THE USSR'S INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA 13 DECEMBER 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040029-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: December 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The USSR's Intentions
with Respect to its
Military Presence in Cuba
13 December 1962
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13 December 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM.- The USSR's Intentions with Respect to
its. Military Presence in Cuba
1. This paper discusses the evidence whether
the Soviets have decided to remove their remaining
military. forces and weapons systems from Cuba. It
concludes that it is too early to decide among three
possibilities: that the Soviets might decide to with-
draw these assets gradually over a rather extended
period of time; that they might have decided to keep
them indefinitely; and that they have not yet made
up their minds. All these possibilities hold the
chance of further action against the interests of
the US, particularly with respect to action against
US surveillance of the island.
2. We estimate Soviet forces in Cuba, -following
withdrawals of about-4,000 r rerswoninel;..-assac atedi *,:~,,I
Gradual Withdrawal
3. The USSR might decide to withdraw a large
part of its forces, and in particular, the armored
combat groups and surface-to-air missile systems, on
the grounds that one of their original justifications
--defense of strategic missiles--had disappeared.
They could reason that their continued large military
presence subjected them to US pressures, prevented
a windup of the Cuban crisis, and perpetuated the
risk of future military involvement with the US, all
without any compensating strategic advantages.
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4. There is very little evidence point4'nig to
such a Soviet decision. The cruise'Tmissile $ite at
La Sierra was dismantled in late November, but its
equipment is still in Cuba and photography
shows that the other three sites Of this
type remain operational. Khrushchev has given a
vague assurance concerning unspecified future with-
drawals, but we have detected no indications of
preparation for any further withdrawals since the
departure of the last 15 of the 42 IL-28s on 'T De-
cember. This lack of evidence does not, however,
negate the possibility that the Soviets have taken
a decision on substantial withdrawals in the future.
It may be that, having rushed the strategic missiles
and jet bombers out in order to satisfy the most
urgent US demands, they now intend to stretch out
further withdrawals in order to avoid an impression
of weakness and to minimize the resulting damage
to their relations with Castro,
No Further Withdrawals
5. The Soviets might decide to keep in Cuba
all of their forces now there, or a great part of
them. They might think this decision essential to
a rebuilding of their relations with the Castro
regime, They might also consider that it would
contribute to deterring any future US military ac-
tion against the island.
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No Decision Yet
8. It is also possible that the Soviets are
still postponing decisions about the future of
their military presence in Cuba. The question
where the USSR's best interests lie in this matter
is a complicated one, apart from the acute problems
of relations with Castro, on the one hand, and the
US on the other. Thus they may still be temporizing
and attempting to gauge the longer-term pressures
and prospects attached to either alternative.
Attack on US Overflights'
9. Whichever of these three possibilities is-
correct, the problem of US overflights is a partic-
ularly thorny question for the Soviets. They almost
certainly estimate that, if they shot down a. US plane
with an SA-2 missile, the Cuban crisis would be re-
newed in a drastic fashion. On the other hand, they
are almost certainly still under strong pressure from
Castro to defend the sovereignty of Cuban airspace.
The USSR for its own part desires to deny the US any
special rights with respect to Cuba and to prevent
the collection of photographic intelligence on its
forces there. The Soviets will continue to encounter
these problems under all of the policies suggested
above save one which calls for early and large-scale
withdrawals, including the SAM system.
10. The Soviets probably estimate a substantial
risk at present that the US would make a.!military
response to any shootdown, attacking a SAM site as
a minimum. After a time, however, they may come to
believe that the crisis has dissipated sufficiently
to minimize these risks. They might reason that,
having withdrawn+nthe weapons condemned as "offensive"
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by the President, they could pose before the world
as the(more cooperative side in the liquidation of
the Cuban crisis. This line of reasoning mightlead
theM to attack overflights in the name of Cuban
sovereignty on the calculation that the US, fearing
that it would incur the major blame for a new crisis,
would limit its response to non-military measures,
11. We conclude that, so long as the Soviets
estimate that a military response is likely, they
will not attack an overflight. Even though they
might calculate that this sequence of events would
do great damage to US political standing in the
world, they would see little profit in reviving at
any early date a military confrontation in which
they would again labor under a grave disadvantage
of power. If they decide that a military response
is unlikely, however, the chances of an attack
against US reconnaissance aircraft would rise sub-
stantially.
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