BEHIND THE LINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00428A000200040022-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 30, 1962
• Content Type: NSPR

Warren Rogers Jr.--
WASHINGTON.
first questions it will ask will be this: how good is our
military intelligence on Cuba and Russia?
:Kennedy administration officials have been sayin:; all
along that it Is very good. They have produced supporting
1.-evidance, including the remarkably clear aerial photo-
: (graphs and a good deal of precise information gained
.? through other. means.
The Administration has not told all it knows eaoat
the Soviet shipment of offensive weapons shippea tto Cuba.
It has told only enough to make its point. For example,
this reporter knows the United States had extremely ac-
curate knowledge of what was in those Soviet ships. and
the Russians knew we knew. This is not the sort of knowl-
edge to be gained through aerial photography and so the
obvious inference is that the United States has agents in
the ports from which the cargo was shipped.
But this is after-the-fact intelligence. Congress will
want to know, for example, how the Russians managed
to get the rockets to Cuba in the first place and it will ask
why the existence of such rockets in the Soviet arsenal
was not known in advance-or, if it was known, why this
was not made public.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has said
the medium-range and intermediate-range Soviet missiles
are unlike anything the United States possesses. Congress
will be asking why this is so. The question is particularly
pertinent because Gen. Lauris Norstad, NATO Supreme
Commander, has been pressing, for two years for a mobile
medium-range missile like the one the Russians sent to
Cuba. Gen. Norstad had been scheduled to retire Nov. 1,
but is staying in his post until Jan. 1 because of the Cuban
crisis.
Mr. McNamara has been cool to the idea. He says
such a weapon would cost about $2 billion and is of doubt-
ful value. But he offered to build one if the NATO coun-
.tries would pay for it. So far, it has reached only the first
stage, "program definition." This make it too tenuous to
be included in the new Defense budget unless it becomes
i more urgent matter.
FIVE MEN BEHIND THE SCENES
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00428A000200040022-8
?U New York -ferO 'T Fd
and-mouse game of collecting and analyzing the intelli-
gence data on-Cuba.. They_are:
-Air Force Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, chief of the
Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. A former top
assistant to FBI .director J. Edgar Hoover, Joe Carroll
is a brilliant intelligence officer. When the Air Force
was organized 15 years ago he created its Intelligence
branch. When DIA was formed a year ago, unifying
military intelligence for the first time, he was a
natural to head it.
-Army Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn, Joe Carroll's
deputy. "Buffalo Bill" Quinn, a football and lacrosse
star at West Point in the 1930s, Is a tough combat
commander, a former chief of Army information, and a
-wear Adm. Samuel B. Frankel, Joe Carroil's
other deputy. He speaks Chinese and Russian and is
an expert on Red China and the Soviet Union. His
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 :
Associated Press
TALK TEAM-Two of the three named by President
Kennedy yesterday to handle negotiations with Cuba
were, left, [der Secretary of State George Ball, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Boswell L. Gilpatric.
?ohn McCloy will head the group.
lion of the Central Intelligence Agency. "Pat" Carter
served on the Marshall mission to China after World
War II, as a military aide in Europe with the rank of
;.sinister, and as a member of U. S. delegations to in-
ternational conferences in Rio de Janeiro, Bogota and
Mexico City.
-Adm. Jerauld Wright, former commander of the
Atlantic Fleet, and currently, by special act of a Con-
gress, a full-tune consultant to the CIA. His long
Naval career involved him intimately with NATO and
Caribbean affairs and made him especially valuable
during the Cuban crisis.
These men will be queried on Capitol Hill during the
"military posture" hearings in January. How they answer
may well determine, among other things, how fast or slow
Secretary McNamara may hereafter proceed with his pro-
gram to unify the armed forces.
MIST REAL UNIFICATION TEST .
Cuba was the first real test of unification. If it is
found that unified intelligence did a better job than ,the
three services could have done individually, Congress 1 will
look more favorably on unification in other fields. Iffnot,
the selling job McNamara had done will come unglued.
Other questions are tantalizingly persistent. J For
example: if the Russians could suddenly come up with a
iiia.hiy mobile missile with a 1,100-mile range and also a
hitherto unheard-of missile with a 2,200-mile range, what
did they do to achieve it? Did they take existing rockets
and give them added range by making the nuclear war-
head smaller (since there is a direct ratio between range
and weight of payload) ?
If so, of what effect will this have on Soviet inter-
continental ballistic missiles? Will the Russians be able
to do what the United States has done-that is, build a
lot of small-yield ICBMs, and even put them on sub-
marines? If so, will this hasten the day of nuclear stale-
mate, when the American umbrella of nuclear superiority
will no longer prevail?
Much secret data on these points plus pictures far
clearer than those made public will be turned over to the
NATO Council at its December meeting. The N;'rTO Coun-
cil may be forced to make new decisions, in light of obvi-
ous Soviet gains in medium-range and it.ttsr i.ti*~c ii'.t range
roeketni .
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