STATEMENT ON SAMUEL A. ADAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110021-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 1, 1975
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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Statement on Samuel A. Adams
In testimony before the House Select Committee and
elsewhere, former CIA employee Samuel A. Adams has charged
that:
The CIA conspired in some unspecified way with
the Department of Defense to produce false and
misleading, but politically acceptable, estimates
of Vietnamese Communist strength.
The Viet Cong Tet Offensive in 1968 caught the
American Intelligence Community largely by
surprise. He claims, ?I? ? ? the Tet surprise
stemmed in large measure from corruption in
the intelligence process. "
The CIA denies these charges and believes that an examination
of its performance during the Vietnam war will not substantiate
them. The record shows clearly that Mr. Adams' views on the
size and nature of the various organized Communist groups in
South Vietnam were in fact supported by CIA. The record also
December 1975
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shows that his comments on the extent to which the Intelligence
Community was caught by surprise by the Tet Offensive in
January 1968, and the conclusions he draws therefrom, are
wrong.
In considering the question of Agency support for Mr.
Adams' views, several points should be kept in mind. The
Agency's general endorsement of the Adams case was not un-
qualified. Few, if any, in the Agency believed that Mr. Adams'
estimates could be accorded such a high degree of precision as to
preclude honest differences regarding their accuracy and the
methodologies used to derive them. Even to this date, there is
considerable uncertainty about the exact numerical strength of
the various Communist groups during any of the war years.
The endorsement of the Adams case also did not mean that
the Agency shared fully his interpretation of the significance of
the numbers. In his testimony before the House Select Committee
and in other public statements on the subject, Mr. Adams frequently
refers simplistically to an enemy army of 600,000. This formulation
masks the substantial qualitative differences between full-time,
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well-armed and well-trained combat forces on the one hand
and poorly armed and poorly trained irregular forces and
unarmed political cadre on the other. Lumping all of these
disparate types together and failing to differentiate between a
l'combat threat" and the broader "insurgency threat" represented
by all organized political, military, and quasi-military groups
was as unacceptable to most observers in the CIA as it was to
those in military intelligence.
Under the first charge Mr. Adams asserts that the CIA
did not give him adequate support in defending his independent
estimates of the size of the enemy forces in South Vietnam. Even
though the primary responsibility for research and analysis of the
Vietnamese Communist order of battle belonged to the Department
of Defense and its field commands, the record shows clearly that
Mr. Adams was given an unprecedented degree of Agency support
for his position.
By his own recounting, Mr. Adams had unparalleled
opportunities to present his views. They were given full considera-
tion by the senior line officers in the Agency responsible for
intelligence on the Vietnam war. He participated as a member
of the CIA delegation to three conferences on the Vietnamese
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Communist order of battle. Mr. Adams also had a major role
in the drafting of CIA position papers for these conferences
and in the drafting during 1967 of a Special National Intelligence
Estimate on the military capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists.
The record also demonstrates clearly that the most senior
officials of the U. S. Government were alerted by CIA to the
nature of the differences in estimates of Communist manpower.
On several occasions the Agency provided to these officials its
own independent estimates which reflected much of Mr. Adams'
research and were significantly higher than those of the intel-
ligence components of the Department of Defense. Some of these
documents, or extracts from them, are attached as annexes to
.this statement.
As Mr. Adams has testified, his initial questioning of
the correctness of official estimates of the size of enemy forces
was made in August 1966. This was done in a draft report,
"The Strength of the Viet Cong Irregulars, " dated 22 August 1966.
On 26 August the CIA, in a special assessment prepared for the
Secretary of Defense and also disseminated to the President,
the Secretary of State, and other senior officials, advised:
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"Recently acquired documentary evidence now
being studied in detail suggests that our holdings
on the numerical strength of these irregulars (now
being carried at around 110,000) may require drastic
upward revision. "
In January 1967 CIA's Board of National Estimates prepared
a special memorandum on the Vietnam war which was disseminated
to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and other
senior officials. This memorandum states:
"For some years it has been estimated that
there were about 100,000-120, 000 irregulars, but
there is now documentary evidence which strongly
suggests that at the beginning of 1965 irregular
strength was about 200, 000 and that the goal for
the end of 1965 was 250,000-300,000. More recent
documentary evidence suggests that this goal was
probably reached, at least during 1966."
Clearly, these and other assessments show that the CIA
did not shrink from pushing the case for higher figures and made
no attempt to produce "politically acceptable" estimates. From
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August 1966, until the agreement reached at the Order of Battle
Conference in Saigon in September 1967, papers produced by
the Agency-giving its independent assessment consistently carried
the higher strength figures.
The Order of Battle Issue
The debates within the Intelligence Community about the
strength of Communist forces centered on two questions--the
quantification of the various organized groups of Communist
manpower, and the determination of which of these groups should
be included in the official order of battle.
The complexity of the issue is reflected in Mr. Adams' own
estimates throughout the period. In December 1966, by his own
recounting, he estimated the size of enemy forces at 600,000
or more than twice that of the official military estimates. After
a study trip to Vietnam in May of 1967, Mr. Adams revised his
estimates downward to a total of 500, 000. This figure of 500,000
was used in the initial CIA draft of a Special National Intelligence
Estimate prepared in the spring and summer of 1967.
During the process of coordinating this draft estimate,
the figures were revised slightly and by August of 1967 the draft
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estimate showed a total figure for enemy manpower of 431,000 to
491,000. Mr. Adams played a major role in the refinement of
these figures which were used by the Washington delegation to the
order of battle conference held in Saigon in September 1967.
Mr. Adams was a member of that delegation and argued for the
figures in the discussions with MACV. As shown in the attached
table, the Washington figure of 431,000 to 491,000 compared
with a MACV figure of 298,000.
It will be seen from the table that the two most contentious
categories were Administrative Services (support) troops and the
category of the Irregular Forces. In each instance, neither party
to the conference was able to convince the other of the validity of
its case.
Regarding the Administrative Services category, it
was agreed that the quantification--35, 000 to 40, 000--required
textual qualification in the estimate. The final draft of the SNIE
acknowledged explicitly that we lacked confidence in the total size
of this category at any given time, but that it was "at least 35,000
to 40,000". In addition the SNIE pointed out that almost anyone
under VC control could be impressed into service to perform the
administrative service functions.
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The conference was unable to reach agreement on the
size of the Irregular Forces. MACV argued that these forces
should not be included in a military order of battle and that
in any event there was not sufficient knowledge to quantify them.
The Washington delegation agreed that the Irregular Forces
were so poorly armed and sketchily trained that they did not
constitute an integral part of the conventional combat threat.
The Washington team nevertheless insisted that Irregular Forces
should be included in any national intelligence assessments of
overall enemy capabilities, both political and military.
The conference agreement not to quantify the Irregular
Forces also reflected the general acknowledgment that our
information on these forces was such that we could not estimate
their size with sufficient confidence. Mr. Adams did not agree
with this. The SNIE made it clear, however, that these Irregular
Forces were a substantial factor in Vietnam. The SNIE stated
that in early 1966 the size of the Irregulars could have been on
the order of 150,000 persons. Although allowing for some attrition,
the language of the estimate made it clear that they still constituted
a substantial element in the Communist effort.
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In regard to the other categories, particularly those
making up the VC/NVA military force, it should be noted that
the final figures agreed at the conference and those used in the
final draft of the SNIE were well within the range of the figures
used to establish the position of the Washington community on
this question. Moreover, the agreed figures for these categories
also show an acceptance by MACV of a range significantly higher
than the estimate it had submitted at the conference.
Thus, the agreements reached at Saigon were far from
the cover-up or sell-out claimed by Mr. Adams. The results of
the conference did not endorse the initial position of any party.
They reflected the lack of definitive data, different methodologies,
and differing concepts as to the types of organized groups and how
they should be presented in the SNIE. In any event the different
views were fully aired and were made widely known to all concerned
with developments in Indochina.
The Saigon conference did demonstrate the need for better
data and for more persuasive analysis by the various components
of the Intelligence Community if differences between Washington and
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IVIACV were to be narrowed. An added impetus to the need for
more research on Vietnamese Communist manpower was the
growing interest in Washington in measuring the impact on enemy
capabilities of extremely high rates of attrition. The debate
about numbers and their accuracy was being overshadowed by a
much more critical national intelligence question. Did the
Vietnamese Communists have adequate manpower resources to
replace their combat losses and to maintain a viable military
force?
In August 1967 CIA established a new branch to concentrate
more resources on this problem. In addition to mounting a more
intensive research program on broader manpower questions such
as recruitment, infiltration, deserters and defectors, the CIA
now became directly involved in independent order of battle
research and analysis. Before this time, order of battle analysis
was the primary responsibility of military intelligence. Among
the analysts assigned to the task was Mr. Adams who, with his
colleagues, produced within a few months a new series of estimates
as the basis for another order of battle conference called at CIA
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initiative and held in Washington in April 1968. This conference
also failed to achieve agreement between Washington and Saigon
for many of the same reasons which prevented agreement during
the conference held in September 1967. The conference did,
however, narrow the differences between the CIA and the military
numbers.
Even though CIA was unable to obtain military acceptance
of its estimates of organized Communist forces in South Vietnam,
CIA did not attempt to mask the fact that there were differences or
to keep from the policymakers an understanding of the magnitude
and nature of the differences. The CIA continued to make its case
for higher figures. A CIA assessment prepared for Secretary of
Defense McNamara in December 1967, for example, used the
numbers agreed at the order of battle conference held in Saigon,
but also expressed our concern that the numbers were too low
and did not include other sizeable components in the Communist
force structure. Moreover, in February 1968 a joint CIA/Joint
Staff/DIA memorandum used the independent CIA estimates for
the size of the Communist manpower base in South Vietnam. This
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estimate--500,000--was compatible with the views of Mr. Adams.
The memorandum was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense by
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Tet Surprise
In making his charges regarding the surprise of the
Washington community at the time of the Tet Offensive, Mr.
Adams states that this surprise stemmed from corruption in the
intelligence process. He also stated that both his belief and the
evidence would show ". . . that American intelligence had so
denigrated the Viet Cong's capabilities that we simply could not
have predicted the size of the Tet attack".
The question of the performance of the Intelligence
Community in providing warning of the Tet Offensive in South
Vietnam in January 1968 was the subject of intensive investigations
within the Intelligence Community. The report resulting from
these investigations has been made available to the House Select
Committee.
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In 1968, shortly after the Tet Offensive, at the request
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, CIA
Director Helms appointed a working group chaired by his Deputy
Director for Intelligence and including representatives from CIA,
DIA, INR, NSA, and the Joint Staff. This group examined the
raw intelligence information received and the intelligence summaries
and judgments reported on in the period immediately prior to the
Tet Offensive and also visited Vietnam to be joined there by
observers from CINCPAC, MACV, and the CIA Station in Saigon.
The working group found that the Intelligence Community--
both in Washington and in Saigon--had reported that the enemy was
preparing for a series of coordinated attacks probably on a larger
scale than ever before. The final results of this group's investigations
acknowledged that warning of the Tet Offensive had not fully anticipated
the intensity, coordination, and timing of the enemy attack.
On the question of timing, the working group found that both
the analysts in Washington and the field commanders in Saigon
believed that the enemy would most probably attack just before
or just after the Tet holiday. Nevertheless, the clear warnings
regarding the imminence of an offensive--whether it would occur just
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before, just after, or during Tet--were sufficient for the military
command in Saigon to take alerting measures throughout Vietnam.
Although these measures varied in effectiveness from area to area
and among units, they were sufficient to reduce considerably the
impact of the enemy offensive.
If the Intelligence Community's performance in warning of
the offensive was as dismal as Mr. Adams maintains, the loss of
American lives and military equipment would have been significantly
greater than actually occurred. Moreover, the fact that intelligence
provided this warning was not an insignificant factor in the failure of
the Vietnamese Communists to attain their goal of a general uprising
that would result in a decisive victory in the shortest possible time.
In Mr. Adams' view the Intelligence Community did not
provide ample warning of the Tet Offensive simply because its estimates
of enemy manpower were so low that they led the community to
misjudge the Viet Cong's capability to mount such widespread
attacks. This argument is largely spurious. Throughout the
Intelligence Community and at the highest policymaking circles
of this Government, there was an awareness of substantial differences
in estimates of enemy strength in South Vietnam and there was also
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an awareness that the CIA estimates of the total enemy threat
were considerably higher than those maintained by MACV. Even
if the only estimates of enemy strength were those of MACV--the
lowest available--they were well within the numbers required for
the Viet Cong to mount the Tet Offensive. Studies made after the
Tet Offensive both by CIA and other members of the Intelligence
Community showed that the Communists committed some 75,000
to 85,000 of their military forces in the Tet Offensive. The
capability to commit this many troops was well within existing
estimates. This was true whether one's perception of the
strength of the VC/NVA military force was based on the lower
figures held by MACV or the higher figures held by CIA.
There was also a universal consensus that, whatever their
number, the attacking enemy units were almost without exception
those of the VC/NVA regular military forces.
The role of the
Irregular Forces?the main component accounting for Mr.
Adams' larger estimates- -was seen to be marginal.
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Analytical Effort on the Vietnam War
In addition to the broad allegations discussed above,
Mr. Adams' testimony gives a distorted impression of the
scope of the analytical effort on the Vietnam war. In addition
to claiming that he was the Agency's principal analyst on the
Viet Cong, he makes a further assertion that for two years he
was the only analyst working full time on the problem.
Mr. Adams' testimony on this point reflects a surprisingly
dim awareness of his own relative position in CIA and of the
broad range of Vietnam-war related activities on which CIA
was conducting research and analysis.
In CIA, two components of the Directorate of Intelligence--
the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) and the Office of Economic
Research (0ER)--shared the primary responsibilities for producing
intelligence on the Vietnam war. During the years 1965-1968 when
Mr. Adams was most directly engaged in making his case for higher
figures, the number of personnel in these offices working full time
on the Vietnamese war grew from 15 analysts in 1965 to 69 analysts
in 1968. In addition CIA's Office of National Estimates had a small staff
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responsible for integrating Community inputs into National
Intelligence Estimates or special assessments related to the
Vietnam war. The DCI' s Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs also maintained a large staff responsible for coordinating
the Agency's analytical and operational activities associated with
the war.
Numbers aside, Mr. Adams' testimony might have been
more accurate if he had stated that he was the only person in CIA
working essentially full time on the exploitation of captured documents
specifically for information on the size and structure of Vietnamese
Communist military organizations. As noted before, the Department
of Defense and its field commands had the primary responsibility
for estimates of these military intelligence matters.
At the same time Mr. Adams was exploiting these documents
for his narrowly defined purposes, they were also studied and
analyzed by the dozens of analysts reporting on a wide range of
activities. These included political and military developments
throughout Indochina; detailed studies of the Communists' logistic
and personnel infiltration systems; and analyses of the effects of the
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bombing; reporting and analysis of Vietnamese manpower
resources; and a variety of topics related to domestic economic,
and foreign trade relationships.
In sum, the responsibilities of the intelligence analysts in
CIA during the course of the Vietnam war were far-ranging and
demanding. In this context, and given the fact that responsibility
for detailed order of battle analysis was not that of the CIA, it
cannot be viewed as surprising that only one analyst was assigned
a related responsibility on a full-time basis. As stated previously,
when the question of Vietnamese Communist manpower acquired a
truly substantive significance in terms of assessing Vietnamese
ability to continue with the war in view of the high loss rates they
sustained, the CIA created a special unit of 8 analysts to work on
all aspects of Vietnamese manpower, including order of battle.
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The 30,000 Agents
Mr. Adams makes several references in his testimony
before the House Select Committee to his role in 1970 in producing
a CIA memorandum reporting that the Viet Cong had 30,000
agents in the South Vietnamese Government and Army. His
testimony gives the impression that Agency work on this subject
was almost exclusively an Adams effort, and, further, that the
Agency attempted to suppress the report.
Public discussion of the Agency estimate that there were
30, 000 Viet Cong agents is not novel. The substance of the initial
memorandum reporting these numbers leaked to The New York Times
shortly after its publication in 1970. Mr. Adams also discussed
this estimate and his role in its production with the press when he
resigned from the Agency in 1973. The subject was also treated in
the Adams' article published by Harper's magazine in May 1975.
Mr. Adams' discussion of this topic reflects some of the
same kinds of deficiencies apparent in his recounting of his role in
estimating enemy strengths. The most notable of these are his
tendency to claim almost exclusive personal credit and his penchant
for reaching highly simplistic judgments and conclusions.
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Mr. Adams was not as he claims " . . . the first person
ever to attempt to count spies or even to estimate the size of the
problem". The effort to publish finished intelligence on this
subject was admittedly modest but consistent with the availability
of the data to be exploited. The question of Communist subversion
was of more concern in the operational components of the Agency.
During the 1969-1970 period the CIA Station in Saigon had 14
personnel assigned to counterintelligence activities. This field
effort was backstopped by a five-person team in CIA Headquarters
who spent full time providing analytical and other support to
Saigon Station's Counterintelligence Program.
In describing the 30,000 agents as fl . the biggest
espiona.ge network in the history of mankind, " Mr. Adams again
shows his tendency to make sweeping generalizations. In the
official Agency publications regarding these estimates, for example,
the text makes it quite clear that the total number must be viewed
only as a broad order of magnitude. The basic question was, "What
is an agent?" Most of the people included in the Adams estimate
were not highly trained and dedicated agents. In a country torn
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apart for years by revolution and war, it was inevitable that
divided loyalties would result from divergent nationalistic,
ideological and familial factors. Thus, the bulk of the 30,000
agents were in fact "fence-sitters" or people with varying degrees
of sympathy for the Communist cause. By Mr. Adams' own
analysis, the number of hard core agents amounted to some
10 percent of his estimate.
Mr. Adams testifies that he had to go outside channels
to get a draft of this estimate to consumers in the White House.
Mr. Adams fails to report that 18 months transpired from his
initiation of the report to its completion. This time was required
for the completion of several drafts in an attempt to get a product
from Mr. Adams that would meet minimum Agency standards
regarding not only the organization of reports and the quality of
the writing in them, but more importantly the consistency and
soundness of the analysis and the evidence for making the
judgments presented in the report.
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The Collapse of South Vietnam
Admitting that he was testifying only from hearsay,
Mr. Adams, nevertheless, probably gave the House Select
Committee the impression that the collapse of the South
Vietnamese government in 1975 took the Intelligence Com-
munity by surprise.
If this impression were left with the Committee, it
needs to be corrected. A thorough review of U. S. intelligence
analysis in the six months preceding the collapse of the Saigon
government shows that it acquitted itself very well.
In terms of its primary predictive responsibility--
the intentions and capabilities of the North Vietnamese--
American intelligence made a continuous, voluminous and
high quality input to U. S. policymakers. The Intelligence
Community correctly estimated that Communist forces in
South Vietnam were more powerful than ever before and
predicted a marked increase in military action in the first
half of 1975. The Intelligence Community also predicted
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correctly that Hanoi was not planning an all-out offensive for
the first half of 1975, but would be quick to go on the offensive
if a major opportunity arose. The validity of this last assess-
ment has since been confirmed by statements of North
Vietnamese leaders.
The Intelligence Community could not perceive that the
major opportunity would be the hasty, ill-planned, and poorly
executed decision made by President Thieu on 13 March 1975
to withdraw his forces from large parts of South Vietnam.
But once this decision was made, the Intelligence Community
was quick to grasp the consequences of its faulty implementation.
On 17 March, the Community predicted Hanoi's likely moves to
exploit South Vietnam's new vulnerability and clearly identified
the factors which could lead to South Vietnam's unraveling.
The Community's first authoritative judgment that Saigon's
collapse was both inevitable and imminent was made by 3 April 1975.
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The 1967 Saigon Order of Battle Conference
Estimated Strength of Communist Forces in South Vietnam
Category
August Draft
SNIE 14. 3/67
MACV
Conference
Agreement
Final
SNIE 14.3/67
VC/NVA 1VIilitary Force
Main and Local Forces
121,000
119,000
119,000
118, 000
Administrative Services (Support)
40 - 60, 000
29,000
35 - 40,000*
35 - 40,000*
Guerrillas
60 - 100, 000
65,000
70 - 90,000
70 - 90, 000
Sub-Total
221 - 281,000
213, 000
224 - 249,000
223 - 248, 000
Other Organizations
Political Cadre
90,000
85,000
75 - 85,000
75 - 85,000
Irregulars
120, 000
No Quantification*
No Quantification*
(Self-Defense Forces
(Secret Self-Defense Forces)
(Assault Youth
431,000 -
299,000 -
298,000 -
TOTAL
491, 000
298, 000
334, 000
333, 000
* To be qualified in the text of SNIE 14. 3/67