CASTRO'S CUBA: SIGNS OF CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001500010020-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 20, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
20 May 1969
SUBJECT: Castro's Cuba: Signs of Change
A growing body of evidence suggests that Castro, mostly
out of a sense of frustration, may be searching for new ways
to relieve some of the pressures on his regime -- and that
he may wish to alter his relationship with the US as part of
such a tack.
Why Would Castro Change?
1. Dur-;.ng the early years, the Castro regime brought
about a revolutionary transformation of Cuba, to the benefit
of the Island's poor. For the most part, however, Castro has
since been frustrated in his major efforts both at home and
abroad. His hopes for combatting US "imperialism" by exporting
revolution to Latin America so far have been thwarted. He
This paper was discussed in detail with representatives of
the DDI and of the Clandestine Service, but we have not
sought formal coordination.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and
declassificat..`.on
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has failed to achieve Cuba's economic diversification or develop-
ment and has only transferred the Island's dependence to another
colossus. Indeed, over the past couple of years the living con-
ditions of most Cubans have declined, hard work and austerity
have come to characterize the regime's programs, and disaffection
though not organized opposition -- have become
widespread.
2. Nor does the immediate future appear to promise suf-
ficient relief. In 1969, the economy probably will only partially
recover from the dismal performance of 1968. This year's sugar
production will probably be less than last year's (5.2 million
metric tons) and below the annual average for the past 20 years..
Castro may realize by now that his effort to produce 10 million
tons of sugar in 1970 is an unattainable goal -- but he continues
to stake the "honor of the Revolution" upon its achievement. While
Cuba may achieve one of its best sugar crops (over 7 million tons),
it is likely that 1970 will be just one more year of continued de-
pendence on foreign assistance and domestic shortages of goods.
It may be that his apparent interest in new policies and new options
comes in part from such frustrations.
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3. Castro's domestic problems cannot be viewed in strictly
economic terms, however. While no group can presently threaten
the regime, or is likely to try to, there is growing dissidence
in Cuba.* This takes many forms, but one of the most difficult
for Fidel to comprehend is disaffection and delinquency among
the youth. During the past year or so Castro has complained
in some of his speeches about wayward young people who do not
work hard enough or who are active delinquents. The problem
is complex for, like many other Latin American countries, Cuba
has not yet developed a means to absorb educated youths into
the economy and society in positions they find commensurate
with their training. This is particularly critical in Cuba
because, while the young have been promised that they will be
the wave of the future, they are in many cases directed, for
the present, to work as agricultural laborers.
By now perhaps as many as one-half million Cubans have
expressed their dissent by leaving Cuba, and perhaps
200,000 more are on the list to leave via the US-sponsored
airlift. In addition, illegal emigration (fencejumping
via Guantanamo, fleeing via small boats) has increased
appreciably over the past two years.
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4. After leaving their highly favored status as students,
the real world of Cuban life -- drab and Spartan -- comes as a
blow rather than a challenge to some young people. To Castro,
their behavior sometimes seems hedonistic, and thereby margin-
ally counter-revolutionary. Moreover, the process of education,
which has been a hallmark of the regime, has equipped Cuba's
youth to recognize the Revolution's shortcomings. Just as any-
where else, the establishment in Cuba cannot always understand
how the status quo could be questioned, let alone how to respond.
All this is probably disquieting to the leader who was going to
create the "new man."*
5. After 10 years, Castro's panacea for Cuba's problems is
a demand for harder work, and a society once light-hearted now
has a solemn cast, with little chance for good times. Castro
did not intend to change Cuba in this way, and the pleasure of the
Revolution may have diminished for him. At the same time, his
The generalizations in this paragraph may pertain more spe-
cifically to urban than to rural youth. Their numbers are
more concentrated, they are nearer the power centers and
therefore their behavior may affect the regime more. The
conversion to agricultural labor may be more startling to
them. Furthermore, we suspect that reporting about youth
and students in Cuba is extrapolated from the sources' ex-
perience mainly in urban areas.
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confidence may also be somewhat down. At age 41 Castro may be
taking personal stock, asking himself what he has done and what
he has to show for it. Confronted with the fact of minimum
achievement, he may have growing doubts. If not Castro himself,
his entourage seems to be increasingly concerned about his per-
sonal safety; indeed, during the past year elaborate security
precautions have surrounded his public appearances. Although
he is still able to captivate a crowd, he makes fewer speeches
than in the past, he seeks to involve his audiences less, and
he seems to have less physical contact with the people.
6. Change seems also to have occurred in Castro's con-
ception of the potential for revolution in Latin America.
Because of the dramatic failure to export revolution to Bolivia,
the dismal fortunes and prospects of Cuban-supported revolutionary
movements elsewhere, and because of concurrently increasing ten-
sion over the spotty domestic performance of the regime, Castro
has apparently undertaken a reassessment of his entire revolutionary
policy. Even though he continues to train foreign revolutionaries,
some sources have said he now believes that conditions which could
support a Cuban-style takeover do not exist in most of Latin America.
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Others report that the Cubans will continue to look for revolu-
tionary opportunities abroad, but that assistance to any movement
will be based upon its ability to sustain itself (money and per-
sonnel) and to pose at least some threat to the established gov-
ernment. We also have good evidence which suggests a new Cuban
desire to re-open ties to other Latin American governments --
among which is the generally less hostile attitude of the Cubans
toward other Latin American delegations at the recent meetings
of the UN's Economic Council for Latin America, and the apparent
cessation of regularly scheduled Radio Havana attacks on the
Frei regime in Chile shortly after a member of Frei's party
visited Cuba. In any case, Castro seems to be giving lower pri-
ority to his effort to transplant his cause. As a consequence,
at least for a while he is likely to spend more time on Cuba's
own problems, and to be considerably less irritating to the US
and to the rest of Latin America.
7. Castro's discomfort under Soviet pressure for support
on the issue of Czechoslovakia may also have been a factor con-
tributing to his search for new alternatives. For some time he
had been trying to sustain an indepentlent posture in foreign
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affairs while remaining under the Soviet umbrella. The Czech
case apparently proved that he was not free to act according to
his views. Castro's initial ambivalence on this issue probably
reflected his own identification with the underdog. Although he
felt Cuba had been mistreated by the Czechs, he believed that,
in their struggle for national identity, they represented Cuba's
search for independence. When the Czechs succumbed, it was prob-
ably quite clear that Cuba's fate could be similar. In the end,
Fidel responded to what we now believe was heavy pressure from
the USSR, and as a result Cuban-Soviet relations have improved
significantly, at least on the surface.
8. Because he has not been able to overcome his economic
difficulties, Castro appears to have had no choice but to hew
closer to the Soviets -- at least for now. He needs Soviet eco-
nomic support, and it appears that at least until after the 1.970
sugar harvest the warming trend in Cuban-Soviet relations will
continue. It is reliabl; reported that Cuba has agreed not to
attack the old guard, pro-Soviet communist parties in Latin
America -- parties once denounced by Castro for their lack of
zeal. In view of his prominent failures in supporting violent
revolutions elsewhere, and the current lack of promising causes
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to sponsor, it costs him little to compromise with the Soviet's
on the peaceful vs. the violent path to power in Latin America.
But Castro doesn't like playing the role of a subordinate, and
some of his effort to find new options may reflect his desire to
find room to maneuver between the two colossi.
Some Signals for the US
9. Along with the other evidence of change in Castro's
attitudes, there have been both direct and indirect indications
that he may have new thoughts on Cuba's relationship to the US.
For example, the number of virulent Cuban propaganda attacks on
the US has been substantially reduced for some time. Of notable
significance in this regard is the fact that the regular occasion
for an anti-US broadside, the 19 April anniversary of the Bay of
Pigs, passed in Cuba without a Castro speech or other noteworthy
observance. Furthermore, the Nixon Administration has come in
for far less criticism than its predecessors, and then mainly on
the issues of Vietnam, Korea, and Peru.
10. The evidence that Castro's attitude toward the US is
changing, or is open to change, also includes explicit signals
through diplomatic and other channels. One of the Western
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diplomats in Havana has brought the message that Castro would
like to discuss with the US the subject of aircraft highjackings
and "other issues." This diplomat also remarked that he was im-
pressed by the suggestions of senior Cubans that this might be
the time for change in US-Cuban relations. Indeed, through in-
direct contact the US and Cuba have already concluded a quite
limited agreement about aircraft highjackings, and throughout
the negotiations the Cubans were careful not to be abrasive.
11. Of additional interest in terms of signalling and
probing by Cuba has been the recent reporting that Castro hopes
to use Cyrus Eaton as a personal link to the US. In fact, a
Cuban mentioned as Eaton's prospective contact with the Castro
regime has been assigned to Cuba's UN delegation. Finally, a
reliable Cuban source on the policies of the regime has indi-
cated that there is a growing Cuban interest in re-opening
commercial ties with the US.
12. It is not clear how much improvement in relations
Castro may hope for, or what he would expect to gain from a
detente with the US at this time. He would undoubtedly like
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to be less dependent upon the Soviet Union, and probably wishes
to be more free to deal with all countries. He may think that
the appearance of seeking better relations would be of value
to him, especially at home among younger members of the regime
who may be growing impatient with slow progress. An acknowledged
less tense relationship with the US would probably please many
in the Cuban population. Fidel may expect that it would also
stimulate more Western European and Japanese interest in trade
with Cuba. It may even be that Fidel's reading of the US indi-
cates that the new Administration is ready to change. The will-
ingress of the US to engage in the Paris negotiations, and a
belief that the US population does not back the war effort --
and may not hold to a hard line on Cuba -- may have encouraged
this line of thought.
What Does It Mean?
13. Castro's policies and his attitude toward the US may
be changing, but it is likely that Fidel has not yet thought
the matter through. He must wonder, for instance, what measures
he would have to adopt to maintain control of the course of the
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Revolution if he allowed an increase in contact with the capi-
talist countries and their goods and agents. Particularly
nettlesome must be his recognition that Americans and their
culture retain an excellent reputation with many Cubans. He
must realize, moreover, that if US-Cuban relations warmed,
allegations about US hostile actions would no longer be a
plausible rationale for the regime's failures. We think
Fidel will move slowly in his effort to extend his room for
maneuver, and that he will be highly sensitive to indications
of animosity from the US and other non-communist countries.
Furthermore, Castro has always been easily diverted, and a
variety of tangential events could disturb the current trend.
He might, for instance, become enamored of the prospects of
some as yet unpromising or unknown revolutionary movement, and
reassume the role of the strident revolutionary. Finally, he
probably does not know how far the Soviets will let him go, and
in the end he may not have the temperament to maximize his in-
dependence without inspiring some form of Soviet reprisal.
14. What all this means for the US may depend heavily
upon US actions in a variety of areas. Castro has shown great
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concern with the US role in Vietnam, and he would not wish to
have normalized relations with the US as long as we remain
heavily engaged there. Even though he may find the Paris
talks increasingly hopeful, he undoubtedly assumes that the US
Congress will continue its animosity toward Cuba. He probably
assumes also that true detente might take several years to
accomplish, and may realize that movement in itself might do
him no immediate good. Nonetheless, as Western diplomats
point out, there are "straws in the wind." He may be looking
for a sign, and at the very least, he probably now sees that
an adversary relationship with the US need not continue to
be expedient.*
15, It is also possible that, though real, Castro's own
motives for playing down conflict may not be paramount. It seems
to us that in an effort to minimize general East-West tension,
the Soviets may have told Fidel to cool his anti-US line at this
In the past Fidel has believed that both the US and the
Soviets might one day turn on him. And although we have
no current indications to this effect, he is known to
have believed that after the US disengages from Vietnam
it may try to throw him out.
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point in time. If this is the case, low level diplomatic talks
between the US and Cuba might represent an appealing reassurance
to the Soviets of US interest in pursuing other East-West talks.
At the same time, Fidel's attitudes over the next year or so,
although likely to remain somewhat ambivalent, may furnish an
opening for the US to re-establish contact with the Cuban people
and leadership on a regular basis.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
AB' OT SMITH
Director
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
A self-explanatory memorandum, which may be
timely.
Attachment:
Memo to the Director
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
"Castro's Cuba: Signs of Change"
cc: DDCI
DDT
D/OCI
Mr. Broe
21 May 1969
(DATE)
FORM NO. lol REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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