CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 3, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA,DP79T00429A000600040021-7
NSC BRIEFING NOTES
3 December 1963
PBA
Sines the October crisis # ' 1962, the Soviets have been engaged in a
continuing program of withdrawing military personnel from Cuba.
As Most of those who now remain are advisers and technicians who are
training
personnel, supervising the use and maintainance of
equipment turned over to the Cubans
25X1
25X1
Based an our continuing appraisal of Soviet activity in Cuba,.
we estimate that Soviet military strength there is now about
four to seven thousands
25X1
TV There are a number of indications that Fidel Castro, feels-with increasing
ttrgen 7-the need for some dramatic now victory to restore the momentum of
his revolution,. to enhance the regime's security, and perhaps ultimately
to lessen Cuba+s dependence on the Soviet Union. 25X1
strongly suggest that what
Castro has in mind is the intensification of revolutionary activity
elsewhere .n Latin America.
25X1
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masse of
. The most dramatic evidence of the now Cuban/ur ;envy was the diecovexy,0
announced by the Venezuelan government on 2#3 November, of a large cache
one of Cuban origin
on a Venezuelan bea
25X1 3. The Venezuelan government asx the weapons were sent from Cuba by
125X1 Cuban fishing boats knxzxm
were being, used in late October to send ar to unidentified points in
South Americaj
The Venezuelan arms cache is the mast solid evidence of major Cuban support
for Latin American subversives to come to light since 1459#Castro is known
to have provided training., money and guidance to Latin American subversives,
-.to avoid
but has ..a .-.with this e=eption-VcmUbvt actions that would clearly
be traceable to Cuba.
1. Castro may have bad taken this greater
that usual risk not only because of his greater sense of urgency but
also because of his estimate, probably erroneous, that the Venezuelan
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E. While Venezuela remains Castro s s key target, he is also actively gashing
for the initiation of revolutionary violence in a mmber of other
s, including Ouatema a, Peru, Pars, Ear,, and Col ia.
subversive assets vary greatly from countr, to country
organization, t in none of them-with the possible
.xception of Venezuela-- i they appear strong enough for decisive revolu-
tiaxy action in the near future.
They could, homer, spax serious disord..xs and possibly establii h
gains which might ultimately threaten the target gover4 Aents.
n an article publivhed in the regime a s ideological
in September, that the r v lutionaa:y struggle in Latin America
long and bloody but he declared that what is needed is that
action begin axe
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040021-7