CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-26: KEY PROBLEMS OF THE NEAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000600030004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 19, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTf'II MI0:1 TO ME-AS OBL.F'= T OF WE I1rl1F._..
Fobruary 19p 1951
25X1
State Dept. review completed
Office of IntolliCeasce Resoarch
DWArTr.E1T OF STATE
gE ,
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Document No.
Review of this document by CIA bas
determined that
C3 CIA has no objection to declass
it contains Information of CIA
Interest that must remain
classified at is S 0
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I. WE& SES OF THE REGION
1. Gene,~,n1. The Near Eastern states differ widely in their political,
economics and social struoturess In their resources of national powers
and in their basic attitudes toward their neighbors and the great powers.
The only unifying factor is geography; collectively the states occupy
the land bridge connecting three continents. In all other respects,
disparities einong the various states are marked. A few of the countries
are strong internally, possess appreciable military strength, and are
f'irnly oriented toward the West. Most of them are weak militeirily, have
grave internal problame? and are tending to draw away from open identi-
fication with the 1-test. However, none is likely to undergo rapid internal
dieintegraticn in the near faiture.o The Western position in the Near
East, therefore, still contains potentially favorable elements and, bar.-
..ring general war, there a" distinct possibilities of developing both
an improvement of internal stability in the various states and a'great
measure of pro-Western orientation.
2. Internal stabi.Utj. Turkey has a stable, democratic government, con
manding the support of virtvally all its people. It has a high degree
of homogeneity and no significant social tensions. The only important
domestic issues relate to the appropriate limits of state control of per-
sonal liberties and economic activity. With relatively abundant iiatu .
resources, Turkey is well an the may toward establishing a strong
*Libya is probably an eacc:eption; after it receives its independey,
in 1952, its internal stability is questionable.
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agricultural and modest, industrial system.
Greece demonstrates a somewhat lower degree of national unity.
Rivalry between conservative-monarchist and liberal-.republican elemments
has frequently led in the past to revolutionary changes in governneeet..
However, the issue currently is less .acute and the prospects are that
within tolerable limits the Greeks will develop a more stable political
and social order. Perhaps the most pressing difficulty is that presented
by inadequate natural resources. The soil is poor, industrial possibtili-
ties limited, and population pressure great. Unless there is a radical
improvement in Greece's export trade? it apparently crust be supported
by foreign assistance.
Internal stability in Iran and most of the Arab states (Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt) is far less favorable. Dominated for centuries
by Ottoman 'and then Western power and possessing a basically conservative
outlook, the Arabs were out off from the main stream of cultural develop..
ments in the 'Vestern world. The rapidly developing nationalie in the late
19th and 20th centuries was not accompanied by parallel developments in
-other fields, and when the countries of the region achieved their Inds.
pendence, institutionally they were poorly prepared for existence in
the modern world. The state systems of the newly-created nations wore
fa-provised and generally represent attempts to reconcile Western parka-
mentary systems, the highly centralized Ottoman administrative order,
and the rule of local oligarchies. In Iran, as well as in the Arab
states, effective social control is exercised by small elite chooses,
mostly large landowners linked by strong family and personal ties.
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3 .,
There 3s a great contrast between the mail ruling groups and the
masses, who live at a very low standard, are poorly educated, if at
all., and regard government primarily as a system for their exploita-
tion. The masses have not,demonstrated in the past any widespread
determination to force changes in the social system, but in recent
decades such aspirations are beginning to appear among a small but
growing middle class and industrial labor group,
In Libya, stability is assured in Cyrenaica and the Fezzan. In
Tripolitania, hour, the stabilizing influence of the Asir of Cyre_
mica is countered by local political strife and foreign intrigue.
Economic underdevelopment is characteristic throughout the area
accept for the petroleum industry which, although in the hands of for.
sign companies, produces substantial income for some local governments.
There is a general scarcity of .arablo 3ardji ustrytda._largely? Wa SA,
embryonic stage, and the financial and credit institutions which could
support development are weak. Exports are insufficient to finance the
purchase of the necessary level of foreign-mde consumer and producer
goods. In general., political irresponsibility and economic destitution
result in chronic internal instability, although this instability rarely
reaches dangerous proportions because of the political apathy and
usually lethargic state of the mass of the people.
The presence of varied ethnic and religious groups contributes to
social tensions, which are particularly significant in Lebanon, where
there is a delicate numerical balance of Christians and Moslems, and
in northern Iraq end northwestern Iran, where Kurds and Azerbaijanis
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resent their treatment by the central governments.
On the other hand, stability is relatively well-assured in Saudi
Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikhdane by the preservation of the patri-
archal system of government, by the receipt of substantial income from
petroleum operations, and, in the case of the sheikhdoms, by firm Brit-
Ish c bntrola
Israel represents essentially a European politico-social system
with "ioniat modifications. The principal doanostic issues relate to
the degree of state control over the economy and to the division of
political life along religious and class lines. The country's greatest
vulnerability is in its weak economic bass; as long as it is sufficiently
subsidized by Western sources, it may expect to pull through, but if such
sources were out off tensions would become acute. Israel has a wall
but highly.-skilled arrG', and its industries are capable of producing a
portion of its military equipment.
3. Fore?isn polio and orientation. Those states that are faced with
asi cue problems of internal instability also pursue foreign policies
unfavorable to the West. These policies are other manifestations of
underlying weaknesses in the Arab states and Iran mentioned in para..
graph 2 above, and of resentment against Western domination. The Arabs
conceive of their reviving but still feeble nationalism as being threat-
ened by the powerful West. This confliot is implicit in most of the
vital issues affecting Arab foreign relations. To the Arabs, the issue
presented in Palestine vas essentially that of Western aggression
against an Arab country, and the frustration of their attempts to
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challenge Zionism only adds to their determination to counter other
aspects of Western "imperialism."
It is therefore not surprising that the Arabs do not necessarily
identify their interests with those of the ITestern powers in the East-
West conflict. Some of the extreme Arab nationalists see little to
choose between the two sides and toy with the idea of enlisting the
assistance of the USSR in adjusting their differences with the West.
Believing that basically their interests lie with neither side and that
in the event of a general war they would sniffer, as innocent bystanders,
most of the Arab states have joined with Asian countries in the UN to
form a neutral bloc designed to prevent the outbreak of another war.
A second set of conflicts is inter-Arab and reflects national,
dynastic, and personal rivalries of various Arab groups. There is some
sentiment for Arab unity? but that sentiment has been more effective
in its negative aspects. While a measure of common effort was motored
against Israel, the Arab League has accomplished little in social,
economic, and defense cooperation. The League at present represents
an uneasy compromise between centripetal sentiment for Arab unity and
centrifugal forces of local nationalism and vested interests in the
various Arab governments. I4utual rivalry and distrust is illustrated
by the long-standing conflict between the Ishimite rulers of Iraq and
Jordan and the King of Saudi Arabia.
Iran, although never completely controlled by Western powers, demon-
strates similar national aspirations. It is resentful of foreign inters-
ference and expects to maintain and Improve its position by playing off
the Western powers against the USSR.
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Greece and Turkey do not identify their interests with those of
the Arab states; they look down condesoending3y on the Arabs and even
regard each other with some suspicions arising from past differences.
and strengthened by recent jealousy over the distribution of US aid.
Israel has, in the past, assumed a position of non identification
in the East-West conflict as the result of ties with both Bast and t'est,
and because it hopes to escape involvement in a future war.
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II. THE SOVIET TrTREAT To THE NEAR FIST
AND LOCAL CAPABILITIES FOR RESISTANCE
1. Soviet objectives. The long-range objective of the USSR in the
Near East is to control the region. r`uch control would i iediately
secure the approaches to strategic areas in the Soviet Union, Inter-
diet ??1estern use of transportation routes through the region, and. deny
Near Eastern oil to the !'astern powers, The USSR would then. be able to
utilize the regior. as a springboard for further aggression and to exploit
Near Eastern oil reserves. Soviet achievement of these objectives through
relatively weak probes in the region bas been blocked thus far by local
resistance to covert aggression and subversion, backed by Western diplo-
matic, economic, and military support.
2. Recent noliev. In the post-hostilities period,, the USSR launched
two attempts to secure control over Greece, and, before withdrawing oocu?
pation troops from Iran, set up a pro.Soviet regime in Azerbaijan. The
failure of these moves may be ascribed to a combination of local will
to resist thinly-veiled foreign aggression, over-confidence of Communist
leaders in their military and psychological strength, and strong reac-
tion in the free world, as evidenced by UN condition and US assist-
ance to Greece.
The unsuccessful outcome of these tests of the region's capacity
for resistance, backed by the ?Test, probably contributed to the Krem-
lin's decision to encourage indigenous trends favorable to the USSR,,
but otherwiso to expend little effort. Bat a more important factor
is that neither the indigenous forces, nor the Western forces pres-
ently and potentially based in the region, nor a embination of 7-the
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two, pose a serious threat to the USSR. In fact, while Turkey and Greece
have developed strength and closer identification with the West,, Western
power elsewhere in the area has declined appreciably since the end of
World War lI,
Current Soviet policy in the Near East apparently is designed to
achieve limited objectives in the near features reduction of Western
power and influence in the region and promotion of internal instability
and intro-regional tensions. As these objectives are achieved, the
USSR probably expects its influence to reach the stage at which it can
effectively control the region.
a. Reductia,_o western power. In pursuit of this objective,,
the USSR utilizes primarily propaganda and Cem=ist-inspired activities
and secondarily, diplomatic contacts and economic measures. Soviet
transmitters broadcasting in Near Eastern languages, as well as "free
Greek";and "free Azerbaijan`, stations,, maintain a vigorous tirade
against the West, appealing to popular aspirations for peace and secur.
ity and for elimination of Western influence which is presented as
working for war. Greeks are warned that the US wants theca as cannon'
fodder,, while the Arabs' demands for removal of vestigial "imperialist"
controls are supported by Soviet representatives in the UN and else..
where. Iran is warned not to permit the build-up of Western forces
and is threatened with Soviet invocation of the 1921 treaty of friend.
ship. CemmMists have exploited front..arganizations in such drives as
the "peace" appeals. Within the past year, the USSR has expanded its
trade with Iran and several Arab states, primarily for political and
psychological effect, and in its propaganda plays heavily on the
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thesis that the West exploits the area economically.
b. .S on of internal 2a&tJJ . Closely linked with
Soviet efforts to reduce Western influence are its activities designed
to increase the instability of local regimes oriented towed the West
and resting on already shaky foundations. roviet propaganda attempts
to incite workers, intellectuals, and in some areas peasants, against
ruling groups, nationalist feeling against pro-Western elements, and
ethnic and religious minorities against majorities and against each
other, thus, hoping to promote social disintegration and prepare the
my for Communist seizure of - control.
c.. Promotion of in~rare jo nay sip PlayIng on national.-
-let sentiments and dynastic rivalries, the USSR attempts to perpetuate
Arab-.Zionist tensions, rivalries among the Arab states, and mutual suv-
picions of other states, with a view toward forestalling the development
of unity among the states in the region. Presumably Soviet expectation
is that it will be easier to seduce individual states that lack any
external support and that as long as Western influence is operative in
the area, the development of regional unity favors the Vest.
d. Pre ton ccnm~ 3st se zurg gf uow~er. Although the
USSR cannot expect that local Con n nist movements will themselves have
the capability of seizing power in any state in the region within the
next several years, it has begun the development of Commist organize
tione which may, in time and under favorable external circumstances,
attempt to seize control of various governments. On absolute terms,
Communist strength is greatest in Greece, 4? here the Greek Communist
Party has been reorganizing underground and forming a hard core of
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loyal party members who can command the support of possibly 15 percent
of the Greek people. The USSR is apparently following similar tactics
in Iran where the Illegal Tudeh Panty now apparently numbers some
10,000 members located in principal urban areas and potentially able to
command the support of several times that number of disaffected persons.
'.sewhere in the area, the only important concentration of organized
Communist strength is in Israel with some 3,000 members. The appeal
of Communism in that state has apparently diminished as the USSR has
out off Zionist emigration from the Soviet bloc and taken unpopular
stands on international issues affecting Israel. In the Arab states,
Co?nmists who could be counted on by the Kremlin to do its bidding
number probably not more than several hundred; there are, however, a
such larger number of fellow-travelers who tend to confuse Ccammmist
objectives with nationalist aims. The spread of Coinnmism has been.
frustrated by strong repressive governmental measures, by Arab sus-
picions of Soviet-Communist aggressive intentions, and by the antip-
athy of Moslems to a doctrine which is admittedly anti-religious.
3. E2ssible future courses of action
a. Deliberate resort to wag, Unless there is a major expansion of
Western influence and power in the Near East, the USSR will probably not
launch an isolated campaign against the Near Fast for reasons inherent in
the Near Eastern situation. However, if the IISSR decides to embark on a
general war, it has the capabilities of overrunning the arms. in a oo nparae-
tively short time. Turkey is firmly determined to resist Soviet attack azd
has capabilities for delaying the Soviet advance for several months if
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aid is forthowning. Greece trial alco offer resistance but on a mmac33er scale.
Tho other states of the region, faced by a general roviot advance, tiotil d
themselves offer little roai Lance, and crould seek to nako the best posriblo
terms with the UC';R, either before' or after token rociotanee. Their bargain-
ing potter ttrould be inconsequential, and tthatovor privileges they weld be
able to extract in negotiations would be limited to thotyo considered by the
Soviets ac'u:eful in producing accoptanco of real, although perhaps veiled
and indiroatv de [naticsn. In the early stages of the campaign, Comunists and
C6= =18t ayr athizers in C.raeao, Iran, and Libya could create difficulties
along military lines of crno xunication. In the Arab states and Israel,, the
C otsti sabotage potential would be low, but unnecessary in the probable
event that the vast majority would support accomodation.
In the vent of the outbreak of war. botween the US -M and the U:'FR
that does not immediately involve the Near East, all the states of the area
Would initially be ?non..bolli.Cerent, but, in . varying degrees, trould favor the
Irene They would seek Western caemitmonte against the implicit threat of
:oviet acgrocsion. Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and CyronaIcc: would probably permit
:1eatera uco of bacos undor sedating agraeraenta. Their subsequent policy
would be determined by the course of the %rar. If the Watt suffered early dofcat s,,,
Iran and the neighboring Arab states (-Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) would be `nos '
prone to yield to Coviot threats, .awhile' :'such. Arabia, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt
would moue from non-abo3.ligorency to . strict neutrality. .
be Coarsos short of del hereto retort to w?*'.
l) T sal, a~ere~scioa satallite armed fauns. We believe that the
Greek army has the Capability of restricting a remotion of Greek guerrilla.
activity to outlying a areas and of holding Balkan catallile forces on a line
across the.
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Turkey could successfully resist a satellite attack launched against
the Straits. The USSR does not have at its disposal sufficient forcas
of Iranian Azerbaijani and Kurdish refugees to pose a serious threat
to the Iranian Army. A Soviet force,, sent across the Iranian border
in the guise of a "liberation" movement, would be thinly-veiled and
would be tantamount, politically as well as militarily, to an overt
Soviet aggression against Iran. Local military aggression by satel-
lite armed forces does not, therefore, appear to present any cogent
advantages to the USSR.
2) Limited Soviet agssion. aickoning?on the possibility
that the West would not respond to localized Poviet aggression by
declaration of general war, the USSR may attempt seizure of Greece,
Turkey, or Iran. The first two countries would initial-1,v resist, but
continuation of their struggle would depend on Western reaction,.
Expressed determination by the Lest to furnish military aid and other
assistance, even if ultimately insufficient to halt the Soviet advance;,
would stiffen Greek and Turkish resistance to the end. On the other
hand, Iran's resistance to a Soviet attack would be minimal and short-
lived., even if Wecteer n aid were prico3sed.
In those states that are not the victims of limited Soviet aggro w
Sion, there would be immediate trends toumrd neutrality and si iultanems
exploration of the possibilities of ,obtaining ediately Western con..
mdtments and assistance. If the latter were not forthcoming, viartuly
all the states would seek to establish neutral positions and slide
rapidly into accomodation with the USSR.
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3. _Cont nnvat ,on of gMg n s, ores, If both the M SR and the West
continue present policies in the Near East, there may be some improver,.
ment in the strength and pro-Western orientation of Turkey, Greece,
Saudi Arabia, and Libya. In Iran and the other Arab states, however..
Western influence will slowly decrease with a corresponding increase
of Soviet power. None of the states is likely to becane an actual
satellite in the next several years, assuming the aontinmtion of
present Soviet and Western policies.
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III. D ITI:'I PA, IUTIE ' EEMgjjrG !!LM M
1. DE "t ,object~. Historic British objoativea in tho clear Eaat
are valid today: to maintain control ovor the region and thereby secure
this vital cantor of ooalth ooacunicationa, source of petroleum
and other raw raterials, and locus of large invortoontes. Britain's
etratogie planners subordinate tlio ro ion only to the bone defohee
zone; they view a Soviet menace to the Near East ac a threat to Britain's
national security virtually an dangerous as any similar threat to
Uostern Europe; they coneidorr that the loss of the hoar East tcould
endanger the security of South Arias and affect the balance of pourer
between East and "sat,
2, &ritiah.capahi3 ties, "bile British objoctivea remit unalterod,
British capabilities in the area have bon appreciably reduce4a begin-
ning in the inter.-war period and accelerating during and after Vorld
War II. Lacking adequate national pot:+er, the British tidthdroi military
assistance to Greece and Turkey and shortly thoreaftor gave up the
mandate for Pale tine. The latter decision revealed.c'_early the
inability of the British to bold a hay strategic position it the Near
East and to maintain order bottroon Arabs and Jews. At present thore .a
a very tilde ; ap betireen British oc itmente and objectives in the region
and their capabilities of defending even areac of their primary reaporie.L..
bility- against soviet aggression.
Having idthdrawn at several points, the United Kingdom is prosued
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further by rab des ands for i,ithdr'a%ra1 of Dritisb (("caps from the
region$ for revision of the unequal treaties of alliance with Ef pto
Jordan, and Iraq, and for,relinquishment of British control in the
Budan,. The United Kingdom? s traditional position as. adview,
protector, and arbiter is continuously challenged and is dedUydnCo
NevorthelOes$ at present the United Kingdom still exercises
the r,o t important forciga influence in the Arab world (Saudi Arabia
exeopted) o Limited Driti&% forces are stationed in Libya, Egypt,
Cyprus, Jordan, and Iraq, and British naval bases maintained in Cyprusa
Aden,, and Bahreino The UK strongly influences the Bing of Jordan and
the Amir of Cyrenalca, holds a pararaunt position in the Persian Gulf
Sheididars, (erns Aden Colony and Protectorate,, and still influences
to a considerable de;ree tho Iraqi ,over ont. British economle
interests are found throughout the area, British funds are inve^ted in
many enterprises, Britain is important in the region's economic trade,
and through the operation of the sterling bloc and control of local
bangs, London maintains a.preeninent position in the financial
relations of the region,
In past ears the UK has been able to enlist the active aid of
membors of the Commontioalth in tho defense of the bear East. In the
future, it is likely that Australia and Now Zealand viii. provide only
token forces, either in peacetime or in the event of star with the UrMRp
as they are preoccupied with the defense of Southeast Asia. "outh Africa
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will be more willing to participate in the defence of the near Da.et,
but it does not have :vfficiont powor to enable it to Contribute
effootivoly.
3. Do
ward ?the j. Turkey and Grooves Z-chile
harboring no enmity toward tho UK, look upon it a: a declining power
whore triendehip is useful but maxginel. Distinct antipathy toward
the UK is currently evident in Iran, re-,.silting from plot and Present
controvors .ec with tho Anglo.Iraniran M7. Corpany and froze a tridosproad
improeaion that the UK souks to prevent Iranian econo1ic development
and that the UK i jealour of recant US activities there. It ie,
however, possiblo that if tho now oil agreenont 2s aticfactori3
concluded, the UK may in tine regain influence in Iran.
Opposition to the UK among most of the Arab states, elthou
moderated by British cool ocs toward Israel in the later stages of the
Palestine Conflicts continuos: to ou. z he UK $ e 3 nvolvemont in Europa
and the Far Forst appears to prevent more favorable 'Opportunities for
the Arabs to secure recognition of their aspirations and removal of
the vertigoe of impcria'lism. Egypt and Iraq fell that their development
as independent stator since, the conclusion of troatios of alliance
with the UK (Irags 1930; Egypt$ 1936) entitles then to major revision
of the treaties embodying recognition of than as ceeplete equals,
While resentment generated by the prevent treaties of alliance auggrore
that Iraq and Egypt may attempt their abrogation,, nevertheless in car,
of actual. soviet aggression in the aroa,,the govornmente of those
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countries Could undoubtedly make their territories available to the
West and roquort ''ostern defense aid.
4. attitude &2L%Cd joint US.. ]Kre-m b ' tsa . Faced crith. a
.widening gap between its capabilities and the pouor roquirod to secure
its objectives in tho Near Easts the UK would readily share with the
CTS responsibility for safeguarding the rogion; it has already invited
VS participation in Near Errtern defense planning. Close British ties
with some of the Near Eastorn autos would complement US ties vdth
othor states.
Although. in broad teztss U:' and UK interests and policies in the
region could be harmonized, it in likely that already existing c poaia.,
tion of interests would persist and near divorgencies would develops
a) the UK would probably expect that the U:', as a newcomer in this area,,
should defor to British experience and await British initiative; b) the
UK would maintain that 'any quiet: or novel ralutions to Near Eastern
problems are doomed to failure. For example, it is likely that the
British would be unimprocead by a "grass roots" approach to internal
problems of the area, in contract to dealing with the traditional
political figures; c) ar Persian Gulf oil represents a major aceot in
British finances, Britainicrill strive to gain a favored position for
Britishiocmed oil against Amorioan-oompetition and to check the tnerican
viilingpess to, grant larger shares of petroleum profits to local govern.
ments and benefits to local ample hoe. Although forced by circumstances
to share responsibility '4th the US in the regions the UK-would attempt
to use US support to buttress and regain UK predominance in the Arab
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50 & , le in the fig, Fuch French influence in the Levant
ftates as survived tho ousting of the French admdnietration in 1943
is boing steadily whittled dawn by Crowing :yrian and Lebanese
deteimin tion to oust French eoonomic interests.
France no 1a er has the parer or position fri ttich to play a
ra3or role in the Noer E^st. Its one asset is the aide diffusion of
French culture (literatures arts, educational system). France has
groan resentful at real or fancied neglect in the pact and iiculd expect
to be aonsultodp olaining an interact in Near Ecstorn regional agreo-
moats by reason of its alliance frith Turkey.and its responsibilities in
North Africea. It could contribute only r..arginal3y to the implementation
of WW regional armament.
mm,
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dos Qn SoaurM A1,y innate. A ' narked variation is
la &Wt
apparent in the attitudes of the Near Eretern states toward tho Eest-
West conflict and is rofleoted in their attitude toward security
errangeamente involving the Western potions. Generally! the docire for
some form of protection by the West is present throughout tho region,
but this desire is we)) ned in Sono etatoc by rocentment toward and
differences 'pith the - U:' and the UK, and b:- fear that closer aligtmont
with the West would produce strong reaction b;; the Ur.R.
Turkey and Greece arc most decira c of offing oommitaanta by
the US to oomo to their aceistance in tho event of an attack by the
an
MOM; they consider tho US the only pouter able to provid%ffoctive
counterweight to the Soviet Union. While they would probably not be
ern
adverse to participating in a Nediterraaoan pact or a Near Viet
regional arran jeent ith .ah is backed by, the US, t bey would see no
advantage In joining such arrangements without Western guarantees.
They perceive. no advantages and substantial disadvantages, if they were
coi fitted to assist in the dofonse of weaker nations like Iran. They
sago apparently itilling to accept the rick of full alliance with the
West and, with Ileetorn aoiamitmente, would pormit the eetabliebTaent? of
Western bases in their'territoriesa Those two eountrioc would also
accept an invitation to join in the Ilorth Atlantic Treaty -tyrganieation
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primarily because of the Uf cozitmont inplicit in such an action and
only secondarily because of the a cai dance they rq obtain from'
"ectorn European countries.
Iran# finding itself in an exposed position and trithont expocta?
tam of receiving effectivo acsistanoe from the Wont in the event of
attack by the U.'. Rs trould be trilling to accept a US or USA M comitnonta
but weuid be hesitant to permit the stationing of "ostorn troops on its
territor,' unlocs it were firmly convinced of the efficacy of such
forces in the defense of tho oountry. Iran's price for joining in a9'
defense arrangnmt against the UPSR Would bo high,, both -in terns of
military and oconornic ascistanee9
Israel and Eg'pt have already proposed and the other Arab Statue
vould tmdaubtedly be willing to join in seauriity errangcnents with the
?Accts In view of the doep..aoated antipathy betcuresen I arasa and the
Arab states, only parallel aCreonents between tho West and Israel and'
tho ??'oct and the Arab States could be accep, table. Defense coordination
between Xeraol and the Arab 1"tates would be poeziblee but only throw
"extern intermediaries, None of these states uduld accept treaties of
alliance frith the Wont unlace they included provisions fore (a) military
a: sistance from the Hest to build up local defense "forcesg (b) guarantees
of T'ectern support in the event of Soviet attack; and (c) no more than
token roctern forces stationed in the area prior to inmmodiate threats
of Soviet attack.
2a l .ae~ ab 1~t~ of 'earuriti rrnng2=_s. An intsgated regional.
security arrang font embracing an the states.of the region and
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involving ec uitaents by each for mutual defense of the area is not
feasible. On the other hand, parallel agreements between individual
Near Fastean states.or groups 'of states and the Western powers appear
to offer considerable possibility of local acceptance. Coordination
an an area-wide basis could be provided by the West, and under such.
auspices and circumstances would not be firmly resisted.
3. Est ted Soviet reactio. The USSR would undoubtedly react
strongly to the creation of agreements by which the West would guaran.
tee the Near Eastern states and station more forces than at present
in the area. Moscow may decide either when such arrangements are con-
eluded or after their implementation has gotten underway that the
threat presented to it outweighs the disadvantages of invading the
area and take a deliberate risk of pro oking a general war. The West
has already taken a simi4ar risk in reviving and rearming Western
Europe, without thus far resulting in Soviet aggression. However,
establishment by the West of Near Eastern security arrangements
extending the barrier around the southwestern perimeter of the USSR
might lead the latter to have greater fear of encirclement,
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1. Ce, . I. broadly conceived pr om of ' ?ortorn support of the
Near East, including "octern coriitbmenta to dofend the region, to
build up local defonao forces, and to contribute aeonomic aid, would
not directly, significantly, and iriediately increaco the rogion2e
ability to defend itself ac-cinet overt :overt a; grossion. However,
such a pros ran *.mad ?Ave other positive and diroot advontagess it
would pormit the deploymont in some parts of tho region of Wertorn
forces, it would check the trend toward neutraLitm, and it would
ierove thoso conditions which facilitate the spread of Co==1M and
-pro -roviet tendencies. Over a long period of'-tine, the -capabilitica
of the indigenous defense forces coud? be raised to the point Lahore
they iwld constitute an irVortant but not, by themselves, decisive
barrier to Soviet aggression.
20 Eoononio acaiatanoe. Provision of economic ac istanoe by the
Mast trauld be a .n?cersar'y part of.any program de:iLned to increase
stability and build up local forces for the defenso of 'the region.
Ba id removing those conditions which make parts of the area vulnerable
to 'Comma#niem, the provision of 'economic aa.iatance would be valuable.
in convincing some of the Near Eastern state: that the West is as much
interested in their welfare as in their alignment at ninst the USSR.
An effective proms of economic assistance would probably
involve an initial expenditure of 250 to .300 Million annually, irhich
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could be tapered off in later years. In arriving at this estivate,
the following considerations are germane: (a) US assistance to Greer
and Turkey has averaged about $220 million annually. These countries
could absorb only lower levels of assistance in coming years. (b)
Israel has absorbed about S.100 million in government funds and 1200
million in private invectment in recent years, and will apparently
require considerable assistance in the future, (c) Some of the Arab
states have received little foreign contributions and local invest;mont
has been light. (d) Oil producing Countries? particularly Saudi Arabia,
,stn absorb little o0onomic assistance over and above their oil revenues.
A program of economic assistance in-the Arab states and Iran
would be most likely to. effect major impravement if concentrated in
the field of agricuitare, vhero there are possibilities both of
increa. ng the. extent of cultivated. land and in raising yields on
presently cultivated lainde Thorn would, however, also be room for
improvaient in industryr particularly in these enterprisoc based an
available agricultural raw vaterials, e.g., nenufacture of textiles
food processing, and in other lirht industries, e.g., cement,
fertilizer, chemical production.
3. Witarv aims anew, Aa pointed out above, key states in the
Near E^stern region trill cooporate Frith the West in the defense of
the region only if they are treated as equals. Primarily, this
means assisting these states in building up their local defense forces
to the point where they can contribute effectively to the defense of
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their own bordors. T'hile there are rang obstacles in the way of develcp -
ing effootive'armies in the region, there are certain underlying factors
wbich are favorable: (a) strong sense of nationaliea[a;(b) relatively
abundant manpower; and (a) familiarity in Qama -etatos t rith modern defense
techniques.
14h3.ly there is a risk implicit in. building up the armed forces
in states uhoee policies may prosently cmviaags iiar on their neighbors
at sc?e future date, theca risks ray bo mitrEmit:ed by Western guarenteos
against MW antra-regional aggression and by the gradual r l
through econ is assistance of the underlying frustrations which now
find egression in errdty aCcinst neighboring ctatoso
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