PROPOSED LEGISLATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000100180005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 7, 1948
• Content Type: MEMO

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HISTOR re A T. BACKGROUND OF THE CLINTRAL D1TaLICOIC3 AGCY
Introduction
As an aid in understanding CIA's present functions and organisa.
tion, a historical background has been compiled including Pertinent
material on World War II agencies and plans for a postwar intelligence
organization which were in process long before the end of the mar.
The United States Government has carried on intelligence activities
since the days of George Washington, but it was not until the swiftly
moving events of the early 154418 Showed the needfor an efficient
method atid organisation for the development of intelligence that a
government-wide system of intelligence work was conceived and later
carried out, culminating in the formation and operation of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
1. World War II
a. Coordinator of Information
The events which foretold the coming of World War 11, also acted
as cataaysts in the forming of various government organisations which
served as nucleii in the subsequent government-wide expansion t.onslattext
with the gigantic war effort. By an Executive Order dated 8 Septerber
1939, President Franklin Roosevelt provided for an office for onergeocy
management "in the event of a national emergence or the t.hreat of one.
Such an office was subsequently established on 25 May 1940.1 ly an
adadnistrative order of 7 January 1941, the functions of the office were
modified and further defined and included advising and assiating the
1. Executive Order 8248 and Administrative Order of 25 ma7 1940.
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President in time of emergency, coordinating emergency activities of
the Government and informing the President as to the various agencies'
progress in emergency matters.
Six months later, the forerunner of a centralised intelligence
service was established under the name of Coordinator of information
and William J. Donovan was named to that position.2 Re had authority-
from President Roosevelt tot "Collect and analyze all information and
data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such Informa-
tion and data, and to make such information and data available to the
President and to such departments and agencies as the President may
determine, and to carry out, when requested by the President, such
supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information
important for national security not now available to the Govvenment."
The Coordinator of Information was to have access to information and
data within the various departments and agencies but he was not to
interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the
President's regular military and naval advisers. To assist him, the
Coordinator could appoint committeea of representatives of the various
departments and agencies. Colonel Donovan was to receive no compensation
but was entitled to transportation subsistence and other incidental
expenses ..3 Under his broad mandate, the Coordinator of Information
began to put together an organization capable of producing intelligence
necessary for the successful carrying out of the war effort.
2. Presidential Order of 11 Jay 1941 (6 F.R. 3422).
3. Letter from President Roosevelt to Colonel Donovan, 23 July 1!/41.
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In less than a year, on 13 June 1942, by a military order, the
President abolished the Office of Coordinator of Information and
established the Office of Strategic Servicee (OSS) which operationally
came under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. OSS's
mandate was quite simple. It was to:
"a. Collect and analyze such strategic information ea may
be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of 3taff; and
"b. Plan and operate such special service as may be iirteted
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."
William J. Donovan was appointed by the President as Director or
Strategic Services "encer the direction and supervision of the Urdeed
States Joint Chiefs of Staff." OSS was allowed certain privileges in
conducting its operations such as entering into contracts "without
regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance,
amendment, or modification of contracts." (Executive Order 9241,
1 September 1942.) Also it was imperative in performing certain of
the wartime functions of OSS that latitude be granted in the itepencieuael
of funds.
It was the announced policy of OSS to employ ordinary vouchered
moneys wherever practicable. When, however, such uae would have grave-ey
impeded the effective prosecution of the program directed by t1-.e Jot
Chiefs of Staff, OSS had to resort to funds expendable without regard
to laws relating to the expenditure of government funds. ?or elampee
it would have been most difficult to have performed Tilley of the peculiar
4. Military Order, 13 June 1942 CF.R. Dec. 42 - 57595).
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eun4eelprisescfMARtelefiReg204410SY:c60.45Waiertfa/641018001tk"
concerning employment procedures, annual and sick leave, dual compensa-
tion, the purchase of motor vehicles, the enployment of aliens, the
retaining of investigators, or the securing of laborers or other
personnel in various foreign countries. The General Accounting effice
was willing to accept vouchers showing the expenditure of funds by tete
for such purposes providing that it was stated that such exnendituree
were necessary in the performance of its peculiar functione in disreeero
of existing law and regulation. The HationaI War Agency Appropriation
Act of 1945 (P.L. 372) as it pertained to OSS read as follows:
"Salaries and expanses: For 411 expenaes necessare to enable
the Office of Strategic Services to carry out its function and
activities, including salaries of a Director at TiI0,000 per anneal,
one assistant director and one deputy director at 49000 Per anaven
each; procurement of necessary services, supplies and eqpiement
without regard to section 3709, Revised, Statutes; travel expenses,
including expenses outside the United States eithaat regard to he
Standardized Government Travel Regulations and the Subsistence
Expense Act of 1926, as amended (5 U.S.C. 821-833), and age gernrel
? provision for the fiscal year 19h5 to the contrary; preparation
and transportation of the re:mine of officers and employees who
die abroad or in transit, while in the dispatch of their ctfitiel
duties, to their former hones in this country or to a place not
more distant for interment, and for the ordinary expenses ef eeee
interment; rental of news-reporting services; purchese of or
subscription to commercial and trade reports; the rendering of
such gratuitous services and the disposition, free or otherwise, uf
such materials as the Director deems advisable; purchase or rentae
and operation of photographic, reproduction, duplicating nnd
printing machines, equipment, and devices and radieereceieing and
radio-sending eqeipment and devices; maintenance, operation, repaire
and hire of notorepropelled or horse-drawn passengerecarrying
vehicles and vessels of 411 kinds; printing and binding; exchange
of funds without regard to section 3651, Pevieed Statutes (31
U.S.C. 543); purchase and free distribution of firearms, euard
eniforma, special clothing, and other personal equipment; the
cost of a compartment or such other accommodations as may be
authorized by the Director for security when authorized personeel
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are required to transport secret oecuments or hand baggage
containing highly technical and valuable equipment; Z57,000,100
of which amount such sums as may be authorized by the oirecter of
the Bureau of the Budget may be transferred to other departments
or agencies of the Government, either as advance payment or
reimbursement of appropriation, for the performance of any of the
functions or activities for which this appropriation is made:
PROVIDED, That 437,000 )000 of this appropriation may be expended
without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating
to the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of
persons in the Government service, and $3520000000 of such
$37,000,000 may be expended for objects of a confidential nature.
such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate
of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and every
such certificate shall be Oeemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified."'
The Director of OSS enjoyed the confidence of the Congress in managing
the disposition of confidential funds as can be seen by reading over the
hearings before the subcommittee on appropriationsof the 'Pith Congress,
2d Session.
2. Post War Intelligence Organization 1946-47
The Central Intelligence Group
The OSS organization remained intact until the close of World
War II. In the fall of 1944, its Director, General Donovan was aakeo
by the President to recommend the concept for a postwar intelligence
organization. In substance, his recommendations were followed out when
the President, in January 1946, created the National Intaligenee
Authority (NIA). A Central Intelligence Group VAS also organised by
directive, with a Director of Central Intelligence designated lkir the
President to assist the NIA and to be responsible to it.
5. U.S.C. Congressional Service, nth Congress, 2d Session, 1944,
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Text of Directive, 22 January 1746.
"l. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all federal
foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordieated
so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelli-
gence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate
you, geeretaries of State, War and Naeg together with another
person to be named by me as py personal representative, as the
National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.
2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall
each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your
respective departments, which persons shell collectively form a
Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direetion of a
Director of Central Intelligence, assist the national Intolligenee
Authority. The Director of Centre,. Intelligence shall be designated
by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority,
and shall sit as a nonvoting member thereof.
?3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and
control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Directer of
Central Intelligence shall:
"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of
intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In
so doing, full use shell be made of the staff and facilittee
of the intelligence agencies of your departments.
"b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities
of the intelligence agencies of your departments as relate to
the national security and recommend to the National
Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-al
policies and objectives as will assure the most effective
accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
"c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such cervices of comnon concern as the National'.
Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.
"d. Perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security an the President
and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time
direct.
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4. No police, law enforcement or internal security
functione shall be exercised under this directive.
"5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies
of your departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence
Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central
Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the
extent approved by the National intelligence Authority, the opera-
tions of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection he
the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning
functions.
6. The existing intelligence agencies of your departments
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate
departmental intelligence.
7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advlsea
by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (er
their representatives) of the principal military and civilian
intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related
to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence
Authority.
"8. 'Within the scope of existing law and Presidential
Directives, other departments and agencies of the Executive Brame,
of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence informa-
tion relating to the national security as is in their possession,
and as the Director of Central Intelligence mey from time to time
request pursuant to regulations of the National intelligence
Authority.
"9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the
making of investigations inside the continental limits of he
United States and its possessions; except as provided by law and
Presidential Directives.
"10. In the conduct of their activities the Iational
Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intellieence
shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources
and methods."
On the initiative of the Executive Department, the United atatee
for the first time in its history, launched a national intellifence
organization. It charter was written in broad terms, which enabled
the embryonic agency to feel its evolutionary way and hanaie oeste 33
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only in such order as it deems best. Many of the obstacles, however,
were inherent in the charter under which the national intelligence
system was to operate. The criterion of all NIA action was whether
the action was necessary to the planning, development and coordination
of Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the moat
effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the
national security. The term "national security" if interpreted
narrowly wasconsidered by none to be an unfortunate limitation upon
CIG because many national interests other than security can be served
by a central intelligence agency submitting information to the policy
makers within the Government.
The operating agency under the national Intelligence Authority,
the Central Intelligence Group, was independent in name only because
for ell practical purposes the activities of CIG were subject to the
budget heads of the three departments - State, liar and Navy. Also,
the agency had no employment rights, obtaining its personnel by
assignment.
After the NIA and CIG system was in existence for about one year
as a purely executive creature, a great deal of interest had developed
in the Congress so that legislation was proposed creating a National
Security Council and a Central Intelligence Agency. Studies mac* by
the Senate Armed Cervices Committee "and all testimony received by .
showe the need for closer and continuous coordination on a high level
within the Government of our domestic, foreign and military policies
for an appropriate intelligence organization to serve both militmrynnd
civilian agencies of security..."6
6. U.S. Code Congressional bervice, derth Congress, p. 1494, Senate
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3.
The postwar Congressional investigations into the Pearl .!i.,Jrbor :Aster
AWO been cited as one of the compelling reasons for the eatabliehmerrt of
the Central Intellieence agency. As a rosult of its investigation te
December of 1946, the buse Committee on :111.itary Affairs isauad "A eeport
The System Currently Employed In the Collectione evaluation. and Dissemina-
tion of Intelligence Affecting the War 2otential of the United Staten", whid4
recognized the need for strong intelligence as the "nation's first line xe
defense". 77- The Committee made nine recommendations:
Recommendation 1: That the :rational Intelligence Ifthorltee
established on January 22, 1946, by Presidential directive* be
authorized by act of Congress (This is desiened to give the new
authority a firmer base.)
Rcccnmendation 2: That the lational Intelligence Authority anal
consiet of the Secretaries of State, "ier, and the Navy, or deputies fer
intelligence. (The Secretaries are obviously too by to give tliie
hiehly important subject the attention it deservee.)
Recomnendation 3: That the Central Intelligence Group receive
- its appropriations direct from the Congress. (At present the Ccreup
receives its appropriations as grants frma the State Departrant,
Department, and the Navy repartment, an unwieldlerend emeetimes
awkward procedure.)
Recommendation 4: That the Central Intelligence Grose have
complete control over its own personnel. (At present the ;.:r01113
receives drafts from the Departments of state, Wars and Navy.)
flouse Report No. 27342 December 17, 19116
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Recommendation 5: That the Director of the Central Intelligence
Group be a civilian appointed for a preliminary term of 2 years and a
permanent term of 10 years, at a salary of at least $128000 a year.
(A civilian would be less subject to the control or criticism
of any eilitary establishments less likely to have ambitions inaleether
direction, would be mere in keeping with American tradition, would be
more synbolio of the politico-military nature of the problem posed by
intelligence in peacetime; furthermore, there is nothing to keep 3
qualified Army or Navy officer from accepting the post in civilian
clothes, and there is every desires by setting the tenure of office at
10 years and making the salary substantial, to make the poet attrac-
tive to one wile has learned intelligence thoroughly in the Armee 7aavys
or Foreign Service of the State Department, Continuity of eervice is
recognised as very important.)
Recommendation 15a That the Director of the Central intelligence
Group be appointed by the President by and with the consent of the
Senate.
Reconmendation 7: That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall (1) acceeplish the correlation and evaluation of intaligenee
relating to the national security, and the appropriate dinaeminetton
within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy
intellieeneee and in so doing making full use of the staff and factlitiee
of the intelligence agencies already existing in the various Goveenment
departnents; (2) plan for the coordination of such of the activities
of the intelligence agencies of the various Government departmentn as
relate to the national security and recomeend to the Iational Intelli-
gence Authority the establishment of such over-011 policies and objectivee
as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national
intelligence mission; (3) perform, for the benefit of said intellaeence
agencies, such services of come= concern related directly to coordina-
tion, correlation, evaluation, and disserdnation as the lational
Intelligence Authority shall determine can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally; (4) perform such other similar fuectiona
and auties related to iatelligence affecting the notional Securiae as
the Congress and the Jational Intelligence authority eay from time to
tie* direct. It is specifically understood that the Director of
Central Intelligence shall not undertake operations for the collection
of intelligence,
(ems paragraph is intended to enable the Central intelligence
Group to concentrate on the analysts and evaluation of highlevel
intelligence for the lresident ana others who have to determine
national policy. One should not remove any intelligence operation from
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the agencies where day-to-..day policies and decisions hey's to be
the collection and basic analyels in.each field of intealleence sheeld
be aesigned to the agency having prinary responsibility in that field.)
Reconmendation WI That peraeraphs 2, 4, 50 61 7, 80 9, and 10
of the President3a, directive of January 220 19/163 relating to the
establishment of a National intelligence Authority be enacted Into
law, with such revisions in wording as may seen necessary.
(The President's directive was carefullerprepared and hu at
the time of its publication, the support of the interested agenc
Recommendation 9: - That the J'Irm7e be requested sympotheticaliy to
examine further the question of the establiehment of an Intel en
Corps for the training, development, and assignment of especially
qualified officers.
In July /9460 a draft of enabling legislation for a proposed enteal
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was sent to the White House by the ::entral Ineel'el-
gence eroup. It called for a national intelligence Authority (JIA, cels-.
ti or the Secretaries of State? 'ar0 and levy, a. personal reeres ntatire
of ;-.,he President and the "Director af.' Z;he Central Intellieenre Agency"
a non-voting eenber. The JIA was to supervise the activitiee of ,.1/A? :t
was erovided that CIA was to be eetablished "with a lirector who 31,1111 1)1
the head thereof." in T_ecember a more detailed and coaprehensive draft ui
submitted to the White douse which reflected the experience rained after 10
months of operation under the 22 January :xecutive 3rdere
In proposing this legislation CIG attenpted to mercer:4) tie unworkeeIe
features of its charter which quickly had ,3ccome apparent. rne of the eeee
elaring of these features was the necessity for CIG to obtain nersennel
the State, War, and ':avy lopartnents. It was not until well into the muster
of 1546 that arrangements were made. for GIG to hire personnel directly.
Budgetary problem also were very difficult to handle until egreement yes
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reached which estahllehed a working fund at the disposal of the ':;TO.
Fortunately for CIG all of the departments and agencies of the overnment
and particularly the Bureau of the 8udget, the (enema. Accounting Office
and the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments, were guide te realize
the special administrative problems which arose Le the edminietretion and
operations of an intelligence agency. They made possible the areeneements
'Welch enabled the agency to operate* However, the manner ef adnftnietrateve
and logistical support was always considered to be of a teeporary nature
pending the passage of some fore of military unification logtolatione
One draft of enabling legislation had incorporated the t-ar.m "with e
Director of Central intelligence who shall be the head thereof." Thje
particular wording was the same- as the terminoixeerin the 22 daneareee eotive
and its apparent purpose then was to create a post with an official ehe Taes
to be responsible for the centralized intelligence functions or leeeral
goverment and who was to have an intelligence agency to eseist him.
The wording "with a Director of Central Intel/igencem remained and
appeared in the eventual legislation; the position of Director or Central
Intelligence we recognized from the beginning as being nore than the head
of the Central intelligence Ageney but rather as the Chief Intellepenee
Advisor in the goverment.
B. Report to honorable James Forreatal on Unification of the ';:ar and
Jepartmente .Senate Committee Print, 79th 'Lc:Ingram,. 1st 5ession*
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h. Congressional Committee Hearings
It must be remembered that in 1947, Congress and the ?resident's fft ice
were strongly influenced by the Pearl 1!arbor investigations which showed
the need for an effective intelligence agency. This was stressed in oua
and Senate hearings on the National Security Act bill, and witness after
witness testified as to value of centralized intelligence. It wee aleo.
pointed out on numerous occasions that the provisions for a Director of
Central Intelligence and a Central Intelligence Agency would be s-,eaTrIe
a legislative recognition of the President's order of 22 January 1946. rne
basic role of the Director of Central Intelligence from 1946 eaa described by
General Vandenberg in April 1947:
"The Director of Central Intelligence is presently charred mth
the following basic functions:
1. The collection of foreign intelligence information cd
certain types -- without interfering with or duplicating the norna:
collection activities of the military and naval intelligence 301*V1.0eitis
or the Foreign Service of the State Department.
2. The evaluation, correlation and interpretation of the foreign
information collected, in order to produce the strategic and national
policy intelligence required by the President and other appropriate
officials of the Government.
3. The dissemination of the national intelligence produced.
4. The performance of such services of common concern to the
various intelligence agencies of the Government as can be more afriu.
ciently accomplished centrally.
5. Planning for the coordination of the intelligence activities
of the Government ea as to secure the more effective accompliehment
of the national intelligence objectives." 9
Statement before the Committee on fixpenditures In the 7zeoutive Deeertment.
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General -andenberg also touched upon the responsibilities of the
Urector to he intelligence community:
"In order to perform his prescribed functions, the itirector of
Central Intelligence nust keep in close and intimate contact -Ate the
departmental intelligence agencies of the Government. To provide
formal eachinery for this purpose, the Presidentls Directive esta-Leehed
an Intelligence Ldvisory Board to advise the Director. The peroariem
menbers of this Board are the Directors of Intelligence of t1e,Seite,
War, and -avy tepartments and the Air Force. rrovisien is made, oeeever,
to invite the heads of other intelligence agencies to uit as membore of
the Advisory Board on all matters which mould affect their aeencies.
In this manner, the Board serves to furnish the Director with the
benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience, viewpoints, and ?tear
over-all regeirements of the department:3 and their intelligence
agencies." i?
In its report to accompany HR 4214, the lational Security-Act of eVW,
the :ouse :-,omrittee on Expenditures in the '-,'xecutive Departeent recogni ed the
importance of the Central Intelligence Agency provision of the Ace in relation
to the coordination of United States policies in the foreign and dlitery
fields. The committee reported that, "In order that the ational Security
Council in its deliberations and advice to the President nay have evaleatie
adequate information, there is provided a Central Intelligence pansy."
On 10 ?ebruary 19472 Mr. Allen Dulles submitted eeverel comrente eo CIO
on its enabling legislation. net wrote that consideration should be i vr to
having the Director of Intelligence vete in NIA and "alio to penveit lee-eters
to be referred to the President . . in case by any chance there ehni La be
a difference of apiniaa between the Director and the other nembera oi ;to
authority". 11r. Dulles also stated that reference to the conduct or' evign
intelligence operations "centrally" does not have much meaning and see-. ted
that it should be stated directly that the operntions are to be enrreed
bir the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Specific reference to the organizational place of CIA and its position
relative to the ?Tational Security-Council and other agencies din not occur
in the hearing conducted on the National Security Act bill, often*
Two of the more authoritive colloquies are included below. On 1 4ril
1947, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the Tattonai
Security-Act of 1947 legislation at which Admiral Sherman and General
oe
Vandenberg testified. The following excerpts from the hearings:
SENATOR TIDINGS: when you get down to the Central Intelligence
Agency, which certainly is one of the most important of all the functions
set forth in the bill, I notice that it reports direotIy to the President
and does not seem to have any line running to the War repartment? or the
Nave- Department, or to the Secretary for Air* And I was wondering if
that rather excluded position, you mIght say, was a wholesome thing.
It seems to me that the Central Intelligence Agency ought to have eore
direct contact with the Army and the Navy and the Air Force; and as I
see it on the chart here, it is pretty,weIl set aside and gate only to
the President. What is the reason for that?
ADMIRAL SIERVAN: Well, sir, this diagram shows the primary control
of the Central Intelligence Agenty through the National Security Council
which, of course, is responsible to the President* But, of course, the
Central Intelligence Agency, by detailed directtve, takes information
in from the military services and also supplies them with information.
In other words, it is a staff agency and controlled through the
:'lational Security Council, which is supported by the military ar!rviese,
and in turn, supports them.
SENATOR TIDINGS: It seems to me that of course they would difruse
such information as a matter of orderly procedure to the Army, lavy,
and Air Force, as they collected the information and is they deemed
it pertinent. But I would feel a little more secure about it if
there were a line running from that agency to the War Department,
the Navy Department, and the Air Force, rather than have it go up
through the President and back again. ;iecause the President is
rather busy man, and while he has control over it, one of its fune Amax
it seems to me, ought to be to have a closer tie-in with the three
services than the chart indicates.
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AMIRAL SIRRMAN: Well, sir, that is the trouble with the &Lee-am*
Actually, the Security Council, placed directly under it, has nere)ers
of the three departments, the Secretary of National Defenses tho eeetral
Intelligence Agency, who collaborates very closely with Alitary
Naval Intelligence, and there aro a good many other croeserelatienvides.
STNATOR TIDDICST I realise that, but even so, I think intelliosnce
is about as inportmat a part of running a war as there is, s I 171M1 you
will agree. And it is rather set off there by itaelf, and i3 or:el ender
the President; which is all right for general direction pureosee, bet I
do not feel satisfied in having it over there without some lines. etnnene
to the War Lepartment, the Navy Department, and the Air Fares, en
though that might follow and they might do it anyhow.
ADMRAL SHER4AN4 Weill in a further development or tate char.? we
might show a line at' collaboration and service and se on, axtendiee from
the Central Intelligence Agency. to the three departmente? and to these
others*
SENATOR TIDINGS: To the joint Chiefs of Staff, 'anyway.
ADAIRAL SHSRMANs: They serve the Joint Chiefe of Staff, as a eetter
of fact. We have a Central Intelligence (man) in the tealeerComcie of
the Research and Development aoard at the present time.
STNATOR T7DINGS: if you ever do another chart, will yen do ne the
favor of connecting that up with those three departments and with tile
Joint Chiefs of Staff? Because it looks like it is eet up in that 'my
to advise the President, nore than to advise the services and ti a Joint
Chiefs of Staff; ehich, of course, is not the intention of it at all, in
my opinion..
ADMIRAL SH7RMAN: We tried, in thie particular chart, to show ealy
the primary line of control, with the exception of the dotted line ;:rom
the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which le there for cota"U....
tutional reasons*
STNATOR TTDINGS1 Well, I hope that my coneents 4U cause es 7.13
find some way that we can make sure that someone will offer an aeeneement
from the ;a r 7:30Partlaent or the Navy Department that the Intellie enee
Aeoncy is to have direct tie-in with the Joint Chiefs and the Army,
:lay, and Air Force* Otherwise, we may have another Pearl harbor
controversy, with the question arising, "Who got the infornationro
And the reply, "It was not transmitted*"
That is one thing that should not happen again*
And as this is set up, it weld lend the layemeeiest opinion telt
It was more or less detached, rather than an integral part of t-14 5iree
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SENATOR TIDETCS: Admiral, that is an awfully short bit o ex-
planation, unaer the caption "Central Intelligence Agency," t le way
it is set up here, separately, to be appointed by the President, and
superseding the services now run by the Army and the Navy, I respect-
fully. submit to you and to General Norstad that it might be wine to
put an amendment in there, in order to make certain that the thing Is
understood; that this Central Intelligence Agency shall service the
three departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and have some tie-in
with the three departments, rather than to leave it hanging up there
on a limb all off it itself. I do not think that would change anifeein
materially, but it would clarify it, and make it plain that we are 1,etting
up something for the purposes for which we conceive it to be set up.
ADMIRAL SMRMANs Well, sir, I would like to rake a comeent on the
language as to the Central Intelligence Agency. At one tine in the
drafting we considered completely covering the Central Intelligence
Agency in the manner that it should be covered by
SMATOR MINOS: Admiral, my point is simply- this that unCer
the wording as to the Central Intelligence Agency which begins on pagk.
20 and ends at the top of page 22, it deals more or less with consol-
idation and not with the duties that devolve upon that office. It 3eems
to re there is a void in the bill that ought to be eliminated.
ADMIRAL eHEMAN: Well, we considered the natter of trying to
cover the Central intelligenee Agency adequately, endue found that
that matter, in itself, was going to be a matter of legislation oe
considerable scope and importance.
On 25 April 1947 during a bearing of the House Committee on Expendt 138
in the Executive Department with Secretary Forrestal testifying the following
remarks were =ides
eeeeeTeer et"meTAL. The only objection is again the general one
of the limitations that could conceivably stop very prompt action.
VR, BOGGS. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency evened
work under the National Security Council.
SITRETARY FORRMAL, That is correct.
MR. B)GCS. He is not a member of the National Security Council he
is an independent appointment of the Preeident? but he work' ender, on this
chart -- he is not a member of the Council, the heavy line drawn tore, but
he is more or less an executive secretary on intelligence mateers for the
Council.
S7LREtka FORIESTAL? Well, it is obvious, Mr. eoggs, that the
results of his work would be of essential importance to the Securiey
Council*
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R. 30CGS. I think so, and I agree with you, but the teoueht that
I have in nind was that he should be a member of the Council himself.
After all, he is dealing with all the information and the eveluation of
that information, from wherever we can get it. It seems to ee that ie
has knowledge and information of matters which the National security
Council would consider more information at hand and the evaluation of
that information than any other member of that Council. He ehould el
put on an equal basis.
SECRETARY AdelaSTAI. I think that there is amen some Unit te the
effectiveness of any organization in proportion to the nuMbee of eeolle
that are on it. The services and the intelligence information of Lla.i
Director of intelligence would be availahlel and certainly no an Wee is
either the Secretary of National Defense or the Chairman of the cueity
Council, would want to act or proceed without constant reference te ehe
sources available to this Central Intelligence Director. But agaiel, I
would not try to specify it by law, so confident, am I that the practecal
workings out of this organization would require his presence most ee the
tine.
MIL BOGCS. I can see -... I do not know that I can see -- I flea
visueliee in my mind, even if this bill becomes a law, as preeantey vet ?
up, a great deal of room for confusion on intelligence matters. elee wee
have the Director of the Contra].Intelligence Agency, responsible u the.
National Security Council, and yet the Director is not a. meter of .hat
Council, but he has to get all of his information down through the eeain
of the Secretary of lational Defense, and all the other agencies oe
Government in addition to our national defense agencies, the leereeeryof
Agriculture, the Secretary of State, and so forth. I just cannot quite
see how the man is going to carry out his functions there without a
great- deal of confusion, and really more opportunity to put the blerva
on somebody else than there is new.
SECRETARY FOUESTAL. Well, if you have an organization, Nr. ,eeeee,
in which men have to rely upon placing the blame, and this is particularly
true of Government, if you once get that conception into their heads,
you cannot run any organization, and it goes to the root, really, of this
whole question. This thing will only and I have said from the
beginning it would only work, if the components in it want it to work.
NR. BOGCS. Right,. I certainly agree with that. Now, sir, In the
event -this hill becomes a law, will it require .very much additdonal
legislation to implement it and make it effective, in your opinion?
SCRETARY FORReSTAie Well, would think there should b? an
examination of all lame that deal with the establishment of the War
Department and the Navy Department, and a dusting off, no to epeak,
of their functions in consonance with this legislation, if it is eseed.
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There vas little opposition in the Congress to the plan for A central
intelligence service. Several Congressmen pointed out that the intelligence
agency provisions in the various unification bills were the nost important
parts of the unification legislation. However, there was a great deal of
discussion particularly in committee on whether or not the Director should
be chomen fron one of the ).reed Services or whether he should be a civilian.
The Senate Bill provided that the Director of Central Intelligence was to
be appointed from the armed services or from civilian life. A Reese
amendment provided that the director of Central Intelligence be appointed
from civilian life. The reason nest often given for the House arsendrerrt van
that it was a step taken to prevent the Central Intelligence Agency from
becoming a "Cestapoetype organization.' The Senate-House conferees adopted
the Senate version but with several conditions limiting the connections with
his service of a Director chosen from the military servicee.
The following excerpts pertaining to the formation of Central Intelli-
gence Agency are taken from the debate on the unification legislat4on. In
the
House on 19 J147 1947:
Mr. WADSWORTH: .. ?In emition, under the Council there would be
another element which is to advise the Council, sebject to regulations
made by the Council, in the field of Intelligence, in the foreign fled;
and there is established a central intelligence agency subject to the
Council headed by a director.
The function of that agency is to constitute itself as gathering
point fpr information coming fram all over the world through all kinds
el channels concerning the potential strength of other nations ant their
political intentions. There is nothing secret about that. Every nation
in the world is doing the same thing. But it must be remenbered that
tthe Central Intelligence Agency is subject tiethe Council and doe; not
act independently, It is the agency for the collecting and disreminat-
ing of information which will help the President and the Coencil to
adoptwise and effective policies. ,
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So with the information of that sort concern.ing other nations anti
intonation coming in with respect to our own resources* both of whtch
are available to the Council and President, we will have for the first
time in our history a piece of raachinery that should work and f_t is
high time that we have it. We have never had it before. During this
last war all sorts of devices were resorted to, obvioualy in great
? haste* to accomplish a thing like this. You may remember the huge
number of special comrd.ttees, organizations and agencies net up by
xecutive Order in an attempt to catch up with the target. Ve have
learned as a result of the war that we should have some pc.r4anent
organization, and that is the one proposed in this hi 13 ?
Mr. K31'EN of Wisconsin; It seems to me from lhat the grntle?
ran has said that the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the ver?
? important parts of this entire set-up. I wish to ask the gentleman
if there is a definite coordination provided for between that Agency
and, say the Department of State? For I feel that certain information
of the Agency would affect the activities of the entire nystera.
Re, WADSWORTH: The gentleman is correct. May I point out that
under the provisions of the bill the Central Intelligence Agency in
effect evert cooperate with all the agencies of the Goverment* inctren cag
the State Department. It is the gathering point of information that
nay come in from any department of the Government with respect to the
fortign field, including the State Department, of course; including
the 't,:ar reportmerrt? through G-2; including the Navy Department,
through CM. That intonation is gathered into the central agency
to be evaluated by Central intelligence and then disseminated t-,o
those agencies of Government that may be interested in some portion
of
Mr. t:MPPARD: . ? .On the next level above the National I1y
EstablIshenerrt there is provided the National Security Council ;,dth
the President as chairman* which will effectively coordinate cur
domestic and foreign policies in the light of sound information fur-
nished by the Central Intelligence Agency, and with the knowledge
of our manpower and material capabilities derived from tlmt National
Security esources Board. IV'
Yr. PFICE: . .As such, it is administrative unity* in the ?nterest
of coordinating the total war effort of the Nation, because in aden
to putting an Army, a Navy and an Air Force 'under the direction of a
single aded_nistrative-Secretax7 of Defense, it placen a '.-rar
the Joint niefs of Staff, the Munitions Board., a Research and Develot
ment Board, the Central Intelligence Agengn* and other such denartnents
in the National Defense Establishment. 2-IY
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NT, JUDD: . .Now, that sounds all right, but all of re, being
AngstevekbEngVolease3:002/.913ttatIAIRDPICG:86(WaROWN470486430?4rectorOf
Intelligence, and a two-star general or a three-star general talke to
him, it is wholly unrealistic to imagine that they will not have rm
influence over him despite the law.
The nen who had charge of our secret intelligence in. Germany dur-
ing the war was a civilian, Mr. Allen Dulles. l!e did such an extra.
ordinary job that he was in contact with the top ren in Hitler's secret
service. Hitler had to execute his top five Pen because they
double-crossing him and playing ball with our people. flr, rulles told
us that the man that takes this job ought to go into it as amen -te
goes into a nenastery. He ought to take it aa J. Edgar Hoover has
taken the vni job - make it his life ss work. He certainly ouellt to
be cut completely loose from any ties or responsibilities or coneectione
with any other branch of the Governnent - civil or,T3ilitary excert
the President and the National Seeelrity Council. 15
Ni', MINASCO: ,Mr. Chairman, this section on central intseJigence
was given more study by our aubcommittee and by the full comeittee than
any other section of the bill. It was a most difficult section to
urite. All of Us had the saee objective in view, yet we had drent
ideas on it. I think personally that the compromise le reached zellecuately
protects the position. Fventually I certainly trust that the head of
this intelligence agency will be a civilian who is trained in the aellney.
It takes years to train that type of man. some will tell yeu that the
present director is not adequately trained; that is true. 1e do dot
have any man in the United States who had adequate training today no
do this kind of work because unfortunately-the United Statec has lever
gone in for the right kind of intelligence. If we had had a etrone
central intelligence organization, in all probability we 'meld weer
had had the attack on Pearl Harbor; there might not have been a 'erA
var II. Many witnesses appeared before our committee. ine were ewern
to secrecy, and I hesitate to even discuss this section because em
afraid I might say something, because the CONGRESSIONAL REXPD in a
etblic record, and divulge some information that we received in taat
coenittee that would give aid and comfort to any potential email' 4n
have. For that reason I an even reluctant to mention the testieole.
I hope the committee 11111 support the provision in the bill, becaaae
the future security-of our country in alarge measure depends upon
tte intelligence we get. Most of it can be gathered without clandentine
intelligence, leut some of it mazt be of necessity clandeetine ineelligencee,
The things we say here today, the language we change, night endanger
the liVes of some American citizens in the future.
_el/ think you can rely on the patriotism of men like the gentleman
-fiT6M New York (Mr. WAD8WORTF), the gentleman fron Massachusetts
NeCORMACK $ the gentleman from California (Ni'. iiOLITIEID), the eentleman
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from Michigan (Mr. HOFFMAN). e did our best to work out lenguene
here that would protect that position and keep fro:a buildine up A
so-called nilitaryhierarchy. A bill will be introduced soea after
this legislation becomes law that will be referred to the Oomnittee
on Axed Servge, where more study can. be given to this met imort-
ant subject.
Mr.. DieeR5Y: .The nein point in the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. JUDE) is permanency and the of ort te '
work toward a civilian head who in not influenced by erny department
of our Military Establishmente. 22/
Mr. PATTERSON:. . Chairman, I should like to direct lyeele'
now to section 105 concerning the Central Intelligence Agency, te
which section ey proposed anendment relates*. The arendment, in
effect, provides that a civilionShall head this Intelligence veneer
rather than allowing a choice of a civilian or a renitaey -an.
also provides that the powers granted the Central Intelligenceolly)
under the President's Txecutive order shall pass on to the :lationel
Security Council as was designated in the bill Which passed the other
body on 9 July.
The amendment further provides that the authority and functions
of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be those which were designated
under the :resident's rececutive Order. As this section is now con-
stituted, the Director of the Intelligence Ageney to 7-e chosen
the President, with the consent of the Senate, may he either a ctvi.ian
or an officer of the areed services. I feel that it -ts extrerely
undesirable to have as head of this agency, in a position which -AM4S
it in&-mbent upon him to coordinate :intelligence reports fron the
various services, a menber of one or the other services. A civiliaa
in this position would not be subject to a cry of discrininatioe
favoritism and would, therefore, be in nuch better position to he
completely objective in discussion. The portion of this anendnent
which related to the granting of powers under the President'a reecutive
order to the 3ational Security Council retains at least a serblance
of power within this agency to effectively corelate, evaluate, and
dissrinate infornatiohuhich is gathered by other intelligence services.
By confining its powers to this authority, we therefore, effect-
ively deny to the Central Intelligence Agency the power to interfere
with the work personally being done by established services in this
field.
I refer you, Mr. Chairnan, to the House Report No. 2734 of the
Seventy-ninth Congress, which is a report on the-inteJlIgence section
of our national war effort and which includes recommendations rade by
the House Committee on Military Affairs at that time. while the
of World War II are still fresh in our einde, the eorrittee
undertook -a survey to determine what our policy on national intellieence
should be. ?heir recomnendatione ere-note4ealiy-carried out in the -
reasure here contemplated; but the gains made since their report vonId
be consolidated by adoption of this aeendnent*
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feel, Mr. Chairman, and I cant-fat-stress it too strengise that
what is needed is an independent intelligence agency's working without
direction by our armed services, with fur/ authority in operational
procedures.
However,, it seems impossible to incorporate such broad authcrity
into the bill now before us - so consequently I support the emendeent
which has now been offered. To do less that this would be to wreck
what little has been done to strengthen our intelligence system. I
feel that it is very important for the security of our Nation, at a
time when our security is more and more threatened, to grant adequate
authority to the Central Intelligence Agency.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I do want to commend the gentlemar
from Nichigan (Me. HOFFMAN) and the other merbers of his corelittes for
their ardent work and fairness in reporting this measures/EY
Mr. JUDD: a . .The Director of Central Intelligence is mppoeec
to deal with all possible threats to the country from abroad, throush
intelligence activities abroad. But without this amendment he will
have not only the restate of the FBI's intelligence activities here
at home, but also the polder to inspect its operations' I dc not
believe that if we had realized the flail import of this language I***
we were studyingeeWin committee we woad have allowed it to stand Es
it is. Surely we want to protectthe Atomic Energy Cemmission and
the FBI from the Director of Central Intelligence coming in and fenc-
ing out who their agents are, what and where their-nets are, how they
operate, and thus destroy their effectiveness. 12/
Mr. R0L1FIELD: ? .1 do not think it is necessary for him to
inspect the operations in order to set up his own intelligetoe unit
in the way that he wants top and I point out that the National Seten-ity
Council is composed of the Secretaries of States of National Defense,
of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the National Security
Resources Board, the Central Intelligence Agency'e so it seems to me
:.'tat the protection of the National Security Council is a dheck men
the President is a check. I hardly think that the ran could exceed
his authority. 22/
Mr. BUSBEY:. ? ,In reference to the gentlemen from California
(pr, HOLIFIELD), when he states that we can assume that thief National
Security Agency will do this and do that, I just wish to rerind the
meebership that the trouble in the past with legislation has, been that
we have not taken the time to spell out these little details. It he
these assumptions we have had that have gotten us into trouble.
think it is very important that the gentleman's amendeent be adopted. Ai
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In the Senate on 9 July 190:
Mr. BALDWIN: . .Under the Council there is established a central
intelligence agency to provide coordinated, adequate intellieence for
all Government agencies concerned with national security. 'ren one
reads the record of the past war in regard to that field it is found
that there was much to be desired in the way intelligence wee covered
and there was great conflict about it. I say nothing here in depreciation
of the men who were engaged in the intelligence service, because some
remarkable and extremely courageous things were done. :;everthelses,
NS demonstrated from our experience the need of a central intelligenze
agency; and this bill provides such an agency. Neither a National
Security Council nor an intelligence agency now exist.
Mr. RILL: . ,It would provide adequate securitymeaeures at 4a
times, rather than only when hostilities threaten. It creates, the
national Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Munitions Board, and the Research a:1d
Development Board, in order that we may Make certain that our forel4e:
and military policies are coordinated and mutually supporting; that
a central intelligence agency may collect and, analyze the IllaBe Of trOar?.
nation which is so essential for the Government to maintain peace ail}
without which the Government cannot wage ear successfUly.
Mr GURNEY: . .The bill also provides for a National Securit7
Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security neaeurces
Board, all of which report directly to the President, but which alae
work closely with the agencies under the Secretary of National Secerety,
Mr. GURNEY: . As an levortant adjunct to the Trational 15ecarlty
Council there is provision for a Central Intelligence 4gencya which
fills a long recognized demand for accurate information upon which ie?
portant decisions relating to foreign apd military policy can be lased. 24,/
During the unification hearings, Admiral therman said that the Central
Intelligence Agency was not adequately covered in the merger bill and iathe
debate on the House bill Mr, McCornick pointed out that:
"We felt, since enabling legislation was going to core in later
from another standing committee of the Rouse . the question
that would arise in connection with this Central Intelligence
Agency, should be left to the standing committee, and that our
committee should try to meet the ienediate prOblem."
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The "immediate problem" was solved by the passage of the National Security
Act of 1947, which was signed by President Truman on 26 July 19147,
6.
6. CIA Enabling Legislation,
Enabling legislation defining the authorities of a Central Intelligence
Agency and establishing certain procedures for its administration had been
prepared soon after the CIO was formed, but with the emphasis in 1947 on
the passage of the armed forces merger legislation with its central intelligence
provisions, the effort devoted to enabling legislation for CIA slackened, jrave
ever, the need for such legislation became more and more acute. In April of
19147, before the passage of the National Security Act, a draft of enabling
legislation was presented to the House Connittee on Expenditures, but it was
not until the next year that a serious effort was made to enact CIA lieleele.
tion.
On 24 February 19480 the Director, Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter apeeared
before the Hourse Committee on Armed Services and answered affirmatively the
Connittee's question of whether legislation in addition to the National Security
Act of_19Welias necessary. On 13 liarch, after approval by the TIldte House,
drafts of a proposed bill to provide for the administration of the agency were
eubmittd by CIA to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee end the
Speaker of the House. 2.Y Senator Gurney introduced on the same day S-e?..74-:6,
a bill to provide for the administration of the Central Intelligence Aeevey
established pursuant to section 1020 National Security Act of 19147, and for
other purposes." A bill with the same titles H.R. 5871, was introduced on
16 March in the House and referred to the Committee on Armed Services. The
21/
full committee approved the bill on L May.
a
61 Stat. 1495 j27 House of Representatives 80th Congress, 2nd Seesion
2.6.1 Central Intelligence Act of 1948
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A new Senate all differed from the souse version (H.R. 5871) in the
following particulars: (1) Section 6(a) of the Senate Bill read: "Transfer
to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as mae hare been
approved by the Bureau of the Budget and appropriated . ? ? " (2) Section
7(a)(1) of the 3enate Bill included the phrase "personal services without
regard to limitations antdpes of persona to be enployed instead ce: the phrase
'employment of aliens" because the Committee throaght, or reasons of -eceritya
that the word "aliens" should not appear in the law although it was the
intent of the Committee that CIA Pnplay aliens where necessary* (3) ection
7(b) which formerly read "of sums rade available to the Agency such amounts
as maybe appropriated by the Bureau of the Budget may be expended ."
was amended to read: "the sums made available to the Agency may as ezcended w
Senate Report 1302 accomanying the bill states on page 3: *. . aal that
such funds ray be expended without regard to the provisions of law apoiieable
to Covernment funds." This was a change from the original draft lf the report
which read: ". ? .end that a portion of such funds. . ."
The bill was passed over three times in the Senate, finally eomine a
for debate on 21 June. An amendment was offered by Senator McMahon serVeing
out section 7(b) of 5.2688 which gave the Agency authority to expend -infad?
ential funds. The Cengress adjourned, however, with no further action ca
the CIA legislation.
On 15 December 1948, the Agency presented a draft of 1ee4alaeion 'o he
Baelget Bureau which, after suggesting changes, advised CIA on 9 Februaee I919
that it would have no objection to the Agency sending the revised draft a the
81st Congress, On 11 February the drafts were sent to Congress wlth in
expialnation that it was substantially the se as 2688 and }LLI 5271
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introduced in the 80th Congress.
Debate with a suspension of rules on the bill took place on 7, Mardh.19490.
Mr. Marcantenio provided the major opposition to the bill in debete, teeing hie
argument on such issues as the secrecy impoted with deprived Congemeeulor
a full explaination of the bill, the danger to civil liberties, the inapprepriate
nese of confidential funds and the undesirability of the alien provisiene.
Mr. Geller also objected to the alien provisions mainly on jurisdictional
grounds. The bill passed 348 for and 4 against.
The jurisdictional issue of the alien provision was of some eoncern in
the Senate. Senator McCarren on 11 March interrosed an objection to the con?
sideration of the bill probably because the Judiciary Conmittee or which he
was chairman had not been given the bill for consideration. Alter a meeting
with the Director at which the Director explained the a:lien provision and
agreed to furnish the Senator with a regular confidential report on the
number of aliens brought in under it, Senator Mearran withdrew his oblections
and wrote to Senator lamas that he would support the bill.
The Senate Comnittee on Armed Services reported out H.R. 2663 on 10 Jere)
22,41
190. In the debate on 27 Nay 3.9J9, Senator Langer provided most of the
opposition to the bill based mainly on the secrecy surrounding the bill end
the alien provisions in it. He offered two amendments which were acceA014,
one to provide that CIA employees while in the continental Vnited States en
leave shall not be available for erployment except by CIA, and an other
requiring a determination by the Cornissioner of the Ienieration Eeerviee es
well as by the Director of. Central Intelligence and the AttorneyCeeeral
before the adnission of certain aliens to the United States for pernanent
residence without regard to-thieiereigratiozi laws, was granted.
22/
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Senator Johnson also voiced some oojection to the bill but announced he would
vote for it. He was concerned that CIA would have "sweeping powers which
are being vested in the military through this piece of legislation." The
Senate passed H.R. 2663 as amended by a voice vote. On 6 June the Conference
Coneittee reported agreerent on the anendments and on the name day the :enete
adopted the Conference Report and on the folloving day after a short debate
in which Yr. Mercantonio again opposed the measure and Mr. Walter egain spoke
on the alien provisioe the House passed H.R. 2663, as amended. President
Truman signed the Central intelligence Act on 20 June 199.
7. CENTRAL INTTLLIGENCE AGENCY AUTHORITIES
a. Executive
The Central Intelligence Agency is organized within the Lxecutive Lrandh
of the Governnent, and it is responsible to the National Security Council, the
function of ehich is to advise the President with respect to the tategration
of donestic, foreign, and nilitare policies relating to the aationel security
so as to enable the military. services and the other 'departments ane agencies of
29
Government to cooperate more effectively ire :natters involving natienal.-7eceritye
The President, as the, "sole organ 'of the Federal Governer/It in the field
22.1
international relations," hasiat his command the executive eower ef tee
Government. Under this power, theorectically he is beyond the reach of anr
other branch of the Government except in the node prescribed by the Constieution.
through the impeaching power - and he iministers his branch eo that he caa most
31/
effectively discharge his duties, The National Intelligence Authority waa
27
Intellkence Activities, A report to the Congress, June 1955.
U.S. v Curtiss Wright; 299 US 304 (1935).
Yendail Nr.u.s.e l35; 37 US 5211 at 610.
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founded and the Central intelligence Group was formed by Presidential 7irective
in 1946 to ensure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission
related to national security which is a matter considered within the 7xecutive
purview,
It was recognized at an early date in our history, however, Ubat cefficere
in the Executive Branch were not under the exclusive ejrection of the l'resident.
Duties and responsibilities grow out of and are subject to the Control of
the law, and not only to the direction of the President, eho must see to it,
however, that the laws are faithfully executed.
. b. Congress
Congress has seen to it that the President has considerable help avail-
able for his administrative burdens. In the development and ieplementatien
of major policies he has the assistance of various offices created by acts
of Congress.. The :Tational Security Act of 19h7 was one of these Is was tee
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 19h9.
The provisions ef the National Security Act are a recognition Che Con-
gress of the highly sensitive nature of Governnentletelligence aetivitiee.
The oavallability of intelligence of the highest order to the President and
to the National Security Council is an essential element in the formulation
of the foreign policy of the United States, and in the conduct of foreign
3,11-1(
relations by the Prevideht in carrying out that policy." /is-aevis its
appropriation and investigative function, Congress is concerned with the
.operation of agencies within the 7xecutive Branch. CIA is aware if ite
position of being dependent on Congress for its legislation and its exIstere
32/ Views of Pe. Hayden Senate Report no. 1570. Coeeittee on Ivies and
Mministration; rillth Congressl l 2nd Session, 1956, Report of the Senate
nJoint Committee on Central Tatelligence"; pp 26-27.
Kendall v U.S., supra at 610.
2_,LSee note 162 sepea. 28
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but with its obvious security problems Mr. Allen pales, the Director, 1.1as
stated: "In intelligence you have to take certain things on faith. You have
to look to the man who is directing the organization and the results he
achieves. The Arred Services and Apyropriations Committee of both ;Touees
have exercised jurisdiction over CIA. As a result the Armed Lervicea Cormittees
of the Senate and the louse have continuoul,CLymaintained "eunervision over the
operations of Lag to an entirely adequate degree, Pressure for a.=
2Z/
Watchdog Committee of Congress arises periodically but has never been eeted.
c. National Security Council
As an executive agency, CIA is under the control of the President, bet
Congress in the National Security Act of 1917 prescribed that CIA "is eatenliehed
under the national Security Council." Furthermore, according to the Act, or
the purpose of coordinating intelligence activities the Central Intelligenee
Agency is given certain duties to perform under the direction of the W.C.
Section 102(0(5) of the National Security Act of 12/7 is a catch-all
vision with rather broad implications stating that CIA shall "perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council ney from time to time direct."
Taken out of context without knowledge of its history, this eectioemould
bear almost unlimited interpretation, provided the service performed colan
be shown to be of benefit to an intelligence agency or related to national
Intelligence, A review of the Congressional debates, however, indicates
that when CIA was first proposed Congress was primarily interested in an
V United States News apd World Report, 19 March 1954 at page 67.
Eirltuden 9p. cit. euera At 23.
Intellieence Activities, A Report to the Con&ress June W.
29
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ILLEGIB
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The United States has carried on intelligence activities since
the days of George Washington, but only since World War II has this
work been systematized on a government-wide basis.
The organization first formed for this purpose was authorized
in a letter dated January 22, 1946, in which President Harry S. Truman
directed the Secretary of State (James F. Byrnes), the Secretary of
War (Robert P. Patterson), the Secretary of the Navy (James V.
Forrestal), and his own personal representative (Admiral William D.
Leahy), to constitute themselves as the "National Intelligence
Authority." The Authority was instructed to plan, develop, and
coordinate "all Federal foreign intelligence activities" in order to
accomplish "the intelligence mission related to the national security.
The members of the Authority assigned persons and funds from thei:-
departments to form the "Central Intelligence Group" which assisted
the Authority in this task. The "Group" was directed by a "Director
of Central Intelligence" appointed by the President.
The National Intelligence Authority and its operating component,
the Central Intelligence Group, were in existence for twenty montns
in 1946 and 1947. Under the terms of the National Security Act of
1947 (which became effective September 18, 1947), they were super-
seded by the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The first Director of Central Intelligence was Rear Admiral
Sidney W. Souers, U. S. Naval Reserve, who served as head of the
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Central Intelligence Group from January 22, 1946, to June 10, 1946.
The next was General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, U. S. Air Force, who served
from June 10, 1946 until May 1, 1947. He was succeeded by Rear
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, who served as head of the Group from
May 1, 1947 until it became the Central Intelligence Agency in Septem-
ber 1947, and then as head of the Agency until October 7, 1950.
General Walter Bedell Smith succeeded Admiral Hillenkoetter on
October 7, 1950 and served as Director until February 9, 1953.
Er. Allen Welsh Dulles, the present Director of Central Inte.ili-
gence, was nominated by President Eisenhower on February 10, 1953,
confirmed by the Senate on February 23, and sworn into office on
February 26, 1953.
The responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency deri're
directly from several acts of Congress, notably the National Security
Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, July 261 1947).
Act provides that CIA shall:
Section 102 of that
(1) advise the National Security Council with respect
to governmental intelligence activities related to the
national security;
(2) "correlate and evaluate intelligence related to
the national security;"
(3) perform "services of common concern" for the
benefit of existing intelligence agencies; and
(4) perform "other functions and duties" as directed
by the National Security Council.
The Act further provides that:
(1) the Agency shall have access (under certain limita-
tions) to all intelligence in the possession of the Government;
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(2) the Agency "shall have no police, subpena, law-
enforcement powers, or internal security functions;" and
(3) "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure."
Section 102 of the National Security Act (as amended April 4,
1953) provides that:
"at no time shall the two positions of the Director and
Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by copmissioned
officers of the armed services, whether in an active or
retired status."
The "Central Intelligence Agency Act" of 1949 (Public Law
June 20, 1949)
supplemented the National Security Act with respect
to the Central Intelligence Agency as follows:
(1) permitted procurement by the Agency without advertis-
ing under certain circumstances;
(2) made provision for training and education of Agency
personnel;
(3) provided for special travel allowances and related
expenses required by the Agency;
(4) made special allowances for transfer of funds between
the Agency and other governmental agencies;
(5) made an exception to statutory prohibitions by per-
mitting the Agency to employ up to fifteen retired officers
of the armed services;
(6) permitted the Agency to withhold publication of
"titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the
Agency;"
(7) granted the Director of Central Intelligence authm-ity
to approve the entry into the United States of certain aliena and
their families, subject to the concurrence of the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization; and
(8) gave the Director authority to expend funds "withoat
regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the
expenditure of Government funds" on a voucher certified by him
alone.
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A further act of l956 (the Federal Executive Pay Act, Public
Law 854) established the annual basic compensation of the Director
and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence at $21,000 and
$20,500, respectively.
The Director of Central Intelligence, in addition to heading
the Central Intelligence Agency, serves ex officio as chairman of
the United States Intelligence Board, which is an interdepartmental
body representing the ten U. S. agencies having intelligence
responsibilities. This Board consists of the Director of Central
Intelligence; the heads of the intelligence organizations in the
Army, Navy Air Force, State Department, and Atomic Energy Commis-
sion; and representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chief of Staff, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
Acting in consultation with that Intelligence Board, the Director
of Central Intelligence makes recommendations to the National Security
Council concerning the intelligence structure of our government ay a
whole. Similarly, after coordination with that Board, the Director
regularly presents to the National Security Council "National Intelli-
gence Estimates" prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency work_ng
with representatives of other governmental intelligence organizations.
These estimates cover specific foreign situations of national security
concern, or the world situation generally. They may embody a unani-
mous opinion, or may contain dissenting views by one or more of tne
participants.
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Various "services of common concern" are provided by the
Central Intelligence Agency to the U. S. intelligence organizatioa
generally. It conducts independent research in fields of economi,:.,
and scientific intelligence; monitors foreign news and propaganda
broadcasts; and collects intelligence abroad. It also provides
specialized library and translation services, including both mechanized
and manually manipulated data-processing facilities, to the various
elements of the U. S. intelligence organization.
CIA's facilities and techniques for the indexing, abstracting,
translation, storage, and retrieval of information and data have been
praised as "the most comprehensive information system now in operatior.
by the Committee on Government Operations of the U. S. Senate, in its
Report of May 24, 1960 entitled "Documentation, Indexing, and Retrieval
of Scientific Information." Among the features of this system described
at length in that Report (pp. 16 ff., 62 ff.) are specialized mirlatt
photography, facsimile-printing devices, punch cards extending to more
than 40 million, and machine-translation computers that are applicable,
for example, to high-speed rendering of Russian texts into Englieh
at the rate of 30,000 words an hour.
Applicants for Central Intelligence Agency employment are
given a full security investigation after they have been approved,
following preliminary tests. Out of every thousand applications for
employment, some 80% are screened out by the personnel officials1
the remaining 20% are turned over to security agencies for investiga-
tion. Of this 20%, some 11% are eliminated as a result of security
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investigation because they drink too much, talk too much, have
relatives behind the Iron Curtain which may make the applicants
subject to foreign pressure; for serious security reasons, la of
this 11% are screened out. These latter are individuals who have
contacts that render them undesirable for service in this highly
sensitive Agency.
The Central Intelligence Agency does not duplicate and rival
the existing intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy, and Air
Force. It makes maximum use of the resources of existing agencies.
It helps put an end to unnecessary duplication.
The Central Intelligence Agency is part of the complex of
departments within the Federal Government that are responsible fel-
the security of the nation. The organization and structure of the
Government in this whole area reflect a recognition of the close
relationship between diplomatic, military, and other elements of
foreign policy. Within this national security area, the Central
Intelligence Agency is the organization which insures that the
information flawing to the President and his principal advisers
on foreign policy--the National Security Council--is timely, con-
sistent, and complete; and which brings together the judgment of
intelligence officers in all departments on the major issues of
fact and interprets them for the benefit of the President and the
National Security Council.
The Director of Central Intelligence is the principal adviser
to the President and the National Security Council on all matters
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of intelligence related to the national security. He constantly
studies the intelligence structure of the governnent to determine
that each part is properly geared to the national intelligence
effort. His responsibility requires solution of problems common
to large governmental agencies, while coping with an additional
problem of secrecy common to few other agencies.
Because of this secrecy--required by law and by considerations
of national safety?the Central Intelligence Agency does not confirm
or deny published reports, whether good or bad; never alibis;
never explains its organization; never identifies its personnel
(except for the few in the top echelons); and will not discuss its
budget, its methods of operations, or its sources of information.
Although its activities are not subject to public inspection
and review, the Central Intelligence Agency is, of course, directly
accountable to Presidential authority and control. This accounta-
bility is exercised in a number of ways, notably through the National
Security Council, which is privy to CIA's activities and programs
generally, and by the President's Hoard of Consultants on Foreigr
Intelligence Activities, which was established in February 1956 NY
Executive Order 10656) in accordance with a recommendation of the
Hoover Commission that the President be served by a special review
committee. Finally, on appropriations and related legislative
matters, the Director of Central Intelligence has regular contact
with the several standing committees of the Congress involved,
particularly the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the
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House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and their respective sub-
committees dealing with CIA affairs.
President Eisenhower, speaking on November 3, 1959 on the occa-
sion of the cornerstone laying at CIA's new headquarters building at
Langley, Virginia, characterized CIA's work as follows:
"...In war nothing is more important to a commander
than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions and
intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation
of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of
a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources,
requirements and attitudes prevailing in the world. They
are essential to the development of policy to further our
long term national security and best interests. To pro-
vide information of this kind is the task of the organi-
zation of which you Enembers of CIA7 are a part.
"No task could be more important.
"Upon the quality of your work depends in large
measure the success of our effort to further the nation's
position in the international scene.
"By its very nature the work of this agency demands
of its members the highest order of dedication, ability,
trustworthiness and selflessness?to say nothing of the
finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot
be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the work
of Intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often
even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is
rooted in patriotism?their reward can be little except
the conviction that they are performing a unique and
indispensable service for their country, and the know-
ledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts.
I assure you this is indeed true.
"The reputation of your organization for quality
and excellence, under the leadership of your Director,
Hr. Allen Dulles, is a proud one. ..."
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ALLFN WELSH DULLES
Allen Welsh Dulles became Director of Central Intelligence on
February 26, 1953. Among the principal reasons for his appointment
were his extensive knowledge, both theoretical and practical, of
world affairs and diplomacy; his knowledge of law, particularly inter-
national law; and his unusual breadth of experience in the field of
intelligence.
After receiving the degree of A.B. from Princeton University in
1914, Nr. Dulles travelled in the Far East. He taught English in
Allahabad, India, before returning to study at Princeton for his M.A.,
which he received in 1916. From that year until 1926, Dulles was a
member of the United States Diplomatic Corps, stationed in Vienna,
Bern, Berlin, Constantinople, and Washington. He was also a member
of the American Commission to negotiate peace at the Paris Peace
Conference in 1918-19. He was a U.S. delegate to two Geneva peace
conferences, the Arms Traffic Conference (1925), and to the Preparatory
Disarmament Conference (1926). He also served as legal adviser to
the U.S. delegations to later Geneva conferences--the Naval Conference
in 1927, and the Disarmament Conference in 1932-33.
In 1926 Nr. Dulles resigned from the diplomatic corps, received
the degree of LL. B. from George Washington University, Washington,
D.C., and joined the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell in New 'York,
of which his brother, John Foster Dulles, was a member.
In 1942, General William J. Donovan selected Allen W. Dulles
for a key position in the Office of Strategic Services. From
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October 1942 until VE Day, Mr. Dulles was chief of OSS in Switzer-
land, and in this capacity was given much of the credit for the
surrender of German troops in northern Italy in 1945. He remained
with OSS until November 1945 as head of its German mission.
For his wartime service, Mr. Dulles received from the U. S.
Government the Medal for Merit and Presidential Citation, and the
Medal of Freedom. The Order of Maurizio e Lazzaro was awarded by
Italy; the Legion of Honor, rank of officer, by the French govern-
ment; and the Belgian Cross of Officer of the Order of Leopold by
the Belgian government.
The citations rendered with two of the American decorations
contain a summary of Dulles's wartime work. His citation with the
Medal of Freedom presented by the War Department reads as follows:
"Mr. Allen Dulles, as Chief of the German Mission
and Senior Strategic Services official in Switzerland
from February to May 1945, was largely responsible for
the evaluation and dissemination of intelligence that
the German Army was eager to effect a surrender. He
was instrumental in arranging a meeting between German
and Allied representatives and thereafter served with
outstanding success as consultant and intermediary in
the negotiations which led to the signing of the instru-
ment of unconditional surrender of the German troops
in Italy."
His citation for the Medal for Merit, signed by President
Truman on July 18, 1946, reads as follows:
"ALIEN W. DULLES, for exceptionally meritorious
conduct in the performance of outstanding services as
chief of the foremost undercover operations conducted
by the Office of Strategic Services on behalf of the
United States Government from November 1942 to October
1945. Mr. Dulles, within a year, effectively built up
an intelligence network employing hundreds of informants
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and operatives, reaching into Germany, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Bnlgaria, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, and
North Africa, and completely covering France, Italy,
and Austria. He assisted in the formation of various
Maquis groups in France and supported the Italian parti-
san groups both financially and by pin-pointing airdrops
for supplies. The exceptional worth of his reports on
bombing targets and troop movements both by land and sea
was recognized by diplomatic, military, and naval
agencies of the United States Government. Particularly
notable achievements by Mr. Dulles were first reports,
as early as May 1943, of the existence of a German experi-
mental laboratory at Peenemiinde for the testing of a
rocket bomb, his report on the flooding of the Belgian
and Dutch Coastal areas long before similar information
Calle in from other sources, his report on rocket bomb
installations in the Pas de Calais, and his reports on
damage inflicted by the Allied Air Forces as a result
of raids on Berlin and other German, Italian, and Balkan
cities, which were forwarded within two or three days of
the operations. Mr. Dulles by his superior diplomacy
and efficiency built up for the United States enormous
prestige among leading figures of occupied nations taking
refuge in Switzerland. He carried out his assignments
in extremely hazardous conditions, and despite the constant
observation of enemy agents was able to fulfill his
duties in a manner reflecting the utmost credit on him-
self and his country. After the German collapse, Mr.
Dulles headed the Office of Strategic Services Mission
in Germany, which supplied highly important and essential
intelligence to American Military Government, occupation,
and diplomatic offices in the difficult post-hostilities
period. His courage, rare initiative, exceptional ability,
and wisdom provided an inspiration for those who worked
with him and materially furthered the war effort of the
United Nations."
?
After the war, in addition to carrying on his law practice,
Mr. Dulles served as a government adviser, particularly in matter
having to do with foreign aid and German policy. He was also
active (as he had been since the late 1920/s) with the Council on
Foreign Relations of which he became president in 1946. In 1948
he was appointed Chairman of a three-man committee to survey-the
United States intelligence system. In this capacity he gained a
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thorough understanding of the Central Intelligence Agency as it had
developed to that time. Mr. Dulles joined the staff of CIA Director
Walter Bedell Smith in the fall of 1950.
An idea of Soviet Russia's opinion of the Director of Central
Intelligence is reflected in a statement by Ilya Ehrenberg in
Pravda, December 31, 1951:
. . Even if the spy, Allen Dulles, should arrive
in Heaven through somebody's absentmindedness, he would
begin to blow up the clouds, mine the stars, and slaughter
the angels. . ."
Nr. Dulles was born in Watertown, New York, April 7, 1893.
His father was Allen Macy Dulles, a Presbyterian clergyman; his
mother was Edith Foster Dulles. His uncle, John Welsh, was envoy
to England in the Hayes administration. There have been three
Secretaries of State in the Dulles family: John Foster Dulles,
under President Eisenhower; John Watson Foster (his maternal
grandfather), under Benjamin Harrison; and Robert Lansing (Allen
Milles's uncle by marriage), under Woodrow Wilson.
On October 16, 1920, Mr. Dulles and Miss Clover Todd, daughter
of Professor and Mrs. Henry A. Todd of Columbia University, were
married. They have a son, Allen Macy, and two daughters, Clover
Todd and Joan.
Mr. Dulles's first book, The Boer War: a History, was writtm
when he was only eight years old. Beginning in 1927, he has fur-
nished articles for FOREIGN AFFAIRS. He wrote two books in colla-
boration with Hamilton Fish Armstrong: Can We Be Neutral? (1936);
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and Can America Stay Neutral? (1939). He also participated in the
Council on Foreign Relations' confidential "war and peace studies"
program, begun in 1939. In 1947 he wrote Germany's Underground.
In the same year he furnished introductions to Problems of Germanw
by Price, Hoyt, and Schorske, and To The Bitter End by Hans Gisevius,
and in 1949 to The Unknown Warriors by Guillan de Benouville. He
has also contributed book reviews to several publications.
Mr. Dulles has been awarded the honorary degree of LL. D. by
Brown University (1947); Temple University (1952); Columbia Univer-
sity (1955); Princeton University (1957); and George Washington
University (1959).
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CHARLES PEORE CABELL
General Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF, became the Deputy Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence on April 23, 1953. Previously, he had
been Director of the Joint Staff in the Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Director of Intelligence of the U. S. Air Force. Other
posts he had held with the Air Force related to intelligence include
Chief of the Air Intelligence Requirements Division in the Office of
the Director of Intelligence (August 1947-May 1948); U. S. Air Force
representative to the Eilitary Staff Committee in the United Nations
(1945-1946); and Chief of the Strategic and Policy Division in the
Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans (1945).
General Cabell was born in Dallas, Texas, October 11, 1903.
He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1925; from the
Air Corps Primary Flying School in 1931; from the Advanced Flying
School, observation course, in 1931; from Command and General Staff
School in 1940; and from the Army and Navy Staff College in 1943.
General Cabell was assigned to the Panama Canal Zone in 1931,
and served at Randolph Field, Texas, from 1934 to 1938. In June
1939 he was assigned to Wright Field, Ohio, where he served in the
Photographic Laboratory of the Experimental Engineering Division.
After a period as an observer with the R.A.F. in the United Kingdom,
he was transferred to Washington, D.C., in 1941 for duty in the
Office of the Chief of Air Corps. From 1942 to 1943 he served as
chief of the Advisory Council to Commanding General Henry Barley
Arnold of the Air Corps.
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General Cabell was assigned to the Eighth Air Force in the
European Theater in October 1943, and commanded the 45th Combat
Bombardment Wing. After service as Director of Plans for the U.
Strategic Air Force in Europe, he was named Director of Operations
and Intelligence for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces with hew-
quarters at Caserta, Italy. In May 1945 General Cabell was assigned
to Air Force Headquarters, where he became Chief of the Strategic
and Policy Division in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air
Staff for Plans.
In December 1945 he was assigned to the Military Staff Com-
mittee of the United Nations. After attending the London Conference,
he remained on duty with the United Nations in New York, as Deputy
and later as U. S. Air Force representative on the Military Staff
Committee. General Cabell was assigned to U. S. Air Force Headquar-
ters in Washington in August 1947, and became Chief of the Air
Intelligence Requirements Division in the Office of the Director of
Intelligence. On May 15, 1948 he was appointed Director of Intelli-
gence of the U. S. Air Force. On November 1, 1951 General Cabell
was named Director of the Joint Staff in the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, from which post he came to the Central Intelligence
Agency as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
General Cabell has been awarded by the United States the Distin-
guished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross,
Bronze Star Medal, and Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster. He also
has been made Honorary Commander of the British Empire, a Chevalier
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in the French Legion of Honor, a wearer of the French Croix de Guerre,
and a member of the Order of Naurizio e Lazzaro of Italy. He is rated
a technical observer and a command pilot.
General Gabel' and the former Jacklyn de Hymel of San Antonic,
Texas, were married in 1934. They have two sons and a daughter ard
make their home at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.
He became a four-star general in July, 1958.
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ROBERT AM0RY1 JR.
Robert Amory, Jr., has been with the Central Intelligence Agency
since 1952. In May 1953 he became the Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence. Since March 1953 he has been Intelligence Adviser to the
National Security Council Planning Board.
He served as an enlisted man in the National Guard in the 1930's
and re-enlisted in the winter of 1940. He was commissioned as Second
Lieutenant, Field Artillery, in February 1941. He served as Battery
Commander and Battalion S-3 until the summer of 1942, when, after a
brief tour as an Assistant G-2 with Headquarters Sixth. Army Corps, he
was detailed to the Corps of Engineers to command an Engineer Bow:,
Battalion. He trained this unit and commanded it overseas in the
Southwest Pacific for over two years, participating in four campaigns
and more than 20 assault landings. In the spring of 1945 he was
assigned to command an Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment slated for
the invasion of Kyushu. From 1946 to 1951 he commanded the Tank
Battalion of the 26th Infantry Division, Massachusetts National Guard,
serving for most of 1951 on active duty as a student at the Infantry
School and at Command and General Staff College. He now commands the
11th Mobilization Designation Unit of the Army Reserves. He is
Colonel in the Officers' Reserve Corps.
He was born in Boston in 1915, and was educated at Milton. Aeaderr,
Harvard College, and Harvard Law School. From 1938 to 1941 he prac-
ticed law in Wall Street. Following World War II, after six months
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as assistant general counsel of a manufacturing concern, he accepted
an appointment to the faculty of Harvard Law School (l946), becoring
a full professor the following year. He taught business law and
accounting at the Law School and Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration until 1952.
Mr. Amory and Mary Armstrong of New York were married in 1938.
They have two sons.
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