[EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY BY GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS BY REP. FRED E. BUSBEY, (R., ILL.), AT HEARINGS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000100050012-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 7, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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rikeiiilkattCleteSTaier- .1:362egr' 11 711.181-1331TX'' '.171r BlISPCINS3
TO 'M.IEErfrCESAIrf 11,r1N-tREDIrp-:_gagHttes:2(,44-,ILL.),:.A7 MANINUS'Ot
HOM'COteiCETI oirVkaa: Tat mtE0011.1/1r DEPARTVENTS cm TIES
HTACT0 1947.
?DUSHrf- Do you :not think it wail be better to have permarent
civilian head at the%Gentral IntellUence Group rather than to be
confrontedvtith the condition ,we- now see? General' Vandenberg held
the position for a short time. He has now-beea replaced by Adatra....1
Milenkoetter,'who may also be relived after a while and aseigned to
other duty. Do you not think it would be better to hai4 a permanent
civilian Director?
EISIOECifiat.- I agree that frequent 'chango.,is-vortibi,and If we
continua under the present -method? I should -certalnly? say that when,
we put a man in, there we-should put him- in fr'r three years unless
there is an einergency or some-necessity .for a. change. It has been
considered that there were advantages in having a military mut for
the job.- There are factors and arguments oni both sides.
BUS2311 I understand that the fwactices of the OIG, are. entirely
outside the confines of the United States and that the FBI takes u;p
the job &emetically. No is it true that most of the officer's of
the OIG are closed on. SatI;days and Sundivs. Should anything as
important to the State, War and Navy Departments be on a forty-hour
week?
EISENICWER: It is natural that the civilian emp.lcotes of CIG
should be on a ifortp-hour-week-, as are civilian elqacyeee-of other
Government _Departaients and agencies. I claret know whether there are
hours when. CIO is completely closed or not.
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JENKINS: You believe that the functional of the ,Agency should
be mor7ra?ccuratebr defined in the legislation instead of being left
in an Executive Order which might be changed over night. A good many
of us agree with that point of view. 'You also agree that there should
be a civilian head of Central Intelligence rather than a military man?
EDSON; Definitely.
IfcCGINACK s You speak of the CIA as a potential Gestapo and say
that the Agency's powers and functions should be carefully delineated
in the law. Do you not recognise that the CIA. might have a lot of
duties to perform in connection with national security that could
only be proferly covered by a broad delineation of powers as distill.?
guished from a detailed one?
ED8CH 2 That is true; but you Call certainly can prescribe its
powerg.7-1S acting as a clearing agency, it should have broad pours.
But in the field of police powers, I think it should be definitely
iim4ted.
JENKINS: That is getting into the functions of the Secret Ser?
vice and the ka. Do you think that the CIG might take over the FBI?
EDS: Ion cannot tell from this legislation.
IfeCORNACIt It has no power to do that.
MCP-Tr Unless Congress sets forth its intent, it leaves them a
pretty broadfield in which they can operate. I am not objecting to
the Central Intelligence Agency. I think it is an excellent thing,
but I do think that its powers should be specifically defined.
*Camas In obtaining intelligence and caunter?intelligence,
we ought to have a lot of that. I would assume that those who are
in charge' are doing what they ought to do for the country. I would
not want to know all about it. Unless the CIA is specifically given
the authority by act of Congress, they have no police activities
except insofar as the national security is concerned. I should
think that vo-uld dissipate a lot of your fears,'
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12 cAme 1947
ITENCIIANDUN Fat THE RECORD
At this morning Is hearings before the House Comatittee on Execu-
tive Expenditures, the witness was John P. Bracken President of the
Reserve Officers of the Naval Services. He was. asked by Rep. Clar-
ence J. Brown, (R.,04, if ROHS had given any thctught to the CIO
provisions of the 1)411. Bracken replied that it had not, but that
it approved the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency;
that it felt that in setting up the CIA, the Ihmitions Boards, etc,
Congress would really be providing for unification.
Brown then asked whether he did not think that there was danger
of military' control under the bill as written. Bracken pointed out
that the bill provided that either a civilian or a military man could
be appointed as Director of Central Intelligence. Ile added, "The
Central Intelligence Agency could very well be headed by a civilian.*
Bram then asked whether he thought it was wise to refer in the
t511 to the Executive Order establishing the CIG, or whether it was
not up to Congress to say *at the jurisdiction and tunetions of the
CIA should be. Bracken replied that the matter of jurisdiction and
functions of an agency was, of courses up to Congress. Brown repeated
the point he has made before that an Executive Order may be changed
at any time by the President, and that he could alter the functions
of the Central Intelligence Agency at will.
Returning to the question of the military, Brown brought up the
question of the National Security Council under which CIA is to oper-
ate. Bracken pointed out that the Council eould be casposed of civil-
ians, and that the President himself would preside at its meetings.
He repeated that the Director of Central Intelligence need not be a
military man, but might be a civilian.
Representative IPorest A. Harness, (R., Ind.), inquired that, it
Representative Brown entertained fears of a Gestapo, what. difference
it made whether the Director of Central Intelligence was a military
man or a civilian, if they both had the same authority. Brown replied
that he thought a uniform sometimes gives a man a little more feel-
ing of power and authority. He added that he 'wanted "to write a lot
of safeguards into this section that deals with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. I want to make certain that the activities and functions
of the Central Intelligence Agency are carefully confined to interne-
tiona3. matters and to military matters and national security.We have
enough-people now rtmning around the country looking intb- Othar'peopleis
business." At this point Rep. Dorn, (D.03.C.) interjected that the
ones for Brown to look into were "the 7.B.I. and Tan Clark:* Brown
persisted, saying that be thought that Congress should decide whether
the Director of Central Intelligence should be a military man or a
civilian, and that he wanted CIA limited to authority necessary to ero-
tect the country, without additional extraordinary powers.
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-2?
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Bracken conceded that "I think I would rather have a civilian as
head of the Central Intelligence Agency. We have coneistent4 kept
civilians as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy."
Rep. Dorn declared that "This Agency is primarily concerned with
military, and iforeign matters and stuff like that." He asked whether
Brown had heard the testimmy of General Vandenberg. Brown replied
that he had not heard him, but that he had read his statement -- also
that he had heard some criticism of General Vandenberg. Dorn pointed
out that 'Vandenberg is no longer Director of CIG, to which Brown re,-
plied that he knew that, also that Vaixtenberg had been replaced "by
another(military man.,
Brown said that he would like to get a final comment troll the
witness on the subject. Bracken said that he thought the principal
point made in connection with a military Director of Central Intelli-
genee was that he would serve a tour of duty, perhaps a short ons
and than be replaced. He added, "I think that if the Central IntitIli-
genes Agency is to araismt to anything at all, it should have greater
continuity." Re agreed, at Brown's request, to give the subject of
the Central Intelligence Agency further thought and to include moments
on the CIA With the suggestions which RON3 13 to present concerning
the bill as a whole.
Mr. Fforzheimer talked with Representative Brown afterwards, The
latter etated that we could be sure that some further safeguards would
be written itittwthe bill, with a delineation of functions. The usual
argument was thrown up regarding the Impermanence of a military Dirac-
. tor-and the possibility that future Secretaries of the Navy could
relieve the Admiral. In addition, the question was raised regarding
t?eakoess of an Executive Order and the undersigned assured Mr.
Bruen that we would -wish to place our bill in the hopper after the bill on
ValifiCtatiOn, had passed. Brown stated, however, that there was no guar.
antee that this would be done, that we might conveniently "forget" to
ido sow
t
-i talked with Mr. Bracken and asked him whether he would like to
talk with the Director prior to sulecitting the comments of ROHS on
CIO. He stated that he would very mach like to do so, but that he is
!leaving for two weeks' active duty, and requested that the appointment
,;be made with his assistant, Mr. Minor ..Rudsce,(RE 81610 preferably
-on the afternoon of 33 June. He stated that he also wished to dis-
cuss it with Admiral Sidney Scalers, a member of their Board.
_WALTER. L. WORZIMMER
Chief, Legislative Liaison Ill:vision
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The thought that the Central Intelligence Agency should
be placed under the Secretary of National Defense is unsound, as
it might be construed as placing the Agency within the military
establielment? which would in all probability be unsatisfactory
to the State Department. This Agency must serve the diploma* as
well as the :Ali tary and naval arms. This can best be done outside
the military establishment. Since it is obliged to serve all,
it
must be free of the natural bias of an operating Department.
3. Inclusion of Detailed Agency Functions in the Present
Bill: It is not felt advisalle as a matter of legislative draftee
manship, to include detailed functions of the Central Intelligence
Agency in H.R. 2319. H.R. 2319 is a broad outline of the functions
of the security establishment. of the Government. The inclusion of
the detailed roles and missions of this Agency &es not seem pro-
perly' to be a part of such legislation. It is quite necessary that
this Agency have detailed legislation of its own setting farth its
foncticams, as well as those general authorities ;thich it is felt
the Agency should have.- These are being included in the draft of
an enabling act to be subaitted for Congressional approval after
the passage of the unification bill.
The fears that the terms of the Paeoutive Order ceder
which the Agency now operates could be changed or broadened by its
witb.dramval or amendment by the President after the bill becceess
appear to be unfounded. The present bill specifically provides
that the functions of the Director and the C.I.G.? as set forth in
the President's Executive Order of 22 January 1946, (11 Federal
Register 1337), are transferred to the new Agency, and therefore
are frozen into H.R. 2319, with no possibility of Executive change.
No ferther changes in these functions could be made except by the
National Security Council once the bill becomes law. As stated
above the detailed legislation for this Agency, which is urgently
needed, should be the subject of a separate enabling act, which
will be submitted as soon as the Agency is established by law.
4. Position of the Agency in Connection with Internal
Securitp The Central Intelligence Agency is limited in its scope
to dealing with the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States. It should not be and is not concerned in any way with do-
meatic intelligence or internal security functions. Its interest
13 in intelligence information originating outside the United
States. However, if the Congressional Committee feels that addi-
tional safeguards are needed, Section 202 of E.E., 233.9 might well
be amended by the addition of a Section t.crits to read aubstantially
in the language of the President's Executive Order, as follows:
"No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shell
be exercised by the Central Intelligence Agency," Such a provi-
sion will be included in any enabling legislationwhich this Agency
shall -submit to the Congress.
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13 June VV,
?SWOESTIONS IN COt&CTIGNMTH CENTILAL DITSLLICIOC31
ACIKNCT MCTICN Cf TM ARVID MIMICS'S UNIMATIOIS DILL
1. Civilian -versus lkilitarf Director' It would seem
referable to state that the Director should be chosen. 4from
civilian or military lit. by the President, eith the advice end
consent of the Senate,6 thus leaving it to the President to de-
teraine whether he wishes to appoint a civilian or a military
Director. The primary problem in this connection is concerned
vrith the continuity of the Director's tenure rather than the
branch trait which the incumbent comae. The present Director
has indicated a desire to remain in this posititxt for the dmrs-
tion of his Naval career. However, it would work a definite
hardship on a military man if it were neoessary for him to re-
tire from the service in assmaing this position unless the sta-
tute called for a spec-ins, tern of years for the Director's ten-
lore. Failure to establish such tenure would place the Director
at the mercy of those mho night desire to out him for rmrs.17
political reasons.
On the other hand, the question of tenure of office*
may well have been omitted fron the propoeed legislation in order
that the President night have a free hand in mediating a Direc-
tor of his opa *hoaxing, as he doe, in the case of other execu-
tive positions in the Governieent. In the early fonaative stages
of Use development of this Ageneir, it may well he considered
preferable to have a military Director -who is conversant wita
the problems and parecznel of the armed services, on whoa 30-
much reliance must be placed for intelligause Information and
cooperation.
2. l'he Position of CU in the Oceermuental Struoturet
wouldi appear beet _ a k the iirrott _Arum emgr.
In the position ttat the hill contemplates it will occupy ? that,
is under the National Security Council. On purely theoretical
gris;unds, it would, of course, he preferable to report to one In-
diridual rather than to a group. However, as a matter of pract.t-
cal operations, it weld sees to be beet to place it order the
Council, so that the Secretaries of 3tate, National Defense, Tar,
Air, and the Navy ? who, will be ammg the prime users of the
produced ? would not have the feeling that the
Director is continnally skirting than into the back door of the
VA-to House. It is felt that 'working with the CCRIACil in the
manner contemplated will produce the best cooperation free the
Departments concerned.
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