BRIEFING NOTES - CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 6, 1963
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040008-2
BR 'EFINc NO= - Cuba
Wing conditions
From Castro's point of vier, events since shortly after his return from
the USSR last June have been unfavorable to his interests and a growing
sense of frustration is probably weighing on him.
A. Prospects for significant economic improvement, at least over the
next few years,, were becoming dim even before the hurricane struck
in early October.
B.
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6 November 1963
drab for the majority of the people and
disruptions to the econot7 and tb the public morale are
likely to result from the 4 October "second agrarians re- or
n which
confiscates remaining privately owned farms larger than 167 acres.
The Castro regime has reesponded)&ith increasingly tight controls
over the Workers and over the population generally,*
1.. Some of these aeurig, yaa Measure is were taken on the pretext t
of necessary measures to overcome the ravages of the hurricane, but
the mention is evidently to maintain then in force after this
excuse passes.
There have been serious problems in the regime's attempts to maintain
and increase labor productivity, as the workers u=XbMVXtkftjX
petires ?or failures to attain the norms--axes run irg into
have lost incentives and become apathetic.
The attempts to standardize wages and establish work norms--along with
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Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040008-2
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040008-2
Open resistance against the Castro regiro is still scattered and relatively
ineffective.
A. There has, however, been an apparent increase in incidents of industrial
sabotage in various towns and cities, particularly in western Cuba.
Small and scattered bands of guerrillas continue to operate, particularly
in the hills of central Cuba, but their effectiveness is limited by
their isolation and by the fact that they are always kept on the run
by Castro,#e anti-insurgent forces, If any group of Cubans has benefited
frok the Castro regime, it has been the peasants and thus the guerrillas
are forced to operate in hostile territory.
The recent increase in smile raids against Cuban targets has given
a boost to the morale of the opposition and added to Castro's own
frustrations.
of pas :iv* resistance, such an work slowdowns and absenteeism,
to be increasing,
III. Castro evidently feels the need for some dramatic now victory to restore the
MOmentum of his revolution and there are indicatiorsthat what he has in mind
is an attempt to initiate a revolutionary offensive elsewhere in Latin America.
A. This seems evident from'the content of his recent speeches and the public
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Be Castro # ss subversive assets elsewhere in Latin America do not now appear
strong enough for decisive revolutionary action in the near futures., but
they could spark serious disorders or establish initial gains that might
ultimately threaten the target governments.
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040008-2