THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040024-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: December 7, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOVIET PRESENCE
IN CUBA
7 DECEMBER 1962
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7 December 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM: The Soviet Presence in Cuba
1. The withdrawal of Soviet offensive mis-
siles and IL-28?s from Cuba still leaves the USSR
with a substantial military presence on the island.
(See Annex I and II) Although Khrushchev has sug-
gested to the President that he would withdraw the
Soviet ground combat groups and other units which
were::associated with protection of the offensive
weapons, we have seen no evidence of preparations
to carry this out.
2. We do not have the evidence upon which
to make a firm judgment as to what disposition the
USSR is likely to make of its forces in Cuba. This
paper merely examines those factors which might lead
the USSR to retain a large military establishment
there.
3. Although Soviet-Cuban relations are now
at their lowest point since Moscow recognized the
Castro regime, Soviet leaders have no intention of
abandoning their earlier conception of Cuba as the
brid0hea:d d?,.e.xXten Soviet Communist influence
in Latin America.
its main objective: ma
in the Western Hemisphere. This is the goal that
probably remains uppermost in the minds of Soviet
leaders as they reassess their Cuban policies.
4. We expect the Soviet leaders will try now
to rebuild their relationship with Cuba. They can-
not ignore the fact that the USSR? s prestige is still
committed to protecting Cuba from external efforts
to undermine and destroy the Castro regime., This
will mean continued and perhaps increased economic
assistance and assurances of continued military aid.
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At the same time, the Soviet leaders wish to avoid
-., .a1ntov,tn of the crisis. They probably recog-
5. The Soviet leaders, however, may decide
to retain a substantial military presence in Cuba.
Such a decision probably would be governed by two
major considerations, the first to improve Soviet-
Cuban relations and the second to deter future US
pressures against the Cuban regime. In addition,
the Soviets would strongly desire
impression of weakness in response to US firmness
by removing their entire military presence from the
island quickly.
6. In view of their present strained relations
with Cuba, the Soviet leaders are anxious to avoid
any appearance of a further major reduction of their
commitments in Cuba. They feel obliged to demon-
strate in some way that they remain committed to
protecting Cuba against all external pressures. In
addition, Moscow may view the retention of a sub-
stantial military presence as providing a base for
an expanded program of assistance and training for
the Cuban armed forces.
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Cuban leaders, in apparent recognition
8
.
ed dependence on the USSR, have been
ti
nu
their con
circumspect in,)public statements critical of the with-
drawal of Soviet: strategic missiles. The closest. any
Cuban leader has yet come to public criticism of the
Soviet position was an interview given by Che Guevara
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to a correspondent of the London Daily Worker
on 28 November in which he said. Some people
in Europe are sabring that a great victory has
been won. We say that the danger is still here
...While war may have been avoided, that does
not mean that peace has been assured. We ask
whether in exchange for some slight gain we
have only prolonged the agony."
9. In contrast to the restrained public
comment, however, there have been strong private 25X1
expressions of Cuban anger
Cuba, Castro is reported oi; ave said that as Tar
as he is concerned, Mikoyan could go home immedi-
ately.
10. In addition to their desire to placate
Castro, the Soviet leaders probably believe that
preservation of a substantial military presence
in Cuba would enhance their ability to deter re-
newed US military pressures. Moscow may also re-
gard the continued presence of the SAMs as an es-
sential element in any efforts to discourage the
US from continuing its aerial surveillance of the
island. Finally, the possibility cannot be ex-
cluded that the Soviets might look upon the ex-
istence of a substantial military presence as the
foundation for a future attempt to re-establish
Soviet offensive bases in Cuba.
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Soviet Military Forces Still in Cuba
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10 The USSR's presence in Cuba has been significantly
reduced by the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the
IL-28s. We have seen no evidence to date of other Soviet
equipment leaving Cuba. Construction continues on barracks
2. We believe that at least 12,000 Soviet troops are
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that the 1000-2000 Soviet personnel associated with stra-
tegic missiles who are still in Cuba will join the approxi-
mately 4000 Soviet troops who have left since the end of
October,
e expect, however,
3. The four Soviet armed combat groups in Cuba are
made up of about 6000 troops. Recent photography shows
continuing construction or other activity at the bases of
all four armored groups. Each of these groups includes
one medium (T-54) tank battalion and some of the following:
armored reconnaissance units, armored infantry units,
multiple rocket launchers, FROG artillery rockets, SNAPPER
antitank missiles, 120-mm mortars, 57-mm antitank guns,
and engineer groups with self-propelled bridging equipment.
We have not yet detected the removal of any of these units
or equipment.
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the recent dismantling of one cruise missile site, which
may have been moved elsewhere on the island, there is no
evidence of Soviet preparations to remove these personnel
from Cuba. Photography I Ishows that
the other three cruise missile sites are st 11 operational.
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