COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO THE ENTRY INTO CAMBODIA OF TROOPS FROM NON-COMMUNIST ASIAN STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001500020012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 28, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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SENSITIVE
CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTUATES
28 May 1970
MEMO tANDC}M FOR ME DIRECTOR
SUWECT: Communist Reactions to the Entry into Cambodia of Troops
from Non-Communist Asian States
or non-Communist states of East Asia show increasing
concern over developftefte in Indochina. The Djakarta meeting is one
sign of this concern but not the only one, and the meeting further
revealed how uncertain these states are about what to do. One
bility is that several of them might decide to take some kind of active
(or more active) military role not only in South Vietnam but also in
Cambodia. The foiling memorandum assesses (1) the availability of
forces for some such role`, (2) how a develo!ment of this kind g'o'ld
be viewed by the Communist states -- North Vietnam, China,. North Korea
and the USSR; and (3) what the Communist response might be.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
dow adin and
declassification
S-E--C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
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ver the extent
o m south free, Indonesia
C nnist ii y ers as ro)
-- to substitute Asis
their invo.v
for rican ground forces
ese .ce
,ould be
e prospect of
oue
east Asia.
against Communist azplratiors
of South Korean forces alone, however,
obably t
ady heav
d be
seen as hadn such broad st iificancc.
ted. in Swth Vjetngm and their a
y Fist but eaeentiaa
exten:ai.. of the
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S-E-C-R- .T
of Chinese Nationalist troops would
be viewed with extreme seriousness and seen as confirmation of United States
Ilingness to move more boldly in Indochina, accepting the risk of a sharp
reaction by Peking. The entry of hitherto neutral Indonesia into Cambodia
would also suggest to Hanoi.. and Peking that major changes) detrimental to
de, were occurring in the shape of the struggle in Indochina.
Communist response to the political and psychological implications of
development would be intense They{ would try by every
credit the Asian character of the moves into Cambodia and to label the
countries involved as puppets and dupes of the United States.
Possibly Communist Reactions
6. Token third-country forces which served primarily to provide garrison
security to Phnom
key lines of communication from Sihanouk-Ville or
the Thai border would not, in Hanoi' s
greatly complicate the Communist
position in Cambodia, which depends mainly on the territory east of the
Mekong. But effective combat forces operating in the, eastern Cambodian
countryside against Communist troop concentrations, base areas, and supply
routes would be an entirely different matter. Hanoi would not, at least in
the first instance, look to Peking for direct assistance, but would attempt
to cope with its problems, as before, by reinforcing VC/NVA units in Cambodia,
strengthening defensive positions in key strategic areas, and, perhaps, by
diversionary attacks in South Vietnam.
,B-C-R-B-T
EXT
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S-R-C-R-N-T
both
South Korean forces were introduced, Hanoi would call upon the
orth Korea to re-open their 1967-1968 campaign of armed harass
ent of South Korea in hope of deterring further ROK troop movements into
uld probably oblige, by some measures calculated
to heighten tensions in the Korean peninsula, though it would want to avoid
provoki
counteraction.
8. As for Indonesia, the Communists probably would not anticipate
that the entry of its forces would significantly affect the military situ-
any case, Indonesia is beyond the reach of their
playsical retribution. The Conunistt powers would, however, use such assets
as exist in Indonesia and the still potent leftwing in that country #o fan
anti-war and anti-regime sentiment.
9.
nose Nationalist troops were to be sent to Cambodia, Hanoi
in cooperation with Peking would invoke the threat of some kind of Chinese
r" response. Hanoi would probably not, however, press for
any large
of Chinese into Indochina lest this threaten Hanoi e s own
predominance in the area and produce the escalation of Allied effort Hanoi
would hope to avoid.
10. In Peking, a Nationalist deployment into Cambodia would raise
concern regarding the possibility of a subsequent move by Taipei into
8IIT
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neighboring Laos and thus close to Chintz's Own border. More broadly,
Poking would consider it a most provocative move simply because of Tai;
aoet
ty tow
to respond with more than propaganda, but in such a way as to minimize the
of direct confrontation with the United States. Peking's actions might
Taiwan;
GRC air and sea units in the Taiwan strait area; and
shelling of the Offshore islands. In addition, the Chinese Ca;miunists would
nforce their forces along the Laos border and might add to their forces
. The primary Soviet concern in tle event of a Chinat deployment
into Cambodia would be that the situation was evolving into one in which
Moscow could exercise little or no influence. The Soviets would also
perceive the likelihood of further losses in their competition -with Peking
luence in Hanoi, particularly in view of their continuing diplomatic
presence in Phnor. Penh. They would view the enhanced possibility of a Sine-
United: States ccnfront&tion with mixed feelings. Wile delighted at the
vanishing chances of a S no-United!. States rapprochement, the USSR would be
.pprehensive concerning the general repercussions of any direct hostilities
between China and the United: States.
S -C-R_E-T
S ITIV
troop and aircraft deployments to coastal areas opposite
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