ADDENDUM TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS -

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200030001-2
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ADDENDUM TO L;EGI.SLATIVE HISTORY
EFORE THE COMMIT TEE ON I
.,
RI
B
T_IVES - .June 27, 1941 f
ENDUM NO. 1 to VOLUME I
ADD
 OF
100020QP3O001-2
MORE THE
IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPAP-TIAENTS
HOUSE OF REpRES.EN-f AT IVES
Wa>th1ne . D. G
June 27, 1917.
H. R. 2319
UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
PERSON REPORTING COMPANY
305 Ninth 3tr?ot. N. W.
Washington 4. D. C.
Totephoneu:
National 1120
National 1121
National 0927
National 1145
f
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CONTENT S
Friday, June 27, 19+7.
Statement oft
Page
2
Mr. "A"
Mr. "M"
70
Mr. "C"
118
Mr. "D"
127
136
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Mr. "A" - Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Mr. "B" - Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Mr. "C" - Mr. Peter Vischer
Mr. "DI" - Col. Grombach
Mr. "E" - Brig. Gen. Hayes Kroner
Mr. "F" - Rear Adm. Thomas Inglis
1 0
 H. R. 2319
UNIFICATION OF THE ARD FORCES
FRI21,!' Y? JUNE 27, 1947
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 10:00 a.m., pursuant to adjournment,
in-Room 1501 of the New House Office Building, Hon. Clare B.
Hoffman, chairman, presiding.
(Harold B. Alderson, and Olive N. Willeroy, the com-
mittoa atenogrpher and typist respectively, were duly sworn
by the Chairman as follows:
(The Chairman. Do you and each of you solemnly swear
that you will not divulge to anyone, directly or indirectly,
any information which you may obtain in either listening to,
recording or transcribing the hearings now being conducted,
so help you God!
(PNr. Alderson. I do.
(Kiss Willeroy. I do.)
The Chairman. The committee will be in order.
We are prepared to hear the first witness this morning
in executive session.
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OF t . "A
Mr. A. I would like to have one member of the CIG pre-
sent while I make my testimony, because there may be some
changes, and he can keep the members of the committee up to
date because I have been gone.
Mr. Dorn. I move that he be allowed to stay.
The Chairman. Without any-motion, unless there is
objection, it Will be so ordered.
Mr. Brown. Are we going to record this testimony or.
The Chairman. We decided that yesterday, but the stenog-
raphers have been sworn, and there is one reason in my mind
at least for that. I do not care how many executive sessions
you hold, there is always somebody talking about it, and my
experience has been that when you have 25 men or 10 men, it
is impossible for them to get the same story, and you go.
out and you give a garbled version. It is not my thought
that this testimony should be distributed, but there should
be a record of it.
Mr. Brown. It would be my suggestion that it be
guarded very closely, because it might bo testimony that
someone might be interested in getting. I think the Chairman
,should take the responsibility of locking up the testimony
and keeping it,and then there is only a question of the use
of it.
3 ~''R~Y
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S en It `QC. just tkr mmm'. W have these
c t d o. that up fr" t wet, and every
-fir of t o stisa u-cg advised that they were here,
and they have b Burn t ninths, and I say this, that
there is nobody on the 'co. ittee, far as I Ianov, that
has oven asked, to see tom.
Mr. Brown. I think the Chain ought to take the
responsibility of protecting the record.
The Chairs n. I vill do that.
. Holifield. I suggest the witnesses who appear in
executive session, in view of the fact that their testimony
is going to be taken, that a code letter or number be in-
scribed there and their nag in the corresponding code number
be kept by the Chair Awn eop?rately from the testimony itself.
Y3r.Dusboy. I would second that motion.
pr. Dorn. I would like to also suggest that if he so
desires, the present Director of the Central Intelligence be
alloyed to sit here all day, if he so desires.
The Chairman. There are some of these witnesses that
just will not testify as they would if somebody is here.
Mr. A. I have no prepared statemont. I am very glad to
answer any questions.
Mr. Wadsworth. To bring this subject up for discussion,
I hope in an orderly fashion, if uombers will turn to page 21
of the House Bill 2319, you will find under the heading of
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 "gc7 XMtSUIZ a Agency, c sing on line 11, para-
"Effcativo whon the Director first appointed under
subsection (a) has taken office--
"(1) the functions of theeNational Intelligence
Authority (11 red. Reg.1337, 1339, February 5, 1946)
are transferred to the National Security Council, and
such Authority shall cease to exist,"
Nov, that is legislation by reference, unless I am very
much mistaken, is it not?
Mr. A. Yet, sir.
Mr. Wadsworth. I have before me a copy of the Federal
Register of February 5, 1946, which contains the Presidential
Directive= dated January 22, 1946, entitled "Coordination
of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities," and it is
addressed to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy.
I am not sure that tho'members want me to read it all,
but it will take about four minutes. He says:
"It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all
Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned,
developed raid coordinated so as to assure the most
effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission
related to the national security.
"I hereby. designate you (those three men), together
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with encthhr qzrson to be nzz. d by a as my personal
representntivo, as the National Intelligence Authority
to accomplish this purpose.
02. Within the limits of available appropriations,
you shall each from tim3 to time assign persons and
facilities from your respective Departments, which
persons shall collectively-form a Central Intelligence
Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, assist the rational Intelligence
Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall
be designated by me, shall be responsible to the
National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-
3? Subject to the existing law, and to the
direction and control of the 9ational Intelligence
Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:" and here is what appears to be a recital of the function
of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central
Intelligence Group -- "the Director of Central Intelligence
shalls
"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of
intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate diCsemination within the Govern ant of the
racualting at togic notional policy intolligonco.
In so doing, full use aha11 be ado of the staff and
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fl< cilitios of the intelligence agencies of your Depart-
lY3~n$8.
-'mat would mean G-2 in - the War Department and ONI in
the Navy Department and an appropriate agency in the State
Department. Would that include F.B.I.? It is addressed to
their department, and as the Secretary of the Treasury is
not included, it probably does not cover F.B.I.
far. A. No, sir, but they are a somber of the Intelligence
Adtisory Board.
Mr. Wadsworth. Now, to continue thiss
"In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and
facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Depart-
ments.
"b.. It is your duty to pla:, for the coordination
of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies
of your Departments as relate to the national security
and recoiiend to the National Intelligence Authority
the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives
as will ensure the most effective accomplishment of the
national intelligence mission.
"c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such cervices of common concern as the
National Intelligence Authority determines can be more
efficiently aaccomplic d centrally.
"d. Porform such other functions and duties related
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 to intelligence affecting the national security as the
President and the National Intelligence Authority may
from time to time direct.
Now, in this next paragraph, 4,14r. Brown will be interested.
"40 No police, law enforcement or internal security
functions shall be exercised under this directive.
"5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence
agencies of your Departments as may be designated by
the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely
available to the Director of Central Intelligence for
correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent
approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the
operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open
to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in
connection with planning functions.
"6. The existing intelligence agencies of your
Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence."
The Chairman. Now, right there, we have had testimony
on that. Would you mind yielding there on that paragraph 6?
As to this Central Intelligence Agency, what was the testimony
which we had the other day about confining their activities
to evaluating? Is that one of the issues up for us?
Mr. Wadsworth. That was one of the informal discussions
with Dr. Bush. We did not go into details. The issue has
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arican, to be perfectly frank, as to whether or not the
collection of information should be centralized in the Central
Intelligence Authority. That is the issue that will be dis-
cussed here today.
The-Chairman. That is one of the main issues, is it not?
When we come to bring the bill,, that is one of the main issues?
fir. Wadsworth. That is right.
Mre Dorn. We want Mr. Vs opinion on that a little
later:
Xr. Busboy. Has there not been quite a little discussion
on the central group's activities, too?
Mr. Wadsworth. I know of no member of this committee
that is approaching this discussion with any feeling of hos-
tility toward any of the people now engaged in intelligence
work, or who have been engaged in it in the past, but in view
of this paragraph concerning the existing intelligence agencies
of your departments, which are G-2, ONI and the appropriate
agency of the State Department, which paragraph reads:
"The existing intelligence agencies of your
Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate.
and disseminate departmental intelligence;"
apparently the issue arises around the meaning and interpre-
tation of that paragraph along with paragraph "c" which
directs the Central Intelligence to perform such services
of common concern as can be more efficiently accomplished
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centrally.
The protest has arisen, or criticism has arisen, to
the effect that since this Executive Order was issued on
January 22, 1946, it has been followed by other directives
or instructions, perhaps not from the President himself, as
this was, but from the Central Intelligence Authority, in
other words, the.three Secretaries.
Secretary Patterson straightened me out on that on the
telephone yesterday, and I was wondering about that, and of
course, the Authority is going to cease to exist under this
bill.
Mr. A. Its place is taken, however, by another group.
Mr. Wadsworth. Now, could you tell us how this thing
has evolved,a..^.d that the present practice is, since January
22, 19467
Mr. A. In "d" of the President's letter, which you
read, is the following:
"Perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the
President and the National Intelligence Authority may
from time to time direct."
That was the basis. The Intelligence Advisory Board,
which consists of the Chief:j of the three departmental
intelligence organizations, State, War and Navy, in consulta-
tion with the Director of Central Intelligence, made an
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exhaustive study of the best way to centralize, both from
the point of view of efficiency of operations and cost,
certain phases of the national intelligence.
They all felt, together with myself, who yeas Directcr
at that time, that a very small portion, but a ver;; inpcrtant
portion, of the collection o_f?intelligence should be centralize(
in. one place. Nov, the discussion vent on within the
Intelligence Advisory Board as tc where that place should be.
1.111. Brown. ',.Y I inter_up t just a there? In
other words, you prcceeded under the theory trot U11--s Central
Intelligence Agency waa authorized to collect this inforr.Ia-
ticn and not simply to evaluate it?
Mr. A. We vent under the ascumrtlon trot we should In-
fern the Al"atienal Intell!Lenee Puthcriti, with the sett,'_nr;
':p of the Central In,tell!gence 0: ,cup, en en 0`';'L: lent base,
as vas required fron us fror: tine to time to a;_v ise, because
we wore the Advisory Board _Cr the Nat_onvtl Intelligence
Authority; and that part that 3a, ,s that we sh('fli(1 '~>(Orforr,
such other functions and duties as the :res'.dent and the
National Intelligence Authority may "rchi time to tide direct"
and "recommend to the National Intelligence authority the
establishment of such over-all policies end objectives as
will assure the most effective accomplishLant cf the National
Intelligence mission" gave us that right.
Mr. Brown. Than, you did not cons'der t11r,.t the word
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"evaluate" vas & limitation on,your duty, but this other
section vas so broad that you could do about anything that
you decided was either advantageous or beneficial, in your
mind?
Mr. A. Yes, sir..
Mr. Brown. In other words, if you decided you wanted
to go into direct activities of any nature, almost, why, that
could be done?
Mr. A. Within the Foreign Intelligence field, if it was
agreed upon by all of the three agenc'_e: concerned.
Mr. Brown. And that you were not lim'ted to evaluation?
Mr. A. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. Now, you are the witness, andts?-ybe it
,will :save a little tine if we can do this: Will you tell
me just about these tvo.agencies and their functions, just
briefly, in a few words? What about the Central Intelligence
Group?
Intelligence Authority.
The Chairman. And the Group does what?
Mr. A. The group operates for the National Intelligence
Mr. A. Its business 13 collecting and evaluat'..ng and
disseminating national intelligence.
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The Chairmn. Than, what does the Authority do?
Mr. A. The Authority.is the directing head, like the
Board of Governors.
The Chairman. It is he boss?
Mr. A.? Yon, sir.
The Chairman. -And these other fellows are, maybe,
employees?
Mr. A. That is right.
Mr. Wadsworth. Have you the copies of the sucsequont
letters or instructions which may have come from the National
Intelligence Authority?
Mr. A. No, sir; I have not.
Mr. Wadsworth. I have seen one of them, and I -.^i going
to have a good deal. -of difficulty in rornembertng, and I ma,%. remember it accurately. As I recollect, it contains one para-
graph wYtch rather bluntly says that the collection of Infor-
mation shall be centered in the CIG.
Mr. A. I do not believe that is exactly correct, 7-ir.
The collection of clandestine intelligence was to be centered.
there. There is nc idea, in the Advisory Board's viewpoint,
of stopping either the collection or the dissemination or the
evaluation of departmental intelligence.
Now, the diffi.culty we ran int^ in the Intelligence
Advisory Board was this: It is almost universally !,greed
that the collection of clandestine intelligence ripist bo
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centralized some place; because if it is dieaeainated among
several oreanizations vithout one hear, the agents who are
operating expose each othor. We saw that ourselves during
the var in the Balkans.
The British have had their experience, and the Qermans
in their report of the war indicate that that was one.of the
causes of their failure. We believe that the Russian expose
in Canada had something to do with the numerous agencies up
there. Universally, gong the heads of the intelligence
organizations Jr, the government, the belief is that clandestine
intelligence should be centralized.
Then the point curse: Where should we centralize it?
If we put It in G-2, that made an organization which had
particular points of view and priorities responsible for
collecting the clandestine intelligence for the State Depart-
ment and the Navy Depart at, and that would immediately
cause a furor, because neither 3tate nor Navy could have
assurance that the proper priority would be given to the
collection of their intelligence.
The same thing was true if we put It in State, and the
saxes thing was true' ii we put it in the Navy Department.
Than it ease to having an entirely separate organization,
but when you have an entirely separate organization, it has
such an Important parti, roughly, the intelligence gained, we
believe, is about 10 per cent of the total amount, but it is
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t koy mount usually.
That key amount, then, has to be Vary carefully allocated
tO the Place ire it vill do the most good for national
intelligence] and since the Director of the Central Intelligencez
Group is charged with that, we thought that we should be
given the opportunity of eiaploying it and directing it for
the b=efit of the whole picture.
Mr. Wadsworth. Who compose that Advisory Board?
Mr. A. The Director of Intelligence in the War Depart-
ment, the Director of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Depart-
cent and the Director of the State Department Intelligence,
and sitting at that Board, also, the Director of Air Force
Intelligence, General McDonald.
1Qr. Wadsworth. You say the F.B,,I. had no part in it?
Mr. A-* I cannot recollect whether they were there at
that eeting or not, sir.
tar. Wadsworth. And did the head of G-2 and the head of
OBI agree to thic proposal?,
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wc:dvorth. That clandestine intelligence and the
collection of that intelligence should be centralized in
C1GT
11r. A. It was unanimous. We have never presented to
the Uational Intolligence Authority, While I was over there$
wWthing from the Intelligence Advicory Board unless we had
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?ttae a' rtioularlq?
. A,9 Mon we first took over, and that, I think,
vainly is South A rioa that pertains to your question, air,
we vent to Rr. Roov go- and explained to him the reason. We
than asked him hou he felt about turning over his legal
attaohe?'a
Ir. Wadsworth. That is in South America?
Bar. A. Yes.. Hoover stated, as nearly as I can
renumber, that he had a new and tremendous load in this
country, that his people had been very carefully trained
and that ho had t1 very great use for them in this country,
duo to his now obligations here domestically. With that in
mind, I went to see Admiral Leahy and explained that instead
of taking over imodiately, 60 that we could get all clandeatin4
intelligence under one hear- right away, that we would have to
procure and train carefully on a peogressive basis our own
people, and those people who voluntarily came from the F.B.I.
with the desire to join the Central Intelligence Group.
Because of Mr. Hoover's added responsibilities in this
country and because he had spent so long training these
people, we decided that we would not take anyone who came to
us asking if we would hire them, if he had at that time a
connection 7ith the F.B.I.; because he made it very plain,
Mr. Hoover did, that he had deasperete need of these people.
Rovover, in some instances, these people resigned from the
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? ua saihue eons nt, so that ovarythir> that has be,n put out
b? the Uation l Intelligence Authority, as an o , bile
hd unanimun consont from the thr a of. the government
intelligence agencies.
Lam. evorth. You must rem ber that you are, speaking
with greenhorns in'all of thisl but how do you define
"olaoatiro intelligence" or deaoribo it1
11ro A. "Clandestine int3llinpe, " I would think,
general coverage could be described by that intelligence that
is obtained through the use of agonts who operate to gain
intelligence in other than an overt manner.
hh?.holifield. In foreign or domestic fields?
P% A. The Naticnal Intelligence Authority and the
Central intelligence Group have nothing whatsoever to do
with anything domestic; so whenever we talk about the Central
Intelligence Group or the MIA, it always means foreign
intelligence, because we have nothing tc do with domestic
intelligence.
Zr. ;1Holifield. That was my understanding` and I wanted
it confirmed.
Mr. Busboy. th'. A, may I ask what use has been made, if
any, of the various intelligence men in foreign countries
that were employed by the F.B.I. during the war?
1r. A. Do you urea foreign nationals, sir?
1r. Busboy. Yea, the non that were known AD legal
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F.B.I. and own to us. When they had resigned,Vithout
any indication on our part that we would hire them, and
aid for a job, we employed them. That number van compara-
tively fev. We thought that we should do our beat to protect
Mr. Eoover and his added responsibilities, so we leaned over
backwards to be sure that we were not proselyting.
E3r.Busbey. Itov, I understand that an order has gone out
to dissolve the clandestine or secret intelligence of 0-2
that vas carried on during thz war.
Hr. A. Yes, sir. When we talk of clandestine intelligences
run by 0-2 during the war, we are talking of a small, tre-
mendously small, operation that is conducted under contract.
The coverage of the Central Intelligence Group, in order
to perform its function for National Intelligence, has got
to be tremendously expanded, and is today tremendously ex-
panded from that small operation run by 0-2 which was done
on a basis of hiring somebody to do it without the control
being centered in 0-2, the way, in my opinion and in the
opinions of the Advisory Board, it should have been.
Its cost us more to run this very am- 11 and, in sly opinion,
inefficient organization than it has cost us to run a much
wider organization that is very closely controlled, and we
have our own people who control the funds and who control
the allocations of priorities. We have our finger on overy
man through a series of localized psoplo in control, instead
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of having it hired out to somebody.
Nov, I can understand very easily why many people who
Vero on this gravy train will object, but I am sure that the
intelligence chiefs who are concerned and the Director of
Central Intelligence, who is responsible in the final analysis
for a good foreign intelligence, has got to get more for his
'money.
Mr. Busboy. Has there been any effort by CIO to bring
any of this group of G-2 into Central Intelligence at all?
Ni'. A. Yea, sir. Before the order vent out, I had
the group chiefs, and this is confidential, air, I had the
people who had been hired by this commercial concern come to
me and say that they desired to work for the Central Intelli-
gence Group and would be very happy If we would take it over.
. Unfortunately, because it was not closely guarded and
because it vas not closely controlled, ray people in a bar
room one day were given the addresses and the names of some
of those people. Obviously,. those people we could not take
over, and I am sure that the committee would not want us
Ni'. Wadsworth. Who gave them the names?
Mr. A. 1=r operative vas in the bar room, and hearing
two girls and two men talking about their op?ratione in
?ranch, after they had gone, want up tend struck up a conver-
cation with tho bear tender and got core dope on these people
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than ve bolievo'chould have b? available to him. We can
say that that can happen to us, but at lcaast ve are responsi-
ble, and not another agency, that ve hire to do this thing,
and if ve find it, ve can take corrective aeasuroa.
I might add that this clandestine intelligence, the
fact that the Central intelligence Group should operate it,
vas presented to the National Intelligence Authority, of
course, and othervise we could not have dons this, and that
it was given to the Contral Intelligence Group with their
blessing. All of the intelligence heads, I think, State,
Mar and Navy, are agreed that this should be centralized.
Nr. Dorn. I just want to know if tar. A vented to
oont on whether or not he thought the head of the now
.Central Intelligence Group under this bill should probably
be military or civilian. If you care to content on that,
I am sure the embers would be glad to hear you.
Ni'. A. I believe I stated bofore in my opinion, it
makes not one bit of differonco, except for this fact:
Initially, the military are very loathe to trust thoir top
secret information to so=one over whom we do not have the
ability to penalize by court action if they divulge some
of this. We do not have an official secret agent with tooth
in it, but we do have within the Ar?r and the Navy the
ability to court va-rtial anybody.
The Chai ^an. Night I ask there if that is your fear?
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Ad If that tom, tit laiw ntnbors of our people are
at id of tt3 a .tit nut Brit , vq could romady that easily
b InGorporatIng a provicio , could we not, for the divulging
of iwfo tic a?
Lr. A. Yen, sirs but my point in that no matter what
law es MEk0P there is alum going to be, for two or three or
four or five years that feeling. Now,, if we can put a military
pon in there initially and let him organise this thing and
lot the flow of inforrtion get fully established, after that
period it akco no difference whether it is civilian or
military, and t information will continue to flow.
I think that today if you appointed a civilian, you
would get just as good, but he would have to work under slight
great r difficultic initie.1ly.
The Chairmzn. You want the n where you can grab him
and take care of him if he does something that he should not?
r. A. Initially, yes, sir.
Mr. a.sco. Along that line, it is air idea that it is
probably wise now to have our military men at the head of
this department, but would you object to an amendment to the
bill providing that, say, in the next 8 or 10 years the
person at the head of the CIC must be a civilian, and that
will give you an opportunity then to take the civilian and
train him like nr. Hoover was trained and make a career man
of him? A change every four years wmakons our intelligence.
 pproved For Release 2006/04/17: CIA-RDP90-0061OR000200030001-2 21
Vr. A. I would prefer not to see it written in. It is
now left up to the President and
Congress under this bill to
pick the man, and if he happens to
think they ought to be free to
The Chairman. Do not you
among a great number of our
be a military man, I
put him in.-
realize that there is a fear
people that there e1e too many
men getting in? For Instance,
of State and so on down, and everywhere
of the people were sort of allayed?
I3r. A. I anticipate, Mr. Chairman,
Hillenkoetter, who the Secretary of War
Marshall is Secretary
look, we s'ae an
Admiral or former military man.
Mr. A. Yes, air.
The Chairman. Would not the law work
more acceptable if the fears,. justified or
not, on the part
that after Admiral
has stated to a
career, that after
him, I would anticipate that probably the next
appointed would be a civilian; I would Just guess
far. A. Fifty-one years old.
Kr.Flanasoo. He retires at 62, does he not?
we would not want to destroy his retirement
years,
benefits or ask
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Cdr. A. There would be no particular advantage, because
the fear and the danger of his serving a short time and then
going out is obviated, if he is going to spend those 11 years,
he might just as well spend it as a military man or as a
civilian.
Ilr.Manasco. He would not have the same retirement
benefits if he'ware going-to be forced to retire from the
Navy and take it over as a civilian.
r. Holifield. I would like to ask this before I
leave. How long, in your opinion, do you think it would
take to get this organization running smoothly?
Ir. A. In connection with the civilian, air, or just
Mr. Holifield. With your military man, presuming that
we have a military man at the head of it.
Zr. A. That would have to be a guess on my part;
yes, air.
}r0 Holifield. Would you say five years?
Mr. A. We have first got to get the Central Intelligence
Croup out of the minds of tho people and the papers, and it
has got to be accepted as a going concern by the Congress.
Once that which causes humpo and ripples in our progress
is smoothed up, then I would guess two to three years,
possibly four to five years. I would say the organization
would boa very cootla running and efficient, in that time,
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23
ffleie nt o ?a i n. It taken tim, however, to start
something that we ire 400 yeare behind ti s on today, and
we cannot expect, if ve are going to compete with these
others, regardless of how s=rt the American people are,
that we can do it in less than two or three years.
Mr. Nadsvorth: Now, that yon have centralized collection
of clandestine information in CIG, has 'that involved the
&mployment of new groups of agents?
Kr. A. The clandestine field, air, is a very compli-
cated one, as it is very difficult, and it takes hours. I
have spent days going through the ramifications of it.
Roughly, the bray it works is that you have an expert in the
clandestine field, or as near an expert as the United States
has, and who 'we can hire for the monoy that we can pay,
He goes out.
Mr. Wadsworth. You are speaking of a civilian?
Mr. A. Yes. In a few instances, there happens to be
a military person who is particularly qualified, one or two
or three., but the majority of these people are civilians who
did, however, operate during the war, many of them in
They go to a certain locality and live in that locality
and buildup an acquaintance and then know the politics and
the intrigue that is going on in that nation. They pick
a man, after very careful study with records back here,
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24
MCA t Va b GV in G.2 and the Fravy and State and from
friandn, and they start him out as a nucleus. He then builds
a chain of people that he knows.
fin, we have to have another wan picked, in whom we
have full confidence, that builds a chain alongside, who is
Just watching him. Then you have to keep these two people
and their reports to make sure that this man is not giving
you information and reciving pay from a foreign government.
Then, this man who has established this is pushed out in
front here, and he then has a contact back with what we call
the letter box or the place through which we got this infor-
mation; and the man who originally set up the net ostensibly
has.no connection with any person or any department of the
government. That is what we term a "cut-out."
That is a very rough description of a vory difficult
business, and a somewhat confusing explanation of this
business. But, it is not a thing for contract operation,
because the chances of the United States Government in peace-
time getting in tremendous difficulties, behooves us to
keep it right under our thumb; and you cannot keep it under
your thumb if you are contring for it.
I do not care how good the contractor is, he has not
the same interest in it that the people who are responsible
to the Government must have.
Fir. MScCoack. Have you stated what a contract operation
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25
Mr. A. That is where you hire somebody who thinks he
is a very fine sleuth and rho can establish nets,and you
give him a lump sum, several hundred thousands of dollars,
and tell him to go get you information in a certain area,
.and then you back off and wait for the information to come;
and you hope it is good.
Mr.I4oCormack. Who would the contractee be? Could you
give us an illustration of who you contact?
Mr. A. Some chap who comes into the office and tells
you that he can get some companies lined up and some people
in these companies lined up, and he has already got agents
in these companies and he is paying them, and he would be
very gldd if you would give him $500,000 a year; and he will
start rolling the information in to you, but you have no
assurance.
In some cases, it is excellent; and in some instances,
you have to take it with a grain of salt, and you de not
know whether it is good or not. You have no control over
it.
Mr.McCor.Ack. This may be a person who is a citizen
of another countr,j?
Mr. A. He might very well be. It might very well be
that that man Is paid by anot r governmont. and is feeding
you the infox ration that that Bove K- nt would like for you
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to have.
The Chair. Is there any way to avoid that?
Mr. A. Yes, sirj have it run by'a central, American
agency who have their finger on every piece of money going
out and have local controls by your own people.
The Chairman. That assumes that you cannot be deceived?
Nr.A. No, sir; it does not. We can be deceived, and
we can have infiltration within our ranks. My point is that
it is much easier for us with this type of control in which
we are interested, rather than contract it to somebody
else and let him carry on without our knowing about it.
The Chairman. If you said the gamble would be less,
I would agree with you. And there are many losses that you
cannot help.
.hr. A. That is right, sir. However, when it happens
to us with this cut-out, this man who is the man who is in
contact with this, is told that if he gets in trouble, we
wash our hands of it. For that reason, his pay has got to be
fairly good, because his throat is cut and we wash our hands
of him, and we say we know nothing about him.
The Chairman. If we assume that your CIO is going to
collect the inforztion and the other agency is to evaluate
it, would you any what, if anything, is wrong with the
langta ga in this 3979, on pagoo 8 and 9, especially paragraph
(3) on page 82 Thhs ie a bill that wont in the other day as
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 Authority today, or the National Security Council tomorrow,
`9 061oR000200030001-2
Now, under this,nev bill, it
becomes the Security Council's job to take the place of the
National Intelligence Authority; and those people, it seems
to me, if it seems expedient to them, after going through
all of the explanation of what the intelligence people think
best, if they think that it is better for the Central Intelli-
gence Group to operate for clandestine intelligence, I
would suggest from my point of viow it would be better to
leave the door open.
Now, if they fed that the Central Intelligence Group
should be out of that field, either the National Intelligence
if the bill passes, can stop it, and they can put it in
another agency, and they can do anything they want.
The Chairman. My question assumed that the CIG was
going to be the collecting agency and that the other group
a suggestion frozi y n in the doirtnts.
tiro A. I would comment on that this way, Ni. Chairmanz
That under the other hill that we have boon looking at
where it says "transfer the functions," in each case, there
is over the top of this organization a group of people whose
integrity and whose interest in national intelligence,
because of their position, must be of the highest.
The Chairman, That is the Secretaries of State, War and
Navy?
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Vdz not to o?lloot the infoz ation. I am asking you to assume
that to be true. Is these anything in that language, especiall)?
this, "Provided that they shall have no internal-security
funotiana, and the responsibility and authority of the
departments and other agencies of the Government to collect,
and 80 on, up to the top of page 9? It states that that
shall not be affected.
Mr. A. I very.strongly advocate that it have no police,
subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal-security func-
tions.
The Chairman. What about the next proviso, down on
line 25, "Provided further, that the responsibility," and
so on?
Mr. A. I would like to leave the word "fully" out,
because I do not think the Director of Central Intelligence
can possibly protect intelligence sources and methods.
The Chairman. You mean "fully" on line 5?
?ir. A. Yea, sir.
The Chairman. What about if that Is out then?
iqr. Wadsworth. What I am asking for is comments on the
proviso commencing on line 25 and going up to the first
three lines on page 9.
The Chairman. That is what I an asking him about.
Mr. A. I approved that, provided wo cannot get in there
and transfer the f'unJtions,which I believe is essential..
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29
The Chairman. Repeat that ansver, please.
Mr. A. Provided that in here, also, the functions are
transferred.
Mr. Judd. As they are in the other bill?
Mr.-A. That is right.
Mr. Brovn. That is one of the weaknesses in this bill
that we have before us. Nobody knows what those functions
are. They have been read here as a matter of an executive
order, issued by the President, which in the opinion of many
constitutional lawyers is questionable as an authority; but
it can be changed at any time without the consent of Congress.
I mean by that, all the President has to do is rescind
an executive order to amend it, as they have done thousands
point. Today we are, in spite of some of the testimony that
you may hear after I leave here, we are tyros in this game of
foreign intelligence. We are trying to overcome in two or
three years sometimes hundreds of years of experience.
People will tell you that we Prov all of the answers
and this is the right v ay to do it. I do not believe that
of times during the war. We had so many floating around
that the air was filled with them. And one of the big
questions in my mind is whether or not we should not set
forth in the statute, as a law-making body is presumed to
what the functions of an agency it creates may be.
Mr. A. I would agree with that, except for this one
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there is anybody in the United States today who can tell you
that; and I would prefer to let this thing grow in the hands
of people who are primarily interested in getting this
intelligence, and with the safeguard that you cannot build
a Gestapo, because after all, all they are trying to do is
get intelligence.
Mr. Brown. You can write these functions in the statute
and you can change them?
Mr. A. I do not think anybody knows.
c Mr.Brovn. You should leave-it as flexible as possible,
so that the President can change it at any time he wants to?
Mr. A. The Security Council, sir.
Mr. Brown. But the Congress as the people of the United
States,or the representatives of the people, have a duty and
a rosporisibility to guarantee the protection of those people
and their rights and privileges under the Ccnstituticn.
Mr. A. That is true.
Mr. Brown. We are supposed to say what an agency of
the Government can do.
Ilr.A. If we had had the Central Intelligence Group 300
years ago, or 200 or 150 years ago, we could come in and tell
you what, in our opinion, was our best advice on how those
functions should be delineated. I do not think that we can
do that today.
Mr.. Brown. Can you not tell us as the changes are
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31
necossary, just like any other agency of the Government comes
in and says that they need a change?
Ur. A. That is right, but there is a danger for the
next tiro or three years, while this thing is being established.
of not allowing it to expand in the field of national intelli-
gence; and T would say if Congress two years from now would
ask the Director of Central Intelligence what the limiting
functions of this should be, that he can come up with a good
answer. I feel sure in ruy ovn mind the committee would
r;ipprove.
Mr. Brown. But it is your opinion that the President
can be more easily sold, or that as you go along, that you
can sell the idea of a change to the President easier than
you could convince the conittee?
Mr.A. No, sir; it is more difficult to get the action.
Mr. Brown. It is more difficult to get to him. lie
has loss time to give to the study of the subject than the
members of the Security Council or the members of this
committee.
Mr. A. The Security Council, I believe, are going to
have this problem with them from day to day. They are the
only people, or, they are the people who are going to control
the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I1r.Brown. You think we should delegate to a Security
Council, then, the authority to fix functions and to change
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 8ggr..Qyad-Eox_.R.elease-2 )OM4/- 7--#-FA-RDP9=fl6?OR~U62Z? 30001-2
them as they army coo fit, which might possibly endanger the
rights and privileges of the people of the United States?
Mr. A. No, sir8 I do not think there is anything in
the bill, since it is all foreign intelligence, that can
possibly affect any of the privileges of the people of the
United States.
Mr. Brown. There are a lot of things that might affect
the privileges and rights of the people of the United States
that are foreign, you know. `1Jow, one of the great complaints
that we have now is that there are too many of us.
Some of that has been entered into, and corrnitments
and arrangements and agreements made through secret diplomacy,
and we have drifted along and are a long way from "open
covenants openly arrived at," which was the theme of the
Voodrow Wilson doctrine; and it is Just a question of hoar
much control Congress wants to keep as the representatives
of the people and how much they ought to know abo,:t it.
It has been my experience, believe it or not, that. an
important matters, as far as patriotism is concerned, that
you can trust the patriotism of members of Congress Just about
as far, and perhaps a little further, than you can thr;se in
the departments of the Government.
Mr. A. I agree with all of that.
llr.Brotm. Certainly, there were a number of men, sn:7e
in this room, who know the secret of the atomic lu:rnb of fur. t.;
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and yet, there was never a leak from Capitol Hill on that
thing. Some of them took their futures in thefr own hands
and authorized an expenditure of funds in matters of that
kind; and if the thing had not worked, it would have wrecked
those men.
There are all kinds of confidential matters up here.
I cannot understand, for the life of me, why we cannot Write
the functions in and why, if it is necessary to change the
functions, we cannot pass upon it as the representatives
of the people and decide whether those functions should be
changed or not. Your ideas, or the ideas of the Security
Council, might be entirely different from the ideas of the
men and women who are elected to represent the people.
1`. A. Yea, sir. Well, if Congress feels that something
should be written in there, I would certainly provide for
clandestine intelligence being done by the Central Intelligence
Group.
flr.Brown. I am not so sure but what you are not right
on that.
br, A. Then, if that is done, you are tying the hands
of the Security Council, if they decide that the Central
Intelligence Group should not be doing it. I do not think
anybody knows today.
F1r.Brotrn. You can cone here and get a change if you
,can convince therm that it is in the national interest.
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PQr.Dorn. I believe that is what was largely wrong
with our intelligence, that you had some politics in it,
and you appointed diplomats overseas that dust drank cham-
pagne and kiev how to take care of women and could not find
out any intelligence.
Iir. Wilson. I4r.A, it is your idea that since this is
new and we are exploring in a field that we have never boen
very proficient in, that things might ccme up in the Hind
of the Security Council which would demand a chars a of pclicy
immediately, is that true?
6r. A. That is true.
Mr. Wilson. And in that case, perhaps Congress voaild
be in adjournment for six months?
Zr.A. That is right.
11r. Wilson. And it would take two or three rnonths
after Congress mot to get the bill through, as is ordinary,
and I think that is right, because the Congress will want
to explore it and want to go into all angles of it. Your
idea is that temporarily and for the present that this
authority should be granted to the Security Council?
11r. A. Yes, sir.
Ilr.Wilson. Now, what is England's experience? They
have been pretty good diplomats in world politics. What
have they done with respect to the collection of intelligence
out of one agency?
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35
The Chmirs . rare you n-ver that, you said "tem-
porarily." What did you mean, that that should be written
into the bill?
Or- Wilson. No. I get his point in that for the next
two or three years we are exploring a field about which we
know very little, from experience.
The Chairman. He said ":.emporarily."
Mr. Wilson. I understood Mr. A to say that two years
from now, after Admiral Hillen same time. If you correlate and coordinate and at
th> same time engage in operations, a question will come up
when we want some information about that. You will say to
yourselves, where will we get that? There is human nature
involved. If it is not very hot, let G-2 do it; if it is very
hot, we will do that ourselves.
Mr. Wilson. I understandthere is a lot of that involved.
After all, these folks when they got the information, they have
to pass it on to the other organizations.
Mr. C. This does not work out that way.
Xr. Wilson. I agree w itii you in general principle.
Mr. C. You bring. up an extremely important pointvhic h
was this, that when this directive was written it was Admiral
Sovosrs' intent, and certainly my strong beliof, that the
relationship between the Central Intolligence A*e ? anthe
f g ree .
I $oSdl a St un t&a 'g , is n ?& i oi A tX' Tar Department
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94
-fn-26 up to the Central Intelligence Agency. It had to go back down
again, so that War, State, and Navy could see for themselves
if the stuff was coming out of there with that peculiar subtlety
that they thought vas essential to a real understanding of the
problem.
A grand friend of mine which vas, my associate of mine on
the Balkan desk in 0-2 at the time of the recent Greek crisis
10 prepared a paper. It went from the War Department to Central
Intelligence. It never came down. He never saw it again.
Some days la ter h-~ saw his friend on the same desk in the
State Department and said to him, "What did you think of my
Greek paper?" He said, "I think you have gone crazy. What is
the matter with you?" He said, "Why?" They fished out the
paper that cane down from C_G. It was something that uas
quite distinct, with a distinct pink tinge. This man would
not have agreed to it . Tth is what will happen if it is not
maintained between CIt} and the various departments, an if
you have a secret intelligence, or if they engage in operations
of their ow. coming into the higher level than State, War, anu
Navy Departni nts. Do you follow what I am talking about?
Then it cannot go down.
Mr . Harness. In other words, this was distorted between
th., War Department and State Department and no "formation of
that distortion was ever given to the man who originally sent
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 Approved For Release 20062
fa-27 the report m l
Ur. imp . Vh7 could v. not oary*:t that situation? It
the state Depart ent vented particular iato~-tion that 0-2
had gathered in the Banns and submitted to 0$ntr6l IntSUIVnoe,
vrhy could not the soaretary of state Or proper official of the
.state.Depertt nt request the infoition that that evaluation
was based on and let his evaluate it
Mr. 0. wait a minute. The point is this, that CIG
also advises the President and we do not b MOW v` tbsr that
particular Greek item that went to CIG, to state, and got
distorted on that trip, did not also go to the white House.
We do not know.
Gr. Mnasoo. I would not want to tam just a summary of
what sombody had read if I had a decision tr make. we do
that with our staff bore, but I rant to road the bill.
Mr. 0. CIG is supposed to give you overall evaluation
gathered from all these ober pis
Mr.Dorn. You are opposed than to CIG collecting the
. VAn"Oo. That would not have ohangsd the paper that
wen'.. to the State Dopa,rtEentt
stuff?
ZLr. C. I oppose the collecting. I a all in :favor
correlation.
r. Dorn. But not the collecting?
M,;,-. Q. That is right.
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96
tea-g8 the C . 19e said ysa it would.
Mr. 1Lnautoo. I do not knot how it would. fbey could
oolox it.
MY. G. If tM hat is the resident and this is the
Direotar of Central IntelliIPxae and have IS Var, State and
)3avy, intellipnoe !lose into these departments this Way, and
it goes from here to the Director of Central Into11ipnce .
$,e is not supposed toput out anything, and this was the principle
under Which the Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Coauiitr'ee
operated quite successfully. Be could not send ea ything on
to the lies ]d ent until it had the approval of all throe. In
other words, it is a two-way street. What goes up has to come
down, or be available to those people. This two-way
street is broken Vasa these people eiagsp in operations them-
navies ank; this alley becoaas a ieoret intelligence or even
ordinary intelligence aqpncy.
Let us say that State, War, and Navy all agree on a certain
picture of the Greek situation and it goes to the Director of
Central Intelli&snoe. no, through his own collection agencies,
gets a report that says, well, say goodness sadms, I do not think
these fellows are right. Because that comes in at a higher
!oral he cannot send that darn to these people; intelligence
does not wo* that way.
The Chair-gin. They go on in their ignorance?
Mr. C. They go on in their ignor nos , dreaming that th i y
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t1r29 are using this thing is sent over. jb could not do it if he
got it out of the collection operation.
or. Judd: What dfl you moan, he got ees othing different?
qtr. Q. Me has gone to the President with something dif-
forent.
Mr. Judd. The President has to bring it back down to
them with his order on it?
*r? C. But he does not.
fle gives his the vront3 order because of
a:3a Chairman.
11 the information that comes in from the side.
Mr. Wilson. Suppose he gives hiss an order based on the
misinformation? Do you not think the Secretary of War would
raise hell?
Kr . C . He did not knot it in this Greek situation until
this
by pure friendship and soeidant they had/visit a roe the board
Kr. Wilson. My question is, ordinarily would not the
order he gave be recognized by the Secretary as being based
on wrong Information?
Kr. . c. I cannot believe the Secretary of War would know
the full details of the Lek Situation.
TTbe Chairman, Is that not what you have in China, they
were by-poeain so sbody and uaderaining aomsone?
r. Jed. It was in the Sate Dopartasnt.
The C But it vas someabody in the Depart nt
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 what in the world todo with it. They. finally d.ded. it
between the War Department and State Department. Then the
we have to have a central intelligence agency to- correlate
andcoordlute'all'these activities It was- held, and z~'_gntfull
mation on Pearl Harbor was all over Washington. It was that
the right, time
and given to the right person:at
agreed,`. allright, we .will' have
central intelligence agency charged with the correlation,:
evaluation and dissemination of the stuff that is already flyinG
all over, the place.--.
i+~VV ilityv ia~p cs~5L i'l6UL Llere? J. agree with you, they should
Dorn. In that connection,. though, here is your central
correlate, evaliate and disseminate intelligence coming in from
However, up here in their dissemination and evaluation they
find out there is a wide diversion of opinion in intelligence
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d=00fDR6~2Q0 0 30 0 01-2
HTUDT"M
fin-31 Mr. C.. Lost certainly. ' It is like this a it is as though
You and the Supreme Court vore sitting bars a#Zd before you are
all these barristers and lswyars and they oases in with all this
information and you sitting in the Supreme Court said, "There
doesn't seem to be any agreement among these fallow; I think I
villhave one of my ava seen go out and get the information.
Mr. Hardy. Is this thing not a matter of operational
detail we could not possibly write in this bill? If the method
of flow needs to be corrected, that should be done in an adminis-
trative way and you cannot incorporate all this stuff. The
one principle that is involved in this thing is the question of
vh.eth-r this top agency is going to collect? _
Mr. C. That is right.
Mr Harness Whether we should write into the lay this
provis;on vhichhe says now gives him the right to do this.
Mr. Hardy. The question is as to whether this information
is going to go down. Whether that is going to be made available
is an administrative detail.
Mr. C. Trua,and I think if you drop 3(c) and 3(d) the
problem is solved. It already says in there that the various
12 Secretaries are charged with getting it, they are charged with
keeping up their own organization, not surrendering them to
the central organization.
Mr. Hardy. Regardless of who collects your clandestine
information, it should be coordinated and then should get back
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the hundreds of channels flowing into G-2, one is a clandestine
outfit and it is put in there to hide it away. The stuff that
comes in there from that outfit is handled in sue a way that
it looks like any other intelligence to the normal handling
it. That has every advantage. In the first place, it keeps
it from looking clandestine. In the second place, it keeps
people from thinking that is a secret pb ce tf information,
this must be ruch more importantthan anything else I have.
fm-32 to the thing you are talking About.
Kr. C. I agree absolutely, but it does not necessarily
,go bask because it comas in dorm bore. That is another impor-
tant point. Here Is the War Department, here is a great
deal of informtion flowing in there of all kinds . ]NOV, of
100
has to elboir its way through every other piece of information
in (}-2 and gets no special attention, and v:?.en it comes up
through and gets to CIG it has been properly evaluated. Let
us transfer this secret agency and put it up here. In the first
The third and must important is that the piece
place, it is out in the open; it is in a showcase. How
you going to hide it. No lines go in there except this one.
Let us say there is no other information up there, that i : has
to fight its way through, and look at the disproportion you viii
get. War, State, and Navy agree of something; this thin.t;
disagrees. If it disagrees, it will be thrown out down ire re ,
but up here the man says, "Gentlemen, this is our own secret
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fm-33 thing, I do not know, maybe the l are right. No way some day
pick it up and run with it and we are wrong, ve are hooked.
One other thing, out of hundreds of lines is one clandestine
line coming in, it is infiltrated. The modern system of
intelligence is not to shoot the man. The trick today is to
give his 90 per Dent incorrect material and 10 per cent correct
material. They feed it. If it comes up here and he says he
has compromised it by some accident, there is no great damage
done, but If this place is compromised, look at the danger we
are in. It is just the wrong place for that stuff to cow in.
Mr. Dorn. What do you suggest about this? If )Du are up
here in your top echelon of evaluation and correlation, they
find that this outfit is not getting the information that they
probably should, haw are tbay going to oorwcit their ate1ll gene
set up in this particular department? Will that be dam in that
department?
Mr. C. I say these people have plenty of authority from
that directive to go in there and get this done. That is quite
different than saying, "I viii do it, set this done."
Gentlemen, suppose you own a ranch and you have thousands
of "rem and tons of thousands of heads of cattle. policy is
determined by the n sitting in the ranch house. He does not
may, "Ho11,. I an going to send fine ?a.-1c s to Colorado and.
I an going to cared five- oarlo to Chicago," and then rttn out
with his horse and collect thou,. goxtaeraaa. No says,, we* will
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102
send this stuff,'* and the boys go out and do the work.
xr- Judd. Your report is wrong, because the report from
the Central Intelligence Agency does not go up to the President]
it gee s up to the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Secretary
of State, up to the Secretary of the National Security Council.
The collection Domes through there but when it Bets up there
h is not under the President but under the National Security
Council. They decide vht, is done with this information.
Nr. C. It does not work out that way. We do not have
time.
Mr. Judd. There.b no need to keep them under the National
Security Council unless the National Security Council is going
to function.
Mr. C. This feellcs, as I understand, is charged with the
proper- dissemination of information. That might mean tare it
to the White House. It might mean even take it over to the
Botanical Gardens. I do not know, but he is charged with see-
ing that it gets to the right place I an quite sure that
was the intent of this Presidential directive to make sure
he gets the inforcaatiou, sees that there are no blank spots
and delivers it to the right person.
Jir. Harness. There was an executive order made in July
1946 that, made it possible for this Central Agency to distort
the m9aning of this law?
Xr. 0. I belie vs so, sir .
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103
fa-35 I Would liras to finish f ' rest of this or my no. 5?
The directive riMulvss State, VW aid Hovey to .vie CZ! at
his request the funds, the psi*soamsl, the faoilltles and other
assistasas Vocessary to carry out these now funstions, this
i's-definition that Vs are. tslking about , and if he still needs
more money he is to ask NIA for a supplsasntal budget. 'Nothing
like that was contemplated when this directive was given.
You know the first thing that happensA after this para-
graph was written in. Admiral Sosera told as,who really did
the most work on this, he said after that directive was written
andit vas s "perform, for the benefit of said intelligenos agen-
cies, such services of coaaon service," be said, "I was
flooded, War, State and Navy oaae to see and said, 'Please take
over these desks, 1b t ee give you this.Admiral 5o r;
said, "I kept saying, 'Look, I an starting in business, I do
not want to pick up the odds and ends you do not want.'"
They said this can be done better centrally. Also, at that
tine he had some ambitious young van, and during the tias I was
making this study for the House Military Affairs Committee
I had Admiral Sovers' peraission to talk to everybody in CIO
and it was very easy for as because this particular i van
my predecessor as Secretary of the Joint Intelligenok) Co aittee
of the Joint dhiafo of Staff. NO said, NO arp going to du a
lot ,of' tLjjn4 c here. We are going to take over the Whole Who
files. It is a waste of tiae and mousy to have a Whole W140
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104
t?-36 tt as. for the Arq, a 1 oPe Who fits for the Navy, and a Who's
Who file over there. We are going to have them in c Piave."
Nor are yoat going to ?et thew to the sea when be needs then?
14 We will have a soteroyole service and the stuff will dot there
faster than it does today. I said, "Let us see what happened
to G-2. I was in the falksnr section in 0-2 and ezoept for
the Chinese I think ve had thsmost unpronounosable name La
the vholoplace. V. would get a Balkan report saying I&. S o-
and-s o was doing this and the other and we turned aye undand
there two or three people who knew the language and said, 'Who
is this bird?' And it case out and we had the record like that.
When it turned functional they took the files away and took them
down to the middle of the Pentagon. When we wanted to get the
san- report, we would call up and say, 'Let mg have the card on
so-and-so.' They said, 'You cannot mention names over the
phone.' You theanvould send the girl down there. She would
come back with a message saying they are working with China
now, or it will be up in an hour or two. The next thing was
that you said, 'The hell with it, we will keep our own.'"
Nov, they are Wing to take those Who's Who files and
take them out of the Pentagon wend take them sosaswhere~ else in
town with a motorcyole escort. rnat is one of the difficulties
with theoretical over-c sntraalizaation.
Dlr. Zorn. Here is your Central Intelligence A enoy hare.
All right. In their correlation and evaluation of Mterial
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105
fm-3T that is ooaring into then they fool national security is in
danker. They have information of vhiah they are pretty sure.
To vhon should they go from there on to have this information
immediately and promptly acted on, to this National Security
Count it or directly to the head of the national defense?
Mr. C. It depends on where it is supposed to go. For
'instance, today I know that Central Intelligence publishes
hundreds of little items. They are distributed to 0-2. They
cos in like anybody else's intelligence. It is notvorthy of
a big central important evaluating agency, the little items
of
that come out/there.' I viii grant that in the flow of business
lots of littleitsms will corms . I as sure they cannot say, "You
rust send all the stuff to the National Security Council."
They would not be bothered, because then come a good piece
that is lost in the shuffle because they get in the habit of
reading the junk, and vhen a good one comas along they do not got
the s ignificance .
Xr. Dorn. If there vere a potential attack, than It vould
be up to them to aee the proper official, whether it is the
National Saaurity Board or the head of national defense.
Mr. C. Thetis the way I understand it. For Ixetanoo,
if a competent head were in there and he heard an attack was
coning and the attack was i t and it vim going to he in
Detroz-, he Gerteeinly would got that info tlon to the
Secretary of War before he got it to the Seare43ary of the Navy.
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Seeonds count. Be boa to use his bean an this ast-up. Seconds
count. -
Dr. Dorn. Should he go to the National Security Council,
or the can responsible for the whob set-up?
Br. C. And the War Department and the coroner and Maybe
the chief of polio* oi' Detroit, I do not know, but he had better
get an the job. If he is going to land in the middle of the
ocean, he had better got the Secretary of the Navy first. Be
is charged with dissosinstion to the proper person here.
Ni'. Dorn. That is his responsibility?
Xr. C. Tea, air.
Xr. Vadsvorth. There is no difference of opinion about
that. That is in the bill and in the Executive Order and he
is still responoiblo for it.
1Ir. 0. An you well know, a man can never surptiae his bows,
and if he is under the Be vstary of National Dsfenne and does not
tell hits right off the reel, he is not very smart.
Xr. Barneass. Under section (a) of Section 3 it says:
"Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of
intelligence relenting to the national security, and the
appropriation diesmeeination within the a overnx*nt of
the resulting otrotegic and national policy intelligence."
What does that an, if it dCs not M *a that he shznild
send beak to the Secretary of Yer the evaluation of the report
that was originally sent theme?
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m r. ?. i t N a m just tist Vie havw t $ r4t~ .
that it is cap tabirl to psaperty zooms is it- Zn other
words, ever7O ehe Is ge~issrily a osRee6 ash het that
intellige>wse.
Xr. Ha rsnels . That is V Mt I thousht it meant but you
pvs an illus teat ton .a. a nt ago Of a Man in the War Depart-
sent making a report which got over. to the State Departtaent
and it was distorted somewhn:rs along the line4
Iii'. 0. That is right.
Dr. Rarrass. When they evaluated or attempted to
evaluate that, they said it was screwy and they did not even
disseminate that back.
gr. 0. They ohaacged it. They changed the tsagr of it
and sent it down to State.
Mr. Judd. Did they send it back to War?
The Chairman. They did from bore and-sent it up, but
they sent back their version.
1[r. Harness. There is nothing that we could writs in. the
law to change that. That is downright crooked.
Xr. 0. I have talla d to everybody on this, Admiral Carter,
Admiral awe". I have brought this up with General Wright,
confronted Admiral Hill, and I said, `Hann did that happen, host
oou7d' such a thing happi nt? Hs said, "It is a nistalce ? ?
107
you kncv, mistakes like that should not happen. When I
go to my friends in G-2 and ask, QXs this two-way flow really
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""Ho, nothing sales ant Of thus that is
worth a dam-0
I believe am reason it is getting cloyed up is because
they are bored with evaluation. They are bored with dissemina-
tion and they want to be in this 4p y business .
The Chairman.. Did not 'this toes about up hers because
of that aide lies coming in there?
Xr. C. I cannot guarantee that.
The Chairman. That is the way it could have been.
Dlr. C. It certainly could.
The Chairman. That is why you dD not want this sideline?
Mr. 0. Exactly.
Xr. Huss. Hov are you going to protect yourself from
that?
Mr. C. By. taking out sections 3(0) and 3(d).
Mr. Xanaaco. Suppose the War Dsjsrtment had chocked G-2,
you could sand it up there. Tho State Department requested it.
?bat would work where the State Department would then go back
and check with afar, they could cull out information all they
wanted to, anyhow?
Xr. C. This is des ed to prevent that.
Coming back again to where we were a eainute ago, when this
was originally planned the plan was that this man in the
eaidd3a vac to be a very powerful figure, all intelligence was
to go to him, ho va.s to fix it up, and he was to p"sit on to
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109
the President. The Navy, Admiral dcaers, b1k that. They
said that principle is no good because if that happens, emery ow
of these people gill not be certain that this inf Creation is
being passed on with that shade of Waning they W& U# and
we will have this running around in circles. Do not pay any
attention to that. The Davy had this counterplan Consisting
of a two-way street. Everything that goes up has to costs
down. In order to do that, you have to awke the Director of
Central Intelligence a less iczportantfigure, and that is why he
was named a non-voting nesber of this board. When this was put
up to the Presiident, "Dr. President, you can either have the
State Department plan whereby he will fix up the intelligence
and pass it on, or you can have it really where he will not
pans it on, where the three departments are not all agreed on
which plan you prefers" He aaia, ETbat is the oars for me, I would
like to sake one change, sMI would like to add my personal
Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy."
We said, "That is great. " V4at have we done since that
day? We have gone all around the clock and we are back to
the very plan ve decided not to have.
In the study I made for the Douse Kilit.sry Affair a Com-
mittee and at the tin. Admiral Sowers left,the CIG was split
.leost half-way between off Lure who believed as I do, and the
other half who are very itioun cued said, ` ntieasn which
is this going to be, a super-dooper aganey? This is going to
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Vandenberg
was on the steps of the Pentagon. He said, "I
have heard about you, come in and see me. I vill be glad to
tall; this over with you." He said, "Coon back in a oar with
Me," but I vas not able to do it.
I said, "I an primarily interested in this questions Do
you believe ina ooordimting and evaluating agency or operation
in central intelligence!"
Hs said, *1 will tell you this, I do not believe in any
. dasa coos mating sawing circle .N
From that mot rat on vs had thatdrive that the central
agsncy uatust do.more and more and then it does that, Ve find
out the fact that he is a non-voting member isn't o1eroome by
the fact that he in delegating power to then and he knocks the
War Department over the head and Navy Department over the head.
Suppose the Atomic Enorgy Goi ission decided that they wanted
to have a clandestine intelligence agency of their own, atvoan
an open intelligence agency of their own. Under this dirsotive
threy crnnot do it, and yet how many atoms ensr87 experts
an the re . Are there enough to have a full set in the Atomic
Energy Do lion and another full not sitting in hero?
fa-42 . have all the potters that Gds had and more." We are going to
have all the rs-pe . They said, "Lot us have the maps, ve are
going in the printing business."
When General Vandenb.rg cane in and Admiral Sovers intro-
duosd me to him, the fizet conversation I had with General
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 Urazuk4o t rated do 703 thLskc be 0
the beoret of , of Ravys &nd of Mate t
tber with
Adsir?-I Leahy to &aMO to tkAt bhund& if it t" Be onerous to
GPI? by did the aaoretary of vy agOss? It ens so o"roas
to G-2, why did the heorstsry of W.Sr awe?
. 0. I beppsa to know the aesrotary of. Vap ap,od before
he asked G-2, and Q-2 when first approached objeoted to it.
Se said to as the other days 'y orders UVO that this this
should be abolished, and those a" myorders until souse higher
power, perhaps the Congress , oh=Vs thou. 1? That it what be
said.
Kr. VaAaworth. I think it is fair to say that perhaps
youhave given an impartial explanation of what happened.
this morning said this final dais ion to put
Central Intelligence in the operation field in clandestine in-
forotion was agreed upon unanimously by the Chief of ( I and
the chief of (1-2 and the State Department representative.
W% 0. I can tell you that in my discussion with Admiral
Ingalls, and you can aback this with him, Admiral Ingalls sale,
"I would like to wash my hands of the olandestiis intelligenos.
I did not vent it in the Navy." He said, Nrould it not be a
terribla thing if we had Clandestine intelligence," and this
vas right after the Runsisn blow-up in Canada, `could it not
be a terrible thing if the Navy Yore caught dealing in secret
rots lligsnoe? "
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ri-4~M I saw, " i3*l, ao you not tbiak it would be & wares
M134 if the ContMI #n0y were caught dealing in sash
inta2.ligenoe9 W Again Admiral Savers the other day said, "the
Iavy till not be ooWetsnt to do this kind of thing. this takes
& peculiar kind of =a. Frankly, I do not think the Army Is
Over going to be competent e'ith a quick turnover in officers.
This needs something permanent." I said, "I agree with you,
and therefore I believe vs should have lots of these little
things put in the places where they belongso that if one of
them is knocked out because of inefficiency of somebody who doss
not know how to do it, it stays on, but if you oily have one,
and that is not run properly, and after all ve have been doing
it for five y.-are and the British for 500 years, they have
learn .d a lot of tricks about ' this . "
kr. Wadavorth. testified this morning that
the British had centralised collection of olandsstine intelli-
gence.
Mr. 'C. I think you are going to have a vi tness later, unless
I am mistaken, who has a full description of the British,
Russian, French and Chinese intelligence systems, but nota
single one of them is centralized.
11I6r. golifield. It that was not discussed before X,oase in,
do you have any opinion os to whether this head elan should be
a civilian or military mm?
Mr. C. I hays been asked that many times. I du not
I care. If he is a darn good 1,srican and he is willing to
work.
!i