THE ATTRITION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES, 1968-1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200110020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 30, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE ATTRITION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES, 1968-1969
ASSUMPTIONS
We have approached the complex problem of determining the
ability of the Vietnamese Communists to withstand manpower attrition
by constructing a hypothetical model of what could reasonably be
viewed as a "worst case" situation for Hanoi. This approach is
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based on the fact that if the Communists have adequate manpower
to meet the hypothetical "worst case" requirements during 1968 and
1969, then they can meet any lesser requirement resulting from
the actual course of events. Our assumptions, therefore, are not
offered as estimate judgments of the probable course of events
during 1968 and 1969, but are presented as reasonable structural
components of a "worst case" model.
In accordance with this approach we are basing our calcula-
tions on the following assumptions:
a. That the level of combat will be significantly higher
than that of 1967 but less than that during the first quarter
of 1968.
b. That manpower requirements must be met completely from
resources within North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with no
manpower inputs from third countries,
e.- China or volunteer
from other Communist countries.
c. That recruitment and impressment in South Vietnam wi 11
be adequate to provide manpower at an average monthly rate of.
7, 000 or about 85,000 persons a
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ar.
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limed ' -
evel o1 aattacks a'.-',a.nst an-'
SSCC_~L~^ recu_rc-
?..en-,,? for air u.--=ease ;?ri1.1 oe based on
c.~ e_ ce in the third quarter
1.707.
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I. ?Manpower Requirements
A. Military Forces
(1) North Vietnam
The North Vietnamese are estimated to have about
4T5,000 men in the Armed Forces and another 1+00, 000 in the
militia/security forces today. Of this force some 115-130,000
are deployed out-of-country. About 300,000 are considered
necessary to provide for defense of the homeland. This defense
force includes basically six infantry divisions, air and coastal
defense forces, and command and logistics elements. Thus, a
force'of about 50,000 or 4 division equivalents would be available
for out-of-country deployment during 1968.
(2) Leos
The North Vietnamese military forces in Laos total
about 30,000. They are a part of the NVA and are counted in the
N IM total. Pa.thet Lao forces have remained.in Laos and are not
considered in this analysis.
(3) South Vietnam
VC/NVA forces
in South Vietnam have probably developed
a total insurgency base in the general range of 500,000 persons.
The North Vietnamese
-c0 com.onent of this base is
._._a----_ f r om 85, 000 to
100, 000 persons.
B. Civilian Labor Force
The North Vietnamese ci'rilian labor force totals 9.8 .
million 'Persons. Over 400, 0OO of this total are shown in our
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figures as militia. About 200,000 full-time workers are assigned
to essential war related work such as bomb damage repair, the
maintenance and operation of LOC's, and logistics activities.
Of the remaining 9.2 million people we estimate that 8.7
million are necessary to maintain economic activity at its normal
levels. Thus about 500,000 persons may be regarded as a potential
manpower pool which can be diverted to other activities without
excessive disruption to the economy.
We estimate that the North Vietnamese labor force contains
about 1 million males in the 17 to 35 age group that are physically
fit for military service.
North Vietnam also maintains a civilian labor force of
about 20,000 persohs engaged in LOC construction and repair
activities in Laos.
II. Manpower Availabilities
North Vietnam has a population of about.18.7 million people
of which about 2.8 rgillion males are believed to be between the
ages of 17 and 35. Of these draft age males, about 1.5 million
are believed to be physically fit for military service. More
than one million of these have yet to be drafted.
In addition every year about 200,000 males reach the age of
17, and it is believed that at least 120,000 of these are
physically fit for military service. We have assumed that 100,000
of these can be drafted each year.
We have previously stated that a total of 500,000 males can
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be drawn from the labor force. If we add to them the 200,000
that can be drafted during 1968 and 1969, a total of 700,000
persons can be diverted to the mili! cy service.
III. Manpower Losses
A. South Vietnam
Our calculations postulate that the insurgency base in
South Vietnam will be attrited at a rate of 300,000 a year during
1968 and 1969. This figure is based on an assumed loss of 800
men per day from all causes -- killed, died of wounds, disabled,
died of sickness, deserted, defected and captured. It is a
compromise between the assumed enemy casualties if the enemy
should revert to a 1965-1967 style protracted war, and the
considerably higher casualties he would sustain if he continued
the forward deployment which he adopted after the failure of the
Tet offensive.
B. In Laos
We have almost no firm knowledge of the attrition ex-
perienced by enemy forces in Laos. For the purpose of this
estimate we have assumed that the forces in Laos will be attrited
at about 15 percent of force levels for annual losses of about
5,000 personnel during 1968 and 19690
C. In North Vietnam
It is assumed that the North Vietnamese will lose.
approximately 10 percent a year, or 45,000, though normal administra-
tive attrition.
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.D . Summ
Sout
Laos
IV. Manpower
1968
1969
Total
Replacement
300,000
5,000
145, 000
350, 000
350, 000
700,000
Capabilities
We ar
during 1968
e assuming that the Viet Cong wi
and 1969 in recruiting at*an annu
required to r
must be infi
Vietnam must
hus calculate that the remaining
eplace total enemy manpower loss
ltrated from North Vietnam. In a
provide an additional 50,000 per
B. North Vietnam
increments th
age, North Vi
civilian forc
In th
troops, or th
to the South
levels necess
be a one-shot
11 be successful
al level of 85,000
215, 000 men
es in South Vietnam
ddition, North
lieve that in addition to its annual population
at yield about 120,000 physically fit males of draft
etnam has a manpower slack in bo
es.
e existing military structure th
e equivalent of 4 divisions,.tha
during 1968 without reducing NVIN
ary for defense of the homeland.
movement c could not be dunli
G
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th its military and
ere are about 50,000
t could be deployed
forces below the
Such deployment would
ated in 1969.
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We calculate that North Vietnam would have to draw down
the surplus elements of its civilian labor force to make. up any
shortfalls not covered by annual drafts or the movement of
existing military units.
As we see the situation North Vietnam would be able to
obtain manpower to replace losses in the following numbers:
1968
1969
Annual Draft Class 100,0
00 100,000
Military Deployment 50,0
00 --
Draw-down from Civilian
Labor Force 115,0
00 165,000
Total
265,0
00 265,000
-
In each year 50,000 of the 265,000 would be required to
replace losses in North Vietnam and iii Laos, and 215,000 would
have to be infiltrated into South Vietnam.
Our figures indicate that the drain on the civilian labor
force would increase from about 115,000 men in 1968 to 165,000
men in 1969. The cumulative drain of 280,000 men is just over
55 percent of our calculation of surplus labor in North Vietnam.
V. Training
The current national estimate of the North Vietnamese capa-
bility to train 75,000 to 100,000 men a year for infiltration was
based on an analysis
of units associated with this training and our estimate of their
requirements. At that time, the identifiable training.base
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consisted of si
training. Airb
were trained by
the basic six d
specialized training is provided by Communist adv
country and in t
Subsequently
cycle.
they no longer provide infiltration training. An
the most recent
now employing fo
infiltration tra
retained the thr
It is estima
duties) can assi
three months. T
On this basis, 1
year. By shorte
additional 50, 00
Replacements
be absorbed in t]
instance, replace
O
r OROQ
x infantry divisions associated wi
orne, artillery, officer/NCO train
other appropriate I organizations
ivisions. In addition, some of th
heir homelands.
, some of the divisions were rede
data has revealed that the North
ur divisions and two training gro
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th infiltration.
ing, and specialists
schools, and
e higher or
isors both in
ployed and
analysis of
Vietnamese-are
D's for basic
ining and that, for the.,most part,
ted that each division (2/3 traini
milate, equip, and train 6,000 to
he two training groups are rated a
45, 000 'to 175,000 recruits can be
ning the training cycle or expandi
0 to 60,000 recruits could be trai
for the NVN forces in-country are
they have
ng,'1/3 regular f
8,000 recruits everyf
t. 6, 000 each.
ng the base an
although there may be some
sic training prior to joining the
ments taken from the militia or o
would.have had some prior basic training.
The most impo
available leaders
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rtant manpower problem is the ade
hip. The quality of the leadersh
ther reserves
quacy of
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and I' CO, has declined as the demand has increased. Officer and 2;CO
schools have been shortened from two years to eight months. she
largest single source of junior officers is now believed to be
from battlefield commissions. The decline in standards and
training, however, is offset to a considerable extent by the type
organizations being deployed south and the absence of r-
-quire,,-,en-'%--for more sophisticated equipment. Basically the VC/ VA is an
individual weapon, man pack army which uses equipment easily
adaptable to the individual soldier. In the North, the training
demands generated by more sophisticated equipment have been met
by provision offoreign training at home and abroad.
Summation
In conclusion, we have examined No: th Vietnam's
designed to maximize the attrition of the.enemy's forces.
manpower resources under a set of "worst case" assumptions
It is clear that even under this "worst case", that Hanoi
retains the capability of meeting all of its manpower
requirements. Since the attrition assumed in our model
is at an unusually high level
Y g'h we believe that the enemy
will be fully capable of meeting the lesser requirements
,.more likely to result from the actual course of events.
Thus., 'we' conclude that manpower is not a factor limiting
Hanoi 's ability, to continue ;ii th the war.
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