DCI BRIEFING NOTES - - CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 23, 1963
• Content Type: NOTES

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T8 No. 166431/63
23 Novamber 1963
DCI DRIVING NOTES .-- CUBA
The Castro regime has spared no effort to tighten its
grip on Cuba, using the standard instruments of
Communist control.
A. In recent weeks the regime has stepped up its
efforts to destroy the remnants of the middle
class.
The confiscation of all remaining private
arms larger than 167 acres was decreed on
4 October.
a. Owners of smaller farms are being pushed
toward collectivisation.
2. It was in the context of one of Castro's
attacks on the "parasites" (his term for
umbers of the middle class) that be announced
last duly the impending establishment of
obligatory military service.
a. The military service law, which is to go
into effect on I December, provides for
unarmed labor battalions for the "reha-
bilitation" of non-sympathizers,.
Labor is being subjected to increasingly
stringent controls such as work norms and
extended workweeks, in an effort to raise
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II. Despite such totalitarian controls, trends sins
Castro** return from the USSR last .June have been
unfavorable to his interests.
As indicated in our BFIE-85-3 of 15 l ovesber 1963,
prospects for significant economic isproveseat,
at least over the neat few years, were becoming
din even before the hurricane struck in early
October.
8. Living aanditions remain drab for the majority
of the people
a growing apathy andhopelessuess among the people.
C. The sporadic exile raids against Cuban targets
have added to Castro** frustrations and have
given heart to his domestic opponents.
D. Finally, it is apparent that the Soviet Union has
made clear to the Cuban leaders that there is a
limit to the economic support which the Comuunist
bloc is willing to give Cuba.
1. While we have not detected any decline in
Soviet economic assistance, Castro has stressed
publicly that Soviet assistance "cannot go on
foreever" and that Cubans must work harder.
tII. Open resistance against the regime is still scattered
and relatively ineffective.
A. Ap lec 0o efe` se &ff8 ~eparDP79T0042nt in00040012 in
incidents of industrial sabotage in various towns
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WW cities, particularly is "91tern Cuba.
Labor unrest erupted into a rare d nstration of
oven resistance early last *onth ihen construction
,orkers in oavsaa province staged a near revolt
over regime efforts to uove them to to *r paying
jobs.
rv's eubversite efforts in the hemisphere
have im recent weeks taken on an increased urgent
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A. Castro seems to feel the need of some dramatic
newyictory to restore the momentum of his
revolution and'there are strong indications
that he thinks of revolutionary action else-
where in Latin America in this context.
The large cache of weapons of Cuban origin
discovered in Teaezuela on 1 November attests
to the increased urgency of the Cuban effort
and the fact that the Cabana are now taking
risks of detection ,rhich they have tried to
avoid in the past. (See Annex for details)
1. The seas she-!about three tons north--
provides the most solid evidence of nr
Cuban support for Latin American subversives
that has come to light in recent years.
2. There is incontrovertible proof that at
least some of the arms came from Cuba.
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V. Castro is not proving to be the docile Soviet puppet
which Shrushchev may have expected after the unprecedented
attentions accorded Castro in the SSSN last spring.
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A. CaatrO'e refusal to sign the test ban treaty has
been a source of embarraseWent tothe Soviets
bo are evidently concerned over Chinese
monist influence in Cuba.
the Chinese to "stage the
1. The/efffa nt
Soviet union in granting Cuba hurricane
xnxzuzt competition between the Soviet
union and moist disaster aid, token
though it .as, attests to the importance
which the Chinese Communists attribute to
Cuba in the Sino..8oviet dispute.
2. ma's opening of its embassy in Albania
earlier this month suggests a Cuban effort
to play Moscow off against Peiping.
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still opposes Moacoworiented Communists,
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TO7O&it IA that Cuba will be able to increase its
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"ideological freedom" tram the .
a. While Castro some temperamentally
more attuned to the Chinese line he
is also are of his economic and
military dependence on the Soviet
Union.
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he believes he is
successfully curtailing the poorer and
influence of pre-- lation*ary C mists
in Cuba as he develops his own form of
Coalas.
In organizing his new political machine,
the United Party of the Socialist Devolution
(pl), Castro is dropping many of the
prq~revolutionary Cr -uaists who had been
influential in the political organization
that is being replaced by thePURS.
d. The PURE, composed of ease 30,000 members
of the "revolutionary elite"" , is being
developed along standard Cosemsist lines,
but its membership is being carefully
selected for loyalty to Castro.
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VI. The Soviet military forces in Cuba have been greatly
reduced mince the missile crisis, and are now primarily
engaged in training Cubans to maintain and operate
ipment.
We estimate that 18-18,000 Soviet military
personnel have been withdrawn since the crisis,
leaving about 4-7,000 in Cuba.
B. Most of the Soviet equipment remaining in Cuba
the withdrawal of the strategic missiles
and jet bombers has been turned over to the
C. As Cuban proficieecy in handling Sovibt equipment
increases, further withdrawals of Soviet personnel
will probably take place.
regular Cuban armed forces are well.-equipped,
but inexperienced.
To estimate that they number lose than
100, 000.
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