STATEMENT OF FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, USN BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000100090023-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 28, 1947
• Content Type: STATEMENT

JAR 1947
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100090023-3
STATEMENT OF FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, USN
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
rir. Chairman and Gentlemen:
The bill which you now have under consideration represents the efforts
of the services to resolve their differences in pursuit of the common goal of
increased nati.ional security. I believe it will work. It cannot be consider3d
perfect from the Navy point of view, but representatives of other services can,
no doubt, make the same statement on behalf of their organizations. It is rz
compromise, a workable over-all compromise, drawn_up in a spirit of cooper-
ation and understanding to 11rovide this nation with a defense organization
adaptable to warfare of tod
The Wartime Theater Commanders understood and practised unity- of
command by methods which varied with local needs and concepts in the theaters
of operations.
Operational control of combatant units under the principle of unity
is relatively simple. That was amply demonstrated in the Pacific where
integrated planning was conducted thru the medium of a Joint Staff such as I
had at Pearl Harbor. Operational Planning was largely a Theater affair, but
the Logistical Planning had roots in the ylashington military and civilian
structure. Consequently, the whole national logistical system; including
procurement, became of vital interest to the Theater Commander. For example:
the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct in general terms an operation; the Theater
Commander estimates his requirements in forces, men, material, and shipping
to do the job; he takes inventory of his resources and requisitions the things
he lacks. Each service component under his command submits its need,-; to its
own cognizant Washington Department -- and this is a vital point -- because
highly technical material can be designed only by technicians experienced in
the needs of the naval or military service concerned. Furthermore, from design
to delivery, careful follow-through has been necessary in the interest of
both efficiency and speed. 2:o fighting man would trust the procurement of his
weapons and equipment to any general supply agency. He wants the technicians
of his own Department to design, build, and test the specialized equipment on
which depends not only his success, but the lives of his men.
Nor would the Theater Commander willingly submit to any screening
of his requirements by a general supply agency which was eriowered to screen,
but which was not responsible for the results of the combat,
I emphasize this point even though this bill will permit the degree:
of procurement autonomy deemed vital by the operating forces, because I as
aware of the contrary concept of an over-all centralized procurement plan.
This central procurement agency may look attractive and sound plausible but it
would not produce the results desired by the Theater Commander.
Logistics, utilizing as it does more manpower than actual combat,
is so vital from the standpoint of military efficiency and economy that I
recommend that this Committee call on assistant Secretary of the Navy Kenney
and my Logistics Deputy, Vice Ad=dral Carney, in order that both the commercial
and military logistical implications of this bill may be explored and developed.
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100090023-3