 1967 than previously, it has not been grave enough to erode
the over-all ability of the Communists to continue the war. While
their losses have been heavy and they face increasing recruiting
difficulties in the South, they retain sufficient initiative to control
their casualty rate and have the ability to maintain, and increase
if necessary, the level of infiltration from North Vietnam. Finally,
the infrastructure--the political cadre and Viet Con- government--
which the fighting forces must protect, remains relatively intact.
Approved For Release i : CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110018-5