BARING OF CUBAN ARMAMENT CALLED VINDICATION OF U-2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00428A000200040016-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 31, 1962
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved Fo
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Baring of Cuban Armament
Called Vindication of U-2
By David Lawrence
Approved F
WASHINGTON.
The U-2 has been vindicated. Without the photographs
made from U-2 planes flying over Cuba, it might have been
difficult to convince the members of the United Nations and
the world in general that the safety of the United States
was actually threatened by missiles aimed at us from Soviet
bases 90 miles away.
Instead of manifesting a sense of humiliation In May,
1960, as if something wrong had been done, the United
States should have staunchly and repeatedly defended the
use of the U-2 by insisting that surveillance over the Soviet
Union was absolutely neces-
sary to protect the free world
against surprise attack.
Incidentally, in the latest
exchange of letters between
the White House and the
Kremlin, Premier Nikita S.
Khrushchev complained about
a U-2 flight recently beyond
Alaska into Soviet territory.
President Kennedy politely
acknowledged that the pilot
had made a "navigational
error." Had it not been a
moment of crisis in other
parts of the world, this might
have been an opportune
occasion to defend the use of
the;. U-2-especially in the
Sibe ?ian area, which is so
clos to Alaska. For there is
no / better way to learn
wl.ther an attack is being
mounted than by day-to-day
photographing. Any substan-
tial change in the progress
of a build-up or in the
mobilization of military forces
can, by this method, be
promptly detected.
The U-2 has done a marve-
lous job of photography in
Cuba In recent weeks. While
the U-2 flights were di.econ-
tiued over the Soviet Union
in 1960, they were not aban-
doned wherever else they have
been useful. Just wht do the
U-2 photographs show? They
do not reveal such things as
the kind of troops on the
ground, but there are many
objects which are too large
to be concealed. The appear-
ance of things on one day can
be compared with what has
been introduced on the scene
the next day, and son on.
Constant surveillance is nec-
essary In the photographic
operation.
It takes a big staff of tech-
nical experts to analyze the
photographs brought back by
the U-2's. Thousands of feet
of motion picture film are ob-
tained and enlarged many
times. Perhaps only a few
feet selected from many reels
tell the vital story.
But the U-2 alone cannot
do the whole job of detect-
ing enemy preparations for
military attack. Secret agents,
or rating inside a country,
are absolutely necessary. Also,
evaluation must be impartial
and without any preconceived
notions by Administration of-
dais as to what policy the
Administration would like to
folloow. A debeat has arisen
here as to when the Pentagon
and the White House really
found out about the Soviet
missiles in Cuba, and why,
if known earlier, something
wasn't done about it sooner
than Oct. 21 and 22.
Authoritative sources sav
that the Washington govern-
ment knew about the bu.:dup
from the time it began in
August and was .ept con-
stantly informed by secret
agents loran cratewv e*? ee
being unloaded from s.iins principal adversary did estalbb--
r ire ue, e; IAt,, Ri~OQ i
i s$~ '
tl , owl a, t1 hQr~ 40016-5
checkmate the Soviets? Why
were 400 reporters and news-
casters from all parts of the
country told by high officials
of the State Department at a
special briefing on Monday,
Oct. 15, at mid-day that "the
threat in Cuba is not ndw a
military threat" and that the
United States had ruled out
either invasion or blockade.
This continued to be the offi-
cial word to the press for
seven days, even though the
U-2 photographs were anal-
ized and the "hard core" of
evidence was available on
Tuesday, Oct. 16.
There has been no satisfac-
tory answer to the question of
why a risk to the national
safety was taken for so matly
days in a nuclear age. Prirr e
Minister Macmillon has jut
told the British Parliamet; t
that President Kennedy made
his decision on Oct. 20. What
would have been the plight of
the United States if Khru-
shchev or Castro had decided
to fire the missiles or launch
planes in, a surprise attack on
Oct. 15? It would have been
of little avail for the Admin-
istration then to have argued
that it was still studying the
"hard core" of evidence."
Also, why was the press
misled for a least six days
after the U-2 photographs
were examined at the White
House and State Department?
President Kennedy went cam-
paigning on Thursday of that
same week and didn't make
any public announcement of
a change In policy until Mon-
day. Oct. 22.
The fact is that the United
States government did know
in mid-August what was hap-
penink and what it could
(mean militarily. That's what
its intelligence system is for,
mid there is every reason to,
believe that theC3nd mili-
tary intelligence- units have
been functioning efficiently
and effectively in the Cuban
situation for many months.
Policy-making is quite an-
other matter.
Iit still is a mystery why
the Administration did rot
properly evaluate the date it
had prior to Tuesday, Oct?,16,
and waited so long before act-
in;. Doubtless an opportunity
will be afforded next January
for Congressional committees
to discuss in executive session
all the facts, just as happened
when the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee investi-
gated the Eisenhower admin-
istration's handling of the
U-2 flight over the Soviet
Union in 1960. For the repre-
scn tatives of the people ought
to be accurately informed
wnethe_ tit lives of the
American people were or were
no' safeguarded from August
why was the risk taken and cItn c L :.,.
no move m ale rt z ~,~ to r' 19t," V 7 ii,'rald Tribune Inc.