THE AIR WAR COLLEGE NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM THE THREAT TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001400410001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1970
• Content Type: SPEECH

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THE AIR WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM
THE THREAT TO U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY''INTERESTS
11 MAY 1970
LT.GEN. R. E. CUSHMAN,.JR.,IJSMC
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A FRIEND OF MINE IN THE UPPER MIDWEST HAS A YOUNG
SON WHO HAS BEEN GETTING UP AT FIVE EVERY MORNING--
RAIN, SHINE, OR SNOW--TO DELIVER A NEWSPAPER ROUTE ON FOOT
AND BUILD UP A SAVINGS ACCOUNT. MY FRIEND CAME HOME ONE
EVENING TO FIND THAT HIS SON HAD WITHDRAWN 50 DOLLARS
TO BUY A CONTRAPTION CONSISTING OF AN OLD TWO-CYCLE
LAWN-MOWER ENGINE WELDED TO THE FRAME OF A BICYCLE,
WITH A SYSTEM OF BELTS PROVIDING POWER TO THE BACK
AXLE. THE BOY WAS PATIENTLY TRYING TO GET THE MOTOR
GOING WITH ONE OF THOSE INFURIATING STARTER ROPES.
WHEN THE FATHER SUGGESTED THAT THE 50 DOLLARS HAD
BEEN WASTED ON A PILE OF JUNK, THE BOY LOOKED THOUGHT-
FULLY FOR A MOMENT AT THE SNOW, THE BICYCLE, AND HIS
FEET, AND THEN ANSWERED: "WELL, OBVIOUSLY I CAN'T AF-
FORD A CAR, AND THIS THING BEATS ANYTHING ELSE I'VE GOT."
I'M INCLINED TO THINK THAT SOMETIMES, WHEN WE ARE
RACING AROUND THE WORLD LINING UP ALLIANCES, OFFERING MILI-
TARY AID, AND SPREADING THE MESSAGE OF DEMOCRACY AND
FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY, WE OUGHT TO STOP AND LISTEN TO
THAT BOY.
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IT SHOULD BE OF VITAL CONCERN TO US THAT THERE ARE
MASSES OF PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO ARE
MORE THAN READY TO LISTEN TO ANY ONE WHO
COMES ALONG SELLING A BILL OF GOODS WHICH PROMISES
TO BEAT ANYTHING ELSE THEY'VE GOT.
WE CAN MONITOR CHINESE NUCLEAR TESTS, COUNT SOVIET
MISSILE SILOS, AND KEEP AN EYE ON COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO
SUBVERT THE LEADERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, BUT
THAT DOESN'T COMPLETE THE COVERAGE OF PLACES WHERE
TROUBLE MAY BE BREWING FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THE FREE WORLD.
IT IS JUST AS IMPORTANT THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE
PEASANT IN A VIETNAMESE RICE PADDY WHO HAS NEVER HAD
A SENSE OF NATIONHOOD; THE INCA INDIAN IN THE PERUVIAN
HIGHLANDS WHO HAS LOST EVERYTHING HIS ANCESTORS ONCE
RULED; AND THE AFRICAN WHO THOUGHT INDEPENDENCE
WAS GOING TO GIVE HIM THE STANDARD OF LIVING FORMERLY
ENJOYED BY THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATORS.
THESE ARE THE PEOPLE--NUMBERING IN THE MILLIONS--
WHO ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN ONE REVOLUTION--THE REVOLUTION
OF RISING EXPECTATIONS, THE SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTS CALL
IT. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE THEM OF THE
DESIRABILITY AND SUPERIORITY OF DEMOCRACY AS WE KNOW IT,
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IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HELP THEM TO BRING DEMOCRACY
ABOUT--TO CHANNEL THEIR REVOLUTION, IF NEED BE, IN THAT
DIRECTION. THE TROUBLE IS THAT IF--FOR ONE REASON OR
ANOTHER--THEY ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT DEMOCRACY IS NOT
ONLY THE BEST SYSTEM BL. ij ALSO WITHIN THEIR REACH, THEN
THESE PEOPLE ARE GOING TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE SALES PITCH
OF THOSE WHO OFFER THEM SOMETHING BETTER THAN WHAT THEY'VE
GOT.
I HAVE BEEN ASKED TODAY TO DISCUSS "THREATS TO U.S.
SECURITY INTERESTS." FOR A STARTER, I SHOULD LIKE TO
TAKE A BROAD LOOK AT POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS, RATHER THAN
DWELL ON THE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC WEAPONRY WHICH YOU WILL
BE HEARING ABOUT LATER.
THIS IS RELATIVELY EASY TO SUMMARIZE, IN A WAY--
THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS ARE GOING TO BE VIRTUALLY
ANY AND ALL COUNTRIES WHERE THERE IS TENSION, CONTRO-
VERSY, POVERTY OR INEQUITY THAT THE COMMUNISTS CAN
EXPLOIT. IT IS A QUESTION OF THE VULNERABILITIES IN
THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF A NATION. IF THE PEOPLE ARE
MISERABLE ENOUGH, THEY WILL SEEK CHANGE. IF THEY
CANNOT BRING THOSE CHANGES ABOUT BY ORDERLY POLITICAL
PROCESS, THEY CAN BE DRIVEN TO TRY IT BY CONSPIRACY,
BY SUBVERSION, OR BY FORCE. THIS CREATES THE OPPOR-
TUNITY FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO TAKE A LEADING ROLE.
IN MANY OF THESE CASES, THE PEOPLE OF THE FREE
WORLD MAY VERY WELL SYMPATHIZE WITH THE ASPIRATIONS
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OF THE PEOPLE. CERTAINLY THE KUOMINTANG RULE OF
MAINLAND CHINA IN THE 19305 AND 1940s FELL SHORT OF
WHAT WE WOULD CONSIDER AN ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY.
FULGENCIO BATISTA IN CUBA, THE TRUJILLOS IN THE DOMINI-
CAN REPUBLIC, KING FAROUK IN EGYPT, AND OTHER AUTOCRATIC
RULERS AND REGIMES HAVE CREATED OR MAINTAINED CONDI-
TIONS WHICH DENIED THEM THE SUPPORT OF THEIR PEOPLE, AND
SET THE STAGE FOR THEIR OVERTHROW.
WE CAN ASSUME THAT IDEALLY, THESE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE
WANTED TO MOVE TOWARD A DEMOCRACY LIKE OURS, BUT FIRST
AND FOREMOST, THEY WERE BENT ON CHANGE. THEIR CONDITION
AMOUNTED TO A VULNERABILITY TO COMMUNISM, AND EITHER
BECAUSE THEY SAW NO CHANCE OF ACHIEVING A REAL DEMOCRACY,
OR BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS EXPLOITED AND TOOK OVER THEIR
REVOLUTION, IN SOME CASES--SPECIFICALLY CHINA AND CUBA--
THEY WOUND UP WITH A COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP.
LET US BE REALISTIC. IN CUBA, AT LEAST, THERE ARE
A GREAT NUMBER OF PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY, WHO ARE
BETTER OFF--IN EVERYTHING BUT FREEDOM--UNDER FIDEL CASTRO THAN
THEY WERE UNDER THE BATISTA REGIME. THEY MAY BE AWARE OF THE
EVILS AND INEQUITIES OF COMMUNISM, BUT THEY FIND IT BETTER
THAN WHAT THEY HAD BEFORE, AND THESE--THE MILITARY--ARE
THE PEOPLE WHO KEEP FIDEL CASTRO IN POWER,
TAKING THE LONG-RANGE VIEW OF POTENTIAL THREATS, THEN,
LET US SAY THAT A THREAT TO OUR SECURITY EXISTS WHEREVER
LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE ARE MISERABLE WITH THEIR PRESENT
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LOT, AND BELIEVE THAT IT CAN BE CHANGED ONLY BY REVOLUTION,
NOT BY PEACEFUL EVOLUTION.
THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE VULNERABILITY--THE NEED
AND THE DESIRE FOR CHANGE. THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT NEED
NOT BE DICTATORIAL OR EVEN AUTOCRATIC--THE OPPORTUNITY
FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO PROMISE SOMETHING BETTER WOULD BE
JUST AS GREAT IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE SIMPLY TOO INEPT TO
BE CAPABLE OF IMPROVING THE LOT OF THE PEOPLE. IN FACT,
IT IS NOT EVEN ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE A STRONG COMMUNIST
MOVEMENT IN EXISTENCE IN THE COUNTRY; ALL THAT WAS NEEDED
IN ZANZIBAR, FOR INSTANCE, WAS AN OPENING FOR LOCAL MAL-
CONTENTS WHO HAD BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT COMMUNIST TRAINING,
FUNDS, AND GUIDANCE. THE COMMUNISTS, IN FACT, MAY WELL
SEE THEIR GREATEST OPPORTUNITY IN SITUATIONS WHERE THERE
IS NO LEADERSHIP WHATSOEVER WORTHY OF THE NAME, BECAUSE
THEN THEY CAN EITHER SUPPLY THE NEEDED LEADERSHIP, OR
BUILD A STRONG MASS COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN THE CHAOS
RESULTING FROM THE ABSENCE OF ANY.
I DO NOT THINK WE HAVE ENOUGH TIME TODAY, THEN, TO
SWING AROUND THE WORLD COUNTRY BY COUNTRY, ANALYZING
WHERE THESE'CONDITIONS EXIST, BECAUSE IN ESSENCE THEY
EXIST IN 6-LL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES--WHETHER ONE CALLS
THEM LESSER DEVELOPED NATIONS, OR NEWLY EMERGING STATES,
OR THE THIRD WORLD.
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IN THE NEW COUNTRIES OF BLACK AFRICA, THERE ARE TWO
SPECIAL FACTORS TO BE KEPT IN MIND. FIRST, MANY OF
THESE COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE ANY INHERENT NATIONAL
COHESION. INSOFAR AS THEIR BOUNDARIES ARE CONCERNED,
THEY ARE ARTIFICIAL CREATIONS. THEIR AREA WAS DETER-
MINED, NOT BY THE DESIRE OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE TO FORM
ONE NATION, BUT BY HOW FAR SOME EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY OR
NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLONIZER EXTENDED HIS SWAY BEFORE
HE EITHER CAME UP AGAINST A RIVAL COLONIZER, RAN OUT OF
ATTRACTIVE TARGETS FOR ACQUISITION, OR HAD ALL HE COULD
HANDLE. NIGERIA, FOR EXAMPLE, CONTAINS MORE THAN 250
DISTINCT TRIBES, AND IS DEEPLY DIVIDED BY RACE, LANGUAGE,
AND RELIGION, FROM NORTHERN ARAB MUSLIMS TO NEGRO CHRIS-
TIANS AND NEGRO ANIMISTS. THE RESULT IS THAT MANY OF THE
NEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES START OUT WITH MORE FACTORS TENDING
TO PULL THEM APART THAN TO HOLD THEM TOGETHER.
A SECOND FACTOR IN AFRICA IS THE EXCEPTIONALLY THIN
VENEER OF QUALIFIED LEADERSHIP. THIS VARIES, OF COURSE,
WITH THE DEGREE OF ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE COLONIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION WHICH PREPARED THEM FOR INDEPENDENCE. THERE ARE
MORE TRAINED LEADERS IN NIGERIA, OR GHANA, OR KENYA, THAN
THERE ARE IN THE FORMER BELGIAN CONGO, OR IN THE REMAINING
PORTUGUESE COLONIES. THE STATES OF FORMER FRENCH AFRICA
FALL SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN. EVEN IN THE BEST OF THEM.-
HOWEVER, WHAT YOU MIGHT CALL THE "BENCH STRENGTH" OF
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TRAINED LEADERS AND ADMINISTRATORS IS TOO THIN NOT TO
SUFFER WHEN A MAN LIKE TOM MBOYA IS ASSASSINATED IN KENYA,
OR WHEN AN ENTIRE GROUP IS EXCLUDED BECAUSE IT
CONSTITUTES THE OPPOSITION, OR WAS ON THE WRONG SIDE IN
A CIVIL WAR AS IN NIGERIA. THIS BRINGS ABOUT THE TYPE
OF TALENT SHORTAGE FROM WHICH DEMAGOGUES, EXTREMISTS,
AND THE COMMUNIST AGENTS CAN BENEFIT.
IN LATIN AMERICA, OTHER FACTORS COME INTO PLAY,
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE LIES FAR BEHIND THESE
COUNTRIES, BUT THE PROCESS AND THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC IN MOST CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN
COUNTRIES LEFT WEALTH AND POWER CONCENTRATED IN A VERY
FEW HANDS--WHAT WE CALL THE ELITE OR THE OLIGARCHY IN
EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES. PROSPEROUS JUAN VALDEZ, WEARING
A GLEAMING WHITE SHIRT AS HE BRINGS HIS COFFEE TO MARKET
ON A FAT AND HAPPY MULE, EXISTS ALL TOO OFTEN ONLY IN THE
TELEVISION COMMERCIALS. THE PEASANTS IN THE FOOTHILLS
AND THE INDIANS IN THE JUNGLE OR IN THE HIGHLANDS CREATE
THEIR OWN VULNERABILITIES, AND SOMETIMES THEIR OWN REVOLU-
TIONS. A GOVERNMENT CAN WIN THEM BY REACHING OUT WITH
ROADS, SCHOOLS, SANITATION, MARKETS, AND OTHER CIVIC ACTION.
THE COMMUNISTS CAN ALSO REACH THEM WITH ORGANIZERS, PROPAGANDA
AND GUNS IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OR WILL NOT MOVE FIRST.
IN COUNTRY AFTER COUNTRY, FURTHERMORE, THE SMALL FARMERS
AND THE HINTERLAND INDIANS ARE GIVING UP BY THE THOUSANDS,
AND MOVING TO THE CITIES WHERE THEY FILL MISERABLE, REBELLIOUS
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SLUMS. IN 1940, THERE WERE ONLY FIVE CITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
WITH POPULATIONS OVER ONE MILLION. IN 1960, THERE WERE NINE;
THIS YEAR, THERE WILL BE 18; AND WE ESTIMATE THAT BY 1980
THERE WILL BE 26 CITIES IN LATIN AMERICAN WITH POPULATIONS
IN EXCESS OF ONE MILLION PEOPLE.
THE COUP, OR MORE PROPERLY THE "GOLPE," IS ENDEMIC TO
LATIN AMERICA, BUT IN THE STRICT SENSE OF THE WORD, THESE
ARE NOT TRUE REVOLUTIONS. THEY RARELY RESULT IN A RADICAL
REORGANIZATION OF THE NATION, OR AN ABRUPT CHANGE OF ITS
POLITICAL COURSE. THE COUP IS SIMPLY AN ALTERNATIVE TO
ELECTIONS FOR TRANSFERRING POWER FROM ONE REGIME TO ANOTHER.
IN THIS CENTURY, THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY A HANDFUL OF
TRUE REVOLUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: CERTAINLY
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION OF 1916, POSSIBLY THE BOLIVIAN
UPHEAVAL IN 1952, AND CASTRO'S TAKEOVER IN CUBA. IF WE
ARE TO LOOK--AS THE COMMUNIST AGENTS CERTAINLY DO--FOR
THE PROSPECTS FOR REAL REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA, I
SUGGEST WE LOOK AT THOSE 26 METROPOLITAN SLUMS OF 1980.
THESE ARE FAR MORE LIKELY SITES OF INFECTION AND
TROUBLE THAN THE REMOTE MOUNTAIN RANGES WHERE FIDEL
CASTRO HAS IN THE PAST ATTEMPTED TO INSTIGATE
OR ASSIST RURAL GUERRILLA CAMPAIGNS. THESE CITIES HAVE
THE DISCONTENTED, THE DEPRIVED, THE DESPERATE AND THE
HOPELESS PEOPLE WHO CAN BE LED TO REVOLUTIONS.
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IN OUR ANALYSIS OF FUTURE DANGER SPOTS, WE ARE
INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE LEADERS OF THESE REVOLUTIONS
ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE YOUNG NATIONALISTS THAN ORTHO-
DOX COMMUNISTS, OR EXTREMISTS OF THE CASTRO PERSUASION,
THEY WILL, HOWEVER, BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMMUNIST DIRECTION OR
INFLUENCE, AND MOSCOW'S AGENTS AS WELL AS CASTRO'S WILL CER-
TAINLY BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR THEM, READY FOR ANY OPPORTUNITY
TO MOVE IN ON AND TAKE OVER A POTENTIAL REVOLUTION.
IN 1959, WHEN CASTRO CAME TO POWER IN CUBA,
THE SOVIET UNION HAD DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN ONLY
THREE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES--MEXICO, URUGUAY,
AND ARGENTINA, IN THE ENTIRE HEMISPHERE SOUTH OF THE
Rio GRANDE, THERE WERE ONLY 131 OFFICIAL SOVIET PER-
SONNEL. CASTRO IN HIS FIRST FEW YEARS OF POWER COULD
CALL ON SEVERAL TIMES THAT MANY GUERRILLAS IN A DOZEN
COUNTRIES, AND MANY TIMES THAT MANY AGENTS.
TODAY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
IN 11 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CUBA, AND
GOOD PROSPECTS FOR ADDING MORE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL
YEARS. SOME OF THESE MISSIONS ARE NOT YET FULLY STAFFED,
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BUT BY THE END OF 1969 THEIR 131 PERSONNEL HAD INCREASED
TO 271--AND IT IS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY
ALMOST HALF OF THEM AS OFFICERS WITH A BACKGROUND IN
INTELLIGENCE.
CASTRO, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS CUT BACK SHARPLY IN
HIS SUPPORT Or INSURGENCY, PARTLY BECAUSE OF SOVIET
URGING, PARTLY IN DISILLUSION OVER THE DISMAL FAILURE OF
CHE GUEVARA'S BOLIVIAN ADVENTURE. HE IS MORE SELECTIVE,
AND OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL "EXPORT OF REVOLU-
TION" WILL REQUIRE URBAN AS WELL AS RURAL GUERRILLAS. HA-
VANA RECENTLY PUBLISHED A SO-CALLED "MINI-MANUAL FOR URBAN
TERRORISM."
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THE CONCLUSION IS FAIRLY OBVIOUS THAT THE KREMLIN
FEELS IT IS TO COMMUNIST ADVANTAGE IN THE LONG RUN TO
SIT BACK AND WAIT FOR THOSE VULNERABILITIES OF THE
LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL FABRIC TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES,
THAN IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE THE ISSUE BY INSTIGATING
GUERRILLA WARFARE FROM OUTSIDE.
IN ASIA, OF COURSE, THE ASIAN COMMUNISTS LONG AGO
CHANGED THE ISSUE OF SUBVERSION AND CONSPIRACY INTO
AN OUTRIGHT TRIAL OF MILITARY STRENGTH, BUT IT IS STILL
INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT IN KOREA, THE COMMUNISTS ARE
HELD IN CHECK IN LARGE PART BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN
UNABLE TO FIND ANY VULNERABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA
WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE PEOPLE TO SEEK OR TO ACCEPT
COMMUNIST HELP, IN VIETNAM, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE
MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE WOODS MILITARILY LONG
AGO IF THE PEOPLE HAD ANY REAL SENSE OF IDENTIFICATION
WITH AND SUPPORT FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT, THIS IS NOT TO
SAY THAT THEY NECESSARILY IDENTIFY WITH HANOI, OR WITH
THE VIET CONG; IT IS THE ABSENCE OF ANY SENSE OF NATION-
HOOD, OF ANY FEELING THAT A GOVERNMENT IS WORKING IN
THEIR BEHALF, THAT CREATES THE VULNERABILITY.
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IF THE WEALTH OF OPPORTUNITIES MAKES IT NECESSARY
TO BE SOMEWHAT VAGUE ABOUT WHERE THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT
CHOOSE TO CAUSE TROUBLE OVER THE NEXT 15 YEARS, PERHAPS
WE CAN BE MORE SPECIFIC IN EXAMINING THE RECORD OF WHAT
THEY HAVE BEEN DOING OVER THE PAST 15,
I USE THAT TIME PERIOD BECAUSE THE MODERN COMMUNIST
DRIVE FOR WORLD INFLUENCE BEGAN WITH THE END OF THE
STALIN ERA,
STALIN WAS CERTAINLY AN OPPORTUNIST WHEN THE SITUATION
AS HE SAW IT CALLED FOR SUCH TACTICS, BUT HE WAS FIRST,
LAST, AND ALWAYS DOCTRINAIRE. HE EVIDENTLY FELT THAT
NON-COMMUNIST FORCES--NO MATTER HOW ANTI-COLONIAL THEY
MIGHT BE--WERE SIMPLY NOT PROPER REVOLUTIONARY COMPAN-
IONS, AND PROBABLY NOT EFFECTIVE TOOLS FOR FORWARDING
COMMUNIST INTERESTS. AND ORTHODOX COMMUNIST ASSETS IN
THE THIRD WORLD IN STALIN'S DAY, IN CONSEQUENCE, COULD
NOT CONSTITUTE BY THEMSELVES THE THREAT TO WESTERN IN-
TERESTS THAT STALIN'S SUCCESSORS ARE ABLE TO POSE TODAY.
STALIN'S HEIRS OBVIOUSLY WERE OF A DIFFERENT OPINION.
THE NEW SOVIET APPROACH TO THE THIRD WORLD WHICH WAS
GRADUALLY UNVEILED, HOWEVER, WAS MADE POSSIBLE IN PART
BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH CLEARLY DID NOT OBTAIN UN-
TIL THE LAST FEW YEARS OF STALIN'S LIFE. BY THE MID-50's,
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MOSCOW HAD MANAGED TO CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL OVER
EASTERN EUROPE--AN AREA WHICH HAD REQUIRED PRIORITY
SOVIET ATTENTION BEFORE. AS A RESULT OF ITS OWN
POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD
AT ITS DISPOSAL FOR THE FIRST TIME THE KINDS OF RE-
SOURCES THAT ALLOWED FOR LIMITED INVOLVEMENT ABROAD.
THE ACQUISITION OF NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND CHANGES
IN SOVIET MILITARY THINKING AT THIS TIME RESULTED IN
VAST QUANTITIES OF SURPLUS ARMS THAT MET THE NEEDS OF
POTENTIAL CLIENTS BUT WERE OBSOLESCENT BY SOVIET STAND-
ARDS, IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET LEADERS HAD PROBABLY
GAINED A CERTAIN CONFIDENCE FROM THEIR COUNTRY'S
NEWLY ACHIEVED INTERNATIONAL POSITION WHICH ENCOURAGED
THEM TO WANT TO STRIKE OUT MORE BOLDLY IN DIFFERENT
DIRECTIONS. BEYOND THAT, LOCAL COMMUNIST FORCES IN
THE THIRD WORLD WERE SIMPLY NOT FARING WELL, AND WERE
CERTAINLY NOT UP TO THE TASK IN MOST INSTANCES OF DO-
ING MOSCOW'S BIDDING. THUS, THE SOVIET LEADERS IN-
ITIATED A POLICY OF LENDING SUPPORT OF VARIOUS KINDS
ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON PLATFORM OF "ANTI-IMPERIALISM."
IN THIS RESPECT, OF COURSE, SOVIET ENTRY INTO VARIOUS
AREAS OF THE THIRD WORLD HAS COME ABOUT AS MUCH BY
INVITATION AS BY SOVIET INITIATIVE.
IT HAS NEVER BEEN CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SO-
VIET POLICY HAS DEVELOPED ALONG ANY PREORDAINED LINES.
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THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH DREW THE SOVIETS INTO THE THIRD
WORLD IN THE FIRST PLACE--AND WHICH HAVE PREOCCUPIED
THEM EVER SINCE--WERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THUS
COULD BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN STRA-
TEGIC INTERESTS. AT THE TIME, THE SOVIETS WERE EVI-
DENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUA-
TION THE US WAS ESTABLISHING ON THE USSR's PERIPHERY..
AND THEIR MOVES IN THAT REGION OVER THE YEARS HAVE
SURELY BEEN DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE AMERICAN PRES-
ENCE. PARTICULARLY THE MILITARY FORCES THE US MAIN-
TAINS IN AND AROUND THE MEDITERRANEAN. OTHER REGIONS
OF THE THIRD WORLD. NAMELY AFRICA AND ASIA. HAVE
DRAWN A GOOD MEASURE OF SOVIET ATTENTION, BUT NONE-
THELESS REMAIN LOW PRIORITY AREAS. THE RELATIVE RE-
MOTENESS OF THESE AREAS FROM THE USSR PROBABLY AC-
COUNTS IN PART FOR MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE. BEYOND THAT,
OPPORTUNITIES HAVE SIMPLY NOT PRESENTED THEMSELVES
IN THE WAY THEY HAVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE SO-
VIETS NOW APPEAR UNWILLING TO GET TOO DEEPLY INVOLVED
IN THE VAGARIES OF POLITICS IN AFRICA AND UNABLE TO
COMPETE TOO HEAVILY WITH THE US COMMITMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA.
INSOFAR AS SOVIET POLICY HAS REFLECTED ANY
BROAD STRATEGIC CONCEPT, THAT WOULD BE MOSCOW'S
BELIEF THAT SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE FORMED BETWEEN
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THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" AND THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NATIONALIST
FORCES OPERATING IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE PRIMARY AIM OF
THIS BROAD FRONT OF "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" FORCES IS TO
REDUCE AND CONSTRICT WESTERN INFLUENCE AND TO DENY
THE WEST INTERESTS OF EVERY SORT--ECONOMIC, POLITICAL,
AND MILITARY. THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSUMED, OF COURSE,
THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE COMMUNIST
STATES, THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES WOULD SOONER OR
LATER TAKE ON A MORE RADICAL CHARACTER, AT THAT
POINT, THEY WOULD EMBARK ON THE "SOCIALIST PATH,"
.THEIR CONFLICT WITH THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD INTENSIFY,
AND THIS IN TURN WOULD LEAD TO A DENIAL TO THE WEST
OF CRITICALLY STRATEGIC AREAS AND RESOURCES, ULTI-
MATELY, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HOPED THAT COMMUNIST
REGIMES MIGHT EMERGE ON TOP IN SOME OF THESE STATES,
THE MAIN INSTRUMENT. OF COMMUNIST POLICY
SINCE THOSE EARLY YEARS OF SOVIET EFFORT,
MOSCOW AND THE COMMUNIST REGIMES OF CHINA AND EASTERN
EUROPE HAVE CONSIDERABLY ELABORATED THEIR TIES WITH
THE AFRO-ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN STATES. IN ATTEMPTING
TO TAKE ON THE ROLE OF THE PREFERRED GREAT POWER
SUPPORTER, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED A VARIETY OF METHODS
TO MAKE THEIR INFLUENCE FELT, ALL THE TACTICAL
INSTRUMENTS FROM LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY TO "NATIONAL
LIBERATION" WARFARE HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY THEM, AND
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UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO. THEIR MAIN RELIANCE,
HOWEVER, HAS BEEN ON THE CONVENTIONAL INSTRUMENTS--
TRADE AND ECONOMIC AID, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, DIPLOMATIC
SUPPORT, VARIOUS KINDS OF EXCHANGES, HIGH-LEVEL
CEREMONIAL VISITS, PORT CALLS, AND OTHER SORTS OF
MILITARY ACTIVITY, CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS AND SUB-
VERSIVE METHODS ARE, OF COURSE, EVERYWHERE A PART OF
SOVIET POLICY, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN USED IN RE-
CENT YEARS MORE TO ADVANCE MOSCOW'S POSITION WITH
ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS THAN TO WIN POWER FOR LOCAL
COMMUNIST FORCES,
AS A RESULT OF SUCH INTENSIVE EFFORTS, IT HAS
BECOME MORE OR LESS A FACT OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE
TODAY THAT THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, BUT PRIMARILY THE
SOVIETS, HAVE MANAGED TO WIN FOR THEMSELVES IMPORTANT
POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE IN SOME AREAS OF THE THIRD WORLD
AND TO SUPPLANT THE WEST IN OTHERS. IF SUCH SUCCESS
AS THEY HAVE HAD CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY ONE TANGIBLE
THING, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TO THE SPECIAL AID RELA-
TIONSHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED OVER THE YEARS
WITH MANY OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. MOSCOW HAS
BECOME A MAJOR SOURCE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND TECH-
NICAL EXPERTISE, A LARGE MARKET FOR TRADE COMMODITIES
(PARTICULARLY RAW MATERIALS), AND, MOST IMPORTANT,
A SUPPLIER OF A WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY ARMS AND
EQUIPMENT, THE COMMUNIST REGIMES OF CHINA AND EASTERN
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EUROPE ARE ALSO INVOLVED IN THESE ENDEAVORS, BUT ON A
MUCH LESS AMBITIOUS SCALE.
ECONOMIC AID
OVER THE YEARS, THE COMMUNIST REGIMES TOGETHER
ABOUT
HAVE PROMISED TO -POUR MORE -THA } $11 BILLION IN ECO-
NOMIC AID INTO 48 NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF THE
THIRD WORLD. ONLY ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THIS AMOUNT,
HOWEVER, HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DELIVERED,. OF THE TOTAL
AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE EXTENDED TO DATE, THE
VAST BULK OF IT, SOME $& BILLION, OR ABOUT-
9/PER-CENT, HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY MOSCOW. OF THE REMAINDER,
THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS HAVE EXTENDED SOME $
.-BILLION AND THE CHINESE ABOUT $1L BILLION. AS FAR
AS THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THIS ASSISTANCE IS
CONCERNED, ABOUT 70 PERCENT OF THE AID EXTENDED HAS
GONE TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA. 15 PERCENT TO
AFRICA. 10 PERCENT TO THE FAR EAST. AND 5 PERCENT
TO LATIN AMERICA. THE OVERALL AID EFFORT IS QUITE
IMPRESSIVE--PARTICULARLY WHEN VIEWED BY THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS--BUT THE OVERWHELMING PORTION OF
THIS COMMUNIST ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS GONE TO A RELATIVE
HANDFUL OF STATES ALONG THE USSR's SOUTHERN PERIPHERY
AND A BIT FARTHER AFIELD IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE MAJOR
RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN INDIA, THE UAR, IRAN. INDONESIA,
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AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND PAKISTAN, WHICH TOGETHER
HAVE BEEN PROMISED ABOUT 68 PERCENT OF ALL ECONOMIC
AID EXTENDED TO DATE.
ONE OF THE IMPORTANT BENEFITS OF SUCH ECONOMIC
ASSOCIATION WITH MOSCOW HAS BEEN THE RATHER LIBERAL
ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN OFFERED.
IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN UNUSUALLY
SELECTIVE IN DETERMINING HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF
ECONOMIC AID THEY HANDED OUT. IN _ADDITION, THE
GL4 lv i~ L/
TERMS THEY OFFERED WERE A4f~Dd-AJAR-I ENEROUS--
LONG-TERM LOANS, LOW INTEREST RATES, AND FLEXIBLE
REPAYMENT PRIVILEGES. FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS,
HOWEVER. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SIGNS THAT SOVIET AID
POLICY IS HARDENING. THIS HAS PROBABLY BEEN BROUGHT
ON AS A CONSEQUENCE OF SOVIET DEALINGS WITH COUNTRIES
4
LIKE INDONESIA WHERE, UNDER SUKARNO, UNSUITABLE PROJ-
ECTS WERE TAKEN ON AND WHERE A PRIMITIVE ECONOMY SIMPLY
COULD NOT ABSORB WITH ANY EFFICIENCY THE VAST QUANTITIES
OF CAPITAL AID THAT WERE DELIVERED.
Now, BEFORE NEW SOVIET COMMITMENTS ARE MADE,
QUALIFIED SPECIALISTS GENERALLY UNDERTAKE FEASIBILITY
SURVEYS. MOREOVER, MOSCOW PRESENTLY EXTENDS RELATIVELY
FEW COMPREHENSIVE LINES OF CREDIT FOR MULTIPLE UNDES-
IGNATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO
ALLOCATE AID FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. AS A RESULT, MOSCOW
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"GLAMOR PROJECTS," AND CREDITS HAVE ACCORDINGLY
TENDED TO SHRINK. FOR INSTANCE, OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
OF NEW CREDITS EXTENDED OVER THE PAST 4 YEARS, ALMOST
70 PERCENT HAVE BEEN FOR LESS THAN $25 MILLION. By
CONTRAST, DURING THE PREVIOUS 4-YEAR PERIOD, MORE THAN
ONE-HALF OF SUCH CREDITS EXCEEDED THAT AMOUNT.
TRADE RELATIONS
COMMUNIST TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES
OF THE THIRD WORLD HAVE DEVELOPED IN A LESS ONE-SIDED
FASHION. THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BECOME
IMPORTANT MARKETS FOR GOODS AND RAW MATERIALS FROM
A LARGE NUMBER OF UNDERDEVELOPED STATES, AND THEY IN
TURN HAVE SUPPLIED EQUALLY LARGE AMOUNTS OF FINISHED
COMMODITIES AND EQUIPMENT. THE TRADE BALANCE THAT HAS
BEEN MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS
ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE THIRD WORLD STATES ON THE
OTHER, HAS GENERALLY BEEN AN EVEN ONE. THIS OF COURSE
HAS HAD A FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, WHICH NOT TOO LONG AGO
ALMOST TOTALLY DOMINATED THESE MARKETS. IN 1968,
FOR INSTANCE, THE COMMUNIST$ REGIMES TOGETHER SUPPLIED
ROUGHLY 6 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL IMPORTS AND TOOK
SLIGHTLY LESS THAN THAT SHARE OF THE TOTAL EXPORTS
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FROM THE WORLD'S 120 LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS. THE GEN-
ERAL TRADING PATTERN. THAT HAS EVOLVED, HOWEVER, FOL-
LOWS PRETTY MUCH ALONG THE SAME GEOGRAPHIC LINES AS
THE COMMUNIST AID PROGRAMS: NAMELY, MOSCOW'S HEAVIEST
TRADING IS WITH THE RADICAL ARAB, STATES AND THOSE
COUNTRIES ALONG ITS SOUTHERN BORDERS. IN 1968, FOR
EXAMPLE, THESE STATES ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT 55% OF THE
COMMUNISTS' IMPORTS AND ABOUT 63% OF THEIR EXPORTS.
DESPITE THIS FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL OF TRADE ACTIV-
ITY, MOSCOW IS EVIDENTLY CONCERNED THAT THE STATE
OF ITS TRADE RELATIONS IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE.
IN FACT, THE VALUE OF THE SOVIET TRADE TURNOVER
WITH THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAS INCREASED ONLY
VERY SLOWLY OVER THE PAST FEW`YEARS. ALTHOUGH THE
SOVIETS CONTINUE TO FIND MODEST NEW MARKETS FOR THEIR
GOODS, THERE IS APPARENTLY A MEASURE OF ALARM IN THE
KREMLIN THAT IF THINGS KEEP GOING THE WAY THEY HAVE
BEEN, THE USSR WILL EVENTUALLY BE TAKING IN CONSIDER-
ABLY MORE THAN IT IS SENDING OUT. WHAT THIS MEANS IN
ECONOMIC TERMS, OF COURSE. IS THAT AN UNFAVORABLE TRADE
BALANCE WILL HAVE DEVELOPED. IN AN EFFORT TO FEND OFF
THIS PROSPECT, THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE A COUPLE OF THINGS:
THEY HAVE ISSUED PUBLIC.WARNINGS THAT CONTINUED
PURCHASES FROM THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE CON-
TINGENT ON THE LATTERS' PURCHASES FROM MOSCOW; AND
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THEY HAVE STARTED TO MAKE INCREASED OFFERS OF TRADE
CREDITS, WHICH ESSENTIALLY ALLOW CUSTOMERS TO BUY SO-
VIET GOODS ON TIME.
MILITARY AID
PROBABLY NO OTHER SINGLE INSTRUMENT OF COMMU-
NIST POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS BROUGHT MORE
POLITICAL DIVIDENDS FOR THE COMMUNISTS, YET CREATED
MORE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THEM, THAN THE
SUPPLY OF MILITARY ARMS. UNLIKE OTHER FORMS OF AID.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IN A
RELATIVELY SHORT TIME; THEY HAVE A SPECIAL APPEAL FOR
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WHOSE STABILITY LARGELY DEPENDS
ON MILITARY FORCES; AND THEY GENERALLY ENCOURAGE A
KIND OF CLOSE CONTACT AND RAPPORT WITH RECIPIENTS THAT
IS OTHERWISE DIFFICULT TO GAIN, ON THE OTHER HAND.
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE LEARNED THAT MILITARY AID RELA-
TIONSHIPS HAVE NOT PROVIDED THEM WITH STRONG OR DE-
PENDABLE CONTROL OVER CLIENTS, AND ONLY RARELY HAVE
THEY LED TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE FORTUNES OF LOCAL
COMMUNISTS. BEYOND THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
WAR IN 1967, THEY HAVE LEARNED THAT SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS
WITH MILITARY AID RECIPIENTS CAN LEAD TO RISKS OF
UNWANTED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. AND POSSIBLY EVEN TO
DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE US, THIS IS TO SAY
NOTHING, OF COURSE, ABOUT THE PRESTIGE LOSSES AND THE
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COSTS OF REPLACING LOST EQUIPMENT AND OF RESTORING
DAMAGED RELATIONSHIPS WITH DEFEATED CLIENTS.
EVEN SO, THE COMMUNISTS PROBABLY REGARD MILITARY
AID AS ONE OF THE MOST SUITABLE MEANS AT PRESENT FOR
GAINING THE KIND OF INFLUENCE THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
IN THE THIRD WORLD. OVER THE YEARS, THE SOVIETS.
COMMUNIST CHINA, AND SEVERAL OF THE EAST EUROPEAN
.COMMUNIST STATES HAVE EXTENDED SOME $6 BILLION IN
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 23 COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND AFRICA.
THE OVERWHELMING PORTION OF THIS, ABOUT 90 PERCENT, HAS
BEEN PROVIDED BY Moscow. THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
REGIMES HAVE EXTENDED SOME $700 MILLION IN ARMS AID
(NEARLY THREE QUARTERS OF WHICH WAS PROVIDED BEFORE
1958); AND THE CHINESE HAVE EXTENDED ABOUT $100 MILLION
IN ARMS ASSISTANCE, MUCH OF WHICH HAS BEEN IN THE FORM
OF OUTRIGHT GRANTS. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE START OF
THEIR PROGRAM, THE SOVIETS HAVE TRAINED MORE THAN 22,000
MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AND
IN RECENT YEARS, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY
PERSONNEL SERVING IN THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES HAS AVER-
1W EXC t iS' GF q 00-D mc/v"
AGED 4,59_n__ANNI/A
ABOUT HALF OF ALL SOVIET ARMS AID HAS GONE TO
TWO COUNTRIES, THE UAR AND INDONESIA. FIVE OTHERS--
IRAQ, INDIA, SYRIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND ALGERIA--HAVE
RECEIVED ABOUT 45 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, WITH THE
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REMAINDER GOING IN SMALL CHUNKS TO A NUMBER OF STATES,
PRIMARILY IN AFRICA. THE PRIMARY RECIPIENTS OF EAST
EUROPEAN ARMS AID HAVE BEEN MOSCOW'S MAJOR CLIENTS,
THE ARAB STATES AND INDONESIA, AND TO A LESSER EX-
TENT, INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN, THIS SHOWS, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, THAT THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES HAVE
GENERALLY ACTED AS ADJUNCTS TO SOVIET POLICY,
THE CHINESE HAVE PROVIDED SIZABLE AMOUNTS OF
ARMS TO ONLY 5 NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: ALGERIA
(BEFORE INDEPENDENCE), CAMBODIA, INDONESIA, PAKISTAN,
AND TANZANIA. IN ADDITION, PEKING HAS EXTENDED
TOKEN ASSISTANCE--PRIMARILY SMALL ARMS, AMMUNITION,
AND TRAINING--TO A FEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND TO
DISSIDENT POLITICAL GROUPS IN,AFRICA AND ASIA, THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHINESE AID PROGRAM ARE BROAD--TO
BUILD POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF BOTH
THE WEST AND THE USSR--BUT THE MEANS THAT PEKING HAS
AT ITS DISPOSAL ARE QUITE LIMITED, AND THE TARGETS
OF OPPORTUNITY HAVE NARROWED OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS,
THE FACT THAT SOVIETS ARMS OFFERS HAVE BEEN
MADE IN WIDELY DISPERSED AREAS SUGGESTS THAT THE
KREMLIN'S MILITARY AID PROGRAM IS NOT DESIGNED TO
IMPLEMENT A RIGID PLAN, BUT TO RESPOND TO OPPORTUNI-
TIES WHEREVER THEY ARISE AND TO ESTABLISH A SOVIET
PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE. THE OPPORTUNISTIC NATURE OF
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SOVIET MILITARY AID POLICY IS HIGHLIGHTED MORE THAN
ANYTHING ELSE BY THE FACT THAT MOSCOW HAS NOT TURNED
DOWN, AS FAR AS ANYONE KNOWS1 A SINGLE PROSPECTIVE
CLIENT SEEKING ITS ASSISTANCE. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS.'
HAVE SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO RISK ALIENATING ONE CLIENT--
AND EVEN INVOLVING THEMSELVES IN REGIONAL CONFLICT--
BY OFFERING AND SUPPLYING ARMS TO AN ANTAGONIST. A
PRIME EXAMPLE OF THIS IS MOSCOW'S RECENT EXTENSION
OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN, WHICH HAS PERIODICALLY BEEN IN
DISPUTE WITH TWO OTHER SOVIET ARMS CLIENTS, AFGHANIS-
TAN AND INDIA. BUT INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IN MOST
OF THESE CASES, THE NEW CLIENTS THEMSELVES ORIGINALLY
PREFERRED OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY, AND TURNED TO THE
SOVIETS ONLY AFTER FAILING TO GET WHAT THEY WANTED
ELSEWHERE,
THE SOVIETS ARE NOT, HOWEVER, AS INDISCRIMINATE
IN SETTING TERMS AND IN DETERMINING THE KINDS AND
QUANTITIES OF ARMS THEY WILL SELL. FOR INSTANCE,
OVER THE PAST YEAR THE SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN
INTENSIFYING THEIR CONTROL OVER THE REQUIREMENTS AND
USE OF THE ARMS THEY ARE PROVIDING THE ARABS. AL-
THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO REPLACE THE ARMS
LOST BY THEIR ARAB CLIENTS, THEY HAVE DONE SO WITH
INCREASING CONCERN FOR ARAB CAPABILITIES TO ABSORB
AND USE SUCH EQUIPMENT EFFECTIVELY. NEW AGREEMENTS
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WITH THE UAR AND SYRIA DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1968,
FOR EXAMPLE, WERE UNDERTAKEN WITH MUCH GREATER DELIB-
ERATION THAN THE ONES CONCLUDED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
THE JUNE WAR. AND THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT
BOTH COUNTRIES GOT CONSIDERABLY-LESS THAN THEY WANTED
AND THOUGHT THEY NEEDED. NOT LONG AGO, SOUTH YEMEN
WAS ALSO DENIED A. CONSIDERABLE PART OF ITS ARMS RE-
'QUEST, APPARENTLY REFLECTING SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES IN THAT COUNTRY
AS WELL AS MOSCOW'S EXPERIENCE IN NEARBY YEMEN, WHERE
INTERNAL MILITARY CONFLICT HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF MOSCOW DESPITE SIZEABLE DOSES OF SOVIET ARMS
AND EQUIPMENT.
IN SUM, SOVIET MILITARY AID HAS BECOME ONE OF
THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF MOSCOW'S POLICY IN
THE THIRD WORLD, IT HELPS TO INCREASE SOVIET INFLU-
ENCE AND TO REDUCE THAT OF THE WEST. IT IS USED AS
A MEANS FOR GAINING ENTRY INTO STATES WHICH MIGHT
OTHERWISE BE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET APPROACHES.
IT SOMETIMES HELPS TO MAINTAIN IN POWER REGIMES FA-
VORABLE TO THE USSR. IT OCCASIONALLY HELPS TO ALIGN
THE SO-CALLED "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES IN THE THIRD
WORLD WITH MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY. (GOOD EXAMPLES
OF THIS POINT ARE THE POSITIONS MOST OF MOSCOW'S
ARMS CLIENTS HAVE TAKEN ON THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE
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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. A LARGE PRO-
PORTION OF THESE STATES HAVE GIVEN OFFICIAL SUPPORT
TO HANOI, AND MOST HAVE EITHER ENDORSED OR BEEN RELUC-
TANT TO CRITICIZE MOSCOW'S MOVE AGAINST THE CZECHS.)
AND.IN RECENT YEARS, IT HAS ALSO-BEEN USED TO PURSUE
THE ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVE OF ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT THE
CHINESE FROM EXTENDING THEIR INFLUENCE.
THE IMPACT OF COMMON I ST'_AiD.POLI CY
HOW MUCH DURABLE LEVERAGE THE SOVIETS HAVE
GAINED FROM ALL THIS ACTIVITY, HOWEVER, IS DIFFI-
CULT TO MEASURE. STILL MORE DIFFICULT TO DETER-
MINE IS HOW MUCH ANY SUCH GAINS THEY HAVE MADE CAN
BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEIR AID PROGRAMS, AND HOW MUCH
TO LARGER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. INDONESIA UN-
DER SUKARNO, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS A MAJOR BENEFICIARY
OF SOVIET LARGESSE. IN TURN, HE WAS FAIRLY COOPER-
ATIVE WITH MOSCOW ON SOME INTERNATIONAL ISSUES,
BUT WENT ON TO PURSUE POLICIES MUCH MORE IN LINE
WITH PEKING. INDIA TOO HAS REPEATEDLY DEFERRED TO
THE SOVIETS ON FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, BUT PRI-
MARILY BECAUSE IT COUNTS ON SOVIET SUPPORT AGAINST
CHINA. THE RADICAL ARAB STATES HAVE, OF COURSE,
BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH THE SOVIETS. BUT EVEN THOUGH
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THEY ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET SUPPORT AND AID.
THEY HAVE FROM TIME TO TIME CRITICIZED MOSCOW FOR
ITS FOREIGN POLICIES AND FOR MEDDLING IN THEIR OWN
AFFAIRS.
EVEN SO. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY CALCULATE THAT
TRIER AID PROGRAMS, PARTICULARLY THEIR MILITARY AS-
SISTANCE. COULD OVER TIME HAVE A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON
THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE RECIPIENT. ITS POL-
ICIES. AND PERHAPS EVEN THE CHOICE OF A SUCCESSOR
REGIME, SOVIET SUCCESSES TO DATE, HOWEVER. HAVE NOT
BEEN COMMENSURATE WITH THESE EXPECTATIONS. IN FACT.
THE SOVIETS HAVE MET WITH SOME OUTRIGHT FAILURES IN
SEVERAL INSTANCES. IN GHANA, FOR EXAMPLE, SOME OF
THE MILITARY WERE FAIRLY COOPERATIVE WITH MOSCOW
FOR A TIME, BUT EVENTUALLY TURNED OUT BOTH THE SO-
VIETS AND THEIR MINION. IiKRUMAH. IN INDONESIA, THE
MILITARY WAS NEVER VERY RESPONSIVE TO THE SOVIETS
DESPITE ALMOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON THEM FOR ARMS.
AND IN THE UAR. MOSCOW CONTINUES TO SUPPLY ARMS TO
A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FOR WHOSE POLITICAL ORIEN-
TATION AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITY IT DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE ANY HIGH REGARD.
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NONETHELESS . ,,,
THE SOVIETS MUST SURE
_..
MADE I1 THE M I DDLF ..
ELSEWHERE
SI"G THAN
PRESENCE THERE IS NO~'AC:`a
ER;Y'W:1ERE AS A
MOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE OF
HTls' S E ANDARDS AT LEA"-,ST
THE INROADS THEY ,HA.VE
SIGNIFICANT AND PROM-
WOF;LD. HE SOVIET
.._F?ED PRACr i ICALLA
L_FE; SO IS THE. AL-
. - Rr.v STATES ON CV { f
AID AND SUPPORT. !N -,A`:T.
ANDED TROOPS I N LED-
ANON I N 1958 TO FORESTALL flR S_LY THE ;C,?-
VI ET I NVO'LVEMENT WF` I .. "'C': E UCTANTLY ACCEPT .
AND SINCE THAT T :lE , OV _ HTS HAVE MA 'AGED `y0
CREATE CONDITIONS ALL. 01.,E R THF_ AREA WHI C,